Termination Troubles
Recently we published an article criticizing DCMA for over-reliance on DCAA auditors. In that article, we noted that a Contracting Officer cannot use the fact that they are awaiting a DCAA audit report as a pretext for failing to issue a Contracting Officer’s Final Decision (COFD) as required by the Contract Disputes Act. The DCAA audit report might address the amount of the costs at hand but cannot address whether or not the contractor is entitled to those costs. Determining entitlement is the CO’s job.
And now comes a story about a CO who failed to rely on DCAA. She failed to listen to DCAA, to incorporate the audit findings into her decision, and, as a result, the government may have overpaid a subcontractor's Termination Settlement Proposal (TSP). Maybe.
For those who don’t know, a TSP is what happens when your contract has been terminated for convenience (T4C). We’ve discussed terminations before – see, for example, this article. As we noted in that article, when a contractor receives a T4C notice, it needs to take certain actions. The first action is (perhaps obviously) stop work. We wrote—
Now, that doesn’t mean turn off the lights and walk out the door. To the contrary, you must cease ongoing contract performance in a reasonable, prudent, and measured manner. For example, you don’t tell your procurement staff to stop work—because they need to flow down the T4C Notice to your contract suppliers and subcontractors, and they need to administer the supplier termination efforts. You also don’t stop the production machines, leaving materials in the middle of fabrication.
Instead, you take measures to shut down production like a prudent business person, and you protect the government’s interest. That means finishing production at a reasonable stopping place, carrying the finished and unfinished goods to property storage, and logging them in. That means saving all work and logging/indexing what’s been done and what’s not been done. Doing all this may take a few days. As we used to say, ‘You can turn off a faucet, but there’s still a few drops left to go.’
Remember, you’re going to have to justify all this work to Government auditors. So it’s not a license to permit employees to keep charging numbers beyond that which is necessary and prudent. Consider it a rapid ramp-down, or perhaps a safe landing without power. Approach the situation in a business-like and prudent manner.
In this story, which comes courtesy of a formal DoD OIG report (link right here), it appears that neither the contractor nor the subcontractor read our article on terminations. As a result, the subcontractor had problems passing its DCAA audit.
But let’s start at the beginning—at least, the beginning as the DoD OIG told the story. On August 11, 2009, the USAF issued a “stop work” notice to the contractor with respect to purchases of titanium for the F-22 fuselage. That stop work order including, obviously, all subcontractors connected with that activity. On December 18, 2009 that activity was formally terminated for convenience. Now the DoD OIG didn’t address the issue, but it would have been interesting to know the chronology of the prime contractor's communications with its subcontractor(s). While we don’t know that, we do know that one subcontractor submitted a TSP to the Air Force, in the amount of $2,930,817, on August 27, 2010. That TSP was updated twice, once to remove more than one million dollars in “unallowable costs,” and again to provide “updated supporting documentation.” The final version of the subcontractor’s TSP was dated October 11, 2011—more than a year after initial submission.
Less than a month later (November 5, 2011), the USAF Terminating Contracting Officer (TCO) requested a DCAA audit of the subcontractor’s TSP. DCAA issued its report on April 29.2014. In other words, the audit report was issued two years and five months after the request was issued. Yes, you read that correctly: DCAA took 29 months to audit a TSP valued at $1,860,001.
In that audit report, DCAA questioned $825,910 of the claimed $1,860,001—or more than 44 percent of the TSP value. DCAA questioned several aspects of the TSP, including $353,577 in costs incurred after issuance of the “stop work” order. DCAA also questioned $472,333 in claimed costs, asserting that they were unallowable. (Remember, the subcontractor had already removed more than a million dollars’ worth of unallowable costs before DCAA received the audit request.)
With respect to the costs incurred after receipt of the “stop work” order, the DCAA audit report apparently questioned subcontractor costs incurred after receipt of the stop work order by the prime contractor, ignoring the date on which the subcontractor received a stop work order from the prime. The DoD OIG report stated “The DCAA audit report questioned $353,577 in subcontractor costs that were incurred up to 109 days after the Air Force termination contracting officer issued a stop-work order for all activities associated with the purchase of titanium for the F-22 aircraft.” Though we are not lawyers, we bet a skilled government contracts attorney could exploit that audit report position. It is very possible that, if the prime contractor were negligent in transmitting the stop work notice to the subcontractor, the costs would be allowable for the subcontractor but unallowable for the prime contractor. Interestingly, the DoD OIG report ignored this potential issue.
