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Apogee Consulting Inc

Whose Money Is It Anyway?

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In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) awarded a complex and potentially very large contract to a company that subsequently became CB&I Areva MOX Services, LLC (“MOX Services”). The contract directed MOX Services to design and build a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (“MFFF”) at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River site, located near Aiken, South Carolina. The MFFF project was created to satisfy the nuclear non-proliferation agreement between the Russian Federation and the USA. When operational, the MOX facility will convert Russian legacy weapons-grade plutonium into fuel suitable for commercial power reactors. The NNSA awarded the contract’s Option 1 to MOX Services on a cost reimbursement basis, with MOX Services eligible to earn various types of fee or profit, including incentive fee. The contract included the standard FAR “changes” contract clause for cost-reimbursement contracts, 52.243-2.

Importantly, in order to more accurately estimate the costs of construction, the parties apportioned the risks. The NNSA took on certain risks that were expressly excluded from the contract's scope of work. In particular, the NNSA accepted risks related to the amount and timing of project funding, and agreed to process appropriate contract changes if the risk materialized. In addition, the contract specifically and broadly excluded risks “related to” the Russian parallel project requirements from its scope. Since the NNSA accepted these risks, they were beyond the scope of the contract, and their potential impacts on the project were not included in the MFFF cost or schedule estimates. Unsurprisingly, Congressional funding uncertainty and delays in the Russian project significantly impacted cost and schedule.

Stuff happens. What are you going to do?

One of the aspects of the MFFF construction contract was awarded on a cost-plus incentive fee (CPIF) basis. The available incentive fee was either 6.75% of estimated costs or 7.0% of estimated costs, depending on whether NNSA ordered a “hot start.” According to MOX Services, NNSA ordered a “hot start” and thus MOX Services was entitled to the 7.0% incentive fee band. However, the NNSA Contracting Officer used the 6.75% incentive fee band, a decision which led to a dispute. Further adding fuel to the dispute fire, NNSA suspended the quarterly incentive fee payments after making 12 payments (equaling $29.1 million). From February 2011 forward, MOX Services was not being paid the incentive fees to which it believed it was entitled.

Just to make matters more interesting, most of the incentive fees were “provisional” in nature, meaning that they “vested” in accordance with a contract schedule. “For at least the first year after MOX Services invoices for quarterly incentive fees, the entire incentive fee is provisional. For as long as MOX Services’ performance has remained within the cost and schedule parameters during the previous four quarters, 50% of the provisional incentive fee payment becomes final, and cannot be reclassified or taken back by NNSA. The other half of each quarter’s incentive fee remains provisional.” If MOX Services didn’t make sufficient construction progress within cost and schedule parameters, then it could lose its provisional incentive fees. At the point at which NNSA suspended the quarterly incentive fee payments, MOX Services had “vested” in about $7.5 million of the total payments, leaving about $21.6 million in “provisional” incentive fee payments.

MOX Services filed a certified claim for about $53 million, related to incentive fees it had allegedly been denied. Not only did the Contracting Officer reject the claim, they demanded immediate repayment of all provisional incentive fees MOX Services had received. MOX Services appealed the decision to the Court of Federal Claims.

Judge Wheeler described the dispute as follows:

On September 29, 2016, MOX Services submitted a certified claim to NNSA for approximately $53 million in suspended incentive fee, representing the incentive fee amounts from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 that NNSA has not paid. In responding to the certified claim on December 7, 2016, the contracting officer issued two final decisions in a single letter. Not only did the contracting officer deny the certified claim for $53 million, but he demanded MOX Services to refund all of the provisional incentive fee payments previously made. As relevant here, the contracting officer directed MOX Services to return $21.6 million in provisional incentive fee in MOX Services’ possession. Through a combination of direct payments and reduced NNSA payments of MOX Services’ invoices, MOX Services has satisfied NNSA’s demand for repayment of the provisional incentive fee plus interest.

