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Proposed DFARS Rule on Contract Financing – Latest Update

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Another update here on the proposed rule we told readers about in this article. It’s DFARS Case 2017-D019.

In our article (link in 1st sentence), we didn’t have many nice things to say about the proposed rule. Subsequently, we updated readers with another article, in which we had even fewer nice things to say about it. In that second article, we wrote—

Readers, rarely do we advocate for a particular position vis-à-vis a proposed rule. However, this is one of those times. The proposed rule is so obviously biased against contractors and it’s potentially unworkable as written even if it weren’t. When one adds in the fact that business system adequacy is already subject to what many call punitive payment withholds, this rule is simply a very bad idea.

So what’s changed since then?

Well, what’s changed is that the Department of Defense got the message and withdrew the proposed rule.

On October 4, 2018, a notice was published in the Federal Register announcing that “DoD is withdrawing the proposed rule on performance-based payments and progress payments that published on August 24, 2018, and is cancelling the public meeting previously scheduled to be held on October 10, 2018.”

Simple. Clear. To the point.

But it didn’t tell the whole story.

The rather banal official notice didn’t mention the Washington Post story, written by Aaron Gregg, that stated—

A Defense Department plan to save taxpayer dollars by paying defense contractors less money upfront on major weapons deals has drawn the ire of influential Republican lawmakers, who say the scheme will hurt the technological prowess of the U.S. military. In a Sept. 24 letter addressed to Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.) and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.) asked the Defense Department to walk back a proposed policy that would cut the amount of financing support that defense contractors get in the early phases of a contract. They called the plan “fundamentally flawed” and asked for it to be rescinded, saying that it would cause the department to fall behind on its national security strategy, which prioritizes competing with Russia and China for technological dominance.

The WaPo story also noted that “Defense contractors and their lobbyists reacted sharply to the proposal, with the three major defense industry associations unanimously opposing the rule in a Sept. 14 meeting.”

The official notice didn’t mention exactly how the rule was withdrawn. In a DefenseNews.com story, authors Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould wrote: “In a statement released at the unusual time of 7:19 PM, Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan said the decision to withdraw the proposed acquisition changes stemmed from a lack of ‘coordination’ inside the department.” Whereas we had assumed the initiator of the proposed rule was Mr. Shay Assad, their article stated that it had originated from the desk of Ellen Lord (USD, Acquisition & Sustainment). The article quoted her as saying in a September 5 interview, “I believe the lifeblood of most industry is cash flow, so what we will do is regulate the percentage of payments or the amount of profit that can be achieved through what type of performance they demonstrate by the numbers.”

The official notice didn’t mention that Mr. Shanahan said the rule was being withdrawn because it had been released “prematurely.” The DefenseNews.com article quoted him as saying in his official statement that the proposed rule was “prematurely released, absent full coordination” within the DoD. Interestingly, we didn’t think that was supposed to happen. We had thought that proposed rules were supposed to be well-coordinated with all stakeholders.

Guess we were wrong.

So all that is good news if you are a defense contractor; though of course perhaps not so good news if you are Ellen Lord, Shay Assad, or a member of the DAR Council who failed to get stakeholder agreement before prematurely releasing the rule for public comment.

But if you think this is over, you are wrong about that.

The Federal Register notice contained the following language—

This proposed rule is withdrawn in order for DoD to conduct additional outreach with industry regarding contract financing methods. Implementation in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) of section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 will be addressed in a proposed rule to be published under DFARS Case 2019-D002. Any other changes to contract financing policy will be addressed under DFARS Case 2019-D001.

So: Note DFARS Case 2019-D001, now opened to address “contract financing policy.” Ms. Lord has provided notice to defense contractors that she believes they have been overpaid in the past few years (a time of low interest rates where borrowing was cheap) and, now that interest rates are increasing (and borrowing is becoming more expensive), it’s now time to lower contract financing amounts. Ms. Lord is an accomplished business person, so perhaps she’ll explain that logic to the business people who will now need to borrow more money, at higher interest rates, in order to finance their contract performance obligations.

Also note DFARS Case 2019-002, now opened to implement Section 831 of the 2017 NDAA. As a reminder, Section 831 reinforced the regulatory preference for performance-based payments and expressly stated “Performance-based payments shall not be conditioned upon costs incurred in contract performance but on the achievement of performance outcomes …” and “In order to receive performance-based payments, a contractor’s accounting system shall be in compliance with [GAAP], and there shall be no requirement for a contractor to develop Government-unique accounting systems or practices as a prerequisite for agreeing to receive performance-based payments.” We are excited to see the DAR Council swiftly implement those clear statutory requirements.

