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Apogee Consulting Inc

SAM Fraud

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If you are not a government contractor and you want to become one, well, it’s not an easy thing to do. We’re not even talking about understanding the myriad rules and regulations that apply to government contractors, in which the violation of any one can crater your company. We (Apogee Consulting, Inc.) created a checklist to help companies new to government contracting understand those rules and regulations, which we use to evaluate contracting readiness. But that’s not the first barrier to market entry you need to overcome.

No; understanding the rules of the game is not the first impediment you face. Before you can even play the game, you’ve got to register to play.

Before you even think about bidding on your first government contract, you need to register in several government databases. For example, you need a DUNS number from Dun & Bradstreet. You to register in the SAM (System for Award Management) database, which includes providing detailed information and executing some representations and certifications. At the end of the SAM registration process, you will get a CAGE number. You will probably want to register in the Small Business Administration’s Dynamic Small Business Search (DSBS) database. In addition, many Federal agencies with whom you will want to do business have their own supplier databases, and you will want to register with those. In some cases, you may have to renew or update your registration annually.

There are many databases and each one wants detailed information and you have to provide that information if you want to play the Federal contracting game. Typically, the security of your information is provided by a User ID and a password, which you specify. As with all such security features, if you don’t choose a strong password, you aren’t doing yourself any favors. Further, if you don’t protect that password, it doesn’t matter how strong it is.

(We are reminded of one client who paid us to register his company into several government databases, which we did. But he never changed the passwords we initially used, despite our urging to do so. Some clients are challenging.)

Today’s article is about fraud in the SAM system. In late March, 2018, the General Services Administration (GSA), the agency that manages SAM, notified contractors that “a third-party changed the financial information of ‘a limited number” of contractors’” in the SAM database. Apparently that third party entered SAM and changed the bank account information that the contractors had provided. Nobody knows exactly how this exploit was accomplished, but security experts stated the most likely approach was to obtain SAM passwords via a “phishing” attack. In any case, it was possible that if the government made payments to those contractors, the payments would end up in the wrong bank account. This is exactly what happened in 2016, when Dwayne Hans diverted $1.5 million in PBGC payments to his own bank account. (Hans pleaded guilty and is currently awaiting sentencing as this article is being written.) SAM is no stranger to fraud. As Jason Miller’s story on Federal News Radio (link above) pointed out, “This is at least the third time SAM.gov has struggled to keep its information secure.”

Mr. Miller continues to update the story on the Federal News Radio website. In the latest update, he reported that “Up to 70,000 federal contractors are heading to their local notary to get that special stamp on a letter that’s destined for the General Services Administration to authenticate the vital details of their business, including who is the authorized ‘entity administrator associated with the DUNS number.’” According to the story, “GSA is requiring notarized letters for several thousand contractors immediately, and then any vendor whose existing registrations on SAM.gov need to be updated after April 27.”

At least 33,000 SAM registrants need to provide notarized confirmation that they intended to change their bank account information. The likelihood is that many of those registrants were intended victims of fraud. The problem is that many of those registrants are having challenges submitting the required notarized paperwork back to GSA. As Mr. Miller reported, “Of the 7,500 notarized letters received, GSA processed more than 3,300 and rejected almost 56 percent of them (1,910) for one reason or another.” That’s not a good statistic, is it?

SAM fraud. It should give every government contractor a chill. SAM registration is mandatory. If the sensitive information you enter isn’t secure, then the consequences for your company could be catastrophic.

On the other hand, cybersecurity is an important element of every online interaction. We reported here about recent attempts to hack our website. We have not reported about DFARS changes intended to make contractors secure “covered defense information.” (See DFARS 252.204-7012.) Why haven’t we addressed the cybersecurity compliance rules? Perhaps because law firms seem to have this one covered. For example: check this summary out. Or see one of the many articles authored by Bob Metzger of the firm Rogers Joseph O’Donnell.

Even though we haven’t made a big deal about it, cybersecurity is an extremely important topic, not only for government contractors, but for the government itself. As the recent SAM fraud demonstrates.

 

USAF Reorganizes for Speed, Innovation, Collaboration

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Speed. Agility. Innovation.

Nearly everybody associated with defense acquisition says those are the goals. Well, along with on-time and on-budget delivery. Along with the requisite quality and performance. Never mind that some of those goals are mutually incompatible. (For example, in an agile, innovative environment, your budget was obsolete after Day 1 of program performance.) That’s what defense leaders say they want.

Despite saying that those are the goals, recent history has shown that the actions of the Pentagon’s “fourth estate” don’t match the words. It’s almost as if the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is in charge of defending the status quo, rather than “moving tail to tooth” in order to focus more of the massive DoD budget on direct warfighter support. Disappointing.

