• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

DoD Changes Micro-Purchase and Simplified Acquisition Thresholds

E-mail Print PDF

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) changed the micro-purchase threshold—increasing it from $3,500 to $10,000. It made the change by revising Section 1902(a)(1) of Title 41, United States Code. Further, the 2018 NDAA changed the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT), increasing it from $150,000 to $250,000 by revising 41 U.S.C. Section 134. The NDAA applies primarily to the Department of Defense, but the statutory change meant that the two acquisition thresholds in the FAR were out of sync with their authorizing statutes. Thus, the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council issued a Class Deviation that permitted civilian Agency level Class Deviations to implement the threshold changes in advance of official rule-making.

Is this a big deal? Maybe.

FAR 2.101 provides the official definition of “micro-purchase threshold” and “simplified acquisition threshold.” We note that both of those definitions are somewhat complex and driven by circumstance; the exact circumstances determine what the exact threshold is. So when we state “$10,000 and $250,000” those are the general thresholds that apply in most circumstances; but you need to know that the exact threshold that applies to your circumstances may be different.

FAR Part 13 discusses the acquisition procedures used by government buyers/contracting officers for purchases below each of those thresholds. Generally, micro-purchases are made via government purchase card and purchases between the micro-purchase threshold and the SAT are made via purchase order. The point is that Part 13 procedures are fast and easy and relatively uncomplicated, especially compared to the Part 15 procedures used for negotiated procurements. So raising the thresholds means that more acquisitions will be subject to the less intrusive and less burdensome procedures. This is a good thing.

On April 13, 2018, the DoD issued a Class Deviation implementing the higher thresholds. Interestingly, DoD chose to raise the micro-purchase threshold to $5,000, not $10,000 as the NDAA demanded. (The $10,000 threshold was implemented only for certain limited circumstances that do not seem to be envisioned in the NDAA language.)

That same Class Deviation raised the SAT to the full $250,000 (except when a higher SAT is authorized by certain circumstances).

All this is good news.

 

Training Auditors

E-mail Print PDF

As busy season winds down and financial statements are signed-off, efforts to prepare the annual proposal to establish final billing rates get going in earnest. For many of us, we have to finish the final cost scrubs and get our ICE Schedule information together while at the same time supporting audits of prior years’ costs.

While supporting financial statement audits.

While supporting other audits and taskers from management.

We don’t complain about the multi-layered workload; it’s just business as usual, right? Do the work while supporting audits of the work that was previously done. That’s our world—especially in Q1 of any fiscal year. We deal with auditors—who are often performing multiple concurrent audits—while working to meet submission deadlines so that our submissions can become the focus of future audits. It’s what we do.

Now seems an appropriate time to reflect on the training of auditors.

We all train auditors, don’t we? We train our external financial statement auditors and we train our government contract auditors, and some of us train the internal auditors. Most people know how to audit but fewer people know what they’re auditing. We have to help them along.

It’s part of the deal.

Let’s take DCAA, for example. The auditor(s) show up and they need to understand how you do business. They can’t assume they already know your company’s practices, because every contractor is a bit different: every ERP system implementation is a bit different; decisions regarding what costs are direct and what costs are indirect are different. Pools and allocation bases differ. Practices and procedures and guidance differ. So the auditors ask for your policies and your procedures, and you give them the documents (assuming you have them). Then they ask for a “walk-through” which, to be honest, is of minimal value, but it’s a required step. Then (in theory) the auditors pick some transactions and test those transactions against what you’ve told them you do.

But sometimes that’s not enough, is it?

Sometimes you get a junior auditor who needs a bit more help. Sometimes you get a senior auditor who has made certain assumptions that turn out to be invalid for your company. Sometimes your company’s system is wildly complex and it simply would not be reasonable to expect an outsider to gain an understanding of how it all works in just a few days. (Sometimes your company’s system is so complex that most of the employees don’t understand more than the basics.) You need to do more than walk-them through your system and/or your implementing practices; you need to actually give them training in how the system works. You need to make an investment in your auditors, an investment in terms of time and resources, so that they can understand your system enough to make the right findings.