In addition, NNSA refused to reimburse MOX Services for more than $2 million expended in outside legal fees and consultants associated with submitting a Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) to adjust the contract’s cost and schedule parameters for the impacts associated with funding and Russian performance.

So there were two issues before Judge Wheeler: (1) Did NNSA have the contractual authority to demand refund of the $21.6 million in provisional incentive fees before construction had been completed? and (2) did the CO have a valid basis for rejection of MOX Services’ invoice for REA preparation fees?

With respect to issue (1), Judge Wheeler wrote:

The NNSA’s attempt to claw back $21.6 million in provisional incentive fees is premised on the assertion that MOX Services has hopelessly exceeded the estimated project cost, has no chance of meeting the project schedule parameter, and thus will not be able to show entitlement to any incentive fees at project completion. In opposition, MOX Services maintains that the estimated project cost and schedule must be adjusted under the changes clause, FAR 52.243-2, because MOX Services is not responsible for the increased costs and schedule delays incurred to date. These contentions present factual issues that will be resolved in the other claims that MOX Services has submitted to the Court. It remains to be seen whether the estimated cost and schedule will require adjustment.

If that were the end of the opinion, we wouldn’t have bothered to write about it. Nope. Judge Wheeler had more to say, and what he had to say is important for those considering pushing a dispute with their government customers. He wrote—

Regardless of which party is responsible for the increased costs and schedule delays, none of the contract provisions permits the NNSA to claw back provisional incentive fees before the completion of the MFFF. What is most troubling here is that the contracting officer used the denial of MOX Services’ certified claim, and demand for refund of $21.6 million, as a way to gain leverage over MOX Services through baseless retaliation. The law requires contractors to certify that their claims are ‘made in good faith,’ that all ‘supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of the contractor’s knowledge and belief,’ and that the amount requested ‘accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the Federal Government is liable.’ Surely, a reciprocal obligation to act in good faith applies to the government. See Moreland Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 268, 292 (2007) (‘Under the Contract Disputes Act, a contracting officer’s review of certified claims submitted in good faith is not intended to be a negotiating game where the agency may deny meritorious claims to gain leverage over the contractor.’) The same reasoning applies where the contracting officer conjures up a baseless claim to demand immediate refund of provisional incentive fees.

[Emphasis added. Internal footnotes/citations omitted.]

Judge Wheeler directed NNSA to return the $21.6 million in had inappropriately taken from MOX Services upon receipt of an invoice for that amount.

With respect to Item (2), Judge Wheeler noted that NNSA Counsel had agreed with MOX Services that the CO lacked a valid rationale for denying payment of the more than $2 million it had expended in preparing its REA. Thus, MOX Services was entitled to reimbursement for those costs.

Judge Wheeler’s opinion also deals with other government arguments, which are worth reading. But we were struck by the part(s) we wrote about above.

One more thought: the original contractor, back in 1999, was Duke Cogema, Stone & Webster, LLC. Stone & Webster was a prestigious engineering company with a long pedigree. The company played a significant role in World War II industrial mobilization and production—including performing as a key contractor for the Manhattan Project. Unfortunately, by the late 1990’s, the company wasn’t operating at the same historic levels. It was acquired by The Shaw Group in the early 2000’s. In 2012, The Shaw Group sold it in two major pieces—and the nuclear power piece ended-up at Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I), who subsequently sold it to Westinghouse Electric Company, which was owned by Toshiba. In 2017, Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, citing losses from nuclear reactor construction projects.

We will never know how the NNSA Contracting Officer’s decisions, discussed in this article, which cost its contractor nearly $25 million in lost cash flow and an untold amount of unallowable legal fees pursuing its appeals, impacted the corporate financial situations related in the foregoing paragraph. Who knows what might have happened, had the CO dealt fairly with the contractor?

 

Corruption at the Top

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It is perhaps arguable whether anti-corruption training actually reduces instances of employee wrongdoing. After all, one might reasonably expect that employees already know their corrupt behaviors are wrong; do we really think reminding them of the rules one more time is going to affect their decision-making?