Nonetheless, it seems that the military services are taking responsibility for fostering weapon system development speed, agility, and innovation. For example, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson recently announced a reorganization of the USAF Space and Missile Systems Center, an organization than oversees a portfolio of space-related acquisition programs valued at more than $6 billion. According to a report by Space News (link in previous sentence)—

Wilson … announced the Air Force will establish a new office that will report directly to Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Will Roper and whose mission will be to ‘speed things up.’ This office will work with program managers to identify bottlenecks. ‘Their job will not be to buy things but to change the Pentagon rules and processes through which we buy things so that speed is a priority and an expectation,’ said Wilson. ‘It’s time to stop circumventing the bureaucracy and start rewiring it.’ Many fingers are pointed when acquisition programs take too long to deliver products, but the ‘biggest barrier is in the Pentagon,’ Wilson said.

Secretary Wilson announced the reorganization of the SMSC and creation of two new offices within the new organization. One office will focus on innovation. The other will work “to increase partnerships with foreign allies and commercial space companies.” Another source reported that the new Innovation Office will “focus on emerging and pioneering technologies, which will free up program managers to concentrate their efforts on their own program.” The new Collaboration Office will focus on developing partnerships with “foreign allies and commercial space companies.”

It seems the Air Force gets it.

In particular, the Air Force seems to get the importance of collaboration. Not all DoD stakeholders seem to share that same viewpoint. For example: here. Candidly, it’s refreshing to see that somebody understands that innovation and true collaboration do not originate from “arms-length” or even adversarial business dealings; but instead, those attributes emerge when partnerships between government and industry are forged.

One need only look at recent legislation (e.g., the past thee or four NDAAs) to see that Congress is pressing DoD to fix its broken acquisition system. Now comes at least one piece of evidence that the military services are focusing on that issue as well. The only stakeholder in the process that really doesn’t seem to get it is the OSD, champion of the “fourth estate”—the entrenched bureaucracy that defends the status quo.

In 2006, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment reported that “’staff oversight organizations, lengthy lines of communication and adversarial relations’ resulted in excessive and ineffective exercise of authority without accountability and ‘inhibit proper execution of our programs. . . . The current decision-making process is flawed.’” (Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform 1960 – 2000, page 210.) In the intervening decade, it doesn’t seem that much has changed. One might speculate that the lack of acquisition reform success is tied to the Pentagon bureaucracy.

We don’t want to go on a rant here, but we think it’s past time to clean house at the OSD, to remove the detritus from past administrations, who carry the baggage of past policy failures. We don’t believe that the DoD acquisition system’s shortfalls will be successfully addressed until the path is cleared for it to happen.

In the mid-1990’s, when acquisition reform seemed to be taken seriously by almost all stakeholders, Colleen Preston was named Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform). As her title indicated, her focus was on reforming the defense acquisition system. She did so relentlessly for about four years, and then she moved on. Sometime in the late 1990’s her position was eliminated and replaced with the current Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). Notice, readers, that the focus shifted along with the change of title. We’re not saying that DPAP doesn’t embrace acquisition reform. But what we are saying is that one title seemed action-oriented while the other title seems a bit (shall we say?) passive.

Where do we go from here?

Congress seems to have some plans. The military services (or at least the Air Force) seem to have some plans. We wonder what the OUSD (A&S)’s plans are?

 

Thornberry Tackles Acquisition Reform

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SisypheusRepresentative Mac Thornberry (R-TX) has emerged over the past few years as one of the House’s most vocal advocates for defense acquisition reform. Earlier this week, his office released two pieces of “draft legislation” that would significantly impact the Pentagon and how it buys goods and services in support of U.S. warfighters.

The first piece—the one that’s getting the lion's share of the press—focuses on eliminating seven Pentagon agencies in order to cut $25 billion (or 25%) from the Pentagon’s “fourth estate.” According to one article (link in previous sentence) “the Fourth Estate is comprised of 28 agencies that are not part of a military service and employs 200,000 civilian personnel and nearly 600,000 contractors.” Another article quoted Thornberry as saying, “To summarize the whole thing from my perspective, it is reduce the overhead to put more resources at the tip of the spear.”

Long-time readers may recall similar words from former SECDEF Robert Gates, when he spoke about cutting DoD overhead by $100 billion in order to move “tail to tooth”. See this 2010 article. Or perhaps this one. Several constituencies supported the Gate’s “efficiency” initiative, including the Defense Business Board. In addition, President Obama gave public support to it as well.

