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Apogee Consulting Inc

TINA Threshold Can Be Raised Across All Agencies

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The story continues.

It started with the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a piece of legislation focused on the Department of Defense and NASA. The 2018 NDAA directed DoD (and NASA) to make a number of changes to the acquisition regulations. We told you about many of those changes. Notably, the 2018 NDAA changed the threshold at which contracting officers (and contractors) must obtain certified cost or pricing data—commonly known as “the TINA threshold” (referring to the Truth-in-Negotiations Act). The 2018 NDAA raised the TINA threshold from $750,000 to $2 million.

Again, the NDAA language was focused on DoD and NASA, but that focus created a problem. The problem is that the TINA language—e.g., FAR 15.403-4(a)(1)—applies to all Federal agencies, not just to DoD and NASA. Essentially, then, Congress was telling the DAR Council (one of the two FAR Councils who writes the acquisition regulations) to make special language in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). That would be an enormous undertaking, since the DAR Council would not only have to create regulatory language that paralleled the existing FAR language, but would also have to create new solicitation provisions and contract clauses that paralleled existing FAR provisions and clauses. That would be hard and take a long time, a duration perhaps measured in years. In the meantime, DCMA contracting officers would be stuck, forced to choose between complying with statute and complying with the existing FAR regulatory language. We wrote about that challenge in this article.

We followed-up that article with another one, one that discussed how the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council (CAAC)—the sister entity to the DAR Council—had issued a Class Deviation that authorized civilian agencies to adopt some of the 2018 NDAA acquisition thresholds. This was a significant step because it was a strong indication that the 2018 NDAA changes were going to be adopted across the entire FAR, and not just adopted within the DFARS. However, we noted that the CAAC Class Deviation was silent with respect to the TINA threshold. We speculated that it might be the subject of a future CAAC communication.

In yet another article on the topic, we discussed in some detail the quandary faced by both DCMA contracting officers and contractors, because the existing FAR language and associated solicitation provisions and contract clauses all referenced a specific dollar value ($750,000) as the TINA threshold, rather than the value in the statute. Thus, if the statute changed but the regulatory language did not, then there was going to be a conflict between the two. Further, the CAS threshold (which is the contract value at which CAS is applied, unless an exemption is available) is tied to the TINA statute rather than to the regulation. That created yet another compliance quandary for people. We wrote—

By ‘slow-rolling’ the implementation of the 2018 NDAA threshold changes into the acquisition regulations, the FAR Councils have created a problem for contractors. If the contractors wait for the regulatory implementation, then they must disconnect CAS coverage from TINA coverage. They will end up requesting certified cost or pricing data from subcontractors that are, by statute, exempt from CAS. This helps nobody and may well lead to increased procurement costs.

In our view, the only rational approach is to apply the statutory threshold changes now. The FAR Councils should immediately issue a Class Deviation to FAR 15.403-4(a)(1) to implement the new TINA threshold, even if formal rule-making takes a bit longer. If you are a contractor, you should discuss this quandary with your cognizant contracting officer and try to get some relief.

Then, in two other (brief) articles, we noted that the DoD had issued Class Deviations to implement the 2018 NDAA acquisition threshold changes in advance of formal rulemaking. (See here.)

Just to recap, by this point the CAAC had issued a Class Deviation to permit civilian agencies to implement some of the 2018 NDAA threshold changes—in particular, those associated with the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) and the Micro-Purchase threshold—but they had not addressed changes to the TINA threshold. The Department of Energy (DOE) had jumped on that permission and had issued its own Class Deviation. But of course DOE could not address the TINA threshold, because the CAAC had not addressed it in its Class Deviation. The DoD had issued two Class Deviations addressing the SAT, the Micro-Purchase threshold, and the TINA threshold.

Now we are all up to date.

