F-35 Program On Track, Can Use Some Help
The F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program is the largest, most expensive, and arguably the most complex fighter production program in U.S. history. Its GFY 2018 budget was described as follows: “The final omnibus budget bill funded F-35 procurement at $10.2 billion for 90 aircraft (56 F-35As, 24 F-35Bs, and 10 F-35Cs, an increase of 20 aircraft and $2.6 billion over the Administration’s request), plus $1.5 billion in advance procurement, the requested level.”
Basically, then, nearly $12 billion annually; and that amount will increase as production ramps up (even though the per-aircraft cost is projected to decrease).
Indeed, Lockheed Martin delivered 91 aircraft in 2018, which was about double its production of only two years before. Looking ahead, the JSF will enter “full rate production” and LockMart has committed to deliver 130 aircraft before the end of 2019. Meanwhile, the government and the contractor are entering into negotiations for Lots 15, 16, and 17—an order of 485 aircraft that would be executed sometime in the second half of 2021. At $80 million each, the multi-year contract would be valued at $38.8 billion. (Just in case you were wondering where your taxes went.)
Suffice to say, the F-35 program is taking care of Lockheed Martin. That wasn’t always the case. Readers may know that relations between contractor and customer have been fairly rocky. Last year, that bastion of defense insider information, Popular Mechanics, published a history of the program entitled “WTF-35: How the Joint Strike Fighter Got to Be Such a Mess.” But after reciting the program’s problems, the article concluded: “The F-35 may be one of the most derided and controversial warplanes, but it's here, nearly ready to go into service in force. That's a good thing. Frankly, we need the F-35.”
But while all the champagne is flowing in Fort Worth and in Bethesda, the DOD Office of Inspector General had some sharp words aimed not at the contractor but at the government personnel who were supposed to be providing oversight, and (according to the DOD OIG) failed to do so.
We’re talking government property.
Even though most of us don’t like to deal with government property issues, it’s important. It’s one of those “necessary evils” that requires an investment of time and expense. Government property control is one of the six DFARS business systems. Accordingly, a contractor’s failure to maintain an acceptable property control system could result in significant payment withholds. Therefore, smart contractors tend to make the necessary investments in time and expense, because not doing so likely would be more expensive.
We tend to focus on contractor requirements and forget that the government has its own responsibilities with respect to managing property. A recent DOD OIG audit report found that USAF Joint Program Office had been derelict in its duties “for more than 16 years.” As a result, the DOD OIG found that “the only record of Government property for the F‑35 Program is with the contractor and its [warehousing and inventory management] subcontractor ….”
How much property are we talking about?
Well, if you ask LockMart and its subcontractor, they are tracking 3.45 million individual pieces of property valued at $2.1 billion.
(Note there is nobody else to ask.)
One thing that many people outside the world of government property fail to appreciate is that government property can pass from one contract to the next. For example, a contractor can create a piece of special tooling or special test equipment. At the end of the contract, that ST or STE now belongs to the government; and if the contractor wants to continue to use it on the next follow-on contract it has to be transferred and it’s now going to be “government-furnished property” (and not “contractor acquired property”) because the government has title to it.
As noted above, the F-35 program consists of multiple contracts. Some may be running concurrently and others may be awarded sequentially. Some may have been cost-type while others may be firm, fixed-price—and each contract type has different government property requirements. As a consequence, we should appreciate just how difficult a job it is to track all that property and identify it with the appropriate accountable contract. Lockheed Martin and CEVA Government Services should be commended for the job they have done in this area.
In contrast, the Program Office and DCMA seem to have fallen down, and have lost the ability (if they ever had it) to track their property. Or should we say—the taxpayers’ property? The DOD OIG audit report lists several areas of deficiency, including—
As a result (according to the DOD OIG audit report)—
… the DoD does not know the actual value of the F -35 property and does not have an independent record to verify the contractor-valued Government property of $2.1 billion for the F-35 Program. Without accurate records, the F-35 Program officials have no visibility over the property and have no metrics to hold the prime contractor accountable for how it manages Government property. … In addition, the lack of a DoD record of GFP for the F-35 Program results in an understatement of either the assets or expenses of DoD financial statements, depending on how the contractor used the property on the contract.
