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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA Retreats on Subcontractor Assist Audits

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It’s a notable day when DCAA publishes a new MRD (Memorandum for Regional Directors). It’s not like that happens very often anymore.

In February, DCAA published a new MRD (19-PIC-001) entitled “Audit Guidance on Revised Policies and Procedures for Auditing Incurred Subcontract and Inter-Organizational Transfer Costs.”

Readers of this blog know that we have, in the past, taken issue with DCAA’s approach to auditing subcontractor costs. DCAA is in a tough spot. They don’t have privity of contract with the subcontractor, so they have to work through the prime contractor’s costs. That means that if they question subcontractor costs during the audit of the subcontractor, and they believe the subcontractor’s invoices to the prime were inflated by those questioned costs, then the method for recovering the inflated costs is to then question the prime contractor’s claimed subcontractor costs. Which then puts the onus on the prime (not the government) to have the subcontractor make it whole by paying it (and not the government) the questioned costs.

That approach has a number of problems, not the least of which is the timing of the whole thing. Too often, when DCAA is reviewing the prime contractor’s claimed costs the audit team reviewing the subcontractor’s claimed costs isn’t anywhere near to issuing its report. The timing situation leads to qualification of audit opinion, which doesn’t help the contracting officers in the slightest.

Moreover, the entire Schedule J of the standard proposal to establish final billing rates is fundamentally flawed in concept and execution. According to the Allowable Cost and Payment clause (52.216-7, Aug. 2018), Schedule J is required to list “subcontracts awarded to companies for which the contractor is the prime or upper-tier contractor (include prime and subcontract numbers; subcontract value and award type; amount claimed during the fiscal year; and the subcontractor name, address, and point of contact information).”

Seems simple enough, right?

Let’s start with: what is a subcontract? You want me to list it; so tell me what it is. Since the clause is prescribed by FAR Part 16, you would think that the definition would be found in that Part. Nope. No such luck. What about FAR Part 42? Since indirect rates are covered by 42.7, maybe the definition of subcontract can be found there? Oops! Not there either. Okay. Maybe the definition can be found at FAR 2.101 (Definitions). Nope. Not there either. So what’s a poor contractor, seeking to comply with the requirements of 52.216-7(d)(2)(iii)(J), to do?

At that point, the increasingly desperate contractor will probably beeline over to the DCAA website and download the “Checklist for Determining Adequacy of Contractor Incurred Cost Proposal.” Looking that that document, the contractor may learn that Schedule J must include “all types of subcontracts (e.g., cost-type, T&M/LH, IDIQ with a variable element, and FFP) and inter-company costs claimed by the contractor on flexibly priced prime contracts and/or upper-tier subcontracts.”

But wait a second. How did we get from listing subcontracts (whatever they are) to listing subcontracts plus inter-company costs? When did that get added to the required list? (We note for the record that various pieces of DCAA information for contractors are schizophrenic on this point: some guidance says inter-company costs should be included and other guidance doesn’t. Further, if one looks at the example Schedule Js provided as an aide to contractors, none of those examples ever shows inter-company work.)

To sum this digression up, contractors are being asked to comply with the requirements of 52.216-7 by listing something that’s never been defined and that may (or may not) include inter-organizational transfers. Objectively, compliance is not possible. But don’t worry, because DCAA no longer audits three-quarters of the final billing rate proposals it receives. As a contractor, you only have a one-out-of-four chance of having an auditor dig into your Schedule J.

At this point, we’re moving on.

Of course, the problem is bigger than Schedule J. The problem is that DCAA (and others) have been telling its auditors that prime contractors have responsibilities not found anywhere in regulations. Again, this assertion will not be news to readers of this blog.

See, for example, this article we wrote in 2016, taking issue with DCAA direction to auditors and contractors that, somehow, prime contractors were responsible “to obtain an adequate incurred cost submission from subcontractor.” Yeah, that was made-up bovine fertilizer, as we told our readers at the time.