And you should not be surprised to learn that on May 3, 2018, the CAAC issued a Class Deviation via CAAC Letter 18-003, that addressed the TINA threshold. The CAAC Class Deviation authorizes civilian agencies to “raise[ ] the threshold for requiring Certified Cost or Pricing Data from $750,000 to $2,000,000.” So there you go.

Importantly, the CAAC Letter also addressed how the threshold increase is to be implemented on existing contracts. The CAAC Letter stated “contracts entered into on or before June 30, 2018 are excluded from this threshold increase.” That sounds like another problem, doesn’t it? Contractors are supposed to have one Purchasing System, with a single set of requirements and thresholds, and not two separate ones (one for old contracts and another for new contracts).

Fortunately, the CAAC Letter also offered a way out of the problem. It stated “contractors for those [old] contracts can request to modify such contracts, without consideration, to use the new threshold.” Note the key phrase – “without consideration.”

At this point, contractors should be moving briskly to revise their Purchasing/Subcontracting procedures to implement the new 2018 NDAA thresholds. They should also be preparing letters to their procuring contracting officers to have their existing contracts modified to adopt the new acquisition thresholds. Contractors with DoD and/or NASA contracts should have already sent those requests, and contractors with civilian agency contracts should be looking to do the same.

 

Defective Pricing: So This Happened

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On May 4, 2018 the Defense Federal Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was revised via issuance of a final rule “to state that, in the interest of promoting voluntary contractor disclosures of defective pricing identified by the contractor after contract award, DoD contracting officers have discretion to request a limited-scope or full-scope audit, as appropriate for the circumstances.”

According to the background section of the final rule, this regulatory revision came about because contractors requested it. Contractors requested it because DoD asked about opportunities to reduce or eliminate regulatory burdens “where costs [of compliance\ outweigh benefits [to the government.” DoD asked contractors for input as part of “Better Buying Power 3.0,” which we discussed here. We offered opinions regarding BBP 3.0 in this article. In our typically understated, diplomatic style, we concluded that “BBP 3.0 is much the same as its predecessors: More bureaucratic management and more bureaucratic processes. Processes designed and implemented by bureaucrats for bureaucrats in order to achieve bureaucratic ends.”

But this article isn’t about BBP 3.0. Nor is it about BBP 2.0 (which is where the notion of regulatory roll-backs started). Nope. This article is about the regulatory revision that allegedly spawned from BBP 3.0, a claimed regulatory roll-back intended to reduce a burden on contractors so that the associated reduced costs could be passed back to taxpayers.

Yeah, that’s a lie.

We documented the true story on this blog site.

As we documented, after five years of intensive study, after five years of focusing on reducing regulatory burdens where the costs to contractors outweighed the benefits to the government, after admittedly spending $600,000 of taxpayer funds, the DoD issued this report entitled “Eliminating Requirements Imposed on Industry Where Costs Exceed Benefits.” (Catchy title, right?) We documented how almost every single input received from contractors was dismissed by the study’s authors. We documented how the authors promised to continue to study regulatory roll-back in “Phase II,” and we opined that we would expect much of the same, in terms of results. I.e., nothing.

One of the few contractor recommendations that was accepted by the authors was to reduce the number of certified cost or pricing (CoP) data submissions. We discussed that recommendation, in some detail, in this article. We quoted from the DoD report and we repeat that same quote here so that readers can see the exact language of the recommended regulatory roll-back:

We concur with contractors’ recommendation in the first category: DoD should clarify policy guidance to reduce repeated submissions of CoP data. Multiple submissions are an unintended, and generally unsought, consequence of the FAR requirement that certified CoP data be ‘current.’ Frequent resubmissions appear to be the result of contractors’ fears that out of date CoP data that becomes inaccurate will lead to defective pricing claims by DoD post-award. However, lack of clarity on what is considered ‘current’ motivates some contractors to provide excessively frequent CoP data updates during negotiations (weekly or monthly), which creates unnecessary work not only for contractors, but also for the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO). We recommend amending DFARS (and/or the FAR) to remove uncertainty about the appropriate frequency of providing certifiable CoP data to ensure it remains ‘current’ and/or to clarify pricing changes that warrant resubmission of CoP data. … Reducing unnecessary resubmissions of certifiable CoP data would lower contractor proposal costs and reduce procurement administrative lead time. Making this change also weakens the argument for making additional changes to the TINA statute, such as increasing thresholds or relaxing waiver criteria.

