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UPDATE: Contract Financing and Performance Incentives

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Hey! Remember that proposed DFARS rule on contract financing payments? You know, the one we wrote about here and then again right here? (Actually we wrote a quick update in between those other two articles, but let’s skip that one.) You know, the one that—according to watercooler gossip and rumor—cost a DoD Director a senior leadership position.

Yeah, that’s the one. Not a great rule and, if gossip and rumor is to be believed, not a great public relations result at the public meetings held to solicit “public input” on the proposed language. (Hey, that’s a lot of “public” used in a sentence to describe a rule that, based on language and discussion points, really didn’t benefit the public to any great extent.)

Anyway, it’s back.

What? No, really. It’s back. And we’ve all got to deal with it.

The Federal Register noticed a new series of three public meetings to be held “to obtain views of experts and interested parties in Government and the private sector regarding revising policies and procedures for contract financing, performance incentives, and associated regulations for DoD contracts.” Yeah, for real.

The public meetings will be held in the Mark Center Auditorium, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia, on the dates of January 10, January 22, and February 19. Note that participants (or onlookers) must register ahead of time.

Hey, let’s all hope these new public meetings go better than the last couple on the same topic, right?

What might participants wish to discuss at said meetings?

Well, if you recall, the earlier (now defunct) proposed rule sought to link the value of contract financing payments to certain performance criteria, including:

  • Conviction or civil judgment related to fraud

  • Criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public (Federal, State, or local) contract or subcontract

  • Violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes relating to the submission of offers

  • Commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, or bribery

  • Falsification or destruction of records

  • Making false statements

  • Tax evasion or violations of Federal criminal tax laws

  • Receiving stolen property

  • Any open level III or level IV corrective action requests (CARs) related to contractor business systems

Were we to present to the members of the DAR Council, we would note that the performance criteria specified in the (now defunct) rule had very little to do with enhancing performance in the “five domains” identified by the rule—i.e., On Time or Accelerated Contract Deliveries, Contractor Quality, Contractor Business Systems, Increasing Contract Opportunities for Small Business and for the Blind and Severely Disabled, and Receipt of Timely Quality Proposals. Really, at best only one of the detailed contractor performance criteria had any relation to any of the five domains; the rest were completely unrelated.

Moreover, every single one of the detailed performance criteria already had both legal and administrative remedies available to the government. Or did somebody on the DAR Council think that all those laws such as the False Claims Act, the False Statements Act, or the Federal Bribery Statute (to name but a few) were just there for window-dressing? And did the DAR Council think that the suspension or debarment rules were for show? And what about the Mandatory Disclosure rule? And what about the Contractor Business System Administration rule? And what about … we could go on, but let’s not.

The point is, there was no point to the (now defunct) proposed rule. It was redundant at best and double jeopardy at worst. It appeared to set up one single bureaucrat as the sole arbiter of how much a contractor might receive in contracting financing payments (to include performance-based payments) and, while authoritarianism seems to be in vogue these days, there is no reason to encourage it, especially when it puts thousands of jobs on the line and might end up hurting the warfighter.

DoD needs to declare what it cares about. If what the Pentagon cares about is accelerated contract deliveries and contractor quality, then it needs to award incentive contracts where the incentive is tied to on-spec, on-time deliveries. It’s that simple. If the Pentagon cares about contract opportunities for small business and for the blind and severely disabled, then it needs to incentivize prime contractor awards to such entities—though it may have to pay for those entities to become approved subcontractors.

And contractor business systems? Yeah, well that’s working out, isn’t it? Neither DCMA nor DCAA are resourced to effectively administer the oversight regime envisioned by the DAR Council in 2011, and we’re all awaiting a forthcoming GAO report that may shed some light on what’s working and what’s not working there. Our position is that the DAR Council broke it, and we need some new folks to come and fix it. Until then, keep the DAR Council the hell away from the topic.

So that’s what we might tell the DAR Council, were we to present at one of the three upcoming public meetings. But as we are not going to be in attendance, this blog article will have to suffice as a public record of our sentiments.

 

UPDATE: CO Dispositions of DCAA Proposal Findings

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Recently we wrote about a DoD OIG report that criticized DCMA contracting officers for failing to properly document dispositions of DCAA audit findings related to allegedly noncompliant contractor cost proposals. To be clear, the DOD OIG audit report found that each of the contracting officers associated with the 23 files reviewed by the OIG auditors “took appropriate actions to address the proposal inadequacies identified by DCAA.” The problem was that nine of the 23 files didn’t contain adequate documentation of those actions.