With respect to the alleged unallowable costs, DCAA questioned $86,691 in claimed costs “because the proposed costs were not based on current market prices at the time of the settlement proposal.” That’s weird, right? Because presumably the costs were already incurred, so what impact could current market prices have on historical costs? Anyway, we don’t know. Perhaps there was a contract clause that would have required revision of historical costs to current costs (e.g., a “mark to market” requirement). But absent such a clause, that seems to be a weird finding.
Also, DCAA questioned $84,023 in claimed costs because they were not “allocable” to the terminated portion of the subcontract. They were costs that the subcontractor “did not incur as estimated at the time of the settlement proposal” and they were “overstated when calculating the proposed direct costs.” That tells us that we are dealing with indirect costs. Somehow the subcontractor was using estimated final indirect rates instead of actual rates (perhaps because it hadn’t yet calculated its actual rates). Further, since DCAA was questioning allegedly overstated direct costs, then obviously indirect costs allocated to that figure would also be questioned.
Finally, DCAA questioned $301,619 in raw material costs (titanium, we presume) that the subcontractor had acquired and processed “before the Air Force contracting officer exercised a contract option to authorize the material.” Again, a weird finding. It makes it sound like the subcontractor had a prime contract directly with the Air Force, instead of a subcontract with the prime contractor. Who cares what the USAF CO did or did not exercise? Instead, the question should be what direction did the prime contractor provide to the subcontractor? Unfortunately, the DoD OIG report didn’t address that question.
To sum it up, the DoD OIG treated the DCAA audit report as if it were Gospel, whereas we might have picked a few nits with its conclusions.
But the real issue here is the DCMA Contracting Officer, and how she treated the DCAA audit report. The DoD OIG report stated that—
In the price negotiation memorandum, the DCMA Contracting Officer indicated that she would uphold all of the DCAA-questioned costs totaling $825,910. However, in another section of the price negotiation memorandum, the DCMA Contracting Officer authorized reimbursement of the full proposed amount of $1,860,001 in subcontractor termination costs. The price negotiation memorandum did not address the inconsistency or explain why the DCMA Contracting Officer authorized full payment of the $1,860,001 subcontractor’s termination settlement proposal.
Oops!
The DCMA TCO signed the PNM; the TCO’s Supervisor signed the PNM. Nobody noticed the discrepancy. On April 28, 2016, the prime contract was modified and the subcontractor’s TSP was approved as submitted for 100% reimbursement. The DCMA TCO notified DCAA on May 3, 2016. And the DoG OIG Hotline received a complaint on August 22, 2016, alleging that the TCO “failed to comply with the [the FAR and the contract] when she did not uphold any of the [DCAA] questioned costs of $825,910 [and] authorized full payment of the $1,860,001 subcontractor’s termination settlement proposal.”
Needless to say, the DoD OIG substantiated those allegations.
But what’s interesting is what the TCO said during her interviews with the DoD OIG. According to the DoD OIG report, the TCO stated that she lacked experience and knowledge in how to deal with the issues involved with settling a TSP, including negotiating and documenting her evaluation of DCAA questioned costs. She stated that she “did not have any experience with contracting actions greater than $750,000 because prior to this termination, she only handled contracting actions below $750,000, which did not require negotiations involving DCAA audits…” The DoD OIG folks checked and confirmed that she had the requisite training; however, that training apparently didn’t stick. They would also have checked with the TCO’s supervisor, to try to figure out why he would have approved that PNM—but he retired a few months after the Hotline report had been submitted.
The TCO had her Warrant rescinded.
What about the contractor and the subcontractor, who had allegedly received $825,910 in cost reimbursements to which they were (allegedly) not entitled? According to the DoD OIG report—
[The TCO] issued a request for a voluntarily refund to the prime contractor. However, the contractor declined the request because the signed contract modification settling the termination costs was final and the contractor had already paid the subcontractor. DCMA determined that, because the DCMA Contracting Officer acted within the scope of her official duties, the Government is bound by the finality of her actions and, as a result, the funds cannot be recouped.
So that, it seems, was that.
One final thought:
The DoD OIG report didn’t really address the issue of the prime contractor’s role in this brouhaha. In fact, the report seemed to confuse the roles and responsibilities of the various parties involved in the termination process. For the record, FAR 49.107(b)(2) requires the prime contractor to review its subcontractors’ TSPs—even if they are also being reviewed by a governmental audit agency. The TSP Certification, executed by the prime contractor, states “The contractor has examined, or caused to be examined, to an extent it considered adequate in the circumstances, the termination settlement proposals of its immediate subcontractors...” There is a real question, at least in our minds, as to whether the prime contractor fulfilled its responsibilities in this situation.
