OTs and NTDCs
We’ve written about nontraditional defense contractors (NTDCs) several times on this blog, the most recent of which is this article. We noted in that article that a new DFARS rule permitted contracting officers to treat goods and services offered by NTDCs as commercial items, meaning that no certified cost or pricing data would be required to support the prices being offered.
Which is, of course, a good thing—at least, if you are an NTDC. (NTDCs are defined as any business that “is not currently performing and has not performed any contract or subcontract for DoD that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards … for at least the 1-year period preceding the solicitation of sources by DoD for the procurement.”)
Subsequently we noted that Don Mansfield had opined that the definition of an NTDC might result in the situation where every small business is potentially a NTDC (because, by definition, small businesses are exempt from CAS coverage). Don suggested that they would thus be eligible under DFARS 212.102(a)(iii) for Part 12 commercial item procurement procedures, regardless of whether the small business’ goods/services had been formally determined to be commercial items.
Well, maybe. It makes sense, but our experience tells us that when an interpretation of an acquisition rule makes sense, somebody is going to disagree with it.
Anyway, on March 5, 2019, the Acting Principal Director of Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPAC) issued a guidance memo regarding use of NTDCs and Other Transactions (OTs). The memo makes clear that the purpose of both OTs and NTDCs is to speed access to the innovative technologies of commercial entities.
*Sigh*
We have written many times about DOD’s love/hate relationship with innovation. It’s almost funny that DOD would love to have the innovation offered by commercial entities but doesn’t really want anything that might disrupt the status quo. Think we’re exaggerating? Check out our articles on Palantir’s attempts (including several lawsuits) to try to get a foot in the acquisition door in order to provide DOD with its leading intelligence fusion software.
DOD has an empirically proven love/hate relationship with innovation and with acquisition of commercial items, which is why both Congress and the Section 809 Panel keeps telling DOD to do better in those areas. Over and over again.
So now comes another guidance memo that reminds contracting officers that DFARS permits use of streamlined acquisition methods, including OTs and NTDCs, to facilitate access to that sweet, sweet, privately developed innovative technology. But who will force the COCOMs to require that technology?
One more thing: the memo clarifies that, when a contracting officer uses the NTDC rule to acquire goods and services, that is not the same thing as making a commercial item determination (CID). The memo states “The decision to apply commercial item procedures to the procurement of supplies and services from a nontraditional defense contractor does not require a commercial item determination, and does not mean the supplies or services are commercial.”
That’s a good clarification. It’s consistent with the actual DFARS language. But it leads us to the question regarding whether a NTDC should insist on a CID rather than accept a quick-‘n’-dirty Part 12 acquisition? We mean, accepting streamlined NTDC procedures solves one immediate problem (submission of certified cost or pricing data), but it doesn’t really solve the underlying concern—which is to get DOD to accept a good or service as being a commercial item whose pricing is based on market forces rather than a detailed cost buildup.
In other words, it’s a bit of a trade-off.
The contractor has the leverage to the extent that DOD wants that cheap innovative technology, and once DOD has the tech, much of the leverage goes away. Why should DOD take the time and effort to consider a CID if it doesn’t need to? But if the CID isn’t made, then the contractor will be right back where it started from at the next acquisition. The problem will not have been solved; it will simply have been kicked down the street.
OTs and NTDCs give DOD something it wants: streamlined access to privately funded innovative technology. We suggest that proper consideration for that access should be a commercial item determination, when doing so can be justified by the FAR.
Procurement Fraud Never Gets Old
Corruption in the public procurement process? Say it ain’t so!
Over at DOE’s Savannah River site, contractor CB&I AREVA MOX Services LLC (MOX Services) has been in the news recently. And it’s not for the ASBCA decisions that keep going their way. Recently, the Department of Justice announced that it had filed suit against MOX Services and one of its subcontractors, Wise Services, alleging violations of the False Claims Act and the Anti-Kickback Act. Between 2008 and 2016, MOX Services awarded multiple subcontracts to Wise Services. As alleged in the filing, “Wise Services’ Senior Site Representative Phillip Thompson paid kickbacks to MOX Services officials with responsibility for the subcontracts [in order] to improperly obtain favorable treatment from MOX Services.”
Consequently, the government alleged that “Wise Services falsely claimed reimbursement under its subcontracts with MOX Services for construction materials that did not exist, and that in turn MOX Services knowingly submitted $6.4 million in claims to NNSA for the fraudulent charges submitted by Wise Services.”
Let’s unpack those allegations a bit.