To wrap this up, the contractors have won the first skirmish. But the fight is not yet over and we expect more battles to come.

 

Level One and Level Two Penalties

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Unallowable costs.

Expressly unallowable costs.

Directly associated unallowable costs.

The foregoing are “flavors” of unallowable costs about which government contractors need to know. In addition to those groups, contractors need to know that the government has the right to impose penalties for inclusion of unallowable costs in proposals to establish final billing rates.

What else do contractors need to know? How about—

  • The government can impose penalties equal to the amount of the unallowable cost, plus interest. These are commonly known as Level 1 penalties.

  • The government can impose penalties equal to twice the amount of the unallowable cost, plus interest. These are commonly known as Level 2 penalties.

  • The government can (and in certain circumstances, must) waive imposition of penalties and interest.

Complicated stuff, right? Well, we’ve written about the topic before.

Here’s a link to a 2015 article on expressly unallowable costs.

Here’s another link to a 2017 article on expressly unallowable costs and associated penalties.

And here’s a link to an article discussing an ASBCA decision regarding expressly unallowable costs and imposition of penalties, with respect to The Raytheon Company. In that decision, the ASBCA addressed five separate cost allowable issues and Raytheon won on four of them.

Here’s a summary of the results:

  • Raytheon’s appeal of penalties and interest associated with $336,900 in fractional airline expenses was sustained, meaning that the Board found those costs were not expressly unallowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeal of penalties and interest associated with $63,000 in other executive airplane costs was sustained, meaning that the Board found those costs were not expressly unallowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeal of penalties and interest associated with $200,000 paid to a software firm to design and build a Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) database was sustained, meaning that the Board found those costs were not expressly unallowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeals of penalties and interest associated with roughly $395,000 in consultant costs were sustained. The costs were alleged to be expressly unallowable because of a lack of work product (see 31.205-33(f)). In this instance, the Board went out of its way to find that the consultants’ costs were not only not expressly unallowable, but also both reasonable and allowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeals of penalties and interest associated with roughly $225,000 in lobbyists’ salaries was denied, because the Board found that such expenses were expressly unallowable.

All in all, Raytheon won on roughly $900,000 of the $1,120,000 in dispute.

Recently, Raytheon and the government were back at the ASBCA, asking the Board for reconsideration of that decision. Raytheon wanted reconsideration of the one area in which it had lost (lobbyist salaries) and the government wanted reconsideration of one of the four areas in which it had lost (fractional airline expenses). Both motions for reconsideration were denied.

But the decision was notable more for the discussion than the result. With respect to Raytheon’s contentions, the Board found that, when read together, the FAR cost principles clearly made the salaries of employees engaged in lobbying activities to be expressly unallowable. With respect to the government’s contentions, we thought the Board’s discussion regarding unallowable costs and imposition of penalties to be instructive.

According to the decision—

The government contends that the Board made clear errors of law when it ruled in Raytheon II that Raytheon's aircraft fractional lease costs were not expressly unallowable under the parties' February 2005 Advance Agreement and thus were not subject to penalties and that, even if they were expressly unallowable, penalties were not warranted because the pertinent penalty statute and regulations do not apply to costs that are expressly unallowable under a contract.

*****

Regarding aircraft fractional lease costs, the CACO assessed level one/single penalties against Raytheon under FAR 42.709-1(a)(1). As noted, that FAR provision states that a penalty applies if the indirect cost at issue is expressly unallowable under ‘a cost principle in the FAR, or an executive agency supplement to the FAR, that defines the allowability of specific selected costs.’ It does not include the terms ‘contract,’ ‘agreement,’ or the like. … if an agency head determines that a submitted indirect cost is expressly unallowable under a "cost principle" referred to in subsection (a) [of 10 U.S.C.§ 2324], then the agency head is to assess a penalty equal to the amount of the disallowed costs plus interest. Again, for level one penalties, the statute does not use the term ‘contract,’ ‘agreement,’ or the like. The FAR 52.242-3, Penalties for Unallowable Costs clause, incorporated into the contract, is to the same effect at subsections (b) through (d) [of the statute]. The aircraft fractional lease costs at issue were not stated to be unallowable under a FAR cost principle or executive agency supplement to the FAR.