Despite the support from the top and the support from the DBB (and from some think-tanks), the Gates plan didn’t seem to go anywhere. Not much seems to have been accomplished. It took us about six years to understand that the effort was sabotaged by Dr. Ash Carter (who became SECDEF at the end of the Obama administration) and his subordinate, Frank Kendall. Those two individuals foiled the Gates initiative by attempting to bury a McKinsey study (commissioned by the DBB), a study that had concluded that the Pentagon could save up to $125 billion (over five years) by better managing its Fourth Estate Bureaucracy.

$125 billion over five years. Or about $25 billion per year. Or about the same amount that Mac Thornberry’s draft legislation purports to save.

Coincidence? We think not.

But enough of that. We want to focus on Thornberry’s second piece of draft legislation. As the Federal News Radio article (authored by Jared Serbu, link in previous sentence) reports, “most of the changes Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) is proposing were first recommended by the Section 809 Panel, an 18-member team of acquisition experts Congress commissioned in 2017 to provide advice on how to streamline the system.”

Readers will note that we’ve been talking about the Section 809 Panel for some time. Our article discussed recommendations from the Panel’s first Report. We heartily agreed with those “bold recommendations for reform.” Among the 24 official recommendations (many of which had multiple subparts), the first four addressed how the Pentagon acquired “commercial” goods and services. We noted some aspects of the issue in this article about DoD’s attempts to reform its commercial item buying practices.

More recently, we have been skeptical that the Section 809 Panel’s recommendations would survive attack by entrenched stakeholders. We are pleased to be proven wrong, at least to the extent that Rep. Thornberry (and his staff) have taken the Panel’s recommendations on commercial item acquisitions and proposed them as draft legislation. As Mr. Serbu’s article summarizes—

The bill also takes aim at another of the main focus areas the 809 panel addressed in the first full volume of its report, which was released in January. The panel found that DoD has been backtracking on what is supposed to be a preference for commercial items, and the use of simplified procedures to buy them. The percentage of its dollars spent on commercial goods and services dropped 29 percent between 2012 and 2017. That’s partially because both Congress and the department itself have made the process for buying commercial items increasingly complex over the past 20 years, including by increasing the number of government-unique contract clauses they impose on commercial firms by 188 percent, and quintupling the number of requirements that flow down to those companies’ subcontractors.

The panel found DoD’s regulations include upward of 40 sometimes-contradictory definitions of what constitutes a commercial item. The Thornberry bill attempts to revert to Defense Department to just two: one for commercial goods, another for commercial services.

Contractors that have struggled to convince contracting officers that their goods and services meet the definition of “commercial item” will no doubt welcome reform efforts in this area. We know of at least one small business that gave up after nearly a year of trying to convince a skeptical CO that its item met the definition (and it did). So anything that streamlines this area is fine by us.

Another area in which the draft Thornberry legislation borrows heavily from the Section 809 Panel recommendations in the area of small business contracting. The Section 809 Panel made a couple of recommendations, including:

Rec. 21: Refocus DoD’s small business policies and programs to prioritize mission and advance warfighting capabilities and capacities.

21a: Establish the infrastructure necessary to create and execute a DoD small business strategy, ensuring alignment of DoD’s small business programs with the agency’s critical needs.

21b: Build on the successes of the SBIR/STTR and RIF programs.

21c: Enable innovation in the acquisition system and among industry partners

David Drabkin, who replaced Dee Lee as the Panel’s Chair, was quoted in Serbu’s Federal News Radio article as saying, “we looked at the various activities that the department has to reach small businesses, we found that they had lots of folks who went to various meetings in places that tend to be attended by people who already do business with a government. They really didn’t have a focus on going to programs, shows, associations where there were people who didn’t do business with the government. And when we looked at DoD’s industrial base office, while they had a mission to look at the whole industrial base and try to identify the department’s needs, they really weren’t focused on small businesses.”

Although details of Thornberry’s exact small business reforms are a bit sketchy at the moment, we believe they implement the spirit (if not the letter) of the Section 809 Panel’s recommendations.

It's gratifying to see that at least one member of Congress is taking the Section 809 Panel’s work seriously. The problem, of course, is moving from a “draft legislation” to a final bill to signed public law. As the Washington Post reported: “His legislation will probably be met with resistance from lawmakers who are fiercely protective of military-related jobs in their congressional districts, as well as from parts of the Pentagon itself, which has a track record of defeating or slow-rolling restructuring proposals.”

Still, we can hope, can we not?