The MOX Services’ subcontract manager (or whatever they are called) accepted kickbacks from Wise Services.1 Wise Services submitted invoices for costs incurred under its illegally obtained subcontracts. Some of the costs were never, in fact, incurred. MOX Services paid the invoices anyway, and then billed the NNSA/DOE for the monies it paid to Wise Services.
Let’s look at the keyword in the allegations: “knowingly.” Did MOX Services “knowingly” invoice NNSA/DOE for fraudulent invoices it paid to Wise Services? The government will say “yes”—because MOX Services’ subcontract manager accepted kickbacks and that subcontract manager represented the company. Even though the person preparing the invoice, and also perhaps the person reviewing and certifying the invoice, had no knowledge of the kickbacks, an official company representative did have knowledge. So that’s going to be a problem.
Let’s look at the notion of inflated prices being invoiced by the subcontractor. In this instance, the government alleged that Wise Services invoiced MOX Services for “construction materials that did not exist” and thus inflated its invoice values. We don’t know the basis for that allegation; however, we are fairly sure (as non-lawyers) that it wouldn’t matter. A long time ago we were involved in a similar matter, where the government alleged the subcontractor inflated its invoices in order to recover the cost of its bribes. At that time, we were told that, when bribes are made or kickbacks are accepted, the government’s presumption is that the resulting invoices are always inflated—because otherwise how would the crooks profit from their corrupt payments? We were hired to help rebut that presumption. We were hired to find evidence that the invoices prices billed to this one prime contractor varied from invoice prices billed to all other prime contractors (where there had been no corruption alleged).2
This is a fairly common story that government contractors would do well to think about. When there is a corrupt payment made/accepted between a subcontractor and the contractor’s purchasing agent, it is like a domino that keeps on moving throughout the life of the prime contract. As a prime contractor, it’s very hard to recover from that corrupt act—especially if your controls never detected it. Prime contractors must work hard to prevent corrupt dealings, and to detect them if/when they happen. It’s not really hard to bolster controls; but it does take an investment of time and resources. We strongly suggest that such an investment will more than pay for itself.
In our next story of procurement fraud, we have another tawdry tale of corruption between a prime contractor and a government official, courtesy of another recent DOJ press release. According to allegations reported in that announcement—
From 2010 through 2018, Dombroski [long-time Government employee at Picatinny Arsenal] and Nayee [“Company A” Division Director, in charge of “Company A’s” Picatinny Arsenal branch office] conspired with other federal employees at Picatinny Arsenal and employees of Company A to seek and accept gifts and other items of value, such as Apple products, luxury handbags, Beats headphones, and tickets to a luxury sky box at professional sporting events, valued at $150,000 to $250,000, in exchange for government contracts and other favorable assistance for Company A at Picatinny Arsenal.
As per the DOJ press release, “Dombroski … is charged by complaint with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and four counts of making false statements. Indra Nayee … is also charged by complaint with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.”
No details were provided regarding how this alleged corruption came to light. However, we note that the government contractor was not identified by name; we are guessing that means that “Company A” either discovered the wrongdoing and reported it, or else cooperated with government investigators to such an extent that it was thrown a bone that might keep downstream shareholder suits from bothering company executives.
We expect to read a future DOJ press release, announcing that “Company A” has settled allegations that it illegally obtained contracts by disgorging all related profits. Meanwhile, “the count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. The false statement charges each carry a maximum penalty of five years in prison.”
1 In fact, the DOJ announcement included this tidbit: “On Feb. 27, 2017, Mr. Thompson entered a guilty plea on charges of conspiring to commit theft of government funds.” Nice plea deal.
2 We did our job and were able to show that the (alleged) crooks—our clients—did not recover their bribes through inflated pricing to the prime contractor. To this day, I’m not sure what happened after we turned in our report to defense counsel. I’m happy to be rid of those clients.
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A Fair Profit
A frequently heard question is “How much profit should I expect on my contract?” It comes up during preparation of the initial cost proposal; it comes up during negotiations; and it comes up when companies are considering entering the Federal marketplace to sell their goods and services.
What’s a fair profit?
As you might expect, government negotiators and contractors differ with respect to their answers to that seemingly straightforward question.
Here is what the regulations say:
It is in the Government’s interest to offer contractors opportunities for financial rewards sufficient to stimulate efficient contract performance, attract the best capabilities of qualified large and small business concerns to Government contracts, and maintain a viable industrial base. Both the Government and contractors should be concerned with profit as a motivator of efficient and effective contract performance. Negotiations aimed merely at reducing prices by reducing profit, without proper recognition of the function of profit, are not in the Government’s interest. Negotiation of extremely low profits, use of historical averages, or automatic application of predetermined percentages to total estimated costs do not provide proper motivation for optimum contract performance. (FAR 15.404-4(a).)
