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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA Audit Sustention

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You know—if you’ve been reading this blog for any significant length of time—that one of the most important metrics that indicates the quality of DCAA audit findings is the contracting officer sustention rate. That is the percentage of DCAA auditor questioned costs (QC or sometimes CQ) that survives negotiation with the contractor. Those negotiations are part of the indirect rate settlement process—i.e., the process by which billing rates become final billing rates. (See the Allowable Cost and Payment clause, 52.216-7, for details.) Final billing rates are used for preparing final invoices on flexibly priced contracts and thus are a key element of contract close-outs.

You know about the importance of that metric. Importantly, DCAA management knows about it as well. As we’ve been asserting for some time, pressure is being exerted on contracting officers to sustain DCAA QC, so as to indicate that auditors are doing a better job than historically has been the case. The chart below illustrates the fall of sustention rates, a plateau at about 30%, then a sharp increase as pressure has been exerted in the past few months.

Chart 1 – Sustention rates by Six-Month Increment GFY 2013 – 2019

chart_1_sustention_rates

Source: DoD OIG Semi-Annual Report to Congress, Appendix F

Note that DCAA’s sustention rate is still below 40%, but we can project that it will break that level in the near future as pressure continues to be applied to DCMA contracting officers to sustain DCAA QC audit findings.

Evidence of the pressure being applied is more than anecdotal (though there’s plenty of anecdotal evidence). The evidence is found in the DoD OIG audit reports, pointing the finger at DCMA contracting officers for failing to sustain DCAA audit findings. In fairness, the reports don’t actually say that. What they say instead is that “DCMA contracting officers did not document adequate rationale for disagreeing with $219 million in DCAA questioned costs” and that “contracting officers did not adequately justify why they reimbursed the [QC] to the DoD contractors.”

Let’s look at DoD OIG Audit Report No. DODIG-2020-036, dated 30 November 2019.

The DoD OIG auditors selected 21 DCAA audit reports issued between October 1, 2015, and March 18, 2018. In those 21 audit reports, DCAA questioned (in the aggregate) $750 million. With respect to two of the 21 selected audit reports, the OIG auditors found that –

DCMA contracting officers did not document adequate rationale for disagreeing with DCAA questioned costs totaling $219 million. DCAA primarily questioned the costs based on the contractor’s failure to provide supporting documentation for the claimed costs, as FAR 31.201-2, ‘Determining Allowability,’ requires. The DCMA contracting officers documented one or more of the following reasons for not sustaining DCAA’s recommendation to disallow the questioned costs:

  • The required time periods for the contractor to retain any of the records had lapsed.
  • The questioned costs in the audit report were identical to those disputed before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), which rendered an opinion against the DCAA questioned costs.
  • No action on the audit report was required because DCAA had disclaimed an audit opinion.

However, none of these reasons adequately justify the contracting officers’ decision not to sustain the DCAA questioned costs.

The OIG auditors found that the DCMA contracting officer’s rationale for not sustaining the DCAA auditors’ QC was invalid. But before we discuss the OIG’s rationale, let’s take a moment and point out that the 21 audit reports selected all had one thing in common: in each of those 21 audit reports, DCAA had disclaimed an opinion.

What does that mean? As stated in the OIG audit report, “DCAA disclaims an opinion when it is unable to perform all audit procedures considered necessary to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence and conclude whether any noncompliances are material and pervasive.” Thus, in these 21 audit reports, DCAA expressly stated that the auditors were unable to obtain sufficient evidence to support their opinions.

That situation didn’t keep DCAA from reporting those opinions anyway.

As the OIG audit report noted, “when DCAA disclaims an opinion, it still has an obligation to report to the contracting officer any proposed costs that it determines are not allowable on Government contracts.” Let’s look at that assertion.

The DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) states, at 2-102.2—

f. A disclaimer of opinion is issued when there are scope restrictions and the departures from GAGAS requirements are so significant that the examination has not been performed in sufficient scope to enable the auditor to form an opinion. A scope restriction may be imposed by the contractor, the requestor, or by other circumstances such as the timing of the work or the inability to obtain sufficient evidence (see 10-208.5).

But there’s more. Looking at CAM 2-302.3 (“Evidence”) we find—

The auditor must obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the conclusion expressed in the report. This requires that sufficient procedures be performed to test the contractor’s assertion to provide reasonable assurance that unallowable costs and other noncompliances with applicable Government laws and regulations are identified.

Thus, if the DCAA auditor did not obtain sufficient evidence to form a reasonable basis for a conclusion, then the audit did not comply with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standard (GAGAS) 6.04b and the opinion must be disclaimed. But does that mean DCAA must still report to the contracting officer any costs it believes to be unallowable? Not exactly.

What the CAM states (at 10-208.7) is that, when disclaiming an opinion, “the audit report should describe the nature of any material noncompliance and its actual and potential effect on the subject matter in a ‘Report on Other Matters’ appendix.” Suggested language includes the phrase “Reporting noncompliances do not represent an overall opinion on the subject matter under audit but are fully developed findings based on substantiated evidence from the limited procedures applied during the performance of the audit.” Further, when reporting such other matters, auditors are directed to—

  • Not use the structured note format in the appendix because audit evaluation section describes the audit procedures and could be misleading.

  • Avoid summary exhibits showing a difference or audit recommended column.

  • Avoid using the term ‘questioned’ costs.

  • Avoid presenting calculated rates based on the report findings.

These are the circumstances presented to DCMA contracting officers in the 21 audit reports selected for review. The contracting officers were not presented with questioned costs. They were not presented with the impact of the findings on the contractors’ submitted indirect rates. And they were not presented with these findings within the body of the audit report, but instead within an appendix to the audit report entitled “other matters.”

Nonetheless, 19 of the 21 audit reports were dispositioned to the OIG auditors’ satisfaction. With respect to the two audit reports that were not dispositioned adequately (in the auditors’ judgment), the OIG auditors found some interesting rationales to support their criticism.

The OIG audit report noted that “DCAA primarily questioned1 the costs based on the contractor’s failure to provide supporting documentation for the claimed costs, as FAR 31.201-2, ‘Determining Allowability,’ requires.” However, when the contracting officer(s) failed to sustain costs that were questioned on that basis, using the rationale that the contractor did not have an obligation to retain its records past the FAR 4.7 required time period, the OIG auditors disagreed, stating, “Regardless of the minimum record retention time periods specified in the FAR, the contractor had an obligation to support its costs claimed on Government contracts.”

The audit report states—

The contracting officer … did not sustain the $209 million in questioned subcontract costs. The contracting officer documented in his negotiation memorandum that the 4-year period prescribed by FAR Subpart 4.7, ‘Contractor Record Retention,’ for retaining subcontract records had lapsed because the costs were incurred 7 years ago. Therefore, he concluded that it would not be fair or reasonable to sustain the $209 million in DCAA questioned costs and recoup the costs from the contractor. We disagree with the contracting officer’s decision to not sustain the DCAA questioned costs of $209 million. The record retention periods outlined in FAR 4.7 identify the minimum amount of time that the contractor must maintain records to support its claimed costs.

Actually, that is not correct. FAR 4.7 establishes that the contractor’s obligation to support its claimed costs ends when the FAR-specified record retention period expires. The government’s audit rights continue (often beyond that period) but the contractor’s obligations to retain records do not. So that’s wrong. The contracting officers were correct.

Let’s support our assertion a bit, with some selected quotes from the FAR:

This subpart provides policies and procedures for retention of records by contractors to meet the records review requirements of the Government. The purpose of this subpart is to generally describe records retention requirements and to allow reductions in the retention period for specific classes of records under prescribed circumstances. This subpart applies to records generated under contracts that contain one of the following clauses:

(1) Audit and Records-Sealed Bidding (52.214-26).