And then, about six months later, we wrote about the ASBCA decision in the matter of Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems (LMIS), in which the Board sustained LMIS’s appeal of a COFD demanding some $117 million because the government’s case was predicated on a “plainly invalid legal theory” that was “originated by a [DCAA] auditor.” That LMIS case is important and, if you haven’t read it, you really should. Part of the recital of facts included some bits about how DCAA questioned $13.9 million of LMIS subcontractor costs (based on assist audit reports) but provided no details. Some amount of questioned (prime contractor) costs was based on differences between amounts claimed by LMIS in its annual proposal and amounts claimed by the subcontractors in their individual final billing rate proposals. All those issues were dismissed by the Board in its decision because the government’s case “provided no allegations of fact.” The decision stated—

Our pleading standard requires factual assertions beyond bare conclusory assertions to entitlement. The audit report, which was incorporated into the complaint, states that some assist audits questioned costs but does not explain on what grounds. It also states there were differences between amounts in LMIS's proposal and costs under subcontracts but provides no facts regarding these differences. More importantly, the COFD does not cite a single actual fact, only the audit report's unsupported conclusions.

Why didn’t DCAA (and the contracting officer) have more facts to offer in support of their claim against LMIS?

One theory is that the government ran out of time. The COFD was issued just one day before LMIS might plausibly argue that it was time-barred by the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations. Another theory is that the subcontractor refused to allow DCAA to release its audit findings to the prime contractor. Chapter 10 of the Contract Audit Manual (CAM) briefly discusses this situation. The situation is also discussed in CAM Chapter 6 (Incurred Costs Audit Procedures) at 6-802.6. The CAM states—

When a DCAA subcontract assist audit is contemplated, the higher-tier contractor normally will have made satisfactory arrangements for its unrestricted access to the subcontract audit results so that it will be able to fulfill its responsibilities for settling any audit exceptions. In rare cases, this may be impracticable. … Before beginning a subcontract audit, determine whether the subcontractor will have any restrictions or reservations on release of the resulting audit report(s) to the higher-tier contractor. A significant reservation exists if the subcontractor desires to withhold its decision on release of an audit report pending review of the audit results or report contents. If the subcontractor does not assure unrestricted report release at the outset, refer the matter to the requesting higher-tier contract auditor.

Readers, we have been doing this for 35 years now. And we have got to tell you, in all those years we have never, ever, seen a DCAA auditor refer a subcontractor denial of release to a higher-tier contract auditor, to the cognizant contracting officer, or to the prime contractor for resolution. But that’s what the guidance says is supposed to happen.

In essence, the entire framework of DCAA’s audit of subcontractor costs is predicated upon the subcontractor granting release of audit findings to the prime contractor. In our experience, that happens only very rarely. Thus, if the subcontractor objects to release of the audit findings to the prime (as is the norm), then what is DCAA to do? Nothing. All the auditor can do is simply provide the amount of questioned costs without detail.

And we’ve seen how the ASBCA felt about that.

Now, having taken way too long to set the stage, we can take a look at the latest piece of DCAA audit guidance. (Hey, remember how we started this article? It does seem like a long time ago!)

The new audit guidance states—

Subcontract assist audits will no longer be requested for the life of the subcontract; instead, auditors will evaluate risk every year and request subcontract assist audits as needed. … The prime auditor will no longer request assist audits for the life of the subcontract based on the total expected subcontract value at the time of award. Rather, the prime auditor, in coordination with the subcontractor auditor, will assess the risk and need for assist audit effort based on subcontract costs included in the prime contractor’s annual incurred cost proposal.

Further (and in reference to the LMIS discussion, above), the new audit guidance states “… auditors should not question subcontract costs based solely on deficiencies in the prime contractor’s subcontract management process.” It seems DCAA got the message. Finally.