It is perhaps more certain that anti-corruption controls, both preventive and detective, reduce instances of employee wrongdoing. If employees know that they are likely to be found out, it might well affect their decision-making. If employees think the company is watching and checking, they might decide not to engage in corrupt behaviors.

But when there is corruption at the top—especially when there is collusion amongst executives who are ostensibly in charge of the anti-corruption controls—well then. That’s a different kettle of fish altogether. How are you going to prevent corruption in those circumstances?

It’s likely you cannot do so. Collusion makes corrupt behaviors easier to hide and collusion at the top makes them easier to carry out. In such circumstances, perhaps the best one can hope for is detection of the corruption after the fact.

In related news, we have another Department of Justice press release to discuss. In it, the DoJ announced that “Kristie Lynn McDonald [who] was the Vice President of Finance and Administration of a software company in Sterling, Virginia,” was recently sentenced to 15 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. She was ordered to pay $1.813 million in restitution.

What did Ms. McDonald do? According to the press release, she “conspired with the company’s Chief Executive Officer Robert Lewis to defraud the United States by failing to pay over to the IRS more than $1.8 million in payroll taxes withheld from employee paychecks.” The conspiracy to defraud took place over roughly a two-year period, between January 2011 through February 2013.

Interestingly, this DoJ press release actually gave some details of the corruption. It stated—

McDonald and Lewis circumvented the company’s normal payroll and accounting procedures by paying some employees with manual paychecks. The employees still received the correct pay after withholdings, but by bypassing the accounting system, McDonald and Lewis were able to hide the fact that the withholdings were not being paid over to the IRS. … [In addition] McDonald and Lewis failed to remit the full amount of employee retirement contributions to the company’s retirement plan. Through their actions, the company failed to transfer nearly $225,000 in voluntary employee retirement withholdings.

As part of their scheme, “they also caused the company to file false quarterly employment tax returns with the IRS that underreported the amount of tax due.”

The key point in the above is that the normal automated payroll system was bypassed by issuing manual payroll checks. That should have been a red flag to the payroll department; unfortunately, it’s likely that the payroll department reported to the VP of Finance and Administration—who probably made up some pretext as to the need for manual paychecks.

Routine payroll reconciliations and/or bank reconciliations might have caught the scheme. But guess who was responsible for seeing that those controls were performed? Yep. The VP of Finance and Administration.

Why did the CEO and VP of Finance and Administration collude together? According to the press release, “McDonald and Lewis used the misappropriated money to pay the operating expenses of the company, which included their own six figure salaries and salary raises for other employees.” They needed the cash “to conceal the company’s failing financial condition from its Board of Directors.”

Thus, it seems that the company had a cash-flow problem. It might even have had trouble making its payroll obligations. Rather than admit the problem and make some hard decisions about the company’s future, the CEO and VP of Finance and Administration conspired to steal money from employees (their 401(k) contributions) and from the U.S. Government (the employment taxes).

Not a good idea. But because the corrupt decision-making was at the top of the company, it was hard to prevent. Those individuals had override authority, and they probably used it to further their scheme. The corporate check on the executives—the Board of Directors—was kept in the dark.

It would be nice to understand how the scheme was finally detected. Did somebody perform a reconciliation and call the IRS? Did the IRS audit the tax returns and see the missing withholdings? We don’t know.

But this story provides a reminder that “tone at the top” is a critical aspect of ethics and business conduct systems. When the “tone at the top” is missing, the results tend to show up in the company’s financial results. When the corruption is at the top of the company, it’s just a matter of time until the company’s operations suffer an abrupt end.

 

Proposed FAR Rule Would Impact Definition of “Adequate Price Competition”

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The NDAA giveth; the NDAA taketh away.

Recently, we have published a series of articles discussing how the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) increased several important acquisition thresholds--notably, the threshold at which certified cost or pricing data must be obtained. The threshold applies both to government acquisitions and to contractor acquisitions. The “TINA threshold” was raised from $750,000 to $2 million, which we thought was a good thing.