This situation is not limited to DCAA auditors. It applies to your Big 4 auditors and your next-tier auditors and your internal auditors. It applies to any set of auditors who walk into your company and then have to opine on what they see. If they don’t understand what they see, they can’t reach good opinions; at least, they can’t do so easily.

Sometimes you need to train your auditors in the nuances of your system(s), just so they can pick the right universe from which to pick representative transaction samples. You need to take them beyond Introduction to Our System and into more advanced topics. Which takes more time and resources.

But it’s an investment, right? It’s an investment in your auditors, so as to prepare them to efficiently perform their audits and reach the right conclusions. If they do that, the audit support effort is (generally) lower. Silly disputes are avoided. They get to the right conclusions and they get there faster. And if all that happens, then you have time to work on all the other stuff that's getting moldy in your in-box. That’s the return on the investment of time and resources.

If you train your auditors, you get an ROI.

At least, that’s what we tell ourselves. But is it really true?

The problem with training your auditors is that too often they don’t stick around to use that training.

Let’s take the outside auditors, for example. It’s true that you can get a Staff Associate this year who becomes a Senior Associate in a couple of years, who then (perhaps) eventually becomes an Audit Manager. You meet them in Year 1 and by Year 5 you’re LinkedIn buddies. That is a real possibility: you can get long-term continuity on your audit team. But it won’t last. Sooner or later the audit team is going to turn-over. The Manager is going to get assigned to another audit client. The Partner is going to rotate off. Over time, you will have 100% (or more!) turnover. You will have new auditors. And the new auditors are going to need the same training you gave the old auditors. Further, even if you are lucky enough to get long-term continuity in some of your audit team, the rest of the team will need training. The Manager isn’t going to train the new Staff Associate in the nuances of your system; they don’t have time for that. So it’s going to be your job to train that young person who just graduated from college last year in the intricacies of your system and your implementing procedures and practices.

In other words, it is almost certain that you will be continuously training your auditors. You need to know that when you calculate the ROI. The investment in auditor training is unending. You will never stop training your auditors and therefore the investment is higher than you would like it to be; and the return on that investment is lower than you would like it to be (because a robust proportion of the auditors you trained won’t be there to use that training next year).

The situation is not limited to your financial statement auditors. It applies to any auditors you interact with. Let’s go back to DCAA. You’ve done your walk-throughs and you’ve given the auditors your command media (policies, procedures, practices, instructions). You’ve done the Introduction to Our System thing and perhaps you’ve also done the Advanced System Stuff course and the System Nuances, Exceptions, and Weird Stuff course. You’ve invested considerable time and effort in training your DCAA auditors to understand what they need to know about your system—taking time away from other pressing matters (such as preparing that proposal to establish final billing rates) in order to help them understand what they need to know. The DCAA audit team is as prepared as you can make them.

And then everybody you trained gets reassigned.

The Audit Supervisor gets promoted and transferred to a new FAO. The Audit Lead is pulled-off to work demand assignments. The auditors are reassigned to work different audits that have no overlap with what you just trained them in.

And the new audit team that shows up next year knows zero about your system(s). You get a new Assignment Letter from a new team—and the first thing they want is a walk-through, followed by submission of applicable command media. You have come full circle and are starting fresh with people who want to understand your system(s).

This is the auditor training conundrum.

The more you train, the more you have to train. You will never be done training.

If you are looking for an ROI on that investment in auditor training, it may not be there. By the time you’re done training, it’s time to start training again.

That doesn’t mean you shouldn’t train your auditors. You need to train them. But what it does mean is that you shouldn't train them too much. You shouldn't train them any more than you absolutely need to. Minimal training only. They need to understand the system(s). And that’s about it. Forget the Advanced System Stuff and the nuances and the weird stuff. If that stuff comes up during the audit, then deal with it. But don’t try to prevent it from coming up through deep training. Deep training is a wasted investment without a return.