(Emphasis added.)
Right away, it is clear that the government expects a contractor to propose, and actually make, a reasonable profit on the work performed. That’s the official policy, as expressed in the FAR.
However, when cost analysis is performed, a contracting officer must evaluate the contractor’s proposed profit using a technique called “structured approach” that ensures a consistent methodology in that evaluation. According to FAR 15.404-4(d), the structured approach should consider the following factors:
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The complexity of the work and the resources required of the prospective contractor for contract performance.
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The degree of cost responsibility and associated risk that the prospective contractor will assume as a result of the contract type contemplated and considering the reliability of the cost estimate in relation to the complexity and duration of the contract task.
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The degree of support given by the prospective contractor to Federal socioeconomic programs, such as those involving small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, women-owned small business concerns, veteran-owned, HUBZone, service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns, sheltered workshops for workers with disabilities, and energy conservation.
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The contribution of contractor investments to efficient and economical contract performance.
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Measures taken by the prospective contractor that result in productivity improvements, and other cost-reduction accomplishments that will benefit the Government in follow-on contracts.
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Recognition of independent development efforts relevant to the contract end item without Government assistance.
Those are the FAR-based factors to be considered. The Department of Defense has developed its own structured approach to profit analysis, called the “weighted guidelines” method. The contracting officer’s analysis is documented in Form DD 1547 (Record of Weighted Guidelines Method Application). According to DFARS 215.404-71, the weighted guidelines method focuses on four factors—
1. Performance risk
2. Contract type risk
3. Facilities capital employed
4. Cost efficiency
The methodology for applying the weighted guidelines profit evaluation is explained in the DFARS as follows—
The contracting officer assigns values to each profit factor; the value multiplied by the base results in the profit objective for that factor. Except for the cost efficiency special factor, each profit factor has a normal value and a designated range of values. The normal value is representative of average conditions on the prospective contract when compared to all goods and services acquired by DoD. The designated range provides values based on above normal or below normal conditions.
Seems simple enough, right? There are four factors; each factor has a range from low to high. The contracting officer puts in a number for each factor and then adds all the numbers up to get to the profit that has been determined to be fair and reasonable. (But note that the number is only a prenegotiation objective; the actual value will depend on how negotiations go.)
It seems simple, but if you look at the actual factors in the DFARS, you see subfactors and weightings and it turns out to be fairly complex and not very simple at all. For example, with respect to contract type risk, the contracting officer is directed to offer 5.0% (as much as 6.0%) for a firm, fixed-price contract; whereas a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract has a contract type risk maximum of 1.0%, with 0.5% being the standard.
We made a simple Excel model following the DFARS rules, and it looks to us as that if the contracting officer maxed-out every possible factor and subfactor in the contractor’s favor, the maximum amount of profit that would be considered to be fair and reasonable would be 15%. That’s it. If the standard values were used, the profit rate looks to be in the neighborhood of 10% (FFP) or 6% (CPFF). So those become a DCMA contracting officer’s prenegotiation objectives and the expectations for “success” at the bargaining table.
Thus, while the DOD is not applying predetermined profit percentages (which would violate the FAR policies quoted above), it is certainly applying predetermined profit ranges that, depending on your point of view, might not be super attractive. With that said, of course, one needs to factor in cash flow and, typically, the Federal government is a good customer with respect to cash flow. Over in the commercial world, it does no good to make a 50% profit if your customer never pays you. The complete story, then, is not solely about profit; but profit is what we are talking about today.
The story of profit does not end with the FAR and DFARS rules about “structured approach” and “weighted guidelines,” because there are also some FAR-based rules (implementing statutes) that put a hard limit on the amount of profit (expressed in percentages of estimated cost) that may be paid. (See FAR 15.404-4(c)(4).) Contracting officers simply cannot exceed those statutory limits. Period. The limits are:
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For experimental, developmental, or research work performed under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, the fee shall not exceed 15 percent of the contract’s estimated cost, excluding fee.
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For architect-engineer services for public works or utilities, the contract price or the estimated cost and fee for production and delivery of designs, plans, drawings, and specifications shall not exceed 6 percent of the estimated cost of construction of the public work or utility, excluding fees.
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For other cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, the fee shall not exceed 10 percent of the contract’s estimated cost, excluding fee.