Sounds to us like the Joint Program Office needs to have a payment withhold implemented on it in order to teach its leaders the importance of government property management and control.
A Unique Approach to Timekeeping Fraud
As far as we knew, the epitome of timekeeping fraud wasn’t mis-reporting actual time worked but, instead, altering FICA (Social Security) withholdings to inflate amounts withheld on an employee’s W-2, which would then entitle that employee to a corresponding tax credit. That was the most creative approach we knew.
But then came Michelle Holt, a secretary with U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Communication Support Squadron, at Joint Base Langley-Eustis. She took creative timekeeping fraud to the next level, raising the bar for the next fraudster.
Ms. Holt was a salaried employee on the General Schedule (GS) grade for the federal civilian workforce. As such, she was entitled to overtime pay if authorized by her employer, was also entitled to other forms of holiday and annual leave, and premium pay for any federal holidays worked.
According to this Department of Justice press release—
Holt falsely claimed over 42,000 hours in unauthorized overtime for hours she did not work, as well as other amounts of unauthorized holiday leave, sick leave and annual leave, all amounting to losses to the United States of more than $1.4 million. In recent years, Holt’s overtime pay was over double that of her regular salary.
The timekeeping fraud was perpetrated for nearly 17 years, apparently with nobody being the wiser that one employee had found a means to effectively triple her secretary’s salary through claiming overtime hours (among other things) for which she did not work. To put that fraud into perspective, that’s about 2,500 hours of overtime claimed per year. And nobody noticed.
How did Ms. Holt accomplish this feat? According to the DOJ—
Holt accomplished the fraud by making manual retroactive adjustments to protected computer time and attendance systems to add overtime, reverse leave taken and reverse holiday leave. In doing so, Holt used another employee’s log-in information without that employee’s knowledge or authorization.
Essentially, then, Ms. Holt falsified her identity with respect to accessing the timekeeping system and made “manual retroactive adjustments” to change her timekeeping records after they had been reviewed and approved by her supervisor. By doing so, she bypassed one of the primary timekeeping controls, which is that somebody reviews and approves the timecard before it is entered into the system.
Nice.
Ms. Holt was sentenced to four years in prison plus she was ordered to repay the $1.4 million she had obtained from her scheme.
Now that we know this is a possibility, now that we know somebody can bypass a supervisor’s review and manipulate the labor data after it has been input, how might we detect such wrongdoing?
First, let’s look at overtime. What kind of compensatory control can we devise?
We can run a report, either monthly or quarterly or annually, that shows overtime hours recorded by salaried employees (or by hourly employees). We can organize that report from highest to lowest. We can decide that anybody recording less than a certain amount of overtime hours can be dropped from the report. For example, let’s run the report quarterly and say that anybody recording less than 40 hours of overtime in a 13-week quarter will not be reported—but that anybody who recorded more than 40 hours will be reported, and that we want to see who recorded the most right at the top of the report.
Had such a report been run, we bet Ms. Holt, who was claiming roughly 625 hours of overtime per quarter, would have been right at the top.
A simple phone call to Ms. Holt’s supervisor would have revealed that the timecards that had been approved did not have such quantities of overtime hours on them … which would have led to further investigation, we presume. In other words, Ms. Holt’s scheme would have come to light within the first quarter or two of being initiated, rather than surfacing only after nearly 17 years had passed.
Now let’s talk about the Paid Time Off (PTO) manipulations.
How about we design a report that shows the PTO elements by employee, including starting and ending balances? Let’s run that report once a year.
For the average employee, there will be a starting vacation (leave) balance and an ending vacation balance. The ending balance will equal starting balance plus annual leave earned during the year, minus any leave taken. If the employee didn’t take any leave then the ending balance will equal the starting balance plus the annual accrual.