The defense acquisition environment is widely thought to be in dire need of reform. Some say it’s broken completely; others say it’s so broken it cannot be fixed. But we say we have to keep on trying to fix it, no matter if the efforts are ultimately Sisyphean, in that the efforts are endless and, ultimately, without significant result. To give up is to surrender hope that the system can be rationalized.

 

Actually It’s About Ethics in Aluminum Production

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Most readers won’t get the humor in the headline; and that’s okay. (If you feel a burning need to understand the joke, go to the "Know Your Meme" website.)

Actually this article isn’t about humor; it’s about mandatory contractor disclosures made pursuant to the requirements of the FAR contract clause 52.203-13. As you may know (because we’ve spoken on the subject), the majority of contractor disclosures submitted pursuant to that clause are related to timekeeping and labor charging irregularities. (In GFY 2017, 83% of all contractor disclosures made to the DoD OIG were related to timekeeping issues.)

The contractor disclosure statistics are counter-intuitive and perhaps not what the promulgators of the rule intended in 2008, when the mandatory disclosure regime replaced the previous voluntary disclosure regime. At the time, “The DOJ expressed frustration that Defense Department contractors were not keeping pace with other industries in terms of self-governance.” (Link to 2009 Crowell & Moring article.) Ironically, the other industries with which the defense contractors were not keeping up, in terms of self-governance and transparent disclosure, includied both the banking and securities industries. (Why is that ironic? Think about the timing.) The promulgators of the new disclosure rules were convinced that defense contractors were hiding something and only a mandatory disclosure rule would compel them to report it. The focus was on violations of Federal criminal law “involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity.” Certainly, nobody would have thought that the big contractor secret was that personnel weren’t properly recording labor charges.

Actually this article isn’t about the mandatory disclosure rule; it’s about false product certifications. You know, the kind of stuff that the contract clause was intended to force contractors to disclose. Specifically, this article is about allegedly false test certifications at an aluminum extrusion plant in Portland, Oregon. More specifically, its about an allegation that the former production manager at that plant had falsified “tensile test results on hundreds of occasions, which were typed onto test certificates provided to the manufacturing facility’s customers.” Those customers, according to the indictment, included both NASA and the Missile Defense Agency.

Even more specifically, the Department of Justice filed a major fraud indictment against Dennis Merkel, 71, of Portland, Oregon.

“What is aluminum extrusion?” you may be asking. We found a website that stated “An aluminum extrusion is produced by pushing heated metal through a press to produce a desired form or shape. Typical applications for extruded products include window and door frames, store fronts, auto body frames, solar panel mounting systems, and heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC).” In addition, the DoJ press release (link in previous paragraph) stated that “Aluminum extrusions are manufactured for a variety of applications, including aeronautic uses such as rockets and military hardware.”

According to that DoJ press release—

There are industry-set specifications for measuring the mechanical properties of extrusions, which are determined by conducting a tensile test. Merkel allegedly sent and caused to be sent testing certifications containing falsified mechanical properties test results in connection with government contracts for NASA and the Missile Defense Agency. The indictment alleges that Merkel and others carried out the scheme to conceal failing tensile test results, increase profits and productivity, and obtain bonuses, which were calculated in part based on a production metric.

Merkel was the production manager at the Portland area contractor and the indictment alleges that he falsified the aluminum test results from May 1996 to December 2006. That’s a ten-year duration. But the alleged scheme ended more than ten years ago. The press release did not state why the government waited more than a decade to file its indictment.

Actually this article isn’t about whether the government can reach back 10 years when the statute's language itself says the statute of limitations for major fraud against the United States is “7 years after the offense is committed, plus any additional time otherwise allowed by law.” (Perhaps the DoJ thinks it has found the “additional time” noted in the statute.)

What is this article about? Actually we’re not sure! Perhaps it’s about the kind of (alleged) fraud that the contractor mandatory disclosure rule was intended to force contractors to disclose. If so, that rule didn’t work so well in this case, since it took more than a decade for the (alleged) wrongdoing to come to light.

 

 

DoD Changes TINA Threshold

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The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) changed the threshold at which certified cost or pricing data was required to be obtained. We told you about it. Several times. We ranted about it. Several times. The statute was revised such that the threshold was increased from $750,000 to $2 million.

On April 13, 2018, the DoD issued a Class Deviation that aligns the FAR with the revisions to the underlying statute. The Class Deviation also acknowledges that the CAS coverage threshold is now $2 million as well.

All this is good news.

As we have urged (several times), you should revise your policies and procedures to require certified cost or pricing data only from subcontractors whose proposals are in excess of the new threshold. You should administer CAS only on subcontracts whose value is in excess of the new threshold.

The changes go into effect for DoD on July 1, 2018, according to the Class Deviation.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.