Name Change
They say you can’t judge a book by its cover but, perhaps, one can glean something from an organizational name or title. When one receives an email from an individual running a small business, whose signature includes: Founder, CEO, President, COO, and CFO then (perhaps) that offers a small insight into that individual’s character. Similarly, when one’s LinkedIn profile includes all the Certifications and Degrees right there in the title (just after the name) then that might say something as well.
In the mid-90’s it was called Defense Procurement and Acquisition Reform. That told you right there what the mission was.
Later, it became Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). For many years, DPAP executed its mission to be “responsible for all acquisition and procurement policy matters in the [DoD], including serving as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary on acquisition/procurement strategies for all major weapon systems programs, major automated information systems programs, and services acquisitions.” Clearly, the new mission had de-emphasized acquisition reform in favor of strategic advisory services (“strategery”?).
A while ago DPAP spun off “Defense Pricing” which didn’t seem to have any mission of its own. At least, it didn’t have a separate website and it was challenging to figure out the chain of command. As one might guess from the title, Defense Pricing focused on the price paid by the DoD for its weapon systems. An early Defense Pricing initiative was “should-cost” analyses. Defense Pricing advised the F-35 PEO regarding negotiating strategies.
While Defense Pricing was doing its thing, DPAP continued to update the DFARS and the associated PGI, as interim and final rules were issued. Our opinion of that process is, shall we say, well known to readers of this blog.
And then Congress forced a reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) and the ripple effects caused a reunion (so to speak) of Defense Pricing and DPAP, under the sole direction of the Director of Defense Pricing/Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy. And that combined organization executed its mission—which was basically the old mission—for several months.
Then, on September 11, 2018, the organization changed its name. It is now known as Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPC). See this memo.
As we noted above, if you go by the organization’s name, you might think that it’s now superseding the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and is managing contracting activity on behalf of DoD. That does not seem to be the case.
Yet.
In fact, the mission of the newly named organization is a bit unclear at the moment. The announcement memo (link above) states “The DPC office is currently evaluating our mission, function, and responsibility. Additional information will be provided at a later date based on our determinations.”
So time will tell exactly how DPC will contribute to the success of the warfighters.
In the meantime, the newly named organization announced on August 21, 2018, that some scammers are trying to represent themselves as being DP/DPAP/DPC. The announcement (found on the DP/DPAP/DPC website, stated, “We have been advised that an individual may be impersonating Mr. Shay Assad, Director, Defense Pricing and Contracting (formerly Defense Pricing/Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy) by email and/or telephone in an attempt to obtain software/equipment/etc. This office does not issue solicitations or buy directly; we are a policy office. The Pentagon Force Protection Agency advises you contact your local law enforcement office if you question the legitimacy of a request or solicitation. Also, forwarding a copy of the suspect email to
This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
enables the Department to track the email as a phishing attempt.”
So if somebody reaches out to you and says they are Shay Assad, Director, DPC (or Director of any other DoD directorate), and asks for software/equipment/etc., then you should report the scam as requested above.
CAS Board Struggles
We’ve written several articles about the CAS Board and how it’s struggled for relevance over the past decade or so. In fact, if you Google “CAS Board” some of our articles show up. That’s a telling result. Not only does it indicate that our articles on the topic are of interest but—more importantly—it clearly demonstrates the paucity of actual links to anything the CAS Board might be doing in the shadows of the Old Executive Office Building.
As we’ve documented, the Trump Administration took down the CAS Board site and replaced it with … nothing. Although the CAS Board has uploaded a couple of items to the White House site, you almost have to stumble upon them.
For example, a list of the current members of the CAS Board was uploaded in November, 2017. You would only know this if you did a Google (or similar) search for it.
Another November, 2017, upload was a Federal Register notice that the Disclosure Statement (CASB Form DS-1) was being revised. It was a 1996 notice. We have no idea why it was deemed so important that it merited an upload.
A more recent upload dates from April, 2018. It is the planned agenda for CAS Board Meeting No. 76. It indicates that the Board plans to hear from members of the Section 809 Panel’s CAS Team 9, addressing the topic “Modernizing CAS”—followed by “CAS Board Recap & Discussion.”
The upload of the meeting agenda for Meeting No. 74 (held February, 2018) has much more content. It includes topic such as “the applicability of commercial standards to CAS,” and “CAS applicability and coverage thresholds” to both ID/IQ and hybrid contracts.