Again, this situation is not about DCAA or about your Big 4 auditors. We think this situation applies to every auditor with whom you interact. Be careful about giving them too much training because, chances are, they won’t use that training ever again.

 

The Fight For (and Against) Innovation

E-mail Print PDF

We were happy to recently report that Palantir, along with new ally Raytheon, had been awarded a $876 million contract to replace the troubled DCGS-A intelligence data-management system. That article concluded on a hopeful note, since we thought the DoD might finally be learning to accept innovative products from non-traditional defense contractors.

Yet this week’s news indicates that Palantir’s path is not a rosy as we first thought. It’s problems with the entrenched “triangle” (generally thought to be comprised of bureaucrats, lobbyists, and Congress) persist. We are seeing reports, without detail, that General Dynamics Missions Systems, a disappointed bidder in the DCGS-A competition, has filed a bid protest. And so it goes …

Meanwhile, at the WIFCON site, Don (“Acquisition”) Mansfield just posted a blog article regarding recent DFARS regulatory changes that, potentially, offer reduced barriers to entry for small businesses and other non-traditional defense contractors. We wrote about those rule changes in this article. We didn’t dwell on the same aspect that Don noted in his article. Don noted that a “non-traditional defense contractor” has a very specific definition (“an entity that is not currently performing and has not performed any contract or subcontract for DoD that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards … for at least the 1-year period preceding the solicitation of sources by DoD for the procurement ….”). Don noted that, as all small business are exempt from CAS, that definition makes every small business a non-traditional defense contractor, and thus eligible under DFARS 212.102(a)(iii) for Part 12 commercial item procurement procedures, regardless of whether the small business’ goods/services have been formally determined to be commercial items.

We further note that same DFARS final rule added a new solicitation provision (252.215-7013) that clearly states that supplies and/or services from non-traditional defense contractors “may be treated as commercial items” but “the decision to apply commercial item procedures to the procurement … does not mean the supplies or services are commercial.”

But that’s all dependent on contracting officer discretion, isn’t it? The rules are expressly intended to be permissive and to provide flexibility, but the rule is not prescriptive. There’s nothing that requires an individual contracting officer to use them, even if doing so would speed up acquisitions and (perhaps) entice more innovative companies to enter the defense marketplace.

And what about traditional defense contractors? What about the companies that have figured out how to overcome the barriers to entry and how to win defense contract award competitions? How are they reacting to the regulatory changes?

Let’s look at Boeing for one example of a reaction. First, in 2015 Boeing created a new, centralized, business unit to focus solely on developmental programs—i.e., contracts that had been awarded to the company to develop weapon systems and to get them ready for future production. At the time, Boeing’s Defense Unit President said, “We expect our customers to see step-function improvements in affordability and schedule performance as we more effectively apply engineering expertise, development program best practices, and program management and integration from across Boeing to our most important development activities.”

At the time, reports stated that six programs were going to be part of the new unit’s portfolio, including the KC-46A aerial tanker, the new Air Force One, the CST-100 spacecraft, the NASA Space Launch System rocket, Boeing’s 502 small satellite effort, and defense-related work on Boeing’s 777X commercial jetliner.

That same report put the Boeing move into a broader context, writing—

Boeing’s reorganization is part of a growing trend within defense companies to operate their businesses more commercially. With fewer defense dollars on the horizon, the Pentagon has pressured companies to cut production and development costs. To remain competitive, firms have been looking at a myriad of ways to lower the cost of all types weapons ranging from fighter jets to warships. This has included everything from consolidating facilities, automating production and shrinking the workforce.

Yet a mere three years later, Boeing decided to kill that centralized development program business unit and, instead, create two new Defense divisions—“Commercial Derivatives” and “Missile and Weapons Systems.” The Commercial Derivatives until will focus on the KC-46 tanker, the new Air Force One, and the P-8 submarine hunter—all programs built on modifications to Boeing’s commercial airliners.