In addition to the above, the MRD announced revisions to the 10100 Incurred Cost Audit Program (Post Year-end Audit) that “incorporate suggestions from the field and stress the importance of clear communication between prime and subcontract auditors.”

The revised audit program now includes the following steps:

  • Where the contractor is performing subcontract or inter-organizational effort (as a lower-tier contractor, coordinate with the prime DCAA office(s) on whether an audit of the subcontractor or inter-organizational transfer cost is needed and if so, coordinate the timing of the audit and expected completion date. If the prime DCAA office does not require an audit, exclude the subcontract / inter-organizational costs from audit and adjust audit scope and auditable dollars (ADV) accordingly.

  • Adjust government participation for risk assessment purposes taking into consideration contracts already closed, non-DoD contracts and subcontracts for which the civilian agency (reimbursable customer) does not participate in our audit, subcontract cost where the prime / upper-tier auditor does not require an assist audit, T&M contracts, settled cost reimbursable terminations, and contracts subject to the class deviation pilot for innovative technology projects. (Emphasis added.)

  • Calculate the materiality of direct costs for contracts subject to audit. Remove dollars associated with contracts that are closed, non-DoD contracts/subcontracts where agency is not participating, dollars associated with subcontracts / IOTs that prime / upper-tier auditor does not require an audit, and contracts subject to the class deviation pilot for innovative technology projects. (Emphasis added.)

  • Assess the need for an assist audit on significant lower-tier subcontract and inter-organizational transfer (IOT) costs included in the prime/higher tier contractor’s (contractor under audit) ICP based on documented risk. This assessment should include coordination with the auditors cognizant of the lower-tier contractor / performing segment and should take place prior to sending a request for assist audit.

  • Due care should be taken to ensure both the prime / upper-tier and lower tier subcontract audits are completed within the required timeframe (i.e. one year) for any adequate submission received December 12, 2017 or later.

  • The prime / upper-tier and lower tier auditors should communicate known risks from their perspective early to design the nature, extent, and timing of appropriate audit procedures.

There may be other relevant audit steps, but those were the ones we saw.

Let’s wrap this up. Recognizing the difficulties in which it placed its auditors with respect to audits of subcontractor claimed costs, Fort Belvoir has made changes to its audit program. Those changes should go a long way toward addressing the difficulties. However, had the auditors been following CAM direction, the additional audit guidance may not have been necessary.

 

Hanford Contractors Back in the News

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There is no Department of Energy site about which we have written more than the Hanford site. Once critical to the nation’s security, home of the plutonium that was used in the bomb that ended World War II, the nearly 600-mile site in southeastern Washington now seems to breed more corruption than isotopes.

A few months ago (August, 2018) we wrote about a reported settlement between the US Government and the former Vice President of Finance for Mission Support Alliance (MSA), which was a joint venture between Lockheed Martin Integrated Technology, LLC, Jacobs Engineering, and Wackenhut Services—though the entity now appears to be run by Leidos.

The issues go back to a 2016 audit report by the DOE Office of Inspector General. If you want to understand the history and players, click on the link in the paragraph above.

In that 2018 article, we wrote “we assume the corporate entities resolved their issues because we can’t find any more about the situation.”

Well, that may have been a trifle optimistic.

Now comes word that the corporate entities likely did not resolve their issues, because the Department of Justice has filed a suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that MSA, Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC), Lockheed Martin Services Inc. (LMSI), and Jorge Francisco Armijo (current Vice President of LMC, who served as a President of MSA during the time period in which the wrongdoing is alleged to have taken place) conspired to make false statements, submit invoices containing inflated costs associated with inter-organizational transfers between affiliated entities under a common control, and to violate the Anti-Kickback Act by making large payments to MSA executives “in order to obtain improper favorable treatment from MSA with respect to the award of the LMSI subcontract at the inflated rates.”

Yeah, that’s going to be expensive.

So here’s the thing:

Companies that treat inter-organizational transactions between affiliated entities under a common control as if they are arms-length transactions are making a big mistake. Huge.