The meeting agenda for Meeting No. 75 shows that there is a new member—Yvonne Hinson, CPA, CGMA, Ph.D. You wouldn’t know that if you went by the official list of Board members (link above), but you’d know it if you Googled each meeting, trying to figure out what in tarnation the CAS Board is actually trying to accomplish.
For the record, we were unable to locate any agenda from any “Meeting No. 77,” so perhaps the agenda has not yet been uploaded.
Based on the foregoing, it’s clear that that the CAS Board is meeting and is having discussions. However, since no meeting minutes have been published, it’s difficult to see if the Board is making any progress. The situation is opaque in the extreme.
On the other hand, information is leaking out via other—quite unofficial—means. The industry associations seem to have some insight into the issues with which the CAS Board is struggling. As we noted in a recent article, the CAS Board has been charged with converging CAS and GAAP. Our perception is that the effort isn’t going very well.
In fact, the July, 2018, issue of Government Contract Costs, Pricing & Accounting Report (Vol. 13, Issue 4), printed in full the letter of resignation from long-time CAS Board Staff member Eric Shipley, who has been with the CAS Board since 1994. The letter of resignation was respectful, but pointed. It was clear that Mr. Shipley had a difference of opinion with current CAS Board leadership.
For example, he wrote: “… under current CAS Board leadership, presenting an analysis of all public comments or even merely communicating alternative viewpoints and approaches appears not to be welcome. I find it almost inconceivable that the OFPP staff believes a full presentation and discussion of public comments is apparently beyond the CAS Board’s interest.” (Emphasis in original.)
Mr. Shipley also seemed to plead with the Board to slow things down. He wrote, “I urge the Board to instruct the Work Group to focus on the issue identified by the public and keep the scope of the rules limited. I also urge the Board to … develop an ANPRM [advanced notice of proposed rulemaking], and not to focus on a stand-alone Staff Discussion Paper that is not needed.” With respect to timing, he wrote “Even taking these actions, I would not expect an ANPRM to be drafted, reviewed by OMB, processed by OIRA and prepared for publication in the Federal Register before 2019.” [Ed. Note: We may have misinterpreted his comment; he may have been asking for the Board to speed things up. In which case, YES.]
(Readers may note that we think the CAS Board is moving sufficiently slowly already. We compared their rulemaking speed to “molasses flowing over ice at the North Pole.”)
There was more to it, of course. The resignation letter ran about 10 paragraphs.
The resignation letter is an indication of tension between the Board and its Staff. As noted above, the Board has a mission to try to converge CAS and GAAP accounting practices. It is clear that Mr. Shipley, at least, did not support that mission. (He wrote, “There is a current case which seems to favor GAAP over the CAS although each set of standards serve a unique purpose.”)
But nobody would know any of this from the CAS Board itself. There is no coherent messaging, no overall communication strategy. Part of this obviously stems from the Trump Administration’s focus on things other than CAS (or even reform of CAS administration). But we suspect that the remainder of the gap comes from a loss of focus on transparency. Which is a shame.
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Rent vs. Lease vs. Buy
In what appears to us to be yet another sign of the dumbing-down of acquisition professionals, the FAR Councils published a proposed rule that would revise FAR Part 7.4 to “clarify … that the term ‘lease,’ as used in the subpart, includes the ‘rental’ of equipment.” Yes, because it was completely unclear for the past 34 years that the term “rental” was semantically equivalent to the term “lease.” Nobody ever understood that when the FAR told Federal acquisition professionals attempting to perform a lease versus purchase analysis to “consider … cumulative rental payments for the estimated period of use” (under the Subsection heading of “Equipment Lease or Purchase”) it was completely misusing terms, and therefore the Federal acquisition professionals who were required to adhere to the requirements were being confused.
And thus the required lease versus purchase analyses were being screwed-up. All because people were confused between “rental” and “lease”.
We are not making this up.
In fairness, it is possible that somebody looking to split hairs might argue that “rental” applies only to land or property (going by the online definition), whereas “lease” could apply to anything (including land or property). And a “rental period” is, technically, only 30 days and is automatically renewed each period, whereas a “lease” is for a specified period. Those are real differences. But Holy Heck is that a convoluted way to approach regulatory analysis! You know a lawyer must have been involved, because the differences (such as they are) are all legal differences. Legal nuances, so to speak.
However, even the FAR Councils weren’t willing to admit that there was a real semantic difference between the two terms. The new proposed language would tell Federal acquisition folks that—
While there are some differences between renting and leasing in many industries, there is no standard distinction between both renting and leasing that spans across all industries. Rental agreements are typically for shorter periods of time than lease agreements. Additionally, maintenance requirements and financial terms (e.g., fees or payment terms) differ between a lease and a rental agreement.