But a recent proposed FAR rule, FAR Case 2017-006, reminded us that not all Congressional acquisition reforms work to the benefit of contractors. The proposed rule would (partially) implement Section 822 of the FY2017 NDAA by redefining “adequate price competition” for the General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Defense (DoD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Importantly, the change would not affect other agencies (e.g., Department of Energy or Environmental Protection Agency) because the NDAA was not directed at them. (We’ll note, however, that we have seen the other agencies adopt NDAA-based acquisition reforms, and they could do so here, as well.)

The proposed rule, if finalized as drafted, would limit the circumstances in which “adequate price competition” would exist. This matters because, if there is adequate price competition, then certified cost or pricing data need not be obtained. Indeed, if there is adequate price competition, then the contracting officer (or prime contractor buyer) is prohibited from obtaining certified cost or pricing data. Thus, some of the workload reductions given by raising the threshold to $2 million would be taken away by the proposed rule.

Currently, there are three circumstances in which adequate price competition can be found to exist. Without quoting FAR 15.403-1(c) in its entirety, they are:

  1. At least two offers are received for evaluation

  2. There was a reasonable expectation that at least two offers would be received, even though only one offer was actually received

  3. “Price analysis clearly demonstrates that the proposed price is reasonable in comparison with current or recent prices for the same or similar items, adjusted to reflect changes in market conditions, economic conditions, quantities, or terms and conditions under contracts that resulted from adequate price competition.”

Most people know the first set of circumstances, but fewer people know the other two sets of circumstances. Regardless, the proposed rule would (for affected agencies) establish that adequate price competition exists “only if two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, submit responsive and viable offers.” Period.

If you were one of the many who only followed the first definition of adequate price competition, then you probably won’t be impacted very much by the proposed rule. But if you were one of the few who used all three definitions—because they offered ways to reduce workload and shorten proposal lead times—then you will definitely be impacted. We suspect you won’t be very happy with the proposed rule.

We do not care for the proposed rule. If you are one of the contractors that don’t like either then you may, if you wish, follow the link in the first sentence and find out how to submit a comment. However, we don’t expect it will matter very much, because the proposed rule is basically just implementing the language in the NDAA.

We were interested to note that the FAR Councils have chosen to implement only a part of Section 822 of the FY2017 NDAA. The part that is not included in the proposed rule concerns prime contractor determinations of adequate price competition.

The NDAA language that was omitted from the proposed rule is—

DETERMINATION BY PRIME CONTRACTOR.—A prime contractor required to submit certified cost or pricing data under subsection (a) with respect to a prime contract shall be responsible for determining whether a subcontract under such contract qualifies for an exception under paragraph (1)(A) from such requirement.

We are not certain, but we believe the language above would clarify that the prime contractor’s determination that its subcontractor(s) do not need to submit certified cost or pricing data to it (because adequate price competition was achieved) could not be overruled by a contracting officer’s finding to the contrary. However, that is conjecture and should not be relied upon. Further, note that the prime contractor would be “responsible” for determining whether or not adequate price competition existed. If an audit or review subsequently found that the prime contractor had made a mistake, then that prime contractor might well be the subject of defective pricing allegations. Further—as we’ve seen before—if DCAA asserts that the subcontractor’s price was unreasonable, then the auditors may question up to 100 percent of subcontractor costs as being unallowable. So the language is definitely not a “get out of jail free” card.

When the TINA (and other acquisition) thresholds were raised by the NDAA, we told contractors to update their procedures. Given the language in the proposed rule—which is almost certain to be finalized as drafted, or very close to it—we suggest that contractors should prepare to update their procedures once again.