(2) Audit and Records-Negotiation (52.215-2).

The retention periods in 4.705 are calculated from the end of the contractor’s fiscal year in which an entry is made charging or allocating a cost to a Government contract or subcontract. If a specific record contains a series of entries, the retention period is calculated from the end of the contractor’s fiscal year in which the final entry is made. The contractor should cut off the records in annual blocks and retain them for block disposal under the prescribed retention periods.

The contractor shall retain the records identified in 4.705-1 through 4.705-3 for the periods designated, provided retention is required under 4.702 . Records are identified in this subpart in terms of their purpose or use and not by specific name or form number. Although the descriptive identifications may not conform to normal contractor usage or filing practices, these identifications apply to all contractor records that come within the description.

Thus, based on the plain language of the FAR, it is clear that the OIG auditors’ interpretation is wrong. The retention periods do not establish a minimum, but instead establish a maximum, beyond which a contractor is not required to retain its records. And the retention requirements expressly and specifically pertain to contracts that contain the 52.215-2 audit access clause. That incorrect interpretation led to an inapposite criticism of the contracting officer, in our view.

Similarly, when the OIG auditors criticized another contracting officer for failing to sustain a position found in a disclaimed opinion, we don’t think much of that OIG rationale either. The OIG audit report stated—

The contracting officer … stated in the negotiation memorandum that she did not sustain the $3 million in questioned costs because she believed she was not required to take any action on DCAA audit reports that disclaim an audit opinion. In our interview with the contracting officer, the contracting officer stated her opinion that DCAA did not perform an audit and that the DCAA audit report ‘was a nothing report.’

The DCMA contracting officer failed in her obligation to take appropriate action on the DCAA questioned costs, as FAR 42.705-1(b)(5)(iii) requires. The contracting officer’s position is flawed because:

  • although DCAA disclaimed an opinion, the contracting officer had a responsibility to take action on the costs that DCAA stated did not comply with the FAR; and

  • the contracting officer did not follow the negotiation process outlined in FAR 42.705-1(b)(4). The contracting officer did not maintain evidence that she obtained adequate documentation for the contractor’s costs.

Well, you know. We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc., disagree with the OIG positions above. As we stated above, there were no questioned costs and the audit report with a disclaimed opinion was indeed a “nothing report” to which the contracting officer was not required to give any deference. In particular, we strenuously object to the notion that—somehow—a contracting officer is required to reperform the failed DCAA audit procedure and “obtain adequate documentation for the contractor’s costs” if the non-questioned costs will not be sustained.

Fundamentally, what the DoD OIG audit report fails to grasp is that the contracting officer is charged with using “independent business judgment” to resolve disputes. The FAR states (at 33.204) that “The Government’s policy is to try to resolve all contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at the contracting officer’s level.” If the OIG auditors had there way, no contracting officer would ever deviate from the original DCAA audit position and we would all see a skyrocketing in the number of formal disputes and litigation—in direct opposition to the FAR directive.

But while we vehemently disagree with the DoD OIG’s position(s), the DCMA Director was just fine with them. The audit report stated—

The DCMA Director agreed with the recommendation and will begin a review of the contracting officers’ decisions not to sustain the questioned costs in the two DCAA audit reports. The Director stated that the review will also determine if the contracting officers reimbursed costs that were not allowable on Government contracts. Subsequent to receiving the Director’s written comments, a DCMA senior official also clarified to us that DCMA will take reasonable steps to recoup any unallowable costs identified by the review. Additionally, the senior official also stated that DCMA will assess whether action should be taken to hold the contracting officers accountable for not sustaining any DCAA questioned costs determined to be unallowable.

Way to support your troops, Admiral.

1 Let’s note the misuse of the term “questioned” in this context, since DCAA will not question costs when the audit opinion is disclaimed. When the OIG audit report states “contracting officers must take appropriate action in response to DCAA questioned costs, even though DCAA disclaims an audit opinion,” it is wrong. There were no questioned costs, since the opinions were disclaimed. It would have been nice of the DoD OIG auditors to get that nuance correct when criticizing the DCMA contracting officers.