(Internal citations omitted. Emphasis added.)

Because the fractional aircraft lease costs were not named as being unallowable under a FAR cost principle (or FAR supplement), the government was prevented from calling them “expressly” unallowable costs and imposing penalties for their inclusion in Raytheon’s proposal to establish final billing rates. Because the costs were not “expressly” unallowable, the government could not assess Level 1 penalties plus interest.

However, the government argued that Raytheon should be subject to Level 2 penalties plus interest, because an Advance Agreement executed in 2005 named the costs as being unallowable. Since the Advance Agreement was, in essence, a contract, then the FAR 31.001 definition of “expressly unallowable cost” would apply. (The definition states that an expressly unallowable cost is “a particular item or type of cost which, under the express provisions of an applicable law, regulation, or contract, is specifically named and stated to be unallowable.”) (Emphasis added.)

Readers should note the distinction being made by the Board in this decision between statute (10 U.S.C. § 2324), regulation (FAR 42.709-3, contract clause (52.242-3), and the FAR cost principles (FAR Part 31 and the definitions at 31.001). The distinction is crucial. The decision stated—

The plain language of the statutory and regulatory provisions regarding level one penalties does not include contracts. The contract aspect of the definition applies when level two, or double, penalties are at issue. Double penalties apply if the agency head determines that a contractor's proposal for settlement of indirect costs ‘includes a cost determined to be unallowable in the case of such contractor before the submission of such proposal.’

Thus, if the government were correct that the Advance Agreement formed a contract in which fractional aircraft costs were named as being unallowable, and that contract was executed before Raytheon submitted the final billing rate proposal in which they were included, then Raytheon could be subject to Level 2—but not Level 1—penalties.

Unfortunately for the government, the Board found that the Advance Agreement did not name the costs as being unallowable. The decision stated, “As more fully explicated in Raytheon II, while Raytheon agreed not to charge a portion of its aircraft fractional lease costs to the government, it did not concede that they were unallowable under the FAR.” (Internal citation omitted.) Oops.

The Board went on to add that, in any event, the CACO never assessed Level 2 penalties “and the government did not pursue level two penalties during the hearing.” Because the CACO did not assess Level 2 penalties, the Board declined to apply them.

Importantly, Judge Scott, writing for the board, stated “The assessment of penalties is not a mere matter of quantum, but rather involves entitlement under the statutory and regulatory scheme. A claim for level two penalties is separate from a claim for level one penalties.” (Emphasis added.) Because “there is no proper government claim for double penalties before us, as required by the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3), and we lack jurisdiction to entertain such a claim.”

Thus, the CACO’s failure to properly read the statute, regulations, and contract clause (as interpreted by the Board) created a situation where penalties and interest were unable to be assessed against Raytheon, even if the Advance Agreement had acted to invoke the definition of “expressly unallowable costs” found in FAR 31.001.

For contractors dealing with imposition of penalties and interest, we think the Raytheon appeals are must-reading.

 

EELV Dispute Update

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More than a year ago (June 2017) we updated an article on BAE Systems’ defective pricing and False Claims Act case, involving facts that happened ten years ago, in 2008. At the end of that article, we wrote: “And speaking of ancient history, whatever happened to Boeing and the government’s dispute about EELV pricing? You know, the one where Boeing ended up filing suit against the government? We suspect it’s been settled, but who knows? If you know the latest status of that EELV controversy, send us an email, would you?”

Well, nobody sent us any emails but, very recently, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims discussed the status of the dispute.

This particular dispute is a well-known issue, with a pedigree rooted in the 2008-2009 oversight wars fought between the DoD OIG, GAO, and DCAA. Original article discussing the issue is here. (The next article is in the link in the first paragraph. That second article includes a lot of important details.) The EELV dispute was seen by many commenters at the time as the litmus test of the assertions that DCAA audit reports were unduly influenced by contractors. If the DCAA audit report conclusions (which were changed by a supervisor) were valid, then the assertions were probably true; but if the conclusions were not valid, then the assertions were probably untrue and the DoD OIG and GAO assertions lacked merit—at least with respect to the rationale for why an audit supervisor would change the conclusions reached by the auditors doing the work. So it’s kind of a big deal and we’ve been eager to hear more about it.