What happened in the intervening three years? Not sure. But one thing that didn’t happen was the KC-46A program. Reports indicate that the program continues to struggle. Deliveries once scheduled for 2017 are now being pushed out to late 2018, which some consider to be an overly optimistic date. The business unit created to focus on development program management evidently failed to turn-around one of its largest programs. And the USAF is not pleased.

Meanwhile, smaller companies – perhaps more agile and responsive – continue to look for opportunities to break into the defense marketplace. Congress continues to push the Pentagon to contract with those smaller companies. The rules change, albeit reluctantly, to help contracting offices do just that.

But the decision regarding whether to do so—and how best to do so—rests with the individual contracting officer. Historically, contracting officers who take risks tend to receive criticism from their legal teams, their contracting chiefs, the IG and the GAO. If the new rules are going to work as intended, then the contracting culture needs to change.

Time will tell whether the DoD (and DCMA) culture will support its contracting officers when they decide to exercise the discretion permitted by the Congressionally driven rules.

 

 

It Costs Too Much

E-mail Print PDF

Recently I was approached by a colleague who wanted some advice. His company’s rate structure wasn’t working for them and management wanted some options. We discussed some notions, but I told him that I had said mostly everything I had to say on the topic in my 5-article series addressing indirect rate structures. Those articles were written six years ago, but (to me) they still ring true today.

(That’s the good thing about this blog: when I have a thought, it gets documented and I can refer back to it. The work is done once and once only.)

A client is in the process of rejiggering its indirect costs because it believes it is losing too many competitions because its prices are too high. In the government contracting environment, prices are almost always linked to costs—so if you want to cut your prices you have to cut your costs. Too often, companies think they can solve their cost problems by taking a hard look at their indirect cost allocations. But most of us know that really doesn’t work. If you want to cut costs you have to cut costs; there’s really no substitute. Companies should look at their cost allocation structures from time to time and evaluate whether or not those structures are meeting their needs; but playing games with cost allocations is really a tacit admission that management doesn’t want to make any hard decisions about cost-cutting.

It may be the case that costs simply cannot be reduced any further. Personnel are paid what it takes to protect them from the poachers across the street. Facilities costs are what they are. Management costs are what management wants them to be. If that’s the case, then what do you do?

You gotta look elsewhere.

If you want your program costs to come down but you can’t find any costs to cut within your factory, then you’ve got to get into your program supply chain and start “helping” your suppliers to cut their costs.

Another client told us about a recent epiphany they’d had. For years—perhaps decades—they had been going to the same supplier for certain critical program services. That supplier performed well: on-time and on-budget and always high-quality output that could be relied upon. Year after year, they kept going back to that same reliable supplier. At a certain point, they realized they were never going to compete the work. It was too critical to program success and this supplier was going to get it done. Period. So now the company had a “single source” situation (which is different from a “sole source” situation) and it was going to have to justify why the supplier’s price was fair and reasonable. (It was perhaps true at this point that the company didn’t actually care whether the supplier’s price was fair and reasonable; because using that supplier reduced so much program risk.) To make a long story shorter, the government customer didn’t like the company’s cost/price analyses of its supplier’s proposed pricing, and the company got told to conduct a competition. After much kvetching, the company agreed. And suddenly their long-time reliable supplier’s price dropped. Significantly.

The company kept using that supplier, but now the costs had dropped. They were happy. The customer was happy. And the supplier was happy to keep the work.

We were reminded of the foregoing anecdote by recent news articles indicating that Lockheed Martin’s government customer(s) think the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter costs too much.

This is not really news, is it? It’s not really new news. We’ve been hearing complaints about the F-35 program budget since Day One. For example, in late 2009, we reported here that a Pentagon Joint Estimating Team (JET) analysis showed that “the program ‘will require billions of dollars more than planned, and more time.’” We also reported, in that same article, that program critics had asserted—

Those findings address only the known problems; there's a huge iceberg floating just under the surface. With F-35 flight testing barely three percent complete, new problems - and new costs - are sure to emerge. Worse, only 17 percent of the aircraft's characteristics will be validated by flight testing by the time the Pentagon has signed contracts for more than 500 aircraft. Operational squadron pilots will have the thrill of discovering the remaining problems, in training or in combat. No one should be surprised if the final F-35 total program unit cost reaches $200 million per aircraft after all the fixes are paid for.