If you follow the link in the first sentence you’ll see that we criticized the OIG auditors. We noted that the audit report curiously failed to include any discussion of DFARS 215.408(4) and the solicitation provision 252.215-7009, which provide a mandatory proposal adequacy checklist that contractors are supposed to submit along with their proposals. We also noted that the audit report curiously omitted any discussion of the actual DCAA audit findings, so it would be impossible for a third party to determine the materiality of the lack of file documentation. We further noted that, in our view, the audit report provided a misleading statement of the actual FAR requirement (found at 15.406-3(7)), which requires that a CO document dispositions of DCAA auditor recommendations, but which is silent regarding what a CO is to do if DCAA simply reports that a contractor proposal is inadequate and does not provide any recommendations. Perhaps the DCAA audit reports did provide recommendations to the COs; but we cannot tell because the OIG audit report didn’t discuss the DCAA audit findings at all.

Another curious aspect of the DoD OIG audit report was to be found in the responses. Management comments were included from many sources, including the U.S. Army Contracting Command, the Naval Air Systems Command, the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Space and Naval Warfare Command, and the Department of the Air Force (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition). There was even a response from the Principal Director, Defense Contracting and Pricing. All responses were thoughtful; there were some (minor) disagreements with the OIG’s recommendation to conduct refresher training. That said, the response from the Principal Director, Defense Contracting and Pricing, was interesting in that it was a full concurrence with the recommendation to issue better guidance to contracting officers—and it promised to issue that guidance within 60 days.

In all of the foregoing, where was the Director, DCMA? Nowhere, as we noted in our original blog post. You would think that before anybody issued guidance to DCMA contracting officers, that guidance would be coordinated with DCMA leadership, would you not? Yet, apparently, that was not the case in this instance.

Weird, right?

Anyway, the guidance from the office of Defense Contracting and Pricing was issued, as promised. It requires contracting officers “to document all DCAA identified inadequacies in the negotiation memorandum or another part of the contract file.” In addition, “contracting officers also must document why the actions take appropriately address the contractor price proposal inadequacies.” So there you have it.

One more item of interest: Appendix B of the audit report (“Other Items of Interest”) noted some concerns with the Contract Pricing Reference Guides. For those who don’t know, these are very important sources of information used to provide direction and guidance to DoD contracting officers in evaluating and negotiating contractor proposals. (They are also really useful reference sources for contractors as well!) The OIG audit report noted that the auditors “found instances where the Guides are outdated.” In addition, the auditors “noted that the guides are difficult to locate on the Acquisition Community Connection website. While the guides are referenced on the Defense Pricing and Contracting homepage, the user is required to navigate through at least five pages to access the Contract Pricing Reference Guides.”

What’s interesting is that the Directorate of Defense Contracting and Pricing maintains those Guides—or at least, it is supposed to do so. Curiously, although the Directorate was quick to concur with the audit report’s Recommendation related to contracting officer file documentation, it ignored entirely the issue of maintenance of the Contract Pricing Reference Guides. Perhaps it ignored the issue because a response was not required. Or perhaps it ignored the issue because addressing it would have taken resources from the Directorate; whereas adding to the file documentation burden of contracting officers cost it nothing except for the paper used to issue the guidance.

 

Pricing Subcontract Changes (Part 1 of 2)

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If you are a prime contractor you are expected to monitor, oversee, and administer your subcontracts.

We’ve written before about DCAA’s wrongheaded (and judicially dismissed) notions of what that means. We’ve written before about what a subcontractor is (and is not); and, while admitting that the definition of what is a “subcontractor” is context-dependent, we’ve also skewed toward the interpretation that a “subcontractor” is an external supplier providing goods and/or services called-forth in a prime contract Statement of Work (SOW). Thus: this article isn’t about those topics. Take them as a given. If you need to know more, do a keyword search on the home page and find those articles. (Trust us, we’ve written extensively about subcontractor management on this site.)

This article is about prime contractor management of changes that arise during performance of a subcontract. Changes happen; they are a fact of life, especially in the government contracting environment. The subcontract you’ve awarded is often not the subcontract that gets performed, especially in a development or immature production situation. Things change and often they change frequently; and it is incumbent on the prime to have a subcontractor change management strategy in place before contract (or subcontract) performance starts.