Which leads us to this conclusion:
Readers, if you are a prime contractor or subcontractor in receipt of a “stop work” order or formal T4C Notice, we urge you to do a couple of things right away: (1) stop work, and (2) contact people who understand the termination process and know what to do. If you try to figure it out on your own, you may find yourselves the topic of your very own DoD OIG audit report.
Corruption at the Top
It is perhaps arguable whether anti-corruption training actually reduces instances of employee wrongdoing. After all, one might reasonably expect that employees already know their corrupt behaviors are wrong; do we really think reminding them of the rules one more time is going to affect their decision-making?
It is perhaps more certain that anti-corruption controls, both preventive and detective, reduce instances of employee wrongdoing. If employees know that they are likely to be found out, it might well affect their decision-making. If employees think the company is watching and checking, they might decide not to engage in corrupt behaviors.
But when there is corruption at the top—especially when there is collusion amongst executives who are ostensibly in charge of the anti-corruption controls—well then. That’s a different kettle of fish altogether. How are you going to prevent corruption in those circumstances?
It’s likely you cannot do so. Collusion makes corrupt behaviors easier to hide and collusion at the top makes them easier to carry out. In such circumstances, perhaps the best one can hope for is detection of the corruption after the fact.
In related news, we have another Department of Justice press release to discuss. In it, the DoJ announced that “Kristie Lynn McDonald [who] was the Vice President of Finance and Administration of a software company in Sterling, Virginia,” was recently sentenced to 15 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. She was ordered to pay $1.813 million in restitution.
What did Ms. McDonald do? According to the press release, she “conspired with the company’s Chief Executive Officer Robert Lewis to defraud the United States by failing to pay over to the IRS more than $1.8 million in payroll taxes withheld from employee paychecks.” The conspiracy to defraud took place over roughly a two-year period, between January 2011 through February 2013.
Interestingly, this DoJ press release actually gave some details of the corruption. It stated—
McDonald and Lewis circumvented the company’s normal payroll and accounting procedures by paying some employees with manual paychecks. The employees still received the correct pay after withholdings, but by bypassing the accounting system, McDonald and Lewis were able to hide the fact that the withholdings were not being paid over to the IRS. … [In addition] McDonald and Lewis failed to remit the full amount of employee retirement contributions to the company’s retirement plan. Through their actions, the company failed to transfer nearly $225,000 in voluntary employee retirement withholdings.
As part of their scheme, “they also caused the company to file false quarterly employment tax returns with the IRS that underreported the amount of tax due.”
The key point in the above is that the normal automated payroll system was bypassed by issuing manual payroll checks. That should have been a red flag to the payroll department; unfortunately, it’s likely that the payroll department reported to the VP of Finance and Administration—who probably made up some pretext as to the need for manual paychecks.
Routine payroll reconciliations and/or bank reconciliations might have caught the scheme. But guess who was responsible for seeing that those controls were performed? Yep. The VP of Finance and Administration.
Why did the CEO and VP of Finance and Administration collude together? According to the press release, “McDonald and Lewis used the misappropriated money to pay the operating expenses of the company, which included their own six figure salaries and salary raises for other employees.” They needed the cash “to conceal the company’s failing financial condition from its Board of Directors.”
Thus, it seems that the company had a cash-flow problem. It might even have had trouble making its payroll obligations. Rather than admit the problem and make some hard decisions about the company’s future, the CEO and VP of Finance and Administration conspired to steal money from employees (their 401(k) contributions) and from the U.S. Government (the employment taxes).
Not a good idea. But because the corrupt decision-making was at the top of the company, it was hard to prevent. Those individuals had override authority, and they probably used it to further their scheme. The corporate check on the executives—the Board of Directors—was kept in the dark.
It would be nice to understand how the scheme was finally detected. Did somebody perform a reconciliation and call the IRS? Did the IRS audit the tax returns and see the missing withholdings? We don’t know.
But this story provides a reminder that “tone at the top” is a critical aspect of ethics and business conduct systems. When the “tone at the top” is missing, the results tend to show up in the company’s financial results. When the corruption is at the top of the company, it’s just a matter of time until the company’s operations suffer an abrupt end.
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Whose Money Is It Anyway?