Boeing and DCMA had executed two Advance Agreements with respect to treatment of Lot accounting practices and unabsorbed PM&HS costs. (Confused? Go follow the link in the first paragraph to our article that laid out the details.) DCAA was supposed to issue a clean, new, audit report untainted by supervisory auditor meddling. We’re not sure if that ever happened. In any case, Boeing filed suit in order to protect its claim from any assertions that the Contract Disputes Act’s SoL clock had expired.

As we wrote, “Clearly, Boeing’s entitlement to the $271 million depends on its ‘Lot Accounting’ practices, why the PM&HS costs were not fully absorbed by prior launch contracts, and how Boeing intended to amortize its production costs under future programs (and whether it would be permitted to do so under FAR and CAS parameters).”

And the rest was silence.

Until now.

In a 34-page denial of Boeing’s motion for summary judgement, Judge Kaplan reviewed the dispute’s history and some of the key issues.

With respect to the history, it turns out that the “silence” comes from an extended discovery period. Judge Kaplan wrote—

Given the case’s factual complexity and the parties’ interest in exploring settlement, the discovery period lasted several years. In March 2016, the parties informed the Court of their intention to mediate the case, and, at their request, the Court stayed the case in June 2016. But the mediation was unsuccessful, and the Court lifted the stay on March 31, 2017.

(Internal citations omitted.)

The first matter we want to discuss is Boeing’s breach of contract claim. Remember, Boeing thought it had settled this issue through execution of Advance Agreements with DCMA. But maybe not. Judge Kaplan reminded the parties that “It is well established that contracting officers lack the authority to bind the government to contractual payment provisions that are contrary to statute or regulation (including the FAR), and that such provisions are therefore not enforceable.” Thus, if the Advance Agreements were contrary to FAR or CAS, then they may be void.

Thus, in order for the Advance Agreements to be enforceable, the agreed-upon accounting treatment must comply with FAR and/or CAS. Looking at the regulations and CAS language, Judge Kaplan concluded that, in order to comply with them, Boeing’s accounting treatment must comply with GAAP—and there was a question whether the treatment was GAAP-compliant.

Judge Kaplan wrote—

… multiple factual questions exist regarding Boeing’s compliance with GAAP between 1998 and 2006, and in particular its compliance with AICPA’s Statement of Position (SOP) 81-1. A non-exhaustive list of these disputes, discussed in greater detail below, includes (1) whether, for purposes of deferring costs via average-cost accounting, SOP 81-1 permits the combination of existing and anticipated production-type contracts; (2) if it does, whether Boeing’s lot accounting method (which undisputedly combined existing and anticipated contracts) nevertheless constituted program accounting, which is outside the scope of SOP 81-1; and (3) if it did not, whether Boeing otherwise failed to comply with GAAP in the course of holding the deferred costs in inventory.

Boeing is one the few companies that use “program accounting” for determining revenue and profit/loss for multiple contracts associated with a single “program.” Judge Kaplan’s decision also discusses the propriety of program accounting. She wrote—

The Court notes that AICPA’s Guide for Audits of Federal Government Contractors (Audit Guide) states that ‘[i]n practice, the program method of accounting has had very limited applications, such as in major commercial aircraft production sold to commercial (or, in some cases, commercial and government) customers.’ This is so ‘because of (a) the significant uncertainties associated with making reasonably dependable estimates of the total number of units to be produced and sold, (b) the length of time to produce and sell them, and (c) the associated production costs and selling prices.’ Further, the Audit Guide points out, ‘[t]he unique aspects of the government procurement process make estimating the market and timing of deliveries extremely difficult’ and place other restrictions on the contractor. ‘Therefore,’ the guide concludes, ‘the program method of accounting is not appropriate for government contracts or subcontracts except as provided in paragraph 3.59’—i.e., in the context of major commercial aircraft production. Here, the record is replete with evidence that some individuals involved with Boeing’s lot accounting practice either considered it to be program accounting or expressed concern that it deviated from ¶38’s prescriptions for combining contracts.

There were also material facts in dispute about whether Boeing could have or should have held its deferred costs in inventory rather than writing them off. Judge Kaplan wrote—

Here, disputes exist regarding whether Boeing’s deferral of costs via lot accounting complied with the requirement that costs not be held in inventory if they are not probable of recovery. As described, the relevant GAAP directives provide that costs may no longer be deferred and held in inventory if they are no longer probable of recovery—that is, once it has become probable that the inventoried costs exceed the future revenues chargeable to the inventory.