(Emphasis added to show exactly what the authors were recommending.)

So then this happened.

As we documented in the article (link above), the report’s recommendation was changed. The recommendation provided to the Director of Defense Pricing became ““Consider revising the FAR to eliminate the requirement that a defective pricing claim and associated audit must be initiated if a contractor voluntarily discloses defective pricing post-award …”

You see the disconnect, don’t you?

Further (and as we documented), even though the recommendation was to revise FAR 15.407-1(c), the Director of Defense Pricing initiated a DFARS Case (215-D030) that would only revise DFARS 215.407-1. Because the FAR was not being revised (as recommended), there would be no associated cost reductions with the regulatory revision.

So here we are today, more than two years after the DFARS Case was opened, with a final rule that does nothing. It reduces no regulatory burden and it reduces no contractor costs. What it does do is clarify the rights of the parties.

  • “Voluntary disclosure of defective pricing is not a voluntary refund as defined in 242.7100 and does not waive the Government entitlement to the recovery of any overpayment plus interest on the overpayments in accordance with FAR 15.407-1(b)(7).”

  • “Voluntary disclosure of defective pricing does not waive the Government's rights to pursue defective pricing claims on the affected contract or any other Government contract.”

Thus, if you determine that you may have defectively priced your cost proposal, in that you failed to disclose accurate, complete, and current certified cost or pricing information (as that term is defined at FAR 2.101), then you may make a voluntary disclosure to your contracting officer. Who will discuss the situation with DCAA. The contracting officer and DCAA will determine how best to proceed in evaluating the contractor disclosure. Regardless of the voluntary nature of the contractor’s disclosure, that disclosure may lead to further demands for repayment, as the solicitation provisions and contract clauses provide. In some extreme cases, the government (or qui tam relator) may pursue a lawsuit under the civil False Claims Act, based on the theory that any invoice submitted under a defectively priced contract is a false claim.

The only silver lining in this situation is that Congress recently raised the threshold at which contractors must certify their cost or pricing data from $750,000 to $2 million. DoD recently issued a Class Deviation to implement that statutory change ahead of formal rule-making. Consequently, the number of proposals subject to this rule—especially at smaller contractors—should decrease significantly.

Otherwise, this story is the poster child for how the DoD “fourth estate” sabotages attempts to improve the defense acquisition environment. As we have documented here for our readership to consider.

 

GAO Discusses DoD Program Management

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It’s all about “knowledge-based acquisition practices,” according to a recent GAO report. The report covered the 86 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) managed by DoD.i GAO reported that the aggregate value of those 86 programs is $1.66 trillion (with a “T”)—so delivering each of those 86 programs on-time and on-budget is very much an important priority for the DoD as well as the taxpayers who are footing the bill.

The report is more than 200 pages long. Each MDAP is grouped by cognizant military service and then discussed individually. There are eight Appendices. Fundamentally, the report provides a year-over-year comparison of the 2016 MDAP portfolio and the 2017 MDAP portfolio.

To sum it all up in one sentence: “DOD estimates that its 2017 portfolio will cost more and take longer to deliver as compared to the 2016 portfolio.” But GAO didn’t just stop there: it evaluated the portfolio’s “buying power” (a term defined as “the amount of goods or services that can be purchased given a specified level of funding”). GAO concluded that “Since last year’s assessment, programs in DOD’s 2017 portfolio realized a combined $2.3 billion gain in buying power—meaning DOD is able to buy more goods or services for the same level of funding. Nonetheless, this gain was significantly less than the $10.7 billion increase in buying power achieved by the 2016 portfolio.” So DoD is doing better, but not better than it did last year.