In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) awarded a complex and potentially very large contract to a company that subsequently became CB&I Areva MOX Services, LLC (“MOX Services”). The contract directed MOX Services to design and build a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (“MFFF”) at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River site, located near Aiken, South Carolina. The MFFF project was created to satisfy the nuclear non-proliferation agreement between the Russian Federation and the USA. When operational, the MOX facility will convert Russian legacy weapons-grade plutonium into fuel suitable for commercial power reactors. The NNSA awarded the contract’s Option 1 to MOX Services on a cost reimbursement basis, with MOX Services eligible to earn various types of fee or profit, including incentive fee. The contract included the standard FAR “changes” contract clause for cost-reimbursement contracts, 52.243-2.
Importantly, in order to more accurately estimate the costs of construction, the parties apportioned the risks. The NNSA took on certain risks that were expressly excluded from the contract's scope of work. In particular, the NNSA accepted risks related to the amount and timing of project funding, and agreed to process appropriate contract changes if the risk materialized. In addition, the contract specifically and broadly excluded risks “related to” the Russian parallel project requirements from its scope. Since the NNSA accepted these risks, they were beyond the scope of the contract, and their potential impacts on the project were not included in the MFFF cost or schedule estimates. Unsurprisingly, Congressional funding uncertainty and delays in the Russian project significantly impacted cost and schedule.
Stuff happens. What are you going to do?
One of the aspects of the MFFF construction contract was awarded on a cost-plus incentive fee (CPIF) basis. The available incentive fee was either 6.75% of estimated costs or 7.0% of estimated costs, depending on whether NNSA ordered a “hot start.” According to MOX Services, NNSA ordered a “hot start” and thus MOX Services was entitled to the 7.0% incentive fee band. However, the NNSA Contracting Officer used the 6.75% incentive fee band, a decision which led to a dispute. Further adding fuel to the dispute fire, NNSA suspended the quarterly incentive fee payments after making 12 payments (equaling $29.1 million). From February 2011 forward, MOX Services was not being paid the incentive fees to which it believed it was entitled.
Just to make matters more interesting, most of the incentive fees were “provisional” in nature, meaning that they “vested” in accordance with a contract schedule. “For at least the first year after MOX Services invoices for quarterly incentive fees, the entire incentive fee is provisional. For as long as MOX Services’ performance has remained within the cost and schedule parameters during the previous four quarters, 50% of the provisional incentive fee payment becomes final, and cannot be reclassified or taken back by NNSA. The other half of each quarter’s incentive fee remains provisional.” If MOX Services didn’t make sufficient construction progress within cost and schedule parameters, then it could lose its provisional incentive fees. At the point at which NNSA suspended the quarterly incentive fee payments, MOX Services had “vested” in about $7.5 million of the total payments, leaving about $21.6 million in “provisional” incentive fee payments.
MOX Services filed a certified claim for about $53 million, related to incentive fees it had allegedly been denied. Not only did the Contracting Officer reject the claim, they demanded immediate repayment of all provisional incentive fees MOX Services had received. MOX Services appealed the decision to the Court of Federal Claims.
Judge Wheeler described the dispute as follows:
On September 29, 2016, MOX Services submitted a certified claim to NNSA for approximately $53 million in suspended incentive fee, representing the incentive fee amounts from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 that NNSA has not paid. In responding to the certified claim on December 7, 2016, the contracting officer issued two final decisions in a single letter. Not only did the contracting officer deny the certified claim for $53 million, but he demanded MOX Services to refund all of the provisional incentive fee payments previously made. As relevant here, the contracting officer directed MOX Services to return $21.6 million in provisional incentive fee in MOX Services’ possession. Through a combination of direct payments and reduced NNSA payments of MOX Services’ invoices, MOX Services has satisfied NNSA’s demand for repayment of the provisional incentive fee plus interest.
In addition, NNSA refused to reimburse MOX Services for more than $2 million expended in outside legal fees and consultants associated with submitting a Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) to adjust the contract’s cost and schedule parameters for the impacts associated with funding and Russian performance.
So there were two issues before Judge Wheeler: (1) Did NNSA have the contractual authority to demand refund of the $21.6 million in provisional incentive fees before construction had been completed? and (2) did the CO have a valid basis for rejection of MOX Services’ invoice for REA preparation fees?
With respect to issue (1), Judge Wheeler wrote:
The NNSA’s attempt to claw back $21.6 million in provisional incentive fees is premised on the assertion that MOX Services has hopelessly exceeded the estimated project cost, has no chance of meeting the project schedule parameter, and thus will not be able to show entitlement to any incentive fees at project completion. In opposition, MOX Services maintains that the estimated project cost and schedule must be adjusted under the changes clause, FAR 52.243-2, because MOX Services is not responsible for the increased costs and schedule delays incurred to date. These contentions present factual issues that will be resolved in the other claims that MOX Services has submitted to the Court. It remains to be seen whether the estimated cost and schedule will require adjustment.