If you are dealing with affiliated entities, and you are billing the inter-organizational transfer costs to a government contract, then you’ve got to get this right. FAR 31.205-26(e) establishes the rules for how the cost accounting is to be done. With only one exception, such costs must be transferred on the basis of actual, allowable, costs. (We’ve written about the exception on our blog, if you’re interested.)

People are going to try to tell you that their CPSR rules require inter-organizational transfers to be treated as if they are arms-length transactions, in terms of contract type, or prime contract flowdowns, or whatnot. Don’t let them persuade you. Don’t let them award anything other than cost-plus-no-fee subcontracts (unless the sole exception applies).

Better yet, don’t award a subcontract. Period. Instead, create a separate vehicle for transferring work tasks, budgets, and associated costs, between the two organizations under common control.

We’ve seen this too many times now. If you haven’t gotten the message then you are not competently performing your job. Follow FAR 31.205-26(e) or risk the same fate as has befallen these Hanford site contractors.

 

Deaf, Dumb, and Blind Auditors from GAO

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Deaf_Dumb_BlindGAO released its long-awaited report on DoD’s management of the Contractor Business Systems (CBS) oversight process. We read it. It didn’t take very long, as there wasn’t really anything there.

You know that feeling when you have a first date with somebody you are really attracted to? You look forward to it. You think about what you will wear. You think about the best place to meet each other, one that is slightly romantic (but not too romantic—after all, it’s a first date). It can’t be too loud, because then you won’t be able to talk to each other and get to know each other, and explore that connection you feel. And then it’s time! You both get to this special place, wearing nice clothes. You sit down and look at each other ….

… and then you realize you have nothing in common. Nothing at all. All the conversational gambits fail. Questions get one-word answers. Or maybe he spends all the time looking at the game on the TV over the bar. Whatever. But after a few minutes you realize that attraction you felt has faded away and you start looking at your watch (or phone), counting the minutes until the date is over. Maybe you start texting your friend to call you with a made-up emergency, just to get out of there that much faster.

What you looked forward to has evaporated and it’s been replaced with nothing. There’s now a hole where the expectation of a potential great relationship used to be.

“Disappointment” is a word that might describe your feelings about the situation, but it’s hardly the right description. Sure, there’s disappointment. But there’s also anger as well. Anger that the opportunity was wasted. Anger that the money was wasted. Anger that the you were misled, that the attraction you felt was really a mirage.

Disappointment and anger and maybe a bit of a betrayal.

Those are our feelings about GAO’s report on Contractor Business Systems.

How did this fiasco get started?

Section 890 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), required the Comptroller General of the United States to “submit to the congressional defense committees a report evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of the program for the improvement of contractor business systems established pursuant to section 893 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 10 U.S.C. 2302 note).”

Note that key word: evaluate.

But more than that was required. Section 890 went on to say:

The report shall—

(1) describe how the requirements of such program were implemented, including the roles and responsibilities of relevant Defense Agencies and known costs to the Federal Government and covered contractors;

(2) analyze the extent to which implementation of such program has affected, if at all, covered contractor performance or the management and oversight of covered contracts of the Department of Defense;

(3) assess how the amendments to contractor business system requirements made by section 893 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2324) were implemented, including—

(A) the effects of revising the definition of “covered contractor” in section 893(g)(2) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 10 U.S.C. 2302 note) and the feasibility and the potential effects of further increasing the percentage of the total gross revenue included in the definition; and

(B) the extent to which third-party independent auditors have conducted contractor business system assessments pursuant to section 893(c) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 10 U.S.C. 2302 note);

(4) identify any additional information or management practices that could enhance the process for assessing contractor business systems, particularly when covered contractors have multiple covered contracts with the Department of Defense; and

(5) include any other matters the Comptroller General determines to be relevant.