Another conclusion from the GAO report is that newer programs are doing better than older programs. GAO reported “DOD has initiated 25 programs since 2010, when the government implemented significant acquisition reforms. These 25 programs represent 29 percent of the 86 programs in the current portfolio, but only account for about 15 percent of the portfolio’s total acquisition cost.” Further, GAO identified a possible reason for the better performance of newer programs—

The lower total acquisition cost in the post-2010 sub-portfolio may be due, in part, to the acquisition strategies that these programs have adopted. For instance, acquisition strategies that employ lower-risk, less complex approaches to system development—such as new increments of existing capabilities or affordability -based capability trades—can produce better cost outcomes.

In other words, GAO concluded that the less innovation involved, the better the acquisition outcome, in terms of cost and schedule.

But that’s not all. GAO also noted that programs that “promoted competition by awarding contracts competitively” fared better than those that did not. By “awarding contracts competitively” GAO meant that the prime contract for development, test, or production was awarded through competition rather than via a single or sole-source award. GAO reported “… the information from these programs shows a possible correlation between a reduction in estimated total acquisition cost growth and a program’s use of acquisition strategies that promote competition.”

Getting back to the knowledge-based acquisition strategies, GAO reported that—

… we observed MDAPs that implemented one or more of three specific knowledge-based acquisition practices had lower cost and schedule growth than those that did not. … These three practices were (1) demonstration that all critical technologies were very close to final form, fit, and function, within a relevant environment, before starting development; (2) completion of a preliminary design review prior to starting development; and (3) release of at least 90 percent of design drawings by critical design review.

Now we don’t disagree with GAO that the three practices above will lead to better program outcomes, in terms of cost and schedule. But where we depart is in the foundational assumption that better program cost and schedule outcomes are more important than innovation. Strictly adhering to the GAO’s practices will tend to lead to better cost/schedule performance, but by the time the warfighter receives the final product, it may be too late.

Moreover, GAO has more than three knowledge-based acquisition practices it deems to be appropriate for use on MDAPs. It has five practices related to entering system development.ii It has eight practices related to critical design reviews. It has five practices related to entering production. In aggregate, GAO has 18 knowledge-based acquisition practices that it believes lead to better program outcomes, but which we believe are inimical to innovative and agile weapon system development.

For example, GAO reported “The MQ-4C Triton program recently discontinued use of its hydrocarbon sensor—the only critical technology planned for its baseline configuration—after determining that the technology was obsolete and not critical to the aircraft’s mission or safe operation.” The program matured the technology, but by the time the technology was mature, it was already obsolete. Similarly, GAO said of the Next-Generation Jammer—

The NGJ Mid-Band program has seven critical technologies that are all approaching maturity and a stable design. This design stability could be disrupted, however, as technologies continue to mature up to and potentially beyond the system’s start of production in September 2019. … The NGJ program completed its critical design review in April 2017 and, as of August 2017, the contractor had released 100 percent of design drawings. This current design stability is premised on assumptions about the final form, fit, and function of critical technologies—and how these technologies will perform in a realistic environment—that may not come to fruition as NGJ critical technologies continue to mature.

Even when everything is copacetic (program-wise), entropy enters in the form of parts obsolescence. For example, with respect to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, GAO reported—

The Air Force may face challenges in supporting additional launches of its heaviest satellites because of parts obsolescence issues and the challenges for commercial-based systems to meet the National Security Space reliability and performance requirements for these missions. … However, while ULA has enough launch vehicle components to support these missions, if additional missions are required and other, new launch vehicles are not available as planned or projected, some new Delta IV Heavy components will have to be designed and manufactured to replace those that are no longer available from suppliers. The use of such components could involve substantial testing, certification, and additional cost.