 

Contracting Officers Rely on DCAA Instead of Doing Their Jobs

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It’s not the first time we’ve asserted that Contracting Officers rely on DCAA to tell them what to do. We’ve asserted that one FTA Contracting Officer relied on an audit report “like a crutch.” (See “The Sad, Yet, Illustrative Case of the PMO Partnership Joint Venture,” which can be found on this site in the members-only section.) Indeed, we are not the only ones asserting that point. In 2011, the GAO issued a report that stated DCMA was overly reliant on DCAA—at least with respect to contractor business system oversight. (See our article on the GAO report, here.)

In a recent decision, the ASBCA essentially said the same thing.

In the matter of Fluor Federal Solutions, Inc. (ASBCA No. 61353), the ASBCA was presented with a government argument that it lacked jurisdiction over Fluor’s appeal, asserting that the appeal “was premature because the Navy desired a DCAA audit before issuing a final decision.” In other words, the Contracting Officer felt unable to issue a final decision until DCAA issued an audit report.

Fluor disagreed, pointing out that a DCAA report might discuss quantum, but should not address entitlement. (Way back in 2009 we took umbrage at a DCAA audit report that discussed a contractor’s entitlement to omitted employee health and welfare costs.)

Importantly, Judge Clarke, writing for the Board, agreed with Fluor. He wrote—

We agree with Fluor's argument that an audit goes to quantum and is not needed to assess entitlement. We have held that a contracting officer's desire to conduct an audit does not change the status of a contractor's claim. Eaton Contract Services, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 54054, 54055. We deny the Navy's contention that the appeal is premature.

[Internal citations omitted.]

In other words, a Contracting Officer cannot use the fact that they may be awaiting a DCAA audit report as a valid reason for failing to issue a Final Decision within the timeframe specified by the Contract Disputes Act.


 

Reminder That Human Trafficking Is a (Very Bad) Thing

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As we told readers more than three years ago, the chances are that your government contract has a clause in it that prohibits human trafficking. Which is a great goal and we’re sure you would never, ever, violate that contractual prohibition.

Do you have that contract clause?

It’s FAR 52.222-50 (“Combating Trafficking in Persons,” March 2015). Why don’t you go look and see if you have it? We’ll wait.

You probably have it, because the clause is required to be inserted in every single solicitation and contract issued by the government. So let’s assume you’re going to find it—at least, it will be listed in Section I of your contract, which is for clauses incorporated by reference.

Good. Now: have you read it?

Yeah, you’re probably going to want to read it. It’s long and perhaps you don’t think it really applies to you—because you’re not that kind of company—but we suggest you read it anyway. It says more than you probably think it does.

We mean to say that the clause contains more compliance requirements than simply “don’t traffic in human beings.” Because if that’s all it said, most of us would be good and we wouldn’t need to even write a blog article about the clause.

But oh no, dear readers, it says more than you think it does.

Among many other things, the contract clause 52.222-50 prohibits “procuring commercial sex acts during the period of performance of the contract.” Anywhere. Even where procuring such may be legal.

It used to be that what happened on R&R stayed on R&R, but no longer. Now what happens on R&R can really cause some corporate problems.

Read our article (link in the first sentence) about what the clause requires, in terms of compliance. Read the clause itself. Understand what you need to do, and understand what your employees, agents, and suppliers cannot do.

After reading all that, you might be prepared to appreciate this DoJ press release, in which it was announced that a “contractor for the Department of Defense” was sentenced to six years in prison for “engaging in commercial sex with a minor in the Philippines.” The press release provided the sordid details, to wit—

On April 19, James Marvin Reed, 62, pleaded guilty to engaging in illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place. According to court documents, from in or about September 2007 until in or about December 2007, Reed, then 52 years old, engaged in commercial sexual intercourse on multiple occasions with the then 14-year-old victim, and impregnated her, while he was working in the Philippines as a contractor for the U.S. Department of Defense. In 2016, he was arrested by Philippine authorities and returned to the United States for prosecution.

Of course, nothing like that would ever happen to any of your employees, who are all upstanding citizens of the highest levels of integrity.

But are you sure of that?

How do you know?

How do you know for sure?

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.