But more than that was required. The House language (quoted above) was modified in Committee and “the Senate recedes with an amendment that would expand the review to evaluate overall implementation and effectiveness of the contractor business system program…” (Emphasis added.)

Again, we note the key word: evaluate.

Evaluate the effectiveness.

Thus, the Comptroller General and GAO had a clear mandate and the topics to be covered were clearly stated. Too bad the Comptroller General and GAO ignored their mandate and ignored the topics to be covered, and issued a nothing burger of a report.

Let’s be clear that auditors from GAO made token efforts to try to hit the marks established by the NDAA. They met with individual contractors and they met with industry associations. Those people interviewed by GAO were led to believe that their inputs were valued, that they would be considered in the final report. Contractors gave their time and taxpayers paid for that time, just like taxpayers paid for GAO auditors to travel to those contractor sites to obtain the valuable insight from the contractors. And it was going to be used in the report and that report was going to pull the curtain away from the utter nonsense that is the Contractor Business System oversight regime.

Yeah, about that. Not so much.

Report findings:

  • DOD does not have a mechanism to monitor and ensure that these reviews are being conducted in a timely manner.

  • DCMA currently lacks a mechanism based on relevant and reliable information, such as the number of reviews that are outstanding and the resources available to conduct such reviews, to ensure reviews are being completed in a timely fashion.

And … that’s it.

Does that sound like GAO actually did what Congress demanded—via Public Law—that it do? No?

We didn’t think so either.

What about the table that showed actual versus planned DCAA Contractor Business System audits? You know, the one that showed less than 20 audits per year over the period GFY 2013 through GFY 2018, but then the number of planned audits suddenly increasing from low levels to more than 100 per year by GFY 2020?

(We mean, we’ve seen charts like that one before—mostly prepared by Marketing. They’re called “hockey stick” charts because they’re flat until they suddenly turn upwards at the very end of the year. That way, the Marketing folks get to keep their jobs longer, until it becomes painfully obvious they will not meet their plans.)

What did GAO say about that hockey stick DCAA audit chart? Well, on pages 22 and 23, GAO wrote about DCAA’s plans to radically amp-up its CBS audits. GAO wrote—

DCAA officials acknowledged they have not been able to conduct audits of contractor business systems within the timeframes outlined in DCMA instructions. … Recognizing that it cannot perform all of the required CBS audits in a timely fashion to meet current DCMA policy requirements, DCAA officials told us they focus their audits on business systems they identify as high-risk. … Our analysis indicates that successfully executing [DCAA’s] plan is dependent on several factors, including the ability to shift resources from conducting incurred cost audits to business systems audits, the use of public accounting firms to perform a portion of the incurred cost audits, and the ability of DCAA auditors to use new audit plans and complete the required audits in a timely manner. … DCAA plans to shift more than 378,000 hours from incurred cost audits to CBS audits between fiscal years 2018 and 2020. DCAA officials noted, however, that although they have made significant progress in addressing incurred cost audits, the fiscal year 2018 NDAA requires DCAA to have all incurred cost audits performed within 12 months. DCAA officials noted that this means it will have to continue to spend significant resources on incurred cost audits in fiscal year 2019 to meet this legislative requirement. … DCAA officials stated that these estimates include the resources that are expected to become available to perform CBS audits as DCAA starts using public accounting firms to perform incurred cost audits. …

In summary, Marketing has a plan to hit its sales goals but it’s dependent on things happening that almost certainly will not happen. Recognition of failure is thus delayed: the can is kicked into GFY 2020.

About those contractor interviews—

Our review of six selected contractors’ business system reviews illustrates the challenges in identifying and resolving deficiencies in a timely manner. Overall, our review of these six cases found that it took from 15 months to 5 years or more to resolve deficiencies initially identified by DCAA or DCMA. Factors contributing to the time it took to resolve these issues included contractors submitting inadequate corrective action plans, DCMA or DCAA identifying additional deficiencies in subsequent reviews or audits, and the use of different auditors to conduct the reviews. [But] DCMA and DCAA officials believe the cases we analyzed were not representative of the length of time needed to complete the CBS review process, but could not provide data to support their views because DCMA and DCAA do not track data on the length of time it takes to complete the entire CBS review process (i.e., from the start of an audit or review to the resolution of system deficiencies and final determination).