The bottom-line is that Judge Kaplan denied Boeing’s motion for summary judgment based on the number of disputed facts deemed material to the final decision. Thus, it very much seems as if Boeing and the government are gearing-up for a “battle” of the accounting experts, who will offer expert opinions regarding whether or not Boeing’s accounting practices complied with GAAP. If Judge Kaplan finds that they did not comply with GAAP, if it likely that Boeing will lose its claim for nearly $300 million.

That outcome, if it comes to pass, will be seen as validation of the initial DCAA audit findings and corroboration that the DoD OIG and GAO were right about DCAA’s culture in the 2008 – 2009 timeframe. Not that it will matter much to anybody but the oldtimers who remember history.

 

FAR/DFARS Regulatory Changes

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After a period of seeming hibernation, the FAR Councils have apparently awoken and are issuing proposed and final rules. Most of the regulatory changes are of a minor nature; we report them here as a service to our readers.

And speaking of service to readers, did you know that becoming a “member” of this site unlocks access to an archive of documents and presentations? Well, if you answered “no,” you are not alone. It seems that the “create an account” button is hidden over on the far right side of the screen, and many people don’t scroll that far over. Okay; so now you know.

But there are also readers who know about “membership” but are concerned about providing Apogee Consulting, Inc. with personal details, such as name and email address. They are concerned that we will misuse that information. Rest assured, concerned readers. We do not sell that information. We do not give away that information. We do not create email lists and spam our members. We do NOTHING with that information. In fact, the only person who has access to the membership list is our Technology Guru, Mark. And he doesn’t share it with anybody—including me.

Okay. Back to the regulatory changes.

Class Deviations

DoD 2018-O0020 (Sept. 19, 2018) established provisions and clauses for “permanent supply chain risk management authority.” We would have devoted an entire article to this particular deviation, but why bother? We have been writing about supply chain management, supply chain risk management, and secure supply chains for literally a decade now. We have devoted article after article to the topic. If you had read—and acted—on our early articles, then you would have been well-prepared for DoD’s current focus on it. If you did, then good show! If not, then we figure one more article is not going to persuade you. (Same rationale for not writing about the recent Mitre study (“Deliver Uncompromised”). It was a good study but a bit superfluous if you’ve been reading this site for any length of time.) Note: the original Class Deviation was corrected and reissued. Our link goes to the corrected version.

DoD 2018-O0018 (Aug. 31, 2018) was modified via policy guidance memo dated September 21, 2018. The original Class Deviation implemented changes to the micro-purchase threshold. We discussed it here. The new policy guidance memo summarizes the Department’s position on what the micro-purchase threshold is for various acquisitions. (Hint: it’s not $10,000 across the board, as one might reasonably think given Congress’ direction.) It also provides guidance related to the question of whether to raise the individual purchase thresholds of Government Purchase Cards (GPCs) to match the new micro-purchase thresholds. With respect to that issue, the guidance states that the individual purchase threshold should be raised if and only if “a determination has been made that anticipated mission requirements and historical spending patterns demonstrate a need” for the increase. Oh, and it also requires that individuals with GPC thresholds in excess of $3,500 receive “appropriate” training. No mention of how to obtain that training was provided.

FAR Changes

The DAR Council proposed to amend the FAR by issuing a proposed rule (Sept. 24, 2018) that would implement Section 825 of the 2017 NDAA by giving the contracting officer authority to eliminate the requirement to make “price or cost as an evaluation factor in solicitations valued above the simplified acquisition threshold for multiple-award contracts for the same or similar services when the Government intends to award a contract to each and all qualifying offerors.” Essentially, somebody with common sense asked why price was an evaluation factor for award of a MATOC contract when subsequent task or delivery orders would be competed against each other, and price would be an evaluation factor then. Right; it makes no sense to us either and we’re happy to see CO’s given discretion in that area.

Federal Acquisition Circular 2005-101 (Sept. 26, 2018) contained two final rules revising the FAR. The first rule implemented a section of the 2018 NDAA “that provides an exception for business operations conducted by a contractor while performing under a Government contract from the requirement to accept and dispense $1 coins.” The second rule updated “the instructions for registration in the System for Award Management (SAM) and correct[ed] an inconsistency involving the timing of registration. In order to correct this inconsistency, the rule [requires] offeror registration in SAM prior to submission of an offer.”