(Emphasis added.)
If there is no real difference and if we should all expect reasonable professionals to figure out that when the FAR says “cumulative rental payments” (under the direction regarding how to do a lease versus purchase analysis) it might be talking about the actual cumulative payments under a lease, then why did the FAR Councils feel such a burning need to address this issue?
In the comments associated with the proposed rule, we were told that “The objective of the rule is to ensure the value of rental agreements are included in the decision on whether to lease or purchase equipment. … Based on Fiscal Year 2016 data from the Federal Procurement Data System, the Government issued approximately 34,925 contract actions for the rent/lease or purchase of equipment.”
In other words, there were no known cases of a lease versus purchase analysis not being performed (or being performed incorrectly) because some hack argued that “rental payments” were somehow different from “lease payments.” Nope. Instead, the FAR Councils decided to attack this … issue … because there were a lot of transactions that required a lease versus purchase analysis—and they wanted to make it super clear to even those Federal acquisition folks at the lowest levels of reading comprehension exactly how to perform such a lease versus purchase analysis.
And just to be absolutely rock-solid certain that all Federal acquisition professionals were given a complete toolset that could be used to perform a lease versus purchase analysis—
The rule also adds a helpful link to a GSA site that provides additional guidance on renting and leasing equipment and updates the GSA office from which agencies may request information when making lease or purchase decisions. In addition, weblinks have been added to the rule for Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance for lease-purchase analysis, see Special Guidance for Lease-purchase Analysis (Section 13 of (OMB) Circular A-94, also see 8.c.(2)); and OMB Circular A-11 Appendix B Budgetary Treatment of Lease-Purchases and Leases of Capital Assets.
Apparently reading comprehension, and basic business analysis skills, are in such dire straits within the Federal acquisition corps that “helpful” links are being added to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, so as to walk “professionals” through the process.
We are not making this up.
It’s pretty clear—or it absolutely should be—that before entering into a lease, one should determine whether it is more economically beneficial to instead purchase. This is just Financial Analysis 101. But rather than find acquisition professionals who can actually do Financial Analysis 101, the FAR Councils have chosen to accept the current state of the workforce and simply walk the “professionals” through the required steps, with lots of hand-holding “helpful links” to make sure they don’t stumble along the way.
Anyway, as with all proposed rules, the public (that’s you) is invited to submit comments. Follow the link above (in the first sentence) if you wish to provide input to the FAR Council’s deliberative rule-making process. We do not encourage anybody to mock the rule-makers, as tempting as it may be—though of course we’ve taken that liberty here, within this blog article.
New DoD Micro-purchase Threshold
Finally.
We’ve been following the strange reluctance of the DoD to comply with Congressional intent regarding the micro-purchase threshold. The 2018 NDAA raised the threshold to $10,000. DoD issued a Class Deviation raising the threshold, but only to $5,000. We reported at the time: “Interestingly, DoD chose to raise the micro-purchase threshold to $5,000, not $10,000 as the NDAA demanded. (The $10,000 threshold was implemented only for certain limited circumstances that do not seem to be envisioned in the NDAA language.)”
Our impression was that the micro-purchase threshold for DoD was buried in some statute that Congress forgot to modify. In any case, Section 821 of the 2019 NDAA clarified that “Notwithstanding subsection (a) of section 1902 of title 41, the micro-purchase threshold for the Department of Defense is $10,000.” That would seem to end any ambiguity regarding Congressional intent.
DoD must have agreed with our assessment of Congressional intent because, on 31 August 2018, another Class Deviation was issued. Class Deviation 2018-O0018 “rescinds and supersedes” the prior Class Deviation and officially increased the micro-purchase threshold from $5,000 to $10,000.
The Class Deviation did a couple of other things, including eliminating the definition of “micro-purchase threshold” found at DFARS 202.101 in favor of the FAR definition. In other words, the DoD will not carve out any exceptions for itself; it will abide by the FAR rules in this area.
So that would seem to be that.
Oh, wait.
The micro-purchase threshold is now $10,000 for DoD, except when it isn’t.
The new Class Deviation restricts the micro-purchase threshold to $2,000 for acquisitions of construction. It also restricts the threshold to $2,500 for acquisitions of services subject to the Service Contract Act. Each of those areas is covered by yet another statute, according to the Class Deviation.
We guess Congress must address these two areas next year, in the 2020 NDAA, if it truly wants to raise the micro-purchase threshold to $10,000.
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