In other words, by the time critical technologies are matured sufficiently to enter production, the specter of diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages from obsolescence gives rise to the need to design, test, and mature additional technologies.

In summary, we believe that while knowledge-based acquisition practices offer opportunities to better manage programs, an undue focus on those practices is inappropriate in an acquisition environment that demands agility and innovation.

i Interestingly, there does not seem to be a consistently used acronym for “Department of Defense.” GAO uses “DOD” while many within the Pentagon use “DoD.” We’re going with DoD unless we quote from a source that uses the other acronym.

ii (1) Demonstrate all critical technologies are very close to final form, fit, and function within a relevant environment (TRL 6). (2) Demonstrate all critical technologies in form, fit, and function within a realistic environment (TRL 7). (3) Complete system functional review and system requirements review before system development start. (4) Complete preliminary design review before system development start. (5) Constrain system development phase to 6 years or less.

 

Subcontractor Cost Allowability Problems

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It’s called “privity of contract” and what it means is that a contract cannot confer rights nor impose obligations on entities who are not a party to the contract. In the world of government contracting, the concept means that (with extremely rare and narrow exceptions) subcontractors may not directly pursue a protest or a claim against the government. Since they are not a party to the prime contract, they do not possess privity. Because subcontractors do not hold the contract with the government, they are not entitled to enforce any of its obligations. (See this brief legal article from the firm of Weitz Morgan, from whence we borrowed the prior two sentences.)

Because the government only has privity of contract with the prime contractor, it enforces requirements on the prime and (generally) relies on the prime to enforce the requirements on its subcontractors, who then enforce requirements on their subcontractors. As the Weitz Morgan article explains, “subcontracts are governed by common law and written agreements between the prime and sub.” Thus, if there is a problem at any level in the prime’s supply chain, it is the prime’s problem as well. If there is an assertion of defective pricing by a subcontractor, it is the prime who must pay. If there is an assertion of somebody billing hours on a T&M contract when they did not meet the qualifications of that hourly billing rate, the remedy is enforced against the prime contractor. If there is an assertion (in a cost-reimbursement contract) that a lower-tier subcontractor invoiced for unallowable costs, then it is the prime contractor who must credit those costs and pay any assessed penalties and interest. The only recourse available to the prime is to require the subcontractor to pay it back. (This assumes that the subcontractor agrees with the government’s assertions. If the subcontractor disagrees then it is likely that a dispute between the prime and sub is going to materialize.)

Because the prime is responsible for its billings to its government customer, it is fairly clear that the prime has to perform some due diligence on its subcontractor cost assertions. We discussed that responsibility in several articles, including this one.

More recently, Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) had some choice words about how the DoD was managing certain Afghanistan contracts. On April 26, 2018, her office released a House Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs report on the subject. The report included some juicy quotes, such as —

The Legacy Program was executed by a contractor named Jorge Scientific Corporation, later known as Imperatis Corporation (Imperatis), which has since become insolvent. This company first attracted the attention of Senator McCaskill in 2012, when allegations arose of drug and alcohol abuse and other misconduct at its compound in Kabul. Last year, Ranking Member McCaskill learned that at the same time Imperatis personnel were reportedly getting drunk and high in Afghanistan, its subcontractor [New Century Consulting, or NCC] was billing taxpayers for Bentleys, Porsches, and other luxury cars under the contract.

The report stated that DCAA audited the contractors and “identified $51 million in egregious costs under the Legacy Program contracts,” but there is a problem. Privity of contract may prevent the government from recapturing those questioned costs. As the report explained—

DCAA’s audit only investigated costs between 2008 and 2013, and was not completed until 2016—nearly three years after that period ended and almost eight years after the first costs were incurred. Its audit of the remainder of NCC’s costs will not be complete until later this year. DCAA’s audit backlog, a longstanding concern of Ranking Member McCaskill, has resulted in an audit inventory whose average age is 14 months. Prior to DCAA’s audit, Imperatis filed for bankruptcy, meaning that the government may never recover its claim submitted after DCAA completed its work.