Remember, those quotes were made back in 2009 – nine years ago. But just a few months later (February 2010) we were back with another article on the F-35, quoting another source’s concerns about F-35 operating costs. We quoted –

… over the lifetime of the fleet - the carrier-based and STOVL JSF versions will cost the Navy 40 per cent more, in total operating costs, than the F/A-18C/Ds and AV-8Bs that they replace. … This is despite a smaller fleet and fewer flight hours: the new aircraft are expected to cost more than 60 per cent more to fly per hour than their predecessors.

In May, 2011, we reported that the F-35 program’s life-cycle costs were expected to exceed $1 trillion. At that time, certain Senators weren’t pleased with that number, and they were not shy about expressing their displeasure. The Pentagon promised to focus on the price problem, and appointed Shay Assad to lead the efforts.

In March, 2012, we reported that F-35 unit costs were now $159 million (according to Lawrence Korb of the Center for American Progress). In that same article, we quoted an AW&ST story that included the following quote: “Higher acquisition costs also drive company growth, as do higher-than-predicted operating costs, particularly this century as more maintenance work was outsourced to contractors. The failure of the Global Hawk Block 30, whose operating costs were higher than the aging, manned U-2, is the exception rather than the rule: Most operators accept the overruns and reduce capability in other areas. …” We also quoted, from another source: “Because of the way sustainment costs are calculated, affordability is still a problem, and that might mean that the number of aircraft bought in the near term might be further truncated or that flight training hours are curtailed, [a senior defense official] said. The numbers are expected to fluctuate during the next five years.”

Finally, in a recent (2018) article, we noted continued problems in negotiating F-35 contract pricing. Lockheed Martin was not reducing its unit costs sufficiently quickly, according to government officials.

In other words, the history of the F-35 program is a history of cost challenges, with many critics complaining about program costs and aircraft unit costs and aircraft operating sustainment costs.

(That’s another good thing about this blog: when I need to do research I can start with searching my own articles. Some of the links are broken but the juicy quotes remain.)

Which brings us to today, April 2018—and this Bloomberg news story, with the catchy title “Lockheed Gets Edict to Cut F-35's $1.1 Trillion Support Bill.” The story referenced the recently released Pentagon Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the program, which stated that Lockheed Martin “must find ways to reduce the Pentagon’s current $1.1 trillion estimate to own and operate the F-35 jet.” The story noted that the $1.1 trillion estimate is a 2015 estimate. It's three years old. The story noted—

The report acknowledges that under current forecasts, ‘the projected F-35 sustainment outlays are too costly’ and ‘given planned fleet growth, future U.S. service operations and support budgets will be strained.’ Bloomberg reported last week that the U.S. Air Force may have to cut its F-35 purchases by one-third, or about 590 jets, if it can’t find ways to reduce operations and support costs by as much as 38 percent over a decade.

In a somewhat unusual move, the SAR also told Lockheed Martin how to cut its program costs. Bloomberg reported: “According to the acquisition report, Lockheed should also ‘optimize priorities across the supply chain for spare and new production parts, and enable the exchange of necessary data rights’ to the U.S. military of software currently owned by the company.

Which is interesting, right? Somehow Lockheed Martin owning its intellectual property (IP) increases program costs, according to the DoD. Hmmm.

But the other recommendation (to look to the supply chain for cost reductions) is perhaps more in line with reality. After all, Raytheon used supply chain management to help improve its position in the SDB-II competition, as we noted in this article. We quoted “[Raytheon picked] suppliers early and then work[ed] directly with them to improve productivity at every step.” So yes, if LockMart could reduce its supplier costs, then it could share those savings with its government customer(s).

