John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2019
With the passing of Senator McCain it seems appropriate to review the 2019 NDAA, named after him to honor his service to the country, both as Sailor and as Senator.
As always, we are deeply indebted to Bob Antonio’s WIFCON site, and to the work he does piecing together the annual public law in a manner that supports analysis. If you are not visiting WIFCON at least weekly, you are likely missing important information. And as always, we are providing readers only with a high-level summary of statutory changes that impact government contracting and government contract cost accounting. We urge readers not to rely on our synopses, but instead to review the language in detail.
In this legislation, we see some of the seeds planted by the Section 809 Panel bearing fruit. It’s obvious that Congress accepted several of the Panel’s recommendations. For example, Sections 812 and 813, which repeal certain outdated statutes and DoD reporting requirements, look very much like Section 809 Panel recommendations.
Perhaps the most important statutory change concerns modifications to the current language regarding commercial items, found in Section 836 of the NDAA, to be effective 01 January 2020. Going forward, there will be separate definitions for “commercial products” and “commercial services.” The definitions are a bit complicated, so if you want to review them, please follow the link provided.
There are some more interesting nuggets; for example, paying small businesses in 15 days. And Section 821 foot-stomped the DoD’s reluctance to increase the micro-purchase threshold to $10,000, as Congress intended it to do last year. Further, Section 878 had some stuff to say about measuring PALT (a topic on which we have opined in the past.) However, not much jumps out as requiring reporting (unlike last year). We were interested in the parts left on the table during conference. For example, a revised definition of “subcontract” was not adopted. In our opinion, that revised definition was needed.
Interestingly, and in contrast to prior NDAAs, we did not see a single provision in the public law related to DCAA. Last year, we devoted an entire article to DCAA-related changes in the NDAA. This year, nothing.
So what happened? Why is this year’s NDAA less full of impactful changes than last year’s, or the NDAA of the year before? Has Congress grown weary of acquisition reform, or were legislators perhaps distracted by other matters?
We don’t know. But what we do know is that this is the shortest article we’ve devoted to an NDAA. Ever.
However, we do have one more related comment to make.
Recently, rule-makers at the DoD published a notice inviting “early inputs” on how to best implement the acquisition rule changes made by the 2019 NDAA. “The public is invited to submit early inputs on sections of the NDAA for FY 2019 via the DARS website.
So if you have thoughts that might help the DAR Council or others implement things such as the new definition of “commercial item,” you should follow the link and submit those thoughts for consideration.
New DFARS Stuff
On the same day that two DFARS rules went bye-bye, ostensibly in response to the President’s Executive Order to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens on the public, the DAR Council published six proposed DFARS rules. Some of the rules purportedly streamline the current regulations; at least one rule adds onerous requirements.
Let’s discuss, shall we?
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DFARS Case 2017-D034 would, if implemented as drafted, would require DoD contractor employees to complete Level 1 anti-terrorism training, as discussed DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-2000.16, Volume 1, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DoD AT Standards (available here). “The training is required within 30 days of requiring access and annually thereafter and must be completed either through DoD-sponsored and certified computer or web-based distance learning instruction, or under the instruction of a qualified Level I antiterrorism awareness instructor.” Contractors should make sure to estimate the costs of compliance when bidding a contract that requires access.
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DFARS Case 2018-D011 would permit for more than five offerors on solicitations issued using two-phase design-build selection procedures for indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts that exceed $4 million. Currently, permitting more than five offerors requires approval by the Head of Contracting Activity.
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DFARS Case 2018-D028 would eliminate the current clause 252.247-7024 (“Notification of Supplies By Sea”) by combining that language within the language of another clause: 252.247-7023 (“Transportation of Supplies By Sea”). This streamlining effort is based on a recommendation from the DoD Regulatory Reform Task Force, which received two public comments on these clauses. This action is actually a bit of a compromise, as the two comments recommended eliminating both clauses altogether—pointing out that the clauses were based on a 1904 Statute. (“Both respondents recommended DoD remove these clauses, as they are based on the requirements of the Cargo Preference Act of 1904 (10 U.S.C. 2631), which was written at a time before many modern forms of cargo transportation were invented and overly burdens the DoD supply chain to use US-flag ships. The respondents also suggested that DoD follow the less burdensome Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (46 U.S.C. 1241(b)).”) However, the Regulatory Reform Task Force declined to do so—likely because they were not a Statutory Reform Task Force.