As we’ve noted before, some prime contractors think they are effectively managing the impacts of subcontractor changes by awarding only firm, fixed-price subcontracts. They issue FFP subcontracts and they assume the price is fixed—and it is!. But only for the priced work. If the work changes, then the subcontractor is entitled to an “equitable adjustment” in the contract price.

Interestingly, the value of the subcontract equitable adjustment varies depending on whether or not the subcontract is for procurement of “commercial items” (as that phrase is defined in FAR 2.101). If the prime contractor has made a Commercial Item Determination (CID) and awarded a “commercial subcontract,” then there is one course of action to be taken when a subcontractor asserts its subcontract has been changed and therefore it is entitled to an equitable adjustment of contract price; and if the subcontract is not a “commercial subcontract,” then there is an entirely different course of action to be taken.

The cause of the differences noted above are found in the differing language of the “Changes” clause found it the different contract types. There is one “Changes” clause for commercial subcontractors and another, entirely different, “Changes” clause for non-commercial subcontracts.

The Changes clause in each contract is what gives the customer the authority to make changes to the performance requirements after contract award. Absent that language, the government would be stuck with exactly what it initially contracted for, even if it no longer needed it. But the Changes clause establishes the right of the government to make changes, and it establishes the right of the contractor to be make whole from those changes.

As the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) states on its website:

Contract modifications (frequently referred to as ‘mods’) are common actions for many contracting professionals. These changes may be related to contract cost, delivery schedule, schedule, fee, terms and conditions, and personnel. Changing technologies, funding, and mission requirements may create the need for changes to a contract. The complexity of contracts—which can involve numerous people from different functional areas on both the Government and contractor teams — can lead to misinterpretations and miscommunications of requirements and administrative issues that do not become evident until the contract is under way. Whenever the Government wants something different than was originally envisioned for the original contract or something unforeseen occurs, a modification may become necessary. ….

When dealing with non-commercial subcontracts, there are several different Changes clauses to choose from, depending on contract type. The clauses are numbered from 52.243-1 to 52.243-5. However, there is only one Changes clause for commercial subcontracts, and that is 52.212-4.

As the DAU site explains—

Contracts for non-commercial items may be modified by use of a change order, which is a unilateral order signed by the contracting officer directing the contractor to make changes using the authority of the various Changes clauses. If the change order causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or time required for, performance of any part of the work under the contract, the contracting officer must make an equitable adjustment in the contract price, the delivery schedule, or both. …

A contracting officer may need to issue an out-of-scope modification. This can occur if the Government requires an increase or decrease in the scope of work beyond what is contained in the statement of work, and which will result in a change to the cost of the contract. In such cases, the modification is considered ‘bilateral’ and must be agreed to and signed by both the Government and the contractor.

Right away, we can see that there are two types of changes in the world of non-commercial subcontracts: there are in-scope changes (which can be issued unilaterally), and there are out-of-scope changes (which must be agreed-to by both contracting parties). There is also a third type of change (constructive) but the government doesn’t like to admit those ever happen and, since constructive changes aren’t germane to this article, we’re going to skip them.

The key takeaway from the discussion of changes to non-commercial contracts (or subcontracts) is that both types of changes, whether they result from a unilateral change order or a bilateral agreement of the parties, entitle the contractor to an equitable adjustment in contract price. The contractor will be made whole from the increased cost of performance. Or, to make it more on-point with this article: the subcontractor will be made whole by the prime contractor for its increased cost of performance, if the cost increase stems from changes made by the prime.

Importantly, the basis for the equitable change in contract price to the non-commercial subcontract is the change to the subcontractor’s costs. For example, contract clause 52.243-1 (Changes-Fixed Price, Aug. 1987) states “If any … change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for, performance of any part of the work under this contract … the Contracting Officer shall make an equitable adjustment in the contract price, the delivery schedule, or both, and shall modify the contract.” Obviously, in order to determine the value of the equitable adjustment, the subcontractor must submit a separate proposal that establishes the amount by which its costs have been increased as the result of the change (or changes) made by the prime contractor.

Remember, the subcontract has already been awarded. Competition (if any) has ended. Consequently, any post-award changes made to the contract will be made on a single-source basis. This means that if the subcontractor’s change proposal exceeds the TINA threshold (currently $2 million) then the prime contractor will be looking for certified cost or pricing data from the subcontractor. The process of preparing a change proposal in the format required by FAR 15.408 (Table 15-2) and providing cost or pricing data for analysis, and then analyzing the cost or pricing data, and then negotiating an “equitable” adjustment to the subcontract price, may be a long and resource-intensive process.