(Emphasis added.)

There you have it. In the time-honored tradition of government bureaucrats, contractor complaints and actual audit findings were arm-waved away as being “not representative” of the situation—even though they absolutely were representative of the situation. GAO accepted the bureaucratic rebuttal at face value, even though (as GAO noted) the bureaucrats “could not provide data to support their views.”

So much for contractor and industry association input.

Oh, there was something about the use of independent auditors and how DoD and DDP haven’t yet acted on the GFY 2017 NDAA Public Law requirements. Because there are “concerns.” Moreover—

… the Director of the Defense Acquisition Regulation Council—who is responsible for promulgating proposed and final rule changes to the DFARS— tasked her staff to draft a proposed rule by March 2017. This deadline was subsequently extended to January 23, 2019. In November 2018, Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPC) officials told us that they now expect to issue the proposed rule for public comment in the third or fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. DPC officials attributed this delay, in part, to a recent executive order that calls for the reduction and control of regulatory costs, as well as the complexity of having public accounting firms perform CBS reviews.

Again, note that the statements were taken at face value. The nearly three-year delay in even issuing a proposed rule for public comment was explained as being President Trump’s fault. If only he hadn’t issued that pesky Executive Order, well then, of course the DAR Council would have fulfilled its role and complied with Public Law. To us, that smells very much like GAO auditors not acting with professional skepticism.

And that’s the report. All of it.

Our understanding is that a representative from GAO will be meeting with contractor industry associations to discuss the findings of this report, just as if it were an important report, with actionable findings. We hope those industry associations ask probing questions about what happened to the Congressional mandate GAO had to evaluate the effectiveness of the CBS oversight regime?

Where the heck was the evaluation of the effectiveness to be found in the report?

This report was supposed to be an important report. Just like that first date was supposed to be an important event. Things were supposed to happen, based on this report. Reforms were possible. Just like that first date was supposed to lead to a beautiful relationship.

Yet, at the end there was nothing.

Nothing of substance. Nothing of consequence.

And now we’re wondering when that “emergency” phone call is going to happen, because we want to get out of here.

 

Graduating from the 8(a) Program

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The Small Business Administration (SBA) “8(a)” program helps socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses gain access to federal contracts, thereby promoting economic and social mobility; the program also promotes the development of small businesses, which helps prevent the formation of monopolies that would stifle innovation and restrict consumers’ ability to negotiate lower prices through competition.

Those are the public policy benefits. To the businesses that are allowed to enter the program, the primary benefit is that certain contracts are “set aside” for certified 8(a) contractors to bid on exclusively. In other words, competition is restricted only to 8(a) firms. This creates a niche of opportunity, where small businesses are protected from the competitive advantages of larger, more experienced firms. There are other benefits, but that’s the main one.

In order to enter the 8(a) program, a small business must meet certain criteria. The qualification criteria are:

  • Be a small business

  • Not have already have participated in the 8(a) program

  • Be at least 51 percent owned and controlled by U.S. citizens who are economically and socially disadvantaged

  • Be owned by someone whose personal net worth is $250,000 or less

  • Be owned by someone whose average adjusted gross income for three years is $250,000 or less

  • Be owned by someone with $4 million or less in assets

  • Have the owner manage day-to-day operations and also make long-term decisions

  • Have all its principals demonstrate good character

  • Show potential for success and be able to perform successfully on contracts

But being a certified 8(a) small business contractor is not a forever thing. Sooner or later, 8(a) businesses “graduate” from the program because they no longer meet the qualification criteria. And even if they continue to meet the qualification criteria, they are only permitted to be in the program for nine years. Nine years and out.