If that were the end of the opinion, we wouldn’t have bothered to write about it. Nope. Judge Wheeler had more to say, and what he had to say is important for those considering pushing a dispute with their government customers. He wrote—
Regardless of which party is responsible for the increased costs and schedule delays, none of the contract provisions permits the NNSA to claw back provisional incentive fees before the completion of the MFFF. What is most troubling here is that the contracting officer used the denial of MOX Services’ certified claim, and demand for refund of $21.6 million, as a way to gain leverage over MOX Services through baseless retaliation. The law requires contractors to certify that their claims are ‘made in good faith,’ that all ‘supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of the contractor’s knowledge and belief,’ and that the amount requested ‘accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the Federal Government is liable.’ Surely, a reciprocal obligation to act in good faith applies to the government. See Moreland Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 268, 292 (2007) (‘Under the Contract Disputes Act, a contracting officer’s review of certified claims submitted in good faith is not intended to be a negotiating game where the agency may deny meritorious claims to gain leverage over the contractor.’) The same reasoning applies where the contracting officer conjures up a baseless claim to demand immediate refund of provisional incentive fees.
[Emphasis added. Internal footnotes/citations omitted.]
Judge Wheeler directed NNSA to return the $21.6 million in had inappropriately taken from MOX Services upon receipt of an invoice for that amount.
With respect to Item (2), Judge Wheeler noted that NNSA Counsel had agreed with MOX Services that the CO lacked a valid rationale for denying payment of the more than $2 million it had expended in preparing its REA. Thus, MOX Services was entitled to reimbursement for those costs.
Judge Wheeler’s opinion also deals with other government arguments, which are worth reading. But we were struck by the part(s) we wrote about above.
One more thought: the original contractor, back in 1999, was Duke Cogema, Stone & Webster, LLC. Stone & Webster was a prestigious engineering company with a long pedigree. The company played a significant role in World War II industrial mobilization and production—including performing as a key contractor for the Manhattan Project. Unfortunately, by the late 1990’s, the company wasn’t operating at the same historic levels. It was acquired by The Shaw Group in the early 2000’s. In 2012, The Shaw Group sold it in two major pieces—and the nuclear power piece ended-up at Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I), who subsequently sold it to Westinghouse Electric Company, which was owned by Toshiba. In 2017, Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, citing losses from nuclear reactor construction projects.
We will never know how the NNSA Contracting Officer’s decisions, discussed in this article, which cost its contractor nearly $25 million in lost cash flow and an untold amount of unallowable legal fees pursuing its appeals, impacted the corporate financial situations related in the foregoing paragraph. Who knows what might have happened, had the CO dealt fairly with the contractor?
Contracting Officers Rely on DCAA Instead of Doing Their Jobs
It’s not the first time we’ve asserted that Contracting Officers rely on DCAA to tell them what to do. We’ve asserted that one FTA Contracting Officer relied on an audit report “like a crutch.” (See “The Sad, Yet, Illustrative Case of the PMO Partnership Joint Venture,” which can be found on this site in the members-only section.) Indeed, we are not the only ones asserting that point. In 2011, the GAO issued a report that stated DCMA was overly reliant on DCAA—at least with respect to contractor business system oversight. (See our article on the GAO report, here.)
In a recent decision, the ASBCA essentially said the same thing.
In the matter of Fluor Federal Solutions, Inc. (ASBCA No. 61353), the ASBCA was presented with a government argument that it lacked jurisdiction over Fluor’s appeal, asserting that the appeal “was premature because the Navy desired a DCAA audit before issuing a final decision.” In other words, the Contracting Officer felt unable to issue a final decision until DCAA issued an audit report.
Fluor disagreed, pointing out that a DCAA report might discuss quantum, but should not address entitlement. (Way back in 2009 we took umbrage at a DCAA audit report that discussed a contractor’s entitlement to omitted employee health and welfare costs.)
Importantly, Judge Clarke, writing for the Board, agreed with Fluor. He wrote—
We agree with Fluor's argument that an audit goes to quantum and is not needed to assess entitlement. We have held that a contracting officer's desire to conduct an audit does not change the status of a contractor's claim. Eaton Contract Services, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 54054, 54055. We deny the Navy's contention that the appeal is premature.
[Internal citations omitted.]
In other words, a Contracting Officer cannot use the fact that they may be awaiting a DCAA audit report as a valid reason for failing to issue a Final Decision within the timeframe specified by the Contract Disputes Act.
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