DCAA’s audit report was obtained by Senator McCaskill, who reported that “DCAA examined NCC’s incurred costs between 2008 and 2013 and revealed that NCC improperly incurred costs over $50 million, including exorbitant salaries, unallowable travel expenses, and Bentleys, Porsches and other ‘luxury’ cars that were used by NCC executives and their assistants.”

Because the prime contractor is now bankrupt, the government lacks the legal means to go after the subcontractor. In addition, late DCAA audit findings raise the issue of whether any government claim would be considered timely under the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations. This is an unfortunate situation—and it's one that Secretary of Defense Mattis promised to address.

This article by Jared Serbu at Federal News Radio includes video of McCaskill’s questioning of SECDEF Mattis, who told her that “it’s probable that federal officials will file criminal charges” as part of an ongoing investigation into the situation.

For its part, NCC posted a letter on its website in response to Sen. McCaskill’s comments that stated (in part) “A number of the points of concern made in your letter are factually inaccurate and incorrect, albeit this partly stems from the inaccuracies within the DCAA audit report itself.” The letter also stated that the company had made a lengthy and detailed reply to the draft DCAA audit report but to no avail. The company wrote: “Disappointingly, but in what we understand is common practice, the final version of the audit report was little changed from the draft, despite these detailed explanations.”

Meanwhile, Sen. McCaskill urged the DoD to use its suspension and debarment process to “at least temporarily prohibit the firm from receiving any new government work.”

Prime contractors should think about this situation. The risk assessment for subcontractor oversight should include some exploration of what happens if the first (or lower) tier subcontractor has audit findings. Certainly, the prime is going to want to understand those findings in some detail, because it is very likely going to be held responsible for them by its government customer.

 

Conflicts of Interest

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In competitions for government contracts, contracting officers are concerned about organizational conflicts of interest. An organizational conflict of interest is a situation where one bidder has a real or potential advantage because it has access to governmental information through its existing contract with the awarding entity. For example, a contractor performing technical support services for the agency may have access to other bidders’ proprietary information, and might use that information to gain an unfair advantage in the next competition. Another type of organizational conflict of interest might occur when a contractor is providing evaluation services to the awarding agency—for example, it is evaluating technical approaches in bidders’ proposals—and it is one of the bidders. In either case, companies are required to disclose real or potential OCIs to the contracting officer, as well as their mitigation plans. The contracting officer will determine whether the OCI has been effectively mitigated, or not. If not, then the contractor will be excluded from future competitions.

This is all discussed at FAR 9.5, for those interested. But that’s not what we want to talk about today. Instead, we want to talk about personal conflicts of interest.

A personal conflict of interest is a real or perceived incompatibility between one's private interests and one's public or fiduciary duties. In the corporate world, a conflict of interest exists when an individual’s personal interests interfere with the interests of the individual’s employer.

Generally, companies that have codes of ethics/business conduct include in those codes a requirement that possible conflicts of interest must be promptly disclosed Some companies have lengthy policy statements that go into great depth on the topic, attempting to guide employees towards disclosure. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric’s policy states (in part)—

A conflict of interest occurs when your private interests interfere in any way, or even appear to interfere, with the interests of PG&E as a whole. A conflict of interest can arise if you take actions or have interests that may make it difficult for you to perform your company work objectively and effectively. When you represent PG&E, you must avoid any real or apparent conflict between your interests and those of PG&E.

The COI policy goes on to cover such topics as favored treatment, accepting or giving gifts, holding an outside elected/appointed office, and outside employment. That latter topic is especially important to Apogee Consulting, Inc., since we have to carefully juggle client engagements with the duties of our full-time job. People frequently ask how we can perform consulting services without creating a conflict of interest with our full-time employer. The answer to that question is “carefully.” To illuminate the issues involved, we’ll quote (again) from the PG&E COI policy.