 

Privity and Contingency Operations

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The Federal government enters into contracts with various parties and often those parties then enter into contracts with other parties to procure goods and/or services necessary to meet the obligations arising under their contract with the Federal government. We call the Federal government’s contract the prime contract, and the parties that contract directly with the Federal government are called prime contractors. The parties that contract with the prime contractor are called subcontractors. If those subcontractors then enter into their own contracts with other parties in order to fulfill their obligations, those are called lower-tier subcontracts.

We thus have prime contractors and prime contracts, first-tier subcontractors and their subcontracts, and the lower-tier subcontractors and their subcontracts. It can get confusing because the term “subcontract” is not consistently defined in applicable regulations; therefore, it helps to use appropriate modifiers such as “first-tier,” “second-tier,” and et cetera. It’s even more confusing when you realize that a prime contractor on Contract A can also be a first-tier subcontractor on Contacts B and C, and perhaps a second-tier subcontractor on Contract D. When you get deep into the defense supply chain you find out that many first and second-tier subcontractors are working for multiple prime contractors. It’s a tangled web and nobody really understands how it maps out.

Once upon a time, the Department of Defense promised Congress it would map its contracting space in something called the “S2T2” initiative, but like so many Pentagon back-office initiatives it sounded great but never seemed to go anywhere. Our quick check revealed that the STT2 initiative is now being handled by the Dept. of Commerce (Bureau of Industrial Security) and it has a survey that it requires selected contractors to complete, under the auspices of 50 U.S.C. App Sec 2155. Now we’re not lawyers here, but our layperson’s reading of that section of the United States Code tells us that use of that authority if inapposite unless it has been implemented in a regulation (e.g., FAR or DFARS). (Note: It’s probably easier and cheaper to fill out the Excel file rather than argue about the authority to require it to be completed in court.) We’re also not sure what BIS does with the data it receives. It would not surprise us in the least to learn that the various Excel spreadsheets received lie in somebody desk drawer (metaphorically speaking). The BIS website says the results of its “Space Deep Dive” survey are available, but that survey was published in 2015. There is nothing available since that date.

Back to the topic at hand: privity. Privity is the concept that only the contracting parties can enforce the duties of the contract. With some exceptions, the Federal government’s ability to enforce its contract begins and ends with the prime contractor. What happens below the prime contract level is the responsibility of the prime contractor (or lower-tier subcontractor, as appropriate).What this means for most of us is that a non-compliance at a lower level in the supply chain is enforced at the prime contract level, even if the non-compliance occurs in the lower-levels of the supply chain.

  • Second-tier CAS non-compliance? Impact enforced on the prime contractor.

  • Third-tier defective pricing? Impact enforced on the prime contractor.

  • First-tier unallowable costs billed to the prime? Impact enforced on the prime contractor.

The door swings both ways, though. The government (with limited exceptions) cannot enforce contractual duties on a lower-tier subcontractor. We discussed this concept about 18 months ago, in this article about New Century Consulting (NCC) a lower-tier subcontractor under the Legacy Program. DCAA alleged that NCC had significant unallowable costs in its indirect rates that it had used to bill the Legacy Program prime contractor. Unfortunately, that prime contractor went bankrupt and the government couldn’t enforce the audit findings. The situation frustrated many, including then-SECDEF Mattis, who testified before Congress that it was “probable” that criminal charges would be filed against NCC. The terms “suspension” and “debarment” were also used. Eighteen months later, we cannot find any new stories that mention what happened to NCC, if anything. NCC appears to still be in business accepting contracts with the Federal government.

Certainly, these things take time. So maybe the wheels of compliance enforcement are grinding slowly and we haven’t heard about it. Or maybe the whole thing was dropped because it was difficult to show criminal intent, or because the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations had run its course. We don’t know.