DFARS Changes

Four DFARS clauses were eliminated on September 28, 2018 at the recommendation of the DoD Regulatory Reform Task Force. The clauses that were eliminated include:

  • 252.247-7020, Additional Services

  • 252.216-7005, Award Fee

  • 252.247-7004, Indefinite Quantities—Fixed Charges

  • 252.247-7005, Indefinite Quantities—No Fixed Charges

And that’s it for recent regulatory changes. As you can see, a lot of activity but not much activity of significance.

 

Case Law on Statute of Limitations Continues to Evolve

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We have written and published many an article on this site addressing the “evolution” of the judicial interpretations of the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations (SoL).

Let’s quickly set the baseline regarding what the SOL requires: Fundamentally (and in words used by non-lawyers), a claim for damages must be filed within six years from the time the party asserting damages knew, or should have known, that it had damages. The amount of damages need not be known precisely; it simply must be known (or should have been known) that damages of some extent existed, sufficient to assert a “sum certain.” (From one decision: “A claim must accrue, and the statute of limitations starts to run, as soon as a contractor can assert a claim, even if it has not yet incurred all possible costs resulting from the change or breach.”). The date on which damages are known, or should have been known, starts a six-year clock. Claims filed after that clock expires are time-barred. It used to be that time-barred claims could not be heard as a matter of the court’s jurisdiction, but after a Federal Circuit decision, the assertion that a claim was time-barred became an affirmative defense.

Both the Boards of Contract Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims hear cases involving the SoL. Although the forums seemingly agree on what the SoL requires, the decisions issued seem to vary by judge and by forum. It appears that the bases for the various legal decisions regarding whether or not a claim is time-barred are based on the circumstances and facts unique to the case at hand. Thus, it’s difficult to predict how the SoL will be applied.

Those of us who are not lawyers tend to be more than a bit confused by the seemingly inconsistent case law associated with the SoL—though I am assured by Big Law attorneys that all decisions can be reconciled. (We’re still waiting for the article that does such a thing….)

While we wait for clarity, here are two more SoL decisions that impact how one might interpret the SoL.

First, the good news:

Over at the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA), Judge Sheridan (writing for the Board) issued a decision denying the GSA’s $3.3 million claim for disallowed costs against United Liquid Gas Company (UPE), finding that about 10 percent of the GSA’s claim was time-barred by the SoL. GSA asserted that the contractor had billed it for fuel at rates in excess of the contractually specified rates. Critically, GSA had paid the contractor at the billed rates even though those rates were higher than they should have been. The decision stated that the SoL clock started to run when GSA overpaid the contractor.

Judge Sheridan wrote—

We conclude the claims in issue began to accrue on January 5, 2011, when the Government overpaid the first task order 1 invoice submitted for payment under the MAS contract. At that point in time, the terms of the MAS contract clearly put both Ft. Irwin and GSA on notice that UPE was overbilling the Government and all events that fixed the alleged liability, specifically, in this case, overpayments in a ‘sum certain,’ were known or should have been known. Government claims continued accruing each time Ft. Irwin overpaid a task order1 invoice under the MAS contract, because every time a payment was made on an invoice, the Government knew or should have known of the overpayment and the ‘sum certain’ it was overpaying.

Although UPE is still on the hook for roughly 90% of the government’s claim against it, it must have felt nice to see the amount of the claim reduced. Judge Sheridan’s decision reminds us of a similar finding over at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, in the matter of Sparton deLeon Springs. We wrote about that decision here.

And, speaking of the ASBCA, here comes the bad news:

DRS Global Enterprise Solutions, Inc. (DRS) appealed a contracting officer’s claim for $8.6 million in various disallowed costs, including both direct and indirect claimed costs included in DRS’ FY 2006 proposals to establish final billing rates. (There were actually two proposals: FY 2006 and FY2006A, but that’s not relevant here.) The submissions were made in February and March, 2008. A little more than a year later (17 July 2009), DCAA held an entrance conference to begin its audit. Nothing happened for three years—until 3 April 2012—when DCAA informed DRS that its submissions were inadequate. DRS resubmitted certain schedules and, on 22 June 2012, DCAA found the final billing rate proposals to be adequate for audit.