Let’s limit our report only to those employees who didn’t take any leave during the year—i.e., to those employees whose ending balance equals starting balance plus annual accrued leave. There won’t be that many employees who are on that report, because most employees take vacations. (In fact, if you work at a bank you are required to take vacations.)
For those few employees on that list, we’ll make a phone call to the supervisor to confirm that the employee didn’t take any vacation during the year. (Most supervisors know if their employees were out for a week or two; often it’s on a calendar somewhere.) If the supervisor indicates that the employee did indeed take a vacation (leave) during the year, then we’d follow up with further investigation.
Again, if we implemented that compensatory control, any shenanigans would come to light within a year or so.
Finally, holiday leave. Each company has its own holiday policy but every government contractor offers at least the Federal minimum holidays. There are 10 Federal holidays. Let’s assume eight labor hours a day. Eight times ten = 80 hours of holiday time per year. That’s what we expect to see. Sure, there are times when people work on holidays, but those exceptions are known.
We can design a report that identifies any employee who recorded less than 80 hours of holiday time per year. (You can tailor the report to match your company’s holiday policy.) There will not be very many employees listed on that report.
For each employee listed, we will make another phone call. If we learn that the supervisor was unaware an employee had worked through a holiday, we’ll investigate further.
The point is, this is not rocket science. The labor hour information you need is almost certainly in your labor accounting system. All you have to do is to design and run the reports, and then have the wherewithal to make the (few) phone calls required.
By the way, if you learn that the employee’s hours were legitimate but the supervisor was clueless about hours worked (even though that same supervisor signed-off on the timecards), then you will have learned something valuable about your primary timekeeping accuracy control. And you will also have learned something valuable about the competency of that supervisor.
We would thank Ms. Holt for prompting us to think along these lines, but that “thanks” doesn’t seem appropriate at this time. Maybe we’ll offer them in four years, or perhaps earlier if she receives time off for good behavior.
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KC-46 Program Back on Track After Some Missteps
The story of the KC-46 “Pegasus” aerial refueller program is one of the more interesting ones we’ve followed on this site. Our first article on the program was published in November, 2009, well before any winner in the competition had been announced. But the story goes back to 2003.
More recently, we have focused on the charges recording by Boeing against program profits, and what that means for competition in the defense industry. Because if the Pentagon is going to continue to let contractors “invest” to win competitions then only the biggest of the players—the ones with the most cash—will be the winners.
As of October, 2018, The Boeing Company had “invested” somewhere between $2.6 and $3.1 Billion (depending on which report you read) into a Firm-Price-Incentive-Fee that was originally budgeted at $4.8 Billion. Remember, before recording a charge, Boeing had to use up all the fee that was associated with of its share ratio. Boeing had to blow through its share of the incentive fee and then record another series of charges on top of that amount, charges associated with program delays and cost overruns.
And it’s not only Boeing, of course. Some of its subcontractors have experienced financial challenges associated with their part of the program. For example, Cobham recorded a charge of £150 million in February, 2017—followed by another charge of £40 million in July, 2018. At that time, reports stated that “Boeing has said it is going to seek damages for delays in the programme but has yet to specify how much it will be seeking; Cobham intends to contest those claims.” Recently, it was reported that—
UK engineering firm Cobham has accepted a £160m ($206m) additional charge from Boeing to settle a dispute over delays in the KC-46 tanker aircraft aerial refuelling programme. The £160m sum consists of one £86m payment relating to the settlement of the dispute, and a further payment of £74m to complete Cobham’s Wing Aerial Refuelling podded system programme for the KC-46 as well as to cover rescheduling and costs of further possible delays.
Apparently, relations between the prime and its subcontractor had soured to the point where “Boeing withheld payments for the KC-46 aerial refuelling system to Cobham until the dispute over delays was settled.”