So, other than the three specified profit limits above, the sky’s the limit (officially) with respect to profit limitations. The contractor is permitted to propose as high a fee as it thinks it can support. The contracting officer will use “structured approach,” including “weighted guidelines,” to evaluate the proposed profit. To be clear: if you are not proposing a CPFF contract or an A/E contract then, in theory, you could propose 1000% profit on your estimated costs.
Of course, a proposed profit of 1000% is going to present a challenge for your contracting officer, especially if that contracting officer works for DCMA and has to fill out a DD 1547 and your proposed profit blows all the predetermined ranges out of the water.
If that’s the situation, it is for sure going to be an interesting negotiation.
But we’re not done yet.
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) has its own viewpoint with respect to the profits a defense contractor should be earning. Would you be interested to know that the DoD OIG believes that a reasonable profit should never, ever, exceed 15 percent of costs, regardless of what the FAR might say the government policy is or what the DoD “weighted guidelines” might say the appropriate profit should be?
If you would be interested, then keep reading. Otherwise, see you later.
On February 25, 2019, the DoD OIG published Report No. DODIG-2019-060, entitled, “Review of Parts Purchased from TransDigm Group, Inc.”
Bottom-Line Up-Front: The audit report concluded that TransDigm “earned excess profit on 46 of 47 parts purchased by the DLA and the Army.”
Important factual detail: “contracting officers followed the FAR and Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) allowed procedures when they determined that prices were fair and reasonable for the 47 parts at the time of contract award. … Contracting officers used FAR and DFARS-allowed pricing methods, including historical price analysis, competition, and cost analysis to determine whether prices were fair and reasonable for the 47 parts.”
Another important factual detail: OIG auditors “used 15 percent as a reasonable profit and determined any profit over 15 percent to be excess profit.” In other words, if TransDigm made more than 15 percent of its costs, that was judged to be excessive. Even though “TransDigm was the only manufacturer at the time for the majority of the parts competitively awarded, giving TransDigm the opportunity to set the market price for those parts.” In other words, it was “buy from TransDigm or go fabricate your own parts.” DoD chose to buy TransDigm’s parts – and forego the costs of fabricating its own parts (assuming it even could do so) – and thus had to pay the price at which TransDigm offered those parts.
This situation made the DoD OIG unhappy. It is almost as if the DoD OIG is not a proponent of free market capitalism.
We could rant on other topics related to this so-called “audit report,” but the conclusion would still be this: A fair and reasonable price is the one at which the seller agrees to sell and the buyer agrees to buy. Period. Contracting officers have Certificates of Appointment (warrants) because they have been trained to analyze prices in order to determine whether the Federal government is willing to be a buyer at those prices. That’s their job. They don’t need second-guessers criticizing them—especially when the second-guessers start the criticism with admitting that (1) the contracting officers followed all the rules and regulations, and (2) any profit greater than 15% is excessive (which violates the FAR policy we quoted at the beginning of this article). When the Monday-morning quarterbacks support their criticism by such admissions, we believe those conclusions are unwarranted. Taking it a step farther, we believe those criticisms are unworthy of professional auditors.
TransDigm had the parts. The DoD could choose whether to buy those parts, or not, at the prices set by TransDigm. Admittedly, this is a bit of a role reversal, because normally the DoD has all the negotiating power and the contractor has almost none. Competitive pressures usually push contractor profits down to the bare minimums; and if they don’t, then the “weighted guidelines” will. But in this case, the contractor set the price and the DoD had to accept it, or walk away. It chose to accept the pricing and now the OIG is upset at the unfairness of it all.
That’s not how the free market works.
Getting Serious About UCAs
Undefinitzed Contract Actions (UCAs) are “any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action. Examples are letter contracts, orders under basic ordering agreements, and provisioned item orders, for which the price has not been agreed upon before performance has begun.” UCAs are discussed at DFARS Subpart 217.74.
UCAs are a pain.
We have written about them before. See, for example, this article (written in 2017), in which we advised contractors to “try very hard to avoid them.”
UCAs are a pain for government contracting officers, as well. Often, they are under pressure to definitize the UCA, which tends to mean they are trying to evaluate the contractor definitization proposal, prepare a Pre-Negotiation Memo, get business clearance, confirm funds are available AND monitor the contractor’s ongoing performance—all at the same time. It ain’t fun and it ain’t pretty … as a rule.