Which is why we wrote at the beginning of this article that the prime contractor must have a subcontractor change management process established and implemented before subcontractor performance starts.

All the above is for non-commercial subcontracts; as we stated, the process is different for commercial subcontracts. The commercial contract (or subcontract) clause 52.212-4(c) states “Changes in the terms and conditions of this contract may be made only by written agreement of the parties.” Right there, the commercial subcontract states that the prime contractor does not have the right to issue unilateral change orders; the commercial contract may only be changed via bilateral agreement. As the DAU site notes, if the parties do agree on a change, the result is not a contract mod; instead, the result is a “supplemental agreement.” (We confess that the nuances of the terms escape us.)

But what about pricing changes associated with commercial subcontracts?

Generally, a commercial item or service is being acquired at a price, and price analysis is the technique used to determine that the price is fair and reasonable. Thus, equitable adjustments to commercial contracts and subcontracts may be made on the basis of price, and the (sub)contractor’s costs can be irrelevant. But there's a hierarchy to be followed ....

FAR 15.403-1 clearly states that commercial items are exempt from the requirements to provide certified cost or pricing data. (“Any acquisition of an item that the contracting officer determines meets the commercial item definition in 2.101, or any modification … that does not change the item from a commercial item to a noncommercial item, is exempt from the requirement for certified cost or pricing data.”) However, commercial item contractors (and subcontractors) may be asked to provide information other than certified cost or pricing data to support a determination that the proposed price is fair and reasonable.

The DoD Commercial Item Handbook, Part B (“Commercial Item Pricing”) provides a clear hierarchy of information that may be used to support a determination that the commercial item price is fair and reasonable. The first source is market research, which is obvious because if the item isn’t being sold to the public, then why is it a commercial item? The second source is “public resources other than the offeror,” and the Handbook provides an extensive list of sources that may be used. Only if the first two sources don’t provide sufficient information (as may happen if the item is merely offered for sale but no sales have yet occurred) should the contracting officer (or prime contract buyer) turn toward the third source (the offeror itself) to obtain additional, noncertified, cost or pricing data. The (sub)contractor may, in certain circumstances, be asked to provide uncertified cost data.

If the offeror is asked to provide data, the Handbook clearly emphasizes price information rather than cost information. However, price information is insufficient, the Handbook recognizes that commercial suppliers may not have the ability to provide detailed cost information in the manner the analyst may wish. It states “When obtaining uncertified cost data on commercial items, requests should not impose undue requirements on the offerors to provide data that is not normally maintained in the offeror’s business operation.”

We asserted above that an equitable adjustment to a commercial contract or subcontract is, generally, valued at price without respect to costs incurred, whereas an equitable adjustment to a non-commercial (sub)contract price is valued on the basis of costs incurred related to the change. Readers may reasonably ask us to support that assertion. Where in the FAR or DFARS does it say that? Where in the DoD Commercial Item Handbook does it say that?

Well, nowhere really. Remember, the FAR and DFARS and the DoD Commercial Item Handbook are not written for prime contractors managing subcontractors. Those documents are written for government contracting officers managing prime contractors. Accordingly, one must “read between the lines” to figure out that a prime contractor may value a change to a commercial subcontract on the basis of price rather than cost, unless there is some unique circumstance that drives the use of cost data. Certainly, where the commercial subcontract has been valued at priced units, acquiring more (or less) units than planned is easy to value. But sometimes it's not that clear.

In the next article, we’ll discuss two ASBCA cases that clarify the principles associated with subcontractor change management. Those two cases will (hopefully) show the differences in valuing commercial (sub)contracts and non-commercial (sub)contracts. In one case, the prime contractor’s mishandling of subcontractor changes cost it millions of dollars. In the other case, the government’s mishandling of changes to a commercial prime contract cost it $240 million.

Stay tuned.

 

Pricing Subcontract Changes (Part 2 of 2)

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In the previous article (Part 1 of 2) we went into some detail regarding differences between commercial item contracts and non-commercial contracts, focusing on how a prime contractor would deal with subcontract changes. We asserted that, generally, subcontract changes for non-commercial subcontracts would be valued on the basis of any additional costs incurred (though of course a change might lead to reduced subcontractor costs). We further asserted that, generally, subcontract changes for commercial subcontracts would be (or could be) valued on the basis of prices rather than costs.