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DFARS Case 2017-D011 would implement a requirement from the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to “apply domestic source requirements to acquisitions at or below the simplified acquisition threshold when acquiring athletic footwear to be furnished to enlisted members of the Armed Forces upon their initial entry into the Armed Forces, and add Australia and the United Kingdom to the definition of the ‘National Technology and Industrial Base.’” In other words, such acquisitions shall be subject to the Berry Act and must be provided only by domestic sources. Okay, then.
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DFARS Case 2018-D007 would “sunset” certain requirements imposed by Congress on DoD via the 2015 NDAA. The rule applies primarily to photovoltaic devices acquired under certain contracts (e.g., energy savings performance contracts, utility energy service contracts, or private housing contracts.) As explained in the proposed rule, “This proposed rule essentially reinstates the DFARS regulations as they existed prior to publication of the final rule under DFARS Case 2015-D007 on November 20, 2015 [with certain exceptions].”
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DFARS Case 2017-D019 would impact contract financing payments. We’ll discuss it separately, in the next article.
This has been your “new DFARS stuff” article. We hope you enjoyed it.
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Proposed DFARS Rule on Contract Financing Payments
Lots of regulatory actions recently. We told readers about rules going bye-bye, rules being sunsetted, and rules being added. This article focuses on DFARS Case 2017-D019, a proposed rule that impacts contract financing payments.
Remember, this is a proposed rule, not a final rule. Public comments are being solicited and it’s possible (though unlikely) that they could affect the language of the final rule. So if you don’t like what you’re reading, we urge you to submit a comment to the rule-makers. Instructions for how to submit comments are in the text of the rule (link in the second sentence above). There will also be a public meeting on the topic, and you can offer comments in that forum, if you have a mind to do so. The point is: the rule is likely to be controversial and the rule-makers know it.
So what does this proposed rule propose to do?
Well, quite a bit, actually.
First, the rule purportedly implements Section 831 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). That piece of legislation pointedly reminded DoD that it was not following the requirements of FAR 32.1001, “which established performance-based payments as the preferred Government financing mechanism.” As we’ve noted in this blog from time to time, DoD has decided that it doesn’t like performance-based payments (PBPs) and has tried to disincentivize their use, despite statutory and regulatory language to the contrary. Section 831 was Congress’ way of telling DoD to stop it.
Did it work? You be the judge. The following are exact quotes from the comments in the proposed rule.
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DoD proposes to amend DFARS 232.1004 to remove the procedures for analysis of proposed performance-based payments using the performance-based payments analysis tool, and also removes the requirement that the contractor provide consideration to the Government, if the performance-based payments payment schedule will be more favorable to the contractor than customary progress payments. The current solicitation provisions at DFARS 252.232-7012 and 252.232-7013 are no longer required and will be removed, thus reducing burden on contractors.
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For maximum performance-based payments, DoD proposes rates and procedures comparable to those for determining the customary progress payment rate. The same representation will be used to determine both the customary progress payment rate and the maximum performance-based payment rate.
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… the contracting officer will not withhold progress or performance-based payments from a contract that includes the clause 252.232-7004 or the provision 252.232-70YY, unless the contractor is receiving progress payments or performance-based payments under the contract at a rate specified in CBAR that includes the 10 percent incentive based on having acceptable business systems without significant deficiencies.
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DoD proposes a customary progress payment rate of 50 percent for other than small businesses and retains the 90 percent rate for small businesses, but provides criteria by which contractors can achieve a customary progress payment rate of up to 95 percent. However, if a contractor or any of its principals has within the preceding Government fiscal year been convicted of or had a civil judgment rendered against the contractor or any of its principals for commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public (Federal, State, or local) contract or subcontract; violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes relating to the submission of offers; or commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, tax evasion, violating Federal criminal tax laws, or receiving stolen property, then the contractor will not be eligible for any incentives and the customary progress payment rate will be 25 percent for that contractor.
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On December 1 of each year, a contractor, or higher-level owner of a contractor, may submit a representation as to which criteria it meets and request a higher customary progress payment rate. Based on the representation received, the Director of Defense Pricing and Contracting will determine the appropriate customary progress payment rate for the following calendar year, and that data will be entered into the Contract Business Analysis Repository (CBAR) by December 31.