Once out, the company is out forever – see the second criterion above. The company is removed from its protective niche and now has to compete with the larger government contractors.

That’s where the real challenges begin.

As this “blog” from the SBA (authored by Caron Beesley) states—

Hundreds of small businesses enter the SBA’s 8(a) business development program each year, but when those companies graduate, continued success and favor isn’t a given. The playground is a lot flatter, your sole-source advantage is gone and the competition is fierce.

Ms. Beesley’s ”blog” offers advice to 8(a) firms regarding planning for program graduation. Those tips are good, and we recommend you read them. She recommends (among other things) narrowing the marketing focus, hiring strong talent, and managing business cash flow. Nothing wrong with those tips! But the fundamental point is that companies who are in the 8(a) program need to have a plan for how to navigate graduation, because once they depart their protected safe harbor, things tend to get a lot harder—and many companies do not survive the change in competitive environment.

There are certain 8(a) graduation plans that probably don’t seem as cunning, in retrospect, as they may have seemed when they were being created.

For example, let’s talk about Vigil Contracting.

According to its website, the company is “an 8(a) woman-owned and operated general construction company” located in Crofton, Maryland. It claims to be the 2009 “USDA Small Disadvantaged Business Contractor of the Year.” Shannon Vigil is listed as President, and J.J. Vigil is listed as Operations Manager. The 8(a) program certification date is listed as being September 26, 2002.

Wait a second. If the company entered the 8(a) program in 2002 and a company can only be in the 8(a) program for nine years, then how can the company continue to be an 8(a) program participant in 2019—17 years after entry?

You’re right. That doesn’t make any sense. The company would have to have graduated from the 8(a) program in 2011.

Also, Manta.com reports that Vigil Contracting’s annual revenues are between $10 and $20 million. Zoominfo.com says $6.2 million. Given the 8(a) financial qualification criteria listed above, it’s tough to see how Vigil Contracting continues to qualify for 8(a) status, regardless of which annual revenue number you believe to be correct.

Something seems off about Vigil Contracting, Inc., doesn’t it?

Now let’s talk about VMJ Construction, LLC.

According to its company profile on Bloomberg.com, VMJ Construction is located at the exact same address as is shown for Vigil Contracting. There’s not much detail, but Bloomberg reports that the company provides “homebuilding services.” There’s also a VMJ Construction, LLC located in Thornton, Colorado. An entry on Opengovus.com suggests that the two companies may be one and the same, because the Maryland company is registered with the Colorado Department of State (though its current status is “delinquent.”) This entry at governmentcontractswon.com states that VMJ Construction was awarded nearly $10 million in government contracts from the Department of Defense during the period 2012 – 2014 (three years).

Not too shabby for a “homebuilding services” contractor!

Also puzzling is that the Bloomberg entry (and entries at some other sites) state that VMJ Construction’s annual revenues have been $600,000. We are not sure how $10 million in contract awards squares with $600K in reported annual revenue. Somewhere, somehow, nearly $9.5 million in revenue seems to have vanished from the VMJ Construction LLC books.

Could the missing revenue have ended-up at Vigil Contracting, Inc.?

The Department of Justice seems to think so.

According to this press release—

VMJ Construction, LLC (“VMJ”) and its owner, Colorado resident Michael T. Vigil, as well as Maryland-based Vigil Contracting, Inc. (“Vigil Contracting”) and its Operations Manager, John J. Vigil, have agreed to pay the United States $3.6 million to resolve allegations that they defrauded the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) 8(a) Business Development Program. …

VMJ was accepted into the 8(a) Program in 2011. Michael T. Vigil, who is Hispanic, was the 91% owner of VMJ, and was the socially and economically disadvantaged individual upon which VMJ based its application to the 8(a) program. John J. Vigil was a 9% owner of VMJ. John J. Vigil was also the Operations Manager of Vigil Contracting. Vigil Contracting is a 2011 graduate of the 8(a) Program. Since 2011, Vigil Contracting has not been eligible to bid for contracts reserved for 8(a) Program participants.