We asserted that when a prime contractor has awarded a commercial subcontract, and then seeks to enter into a supplementary agreement with the subcontractor to make a change to that subcontract, then the value of the associated equitable adjustment may be based on price, and the subcontractor’s costs in performing that changed work are irrelevant if that is the case.

In this article we want to discuss two ASBCA cases that hopefully support those assertions.

The first case is yet another ASBCA appeal of a contracting officer’s final determination regarding Kellogg Brown & Root’s (KBR) LOGCAP III contract. If you were ever looking for a contract that generated litigation, this would be it. One of the reasons for that, of course, is KBR was supporting U.S. combat operations in Southwest Asia. Regardless of the amount of planning done, combat is (shall we say?) messy and tends to disrupt the best of plans. As a Prussian wrote 150 years ago, “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.” The same truism could be said of contracting. No combat support contract, no matter how well written, survives contact with the battlefield.

Anyway, in this appeal, KBR sought reimbursement for the costs of settling two requests for equitable adjustment (REAs) by a subcontractor that was providing accommodations to house military personnel at bases in Iraq, including Camp Anaconda. KBR issued an $81 million FFP subcontract to First Kuwaiti Co. of Kuwait (FKTC) to construct 2,252 prefab trailers and transport them to a staging area bordering Iraq, from where FKTC would then transport them to Camp Anaconda. When they got to the Camp, FKTC would unload them and set them up for troop housing. At least, that was the plan. But the plan didn’t survive for very long.

As Judge Melnick (for the Board) wrote—

Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa was the critical road for transporting supplies into Iraq from Kuwait. … Because there was a war on, MSR Tampa was extremely dangerous. Insurgent attacks began in the spring of 2003 and people were shot and killed. Among those who frequently lost their lives were KBR affiliated personnel. Its vehicles were attacked at least as early as July 2003. KBR was aware of and concerned about convoy force protection prior to the issuance of TO 59. In June 2003, the military imposed movement restrictions, requiring military control and escorts into Iraq of all assets, including contractors. The military required the escorts to reduce disruptions that would otherwise arise from attacks upon unescorted elements.

(Internal citations omitted.)

Long story short, the trucks carrying the trailers backed up at the border. FKTC had to incur additional costs to store the trailers until they could be transported. In addition, the Camp wasn’t fully prepared to receive the trailers, and thus FKTC incurred additional costs during the unloading and preparation phases of its work. FKTC submitted a request for equitable adjustment (REA) to KBR for “double handling.” Judge Melnick didn’t think very much of the subcontractor REA, characterizing it as “cryptic,” and noting that FKTC never disclosed its additional costs to KBR—it provided “rates and prices,” but never costs. KBR added $23.831 million to FKTC’s FFP subcontract to cover the “double handling.” In addition, FKTC submitted a second REA for “delays” and “idle truck time” at the border. Again, FKTC did not base its proposed REA on additional actual costs; it proposed a flat rate of $500 per delay day. Again, KBR negotiated the rates without addressing actual costs incurred, and added an additional $24.923 million to the FFP subcontract to compensate KFTC for the delays.

DCAA disapproved the payments because they lacked cost data to support them. DCAA disapproved $51.27 million in subcontractor costs, indirect costs, and award fee. The ACO allowed $3.78 million but disallowed the remaining $47.49 million. KBR appealed.

Another long story short, Judge Melnick found that the REA costs paid by KBR were unreasonable, pursuant to the requirements of 31.201-3. Because they were unreasonable, they were not allowable. Among other failures noted by the Judge, he wrote extensively about KBR’s acceptance of KFTC’s rates and factors instead of actual costs incurred. He wrote “Thus, an equitable adjustment is not based upon market prices, but reasonable incurred costs. … An equitable adjustment's use of actual cost data ensures that it does not produce a windfall.” In addition, Judge Melnick wrote—

… FKTC was required by its subcontract with KBR to support equitable adjustments with detailed cost breakdowns in conformance with FAR Part 31 and the DoD FAR Supplement. It was also required to maintain books and records reflecting its subcontract performance and make them available to KBR for cost-reimbursement purposes. Indeed, FKTC knew its truck lease costs but declined to disclose them. FKTC also maintained records of when trucks carrying trailers crossed the border, and records of the number of trucks waiting at the border on specific dates. It simply strains credulity that it did not record how much it actually paid its drivers while they waited at the border or how long trucks actually waited, especially given that it would ultimately seek millions of dollars in additional compensation for these events. It is highly unlikely that a company could grow to the size and sophistication of FKTC without tracking its costs. Significantly, KBR has not contended that it asked for such records at the time the REAs were submitted, or knew that they did not exist. It was not reasonable for KBR to simply assume they did not exist. It was not reasonable for FKTC to consider their absence acceptable, especially in light of FKTC's record-keeping responsibilities contained in the subcontract.