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If a contractor fails to submit by the December 1 deadline, then the rate for that contractor in CBAR will be 50 percent if the offeror is other than a small business and 90 percent if the offeror is a small business, unless the rate is 25 percent as provided in DFARS 232.501-1(a)(ii). If the offeror subsequently submits a representation after the December 1 deadline, any increase in rates will not be effective in CBAR until 30 days after submission.
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The rate may be adjusted at any time during the year if it is subsequently determined that the representation provided by a contractor was not accurate.
So how did the rule-makers do?
Our reading of the proposed rule is that they did not do very well. The customary progress payment rate for large businesses would fall to 50 percent of incurred costs; even though a contractor could earn a higher payment rate, our experience tells us that doing so would be difficult. The PBP valuations would be pegged to the same analysis used for progress payments based on costs—i.e., starting at 50 percent of contract value. In our view, this defeats the intent of PBPs, which is to divorce financial payments from cost incurrence and, instead, tie them to programmatic progress.
If you are a large business that currently receives customary progress payments based on costs incurred, you really should dig into the proposed language and see what it does to your cash flow. Our prediction: nothing good.
On the other hand, the DoD will be rescinding its nonsense about PBPs, which is nice. Too bad the rule-makers had to tie those actions to somethings that were less nice.
DFARS Clauses Going Bye-Bye
On February 24, 2017, the President signed Executive Order (E.O.) #13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” which established a Federal policy “to alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens” on the American people. To carry out the POTUS’s E.O., the DoD established a “Regulatory Reform Task Force” and solicited public input. Surprisingly, the Task Force listened to the public input (at least, they listened to some of the public input) and we are now—a year after the Task Force was established—seeing the elimination of a couple of DFARS clauses.
The first clause to go bye-bye is 252.247-7006 (“Removal of Contractor's Employees”). The final rule eliminating that clause is here. According to the rule-makers (or “rule-killers,” if you will)—
The DFARS clause served as an agreement from the contractor to only use experienced, responsible, and capable people to perform the work under the stevedoring contract. The clause also advised the contractor that the contracting officer may require the contractor to remove from the job, employees who endanger persons or property or whose employment is inconsistent with the interest of military security. [However] the information conveyed in DFARS clause 252.247-7006 is directly related to performance of the work under a stevedoring contract. It is more appropriate to define what the Government considers an experienced, responsible, and capable employee to be in a performance work statement, not a contract clause, because those requirements may change depending on various factors of the work being performed. If the need to remove employees from performing under the contract exists, it should be identified in the performance work statement. The removal and replacement of employees directly relates to the contractor's ability to perform and staff the work under the contract. As such, this DFARS clause is unnecessary and can be removed.
The contract clause has been around since 1991. Apparently, DoD is just now realizing—with a push from POTUS—that the clause is unnecessary. And you thought the CAS Board moved slowly!
The second bit of unnecessary regulatory verbiage to be removed is the language at DFARS 231.205-18(c)(iii)(C)(4), which required major contractors to engage in and document a technical interchange with the Government, prior to generating independent research and development (IR&D) costs for IR&D projects initiated in fiscal year 2017 and later, in order for those costs to be determined to be allowable. We’ve written about this piece of pernicious nonsense before, more than once. (See, for example, this article.)
The rule was stillborn upon delivery. Implementation problems at the DoD coupled with contractor push-back effectively killed it. A DFARS Class Deviation acknowledged the rule was dead. But now we have a final rule that not only sticks the final nail in the coffin, but also buries that coffin at the bottom of the Mariana Trench.
According to the rule-killing comments, no public input was received and the rule is being killed at the behest of the Task Force. Well, not exactly. We know for a fact that certain industry associations were bombarding DoD leadership with respectful, but firm, demands to kill this rule. In any case, the DoD Task Force “determined that the DFARS coverage was outmoded and recommended removal, since requiring a technical interchange between the Government and major contractors is unnecessary. The objective of the interchange can be met through other means.”
So that rule went bye-bye.
Next up: Proposed regulatory language and requirements to be added to the DFARS, because hey, why not? It’s not like POTUS has a problem with regulatory burdens, right?
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