You must take special care when engaging in outside employment activities. You’re not permitted to have outside activities that compete with products or services offered by PG&E. (If you’re represented by a bargaining unit, this restriction applies only to products or services offered by your line of business.) The types of activities to avoid include the planning, design, manufacture, sale, installation, or maintenance of any commodity, equipment, or service that our lines of business currently provide or have known plans to provide.

Also, even if these requirements are met, you should take the following precautions to avoid a conflict of interest:

  • Don’t participate in an outside employment activity that could have an adverse effect on your ability to perform your duties for PG&E.

  • Don’t use company time or assets for your own business or other job.

  • Don’t solicit work from PG&E for your business or other employer based on inside knowledge of the company or contacts, and don’t solicit PG&E employees, vendors, or customers while at work. Local management has discretion to allow passive solicitation, such as a poster on a bulletin board or a catalogue on a lunchroom table.

  • If, during non-business hours, you solicit vendors or customers with whom you interact for PG&E, you must ensure that your solicitation does not create an appearance of impropriety or in any way imply that the vendor’s or customer’s dealings with PG&E will be affected by the response to your solicitation.

We adhere to those rules (or ones like them) because we do not want to create a conflict of interest with our full-time employer. To those rules we add—as our guiding principles—a prohibition on providing consulting services to any existing supplier, or to any supplier who has submitted a proposal to become a supplier, or to any direct competitor. Living by those principles means that, from time to time, we are required to turn down work. So be it.

Not everybody is as focused on avoiding personal conflicts of interests as we are. For example, in late 2017 we told readers about an indictment returned against a “procurement officer” at Sandia National Labs. This individual was going to award a contract for moving services. As part of the source evaluation and source selection processes, she (a) created her own company, (b) submitted a bid, (c) evaluated that bid and found it to be the best value, (d) awarded herself a contact, and (e) invoiced and paid herself.

That’s a pretty clear conflict of interest, in our view.

In related news, on April 25, 2018, the Department of Justice announced that the former SNL “procurement officer” was sentenced “to three years in prison for orchestrating a scheme to obtain approximately $2.3 million in federal funds through fraudulent means and for laundering the fraudulently obtained proceeds through her father’s companies.“ The sentence was apparently the result of a plea agreement.

In other related news, the Amtrak Office of Inspector General recently reported that a former Lead Contract Administrator for Amtrak “pleaded guilty to one count of federal program bribery.” According to the OIG report, the Contract Administrator (Miller) “steered four fleet maintenance contracts worth more than $7.6 million to a single vendor in exchange for approximately $20,000 in bribes, trips, and other items of value. Miller received the payments through a sham consulting company he created in coordination with two executives from the vendor to conceal his relationship with them.”

In other words, Miller created a “sham consulting company” that purportedly provided services to the same supplier to which he was selecting for contract awards. Again, that situation seems to be a clear conflict of interest.

Given all the above, how does a company check to see if its buyers, other procurement folks, and employees outside of purchasing are steering clear of any personal conflicts of interest? We believe it starts with identifying functions and individuals who have an opportunity to create a COI. Obviously, people who make subcontract and supplier awards very much have that opportunity. But are there other functions that also have a COI opportunity?

  • What about the engineer or other technical staff member who can list potential or recommended sources on a Purchase Requisition?

  • What about members of the technical team who can decide whether a part or service can only be provided by one source (i.e., creators of source-controlled drawings)?

  • What about functions or individuals that decide whether or not a supplier can be listed on an Approved Supplier List?

  • What about Quality Inspectors—especially supplier inspectors who are embedded deep in the supply chain, often at remote supplier sites?

The point is, it’s not just procurement folks you need to be thinking about. But if you don’t think about where potential COIs may be found in your organization, you are unlikely to ever detect one.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.