(Internal citations omitted.)

KBR tried to argue that its subcontract with FKTC was a commercial subcontract. (See? We got to that point eventually.) KBR argued that, because the subcontract was for a commercial item, “it was legally barred from basing [the REA] upon actual costs." Judge Melnick was not persuaded.

He wrote that “KBR's subcontract with FKTC does not contain the FAR's commercial items changes clause. Its changes clause permits unilateral changes and requires REAs to be supported with costs conforming to FAR Part 31.” Because the FKTC subcontract lacked the appropriate changes clause language, KBR could not claim should be treated as a commercial subcontract.

The appeal(s) were denied. KBR is out $47.49 million, unless it is successful on appeal.

The second case we want to discuss went a different way. Indeed, KBR cited to that decision in its arguments. The second case is an appeal of United Launch Services. The appeal has a long pedigree, going back to a first summary judgment decision in 2013 (ASBCA No. 56850) and then another (much more relevant) decision in June, 2016, followed by a very recent notice of final settlement in the contractor’s favor.

Summarizing all that litigation history into a blog article is tricky, and we already wrote too much about KBR. What you need to know is that the USAF awarded Boeing a fixed-price commercial item contract for Integrated Launch Services (ILS). The fixed price was based on a certain number of launches of certain missions, with each mission having a certain payload weight. The payload weight determined the launch vehicle used by Boeing. Importantly, the contract contained a commercial changes clause and did not contain any of the other changes clauses we wrote about in Part 1.

You really ought to read the 2016 decision. The interplay between Boeing and the USAF is fascinating. During the interplay, ULA was formed and became a subcontractor to Boeing, pending contract novation. Long story short, Judge Wilson found for ULA, stating that the subcontract had been changed by the USAF and Boeing/ULA was entitled to be compensated for the change. Judge Wilson reached back to the 2013 decision to discuss how to quantify and support an REA in a commercial subcontract. He wrote—

Although the term ‘equitable adjustment’ has been considered a term of art, that conclusion arises from its use in non-commercial items contracts where the government has a right to direct a unilateral change. In that context, the term is generally limited to requiring those ‘corrective measures utilized to keep a contractor whole when the Government modifies a contract.’ However, this customary understanding of the term need not be followed in the event of a significant change in context. The Changes clause in this commercial items contract dictates that it can only be changed with the agreement of the parties. It requires the parties to negotiate an equitable adjustment in the event they agree upon a change causing an increase or decrease in contract costs, performance time, or that otherwise affects any other contract provision, but it does not define the limitations of the equitable adjustment. The government cites no authority defining the term in this context. Appellant has produced evidence that the parties negotiated equitable adjustments under this contract based upon changed market conditions, and not merely upon changed costs, showing the term was intended to permit such action.

(Internal citations omitted.)

Accordingly, Judge Wilson found that cost information was not relevant to valuing an REA for a change to a commercial subcontract, at least in this instance. The subcontract contained prices for certain launches, and the change could be quantified using contract pricing, without regard to costs incurred. More than two years later (November, 2018), a brief decision announced that the parties had agreed to award ULA $240 million for the changed launch requirements.

But that’s not quite the end of the story. Going back to Judge Melnick’s decision in KBR, footnote 7 discusses, and distinguishes the 2016 ULA decision. Judge Melnick wrote “Nothing in United Launch Services dictates that the equitable adjustment of an allegedly commercial subcontract must ignore costs and rely only upon a price analysis.” We agree that the ULA decision did not state that costs must be ignored when available; but in that particular case of REA valuation costs were ignored and the ASBCA accepted the methodology used. In any case, it is unclear whether the comment in a footnote is precedent-setting, or simply dicta. But what do we know? We’re not attorneys.

So that’s the story on pricing subcontract changes. It’s been a long road; we trust it was worth the trip.

 

Indirect Rates Are Not Hard But Ignorance Makes It So

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Homine imperito nunquam quidquid injustius,
Qui nisi quod ipse facit nihil rectum putat.