It had taken DCAA literally four years to get to the point where the audit agency was ready to conduct its audit.

Now, readers know that there were a couple of things happening at that time—notably, that DCAA was under fire from several sources for poor audit quality. In a fit of pique, DCAA management made the decision to stop performing audits of contractor final billing rate proposals. Eventually, a sufficient number of people and entities (including Congress) pointed out that the decision was a very bad idea, and DCAA resumed its audits—but that was years later. In the meantime, contractors such as DRS were left hanging in the wind, wondering when their proposals were going to be audited.

And when DCAA got back to performing “incurred cost audits,” its procedures had changed. But more than the audit procedures had changed: the agency’s entire audit philosophy had transformed. No longer would audits be scoped based on prior audit work; now, each audit had to stand on its own. What had been sufficient before 2008 was no longer sufficient. What had been adequate before 2008 was no longer adequate. Contractors were, almost without exception, blindsided by DCAA’s seismic shift in how it performed its “incurred cost” audits. DRS was obviously one of those contractors caught by the unexpected changes in audit approach.

Back to the case at hand.

After more than four years, the DCAA “incurred cost audit” started to move forward. As is the process, Requests for Information (RFIs) were exchanged. DRS either couldn’t, or wouldn’t respond to some of those RFIs. As is the process, DCAA didn’t take lack of responsiveness especially well. As Judge O’Connell wrote for the Board: “In September 2013, DCAA requested additional documentation from DRS, which it did not provide. On November 7, 2013, DCAA wrote to DRS to inform it that it had been denied access to data/documentation for labor transactions, direct material transactions and the other direct cost transactions.” On December 30, 2013, DCAA issued an audit report in which it questioned more than $54 million in costs for the fiscal years at issue.

Remember, DRS had initially submitted its proposals in early 2008. Now, more than five years later, DCAA had questioned a huge amount of direct and indirect costs because, allegedly, DRS couldn’t provide necessary supporting information.

Still, five years is less than six years. (Remember the SoL?)

And then the cognizant contracting officer waited another three years, until September 11, 2017, to assert the government’s claim in the amount of $8.6 million, of which $8.4 million related to other direct costs (ODCs) that the CO found to be unallowable because of “lack of an invoice for the costs, proof of payment, or a signed purchase order.” In other words, all the supporting documents that DCAA had requested during the audit, that DRS either couldn’t or wouldn’t provide.

Open and shut, right? Eight years is more than six years, so the government’s claim is time-barred. Obviously.

Not so fast, there.

Judge O’Connell wrote—

These [SoL] decisions demonstrate that determining when the government reasonably should have known of its claim requires consideration of the unique facts in the appeal. This is particularly relevant in this appeal because the final decision identifies 39 discrete direct cost items that the contracting officer found to be unallowable.

The Judge went on to discuss the specific facts of this case. He found that there was no way for the government to reasonably know that DRS lacked adequate support for its costs until the audit report concluded that was the case. For example, the largest single dollar item was questioned because DRS was unable to provide proof of payment. He wrote “… the record as currently developed lacks undisputed facts demonstrating that the government knew or should have known of its claim before September 11, 2011.”

In other words, motion for summary judgment denied. A trial on the merits will be needed.

(We hope that in the future trial, somebody asks DCAA to discuss when the audit agency began requesting such supporting documentation, and whether DRS should have reasonably expected that it would need to retain such documentation—pointing to FAR 4.7 as establishing record retention requirements.)

So that’s the bad news. On the other hand, the end of the decision offered DRS a ray of hope. Judge O’Connell wrote—

We note that DRS's motion raises only the statute of limitations. Therefore, we need not address whether the more than 10 years that elapsed between payment of the invoices at issue and the issuance of the contracting officer's final decision calls for application of the doctrine of laches.

Although we are not lawyers, we think laches is the legal doctrine that a lack of diligence and activity in making a legal claim, or moving forward with legal enforcement of a right is unreasonable and can be viewed as prejudicing the opposing party in litigation. In other words, it may be possible for DRS to assert that DCAA’s intentional deferral of its audit led to a situation where DRS was unable to provide the supporting documentation; whereas, if DCAA had performed its audits more timely then DRS would have been able to support them. We’ll have to see how that argument goes in the (future) trial.

So that’s the state of the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations today. Still a mixed bag, in our view.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.