The United States contends that VMJ made false statements to the SBA regarding its eligibility to participate in the 8(a) Program. Specifically, VMJ relied almost exclusively upon Vigil Contracting to bid on and complete the work awarded to VMJ under the 8(a) Program. VMJ used Vigil Contracting’s bonding, office space, employees, contractors, software, computers, and vehicles. Vigil Contracting employees and contractors, including John J. Vigil, made the high-level business decisions of VMJ and managed the day-to-day operations of VMJ. Michael T. Vigil did not control VMJ, did not set the long-term policy, nor manage the day-to-day management of the business. VMJ knowingly misrepresented these facts to SBA, in both VMJ’s initial application to participate in the 8(a) Program and in an annual update to SBA. As a result of the deception, the United States Army, the United States Navy, and the United States Department of Agriculture awarded VMJ several federal government contracts set aside for 8(a) Program participants.

Based on the DOJ press release, it seems that Vigil Contracting did graduate the 8(a) program in 2011 (despite what its website continues to assert) and it developed a plan for what to do after graduation. Apparently, its plan was to create another “front” 8(a) company to continue to receive set-aside contract awards.

Eventually, the scheme was discovered and a settlement agreement was crafted.

There are certain 8(a) graduation plans that probably don’t seem as cunning, in retrospect, as they may have seemed when they were being created.

 

CPSRs Get Harder

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DFARS contract clause 252.244-7001 (“Contractor Purchasing Systems”) establishes 24 adequacy criteria. A “significant deficiency” in any one of those criteria will lead to a disapproved purchasing system and possible payment withholds. As readers may know, in 2014 the clause was revised to add adequacy criteria related to compliance with the requirements of DFARS contract clause 252.246-7007 (“Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System”) (CEPDAS). We wrote about the new criteria (with a certain air of smugness, since we had predicted the increased emphasis on the area) in this article.

The point is, a CPSR doesn’t just cover purchasing files. It covers a wide range of requirements including compliance with CEPDAS and compliance with Item Unique Identification (IUID). If you think your Supply Chain Management department can pass a CPSR on its own, think again.

And now comes word that CPSRs are getting even harder. On January 21, 2019, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment) Ellen Lord issued a Memo that directed DCMA to “validate, for contracts for which they provide contract administration and oversight, contractor compliance with the requirements of DFARS clause 252.204-7012.” That DFARS contract clause, for those who don’t know, is the Cybersecurity clause, known more formally as “Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting.”

Consequently, when CPSRs are performed, reviewers will be assessing how well contractors are complying with cybersecurity requirements.

According to the Memo, reviewers will—

  • Review contractor procedures to ensure contractual DoD requirements for marking and distribution statements on DoD CUI flow down appropriately to their Tier 1 Level Suppliers.

  • Review Contractor procedures to assess compliance of their Tier 1 Level Suppliers with DFARS Clause 252.204-7012 and NIST SP 800-171.

According to a client alert from attorneys at Crowell & Moring, “the scope of DCMA’s review appears broader than the Clause’s textual requirements.” To us, this means that CPSR adequacy may hinge on more than complying with the requirements of the clause itself, which is not good news for contractors.

Importantly, the actual Purchasing System clause was not rewritten. There are no additional adequacy criteria. The cybersecurity review steps appear to be “unwritten” adequacy criteria. Consequently, we don’t know what happens if a contractor doesn’t pass the cybersecurity review steps. Will a system be failed? Will payment withholds be implemented? We just don’t know.

But if history is any guide, it is just a matter of time until the clause is revised (again) to add cybersecurity to IUID and CEPDAS requirements. Meaning, of course, that it will become even harder to pass a CPSR, and that it will require even more cross-functional support to do so.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.