IMPORTANT NOTE: THE FOLLOWING IS FICTION. IT IS OUR INTERPRETATION OF A DISPUTE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CONTRACTOR. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO BE AN ACCURATE REPORT OF ACTUAL EVENTS.

The NASA Contracting Officer’s Story:

On December 21, 2007, I awarded a small business contractor named L&M Technologies (L&M) a huge contract for logistics support services at the Johnson Space Center (JSC), in Houston, Texas. The contract contemplated up to 10 Contract Years of performance and included a combination of CPFF, CPAF, and Award Term options. L&M used a Calendar Year for its fiscal year, but the Contract Years were not calendar years. They were both abbreviated CY though. In hindsight, this may have caused some confusion. To keep things simple, I’m going to use FY to indicate the contractor’s Fiscal Year and CY to indicate the Contract Year.

To further make things clear: CY1 ran from March 1, 2008 through February 28, 2009 and CY2 ran from March 1, 2009 through February 28, 2010.

In April, 2008, L&M informed me that DCAA had approved its FY2008 provisional billing rates. Those provisional billing rates covered most—but not all—of CY 1. I still needed DCAA-approved provisional billing rates for January and February, 2009.

Why didn’t I let the contractor bill its fiscal year rates for the months of performance for which it had approved rates? In hindsight, perhaps I should have considered that approach. Regardless, that’s not the approach I took.

For some reason, L&M was slow to submit a provisional billing rate proposal to DCAA for its FY2009. It wasn’t until May, 2009, that the proposal was submitted. That’s on L&M, not on me. Anyway, right after they submitted their 2009 provisional billing rates to DCAA, they called me and asked to process indirect rate adjustment invoices for CY 1. I assumed they were going to bill everything at the approved FY2008 rates but for some reason they billed FY2008 costs at FY2008 rates and FY2009 (January and February) costs at FY2009 provisional billing rates—even though DCAA had not yet approved those FY2009 rates. Naturally, I rejected the invoice.

But then DCAA told me that the contractor could bill me at the submitted rates prior to DCAA approving them. That part surprised me—though in hindsight I could have read the Allowable Cost and Payment clause (52.216-7) in the contract and seen that provisional billing rates were supposed to be as close to estimated final rates as possible, and then I might have taken a different tack. But that’s what hindsight is for, I guess.

L&M submitted NASA Form 533, as required by the contract. But there was some confusion, because Form 533 requires reporting of “actual costs incurred” and “estimated cost to complete” but L&M seemed to be reporting its costs as billed rather than as incurred. More confusion was caused because L&M was reporting costs at its FY2008 DCAA-approved provisional billing rates and was not reporting costs at the FY2009 rates because—get this—they said we had directed them not to use those rates. They sent me a letter that said “In … June … we were directed to remove 2009 rate true-ups from our 533. Since then we understood from a number of conversations that the rate adjustments would be dealt with after the REA was resolved.” So now somehow this was all my fault, when of course the contractor is responsible for accurate reporting, not me. Can you believe it?

I told L&M in no uncertain terms that this situation needed to be corrected. I wrote them and said—

L&M's 2009 provisional rates were not even approved by DCAA at the time of May 2009 (Invoice 67 dated 5/14/09 and 70 dated 5/18/09) yet L&M attempted to bill them and include them in the REA and I took exception to that. So do you concur that you are reporting on the 533 and invoicing for provisional rates ('08) just not '09 rates? What are L&M's '09 provisional rates?

Not much happened for a few months. We finalized the REA and then, in September, 2010, L&M submitted a “contract-to-date adjusting invoice for the period of 03/01/2008 – 08/27/2010” in the amount of $433,839. According to the letter of transmittal, L&M was now billing its FY2009 costs at DCAA-approved FY2009 provisional billing rates.

Then I found out that DCAA has a disagreement with L&M over its indirect cost allocation bases, and that if L&M were to invoice at the rates DCAA wanted them to use, then it would blow through some contract “cost gates” and would result in some negative incentives. L&M told me it wanted to establish contract indirect cost rate ceilings that would prevent this from happening. So even if L&M’s rates went up over the ceilings, the resulting costs would be unallowable for the contract.

I didn’t go for it; and why should I have? Instead, we submitted a draft Clause B.8 that would allow L&M to bill at rates less than DCAA calculated as the correct rates. It said—

For contract years 1 through 5 that the Contractor invoiced at indirect rates below the provisional billing rates approved by the DCAA, the Contractor shall assume all costs in excess of the indirect rates in the table below. Any costs incurred above these amounts shall be unallowable costs and shall not be billed to the Government under this or any other Government contract.