And speaking of government customer(s), those who remember our article on the lack of collaboration being exhibited between LockMart and its government Program Office negotiators may not be shocked to see this news story, in which DefenseNews reported that “The Defense Department plans to dissolve the F-35 Joint Program Office and revert to a more traditional management structure where the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps all run their own program offices …” The story notes that “While the changes could make it easier for the services to have oversight over their respective F-35 variants, the eventual dissolution of the JPO could make it more difficult for international customers to interface with the program.”

Obviously, I’m not privy to the details that led to this decision. However, I note that if each service is separately managing its own variant as a separate program, then costs will be more accurately reported. For example, aircraft unit costs for the USAF’s F35-A program (which are 20-25% lower than the other variants) should not be impacted by the higher aircraft unit costs for the Navy and Marine Corps F35-B/C variants. Similarly, operating sustainment costs will be more granular as well.

I’d like to wrap this one up by going back to the beginning. Everybody, it seems, is under pressure to cut costs. Cutting costs is hard work and requires making hard decisions. Those companies that can successfully make the hard choices tend to see their efforts rewarded; whereas companies that cannot navigate their way tend to experience problems. In today’s defense acquisition environment, the path to success tends to be found in the program supply chain and not within the four walls of the prime contractor’s integration area. Investing time and resources in the supply chain tends to produce a positive return.

 

 

Sanders Speaking at NCMA Orange County Chapter Annual Educational Symposium

E-mail Print PDF

I was honored to be invited to speak again to the NCMA’s Orange County (California) Chapter. I will be speaking at the Annual Educational Symposium, an all-day event whose theme this year is “Contracting in the Age of Startups, Technology & Innovation.” The event takes place on April 26, 2018, and you can find out more about the Symposium here.

As might be guessed from the Symposium’s title, the focus this year is on “non-traditional” contractors, including start-ups and small businesses. I was asked to speak to the theme, so I picked the topic of “Barriers to Entry: What Keeps Companies from Selling to the DoD, and How to Overcome Them.” (My wife pointed out that my title is ambiguous: it’s not clear whether I’m telling folks how to overcome the barriers or how to overcome the other companies. Whatever. I think it works either way. And now you understand why we’ve been married for nearly 20 years.)

The traditional aerospace/defense market isn’t what it used to be in Southern California. There was a time when most A&D companies were headquartered here, and the industry headcount was measured in the hundreds of thousands. Over the past 50 years, corporate headquarters have moved closer to Washington, D.C. and the work has moved to places where the cost of living (and therefore wages) are generally lower. I think the last major programs where the majority of work was performed in SoCal were the B-2 “Spirit” bomber and the C-17 “Globemaster III” transport aircraft. The final B-2 was produced in Pico Rivera in 1997 and the final C-17 was produced in Long Beach in 2015. That’s not to say that there isn’t an aerospace/defense market left; companies like General Atomics, and SpaceX are located there, and other companies, including Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin still have sites there. But based on headcount if nothing else, the A&D market that’s left in SoCal is a hollow shell of the vibrant market that used to thrive there.

We can debate about why the work migrated out of state. Certainly, the State of California never appreciated its industrial base the way it appreciated the film and television industry, which was also led from SoCal. (Sorry New Yorkers, but it’s true.) While the state extended tax break after tax break to production companies, A&D companies largely were taken for granted. Of course, there are many other causes of the migration, but the state’s rather cavalier treatment of its A&D companies springs to mind first. In any case, the 21st Century SoCal A&D market is rich in heritage but poor in business opportunity.

Thus, the Orange County Chapter’s focus on start-ups, high-tech, and innovative small businesses makes a lot of sense. It is those types of companies that are the next generation of government contractors. Moreover, it is exactly those types of companies that the Federal government says it wants to attract. This blog has chronicled the government’s attempts to woo such companies, with results that have been, to date, mixed at best.

So come on down to Orange County, California, on April 26th and hear a full-day’s worth of presentations, and earn 7 CPE/MCLE credits. I think it will be worth the price of admission.

 

 


Page 54 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.