But while the lawyers were calculating settlement amounts, the program seemed to be righting itself. Although the first delivery had been expected in 2017, it finally happened in January, 2019. As was reported (same article as above): ”the USAF accepted delivery of six … tanker aircraft despite finding a number of technical deficiencies. In response, Boeing agreed to fix the deficiencies at its expense.”
By January, 2019, the program was back on track (albeit two years behind the original schedule) but almost immediately the wheels came off once again. In late February, the USAF customer “suspended” further deliveries because of “concerns about tools and other foreign object debris left in the aircraft — a potential safety hazard.” USAF”s Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Dr. William Roper) told reporters that “It boils down to process, culture and leadership in making systems. A trip to Boeing is almost certainly going to be necessary for me to approve DD250s again.”
The suspension lasted about 10 days. On March 11, 2019, USAF began to accept deliveries once again. As this article reported—
To tackle the issue, a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) was issued for the delivery process. ‘As directed by the CAP, subsequent deliveries will occur as Boeing successfully completes each aircraft’s inspections and actions,’ said Rose Riley, Air Mobility Command Public Affairs spokesperson.
Now that the deliveries resumed, the USAF is set to keep an extra eye on the coming planes. ‘We're going to be measuring as we go, and we expect to see many months of pristine airplanes,’ said Dr. Will Roper, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics during a hearing, as quoted by military.com. ‘They should be clean on delivery. If we don't see progress, we'll have to raise the stakes.’
To summarize, the KC-46a “Pegasus” program is years behind schedule, immensely overrun, and is still grappling with technical issues. So basically, just like almost every other major weapon system development program ever.
But on the bright side, deliveries have resumed, and signed DD250s mean cash for Boeing and its subcontractors.
CASB Staff Discussion Paper – A Call to Reasonableness
The CAS Board recently issued a new Staff Discussion Paper (SDP) that covered conformance of CAS with GAAP requirements in general, and conformance of two specific Standards with GAAP. This article will not rehash the 49-page SDP in detail. Follow the link and read it for yourself.
Instead, we are going to focus on significant issues/questions raised within the SDP. These are issues and/or questions for which the CAS Board staff has requested input from stakeholders—including contractors. We will probably submit input (time permitting). Will you?
The SDP states—
The growth in GAAP content presents potential opportunities to modify or eliminate overlapping CAS requirements where GAAP standards may be applied reasonably as a substitute for CAS to support contract cost and pricing. Such reductions might help to reduce overall burden in the procurement process by allowing contractors to more heavily rely on GAAP, which they are already using to report on their daily business activities. … At the same time, rolling back CAS and relying on GAAP may create challenges where the standards are similar, but not the same, and leave the Government vulnerable to future GAAP changes that, as explained above, are implemented with a purpose that differs from the goals of CAS.
CASB organized the existing 19 Standards into four groups: (1) Standards focused primarily on cost measurement and assignment of costs to accounting periods; (2) Standards focused primarily on allocation of costs; (3) Standards with complex rules satisfying unique needs of Government contracting; and (4) Standards that are generally foundational principles of Government contracting.
Unsurprisingly, the Board started with examining the Standards associated with the first group, which includes CAS 404 (Capitalization of tangible assets), CAS 407 (Use of standard costs for direct material and direct labor), CAS 408 (Accounting for costs of compensated personal absence), CAS 409 (Depreciation of tangible capital assets), CAS 411 (Accounting for acquisition costs of material), CAS 415 (Accounting for a the cost of deferred compensation), and CAS 416 (Accounting for insurance costs).
In this SDP, CASB focused on only two of the Standards in the first group: CAS 408 and CAS 409. The Board promised to issue another SDP focusing on “two other Standards in the first group,” which are currently unidentified but may include CAS 411, a Standard that is woefully outdated and does not address use of ERP systems to acquire goods via aggregated demand.
The Board has invited input regarding its planned approach. For example, is the grouping of the Standards appropriate? Have the Standards been bucketed in the correct groups? Has the Board properly prioritized its efforts?