And speaking of rules, on June 29, 2018, the DAR Council published a final rule (implementing DFARS Case 2015-D024) that modified weighted guidelines profit analysis for UCAs. It stated—
If the contractor demonstrates efficient management and cost control through the submittal of a timely, qualifying proposal (as defined in 217.7401(c)) in furtherance of definitization of an undefinitized contract action, and the proposal demonstrates effective cost control from the time of award to the present, the contracting officer may add 1 percentage point to the value determined for management/cost control up to the maximum of 7 percent.
Whoohoo!
(That comment immediately above was sarcasm.)
That same final rule also stated: “If a substantial portion of the costs have been incurred prior to definitization, the contracting officer may assign a [weighted guidelines profit] value as low as 0 percent, regardless of contract type.”
Thus, the DAR Council giveth and the DAR Council taketh away. And lo, it was done.
As part of the finalization of the rule, the DAR Council received public comments (as is required). A couple of the comments pointed out that the DAR Council was ignoring Congress’ direction with respect to UCA definitization, as codified in Section 811 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Section 811 required that contractor profit be based on its situation at the time it submitted a “qualifying” proposal, not on the situation at the time the UCA was definitized. In typical DAR Council fashion, the rule-makers hand-waved the comment away, by stating that DFARS Case 2017-D022 had been opened to implement the requirements of Section 811.
But DFARS Case 2017-D022 was never issued. In another typical bureaucratic maneuver, DFARS Case 2017-D022 was “merged” into DFARS Case 2018-D008, such that the requirements of Section 811 of the 2017 NDAA were combined with the requirements of Section 815 of the NDAA “relating to commercial items.”
Yeah, that makes no sense to us either. It’s probably a typo, because Section 815 didn’t deal with commercial items. Instead, Section 815 made it much harder for contracting officers to unilaterally definitize a UCA—which is what happens if negotiations break down. If you follow the first link above, you can find an example of that unfortunate and unpleasant situation.
With us so far?
If so, you are ready to hear about DFARS Case 2018-D008, a proposed rule issued on February 16, 2019.
Remember, the proposed rule is supposed to combine requirements from two NDAAs into one. Let’s see how the DAR Council did.
The proposed rule, if implemented as drafted, make three significant revisions, as follows:
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If a UCA is definitized after the end of the 180-day period beginning on the date the contractor submits a qualifying proposal, the head of the agency shall ensure profit reflects the cost risk of the contractor as such risk existed on the date the contractor submitted the qualifying proposal.
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The definitization of a UCA may not be extended by more than 90 days beyond the maximum 180-day definitization schedule negotiated in the UCA without a written determination by the Secretary of the military department concerned, the head of the defense agency concerned, the commander of the combatant command concerned, or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, that it is in the best interests of the military department, the defense agency, the combatant command, or the Department of Defense, respectively, to continue the action.
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Contracting officers of the Department of Defense may not enter into a UCA for a foreign military sale unless the contract action provides for definitization within 180 days and the contracting officer obtains approval from the head of the contracting activity. The head of the agency may waive this requirement if necessary to support a contingency or humanitarian or peacekeeping operation.
Those three points above came from the 2017 NDAA. In addition, the proposed rule states:
Contracting officers may not unilaterally definitize a UCA with a value greater than $50 million until—
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The end of the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the contractor submits a qualifying proposal to definitize the contractual terms, specifications, and price; or the date on which the amount of funds expended under the contractual action is equal to more than 50 percent of the negotiated overall not-to-exceed price for the contractual action;
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The service acquisition executive for the military department that awarded the contract or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment if the contract was awarded by a defense agency or other component of the Department of Defense, approves the definitization in writing;
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The contracting officer provides a copy of the written approval to the contractor; and
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A period of 30 calendar days has elapsed after the written approval is provided to the contractor.
That part above came from the 2018 NDAA.
So far, so good.
In addition, the definition of “qualifying proposal” would be revised (again). If the proposed rule is implemented as drafted, then a qualifying proposal would be one that “contains sufficient information to enable DoD to conduct a ‘meaningful audit’.” The former language defined it as a proposal that contains sufficient information to enable DoD to conduct a “complete and meaningful audit.” That change is nice, but we continue to point out that the definition is hella squishy. What happens if the contracting officer determines that field pricing assistance isn’t necessary? What happens if the auditor doesn’t like the proposal, but the contracting officer believes they can negotiate a fair and reasonable price? What happens if the customer requires the contractor to submit a proposal over and over and over again, using the pretext that it is not auditable?
Call us cynical, but we have concerns.
Anyway, that’s the proposed rule. With background that was curiously omitted. As always, public comments may be submitted. If you have some UCAs, consider commenting on the proposed rule.
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