Pretty good, huh?

In hindsight, I might have wondered how the agreement would affect the Form 533 reporting. Would L&M report at actual indirect rates, or at the provisional billing rates, or at the contract ceiling rates? I’ve got to be honest here and tell you nobody asked those questions at the time.

In any case, all was seemingly fine for years, until December, 2016, when L&M and DCAA entered into a final indirect cost rate agreement for L&M’s FY2009. A few months later—in January, 2017, L&M submitted another series of rate adjustment invoices for costs incurred in its FY2009, and this time they wanted an additional $683,739! Naturally, I rejected those invoices because the rates agreed-to between DCAA and L&M were in excess of the rates established by contract clause B.8—which was the clause that L&M had asked for in the first place. Can you believe the nerve of those guys?

L&M argued that the clause only applied if they invoiced at “indirect rates below the provisional billing rates approved by DCAA,” and if they billed at DCAA-approved provisional billing rates then the clause was not applicable. That was clearly not the intent of my clause, and I told them so.

L&M filed a certified claim for the $683,739, which I denied. Then they appealed to the ASBCA.

Great; more work for me. But I know I’m right on this.

L&M Technologies’ Story:

There’s always a balance between telling the customer it is wrong and giving in on a point in the name of customer relations. In this case, we gave in and it cost us a ton of lost cash flow. As a small business, that really hurt us.

The CO kept insisting that we needed DCAA-approved provisional billing rates. Even when DCAA told the CO that we could bill without a DCAA approval, the CO didn’t budge. As a result, we kept billing at FY2008 rates even though we knew that FY2009 rates were higher.

In hindsight, we should have done a better job of helping the CO to understand how the lifecycle of billing rates under 52.216-7 works. We should have explained that the rates were going to be trued-up eventually, and it was in both parties’ best interests to make sure they were trued-up as the work was performed and costs were incurred. We didn’t do a great job there, and it cost us—not only in lost cash flow but also in unallowable legal fees as we appealed that CO’s final decision denying our rightful costs. But what do you expect from us? We’re a small business. We don’t know everything like the big contractors do.

What was that? No, we didn’t really think too much about the Form 533. We made sure it accurately reported the costs we had billed. The Form was as accurate as we could make it. When NASA told us to keep billing at FY2008 provisional billing rates, we kept reporting at FY2008 provisional billing rates on the Form. I told you, it was accurate. We did our job.

What do you mean that there’s a difference between actual cost rates and provisional billing rates? I told you we should have done a better job with the 52.216-7 clause. Maybe we should have made sure we fully understood it, as well. But we can’t be expected to know everything: I told you, we are a small business.

Those contract “cost gates” were really important and so when DCAA recalculated our rates higher based on a change in allocation base, we had a problem. We had to keep our rates low; that was an investment we needed to make to retain the contract work.

What do you mean we didn’t need anybody’s approval to bill at rates below the ones that DCAA calculated? The CO wouldn’t let us bill at anything other than DCAA-approved rates, and we needed to stay below those rates. What do you mean, we could have self-disallowed the costs rather than dealing with a contract mod? Well, now you tell us. At the time, we didn’t think of that. I told you, we are a small business.

Anyway, we know we are right on this and we’re appealing the decision.

The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals’ Story:

Clause B.8 is silent about when the contractor's invoice must be submitted, ‘For contract years 1 through 5 that the Contractor invoiced at indirect rates below the provisional billing rates approved by the DCAA’ (finding 15). Nothing in the clause directs us to consider the invoices itemized in the NF 533s (finding 8) to take precedence over Invoice No. 200 that bills at the higher 2009 rates and was paid by NASA (finding 12). Taking into consideration that it was NASA's direction that prevented L&M from invoicing at the 2009 rates earlier, we hold that Invoice No. 200 satisfies the B.8 requirement that L&M invoice at the approved provisional rate[s] listed in the clause in order to receive any increase in rates when DCAA approve[d] the final indirect rates. For that reason we conclude that the rate cap in Clause B.8 does not apply and L&M may recover any increase in its final rates over approved provisional rates.

In accordance with the above, L&M's appeal is sustained. The matter is remanded to the parties to determine quantum.

For those interested in the decision that sparked this fictional story, here is a link.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.