Another issue for which CASB invites input is whether the existing whether the existing CAS clause found at 9903.201-4 (“Cost Accounting Standards, July 2011) should be revised “to protect the interests of the Government and contractors,” because the current language does not address noncompliances with GAAP. What do you think?
One problem may be that the single CAS clause found in the regulations has been split into seven separate solicitation provisions and contract clauses by the FAR Council (see 52.230-1 through 52.230-7). When discussing the single CAS clause, it is easy to get confused by the individual requirements of the FAR provisions/clauses. We suggest sticking to the CAS language since that’s the only thing CASB has authority to change. (Of course, if the CAS language changes, presumably the FAR Council would need to make conforming changes to their provisions and clauses.)
When looking at both CAS 408 and 409, the SDP asserts that GAAP largely covers the same requirements as CAS does. Of course, the coverage is not exactly perfect and gaps remain. (No pun intended.) Input to the Board should address whether the coverage is sufficient to permit elimination of the Standard(s) altogether, or whether the existing Standard should be rewritten to cover the remaining gaps in coverage. The answer may turn on whether the cost of compliance exceeds any foreseeable benefit that the contracting parties may receive. The opinion of contractors should carry significant weight.
For example, with respect to CAS 408 conformance, the SDP requests input on “whether the GAAP requirement of generally assigning the cost of benefits in the year the employee performed services upon which the benefit was earned would result in a materially different result than the requirement in CAS 408-40(a) to accrue only vested benefits earned.” Moreover, the SDP solicited input regarding “the magnitude of compensated personal absence costs that accumulate but don’t vest, as described in GAAP, taking into consideration the reduction for estimated forfeitures.” Importantly, the SDP requests input on noncompliances with CAS 408. The SDP asks for –
… facts and data of the history of CAS 408 non-compliance issues raised and how they were resolved. In particular, what is the frequency and magnitude of the issues identified on Government contracts? Furthermore, could the issue raised have been considered non-compliant with GAAP, other CAS or FAR?
Looking at CAS 409 conformance, the SDP requests input regarding “what detailed records contractors would keep and for what purpose (e.g., GAAP compliance) if the requirement in CAS 409 to support service lives with actual historic records was eliminated?” Additionally, the SDP solicits input regarding “about the impact to estimated service lives used, if any, anticipated if the requirement to use estimated service lives based on contractor historical experience was eliminated?”
One potential issue identified by the Board is the CAS requirement to “assign to the transferor the gain/loss on disposition of an asset transferred in an other than an arms-length transaction and subsequently disposed of within 12 months of transfer”—a requirement not found in GAAP. Thus, the SDP requests input regarding “the frequency of such transfers and data about the magnitude of the gains/losses experienced on the assets transferred. In addition, how could the selection of service life, depreciation method, and residual value mitigate the risk of a significant gain/loss at disposition?”
Moreover, “The Board is interested in public comments about how contractors set residual or salvage values for categories of assets and the frequency that for a particular asset the residual value used for CAS and a salvage value used for GAAP are the same.”
Finally, as was the case with the CAS 408 discussion—
The Board is interested in public comments with facts and data of the history of CAS 409 non-compliance issues raised and how they were resolved. In particular, what is the frequency and magnitude of the issues identified on Government contracts? Furthermore, could the issue raised have been considered non-compliant with GAAP, other CAS or FAR?
In summary, it’s been a long time—roughly 15 years—since the CAS Board indicated significant interest in revising its regulations or Standards. Contractors are being offered a rare opportunity to help shape at least two Standards, with the promise of another opportunity to help shape two more in the future. We have written about several specific areas of input requested by the Board, and there are other areas buried deep in the CAS-to-GAAP comparison charts included in the SDP.
If you are concerned about the burdens and complexities of CAS compliance—and aren’t we all?—we urge you to read this SDP carefully and provide the Board with your constructive input. Importantly, if you can speak to the burdens the two Standards create and what savings might be achieved from reduction or elimination, we hope you will do so.
If you don’t speak up now, then we feel you will have no right to complain later if the regulatory revisions don’t go the way you think they should have.
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