Another issue about privity that bothered many was the allegation that funds going to Afghanistan contractors ended-up in the hands of Afghan insurgents. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that its efforts to track the funds were impeded by the use of subcontractors. For example, in its report to Congress dated July 30, 2013, SIGAR wrote “the vetting challenges inherent in the use of multiple tiers of subcontractors.” Congress heard the complaints, and included in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Subtitle E (“Never Contract with the Enemy”) that included Section 842 (“Additional Access to Records”).

Section 842 provided that, upon a written determination by a contracting officer that “upon a finding by the commander of a covered combatant command (or the specified deputies of the commander) or the head of an executive agency (or the designee of such head) that there is reason to believe that funds, including goods and services, available under the contract, grant, or cooperative agreement concerned may have been provided directly or indirectly to a covered person or entity,” the Federal government may “examine any records of the contractor, the recipient of a grant or cooperative agreement, or any subcontractor or subgrantee under such contract, grant, or cooperative agreement to the extent necessary to ensure that funds, including goods and services, available under the contract, grant, or cooperative agreement are not provided directly or indirectly to a covered person or entity.” Section 842 required DOD to implement a clause enforcing the public law with 270 days, and further provided that the clause was to be a mandatory flowdown clause—i.e., that the substance of the clause, granting the access to subcontractor records—was to be included in “any subcontract or subgrant under a covered contract, grant, or cooperative agreement if the subcontract or subgrant has an estimated value in excess of $50,000.”

So that never happened. The DAR Council never issued the required clause.

In what has become the familiar routine, a Class Deviation has been issued to implement the requirements of the public law. The Class Deviation includes two clauses. One of the two clauses is 252.225-7975 (“Additional Access to Contractor and Subcontractor Records (DEVIATION 2020-O0001)”). The new clause states:

In addition to any other existing examination-of-records authority, the Government is authorized to examine any records of the Contractor and its subcontractors to the extent necessary to ensure that funds, including supplies and services, available under this contract are not provided, directly or indirectly, to a person or entity that is actively opposing United States or coalition forces involved in a contingency operation in which members of the Armed Forces are actively engaged in hostilities.

And it is a mandatory flowdown clause.

We note the clause does not require a contracting officer’s written determination (as per the FY2015 NDAA authority). Perhaps that will be covered in the PGI when the DAR Council finally issues the clause.

In the meantime, if you are a contingency contractor, you should start working with your subcontractors regarding organizing their books and records. You know, just in case.

 

Employee Qualifications

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Some Federal government contracts contain requirements and directives regarding who can, and who cannot, charge reimbursable labor hours/dollars to them.

Did we say some? We meant to say all.

All of them do.

Whether you know it or not, every single Federal government contract that will be reimbursing your company for direct labor dollars (or direct labor hours) contains a statement or two (or more) delineating what labor will be reimbursed. If you don’t meet the contractual qualifications, your labor is not reimbursable.

(To be clear: you can always charge the labor to the contract; and in many circumstances you must charge the labor to the contract. However, the contract terms and conditions determine whether or not that labor will be reimbursed by the government customer.)

What happens if you bill labor to the customer that doesn’t meet the contractual definitions of reimbursable labor? Well, sometimes you might get away with it, but it’s likely that—sooner or later—you are going to get caught and then you may end up with an allegation of overbilling. That allegation may well be connected with an allegation that you violated the False Claims Act.

Some contract qualifications are very clear and expressly stated. Perhaps the most obvious example is a contract statement that all employees working on the project must hold the requisite security clearances. If they do not hold those clearances, then their labor is not reimbursable. This situation, of course, often leads to the question about where employees should charge time while awaiting their clearances. The answer to that question often depends on company policy or established practice. However, regardless of what that policy or practice is, that time cannot be billed as reimbursable labor—because it is non-compliant with contract terms and conditions.

The issue of employee labor qualifications is obvious when dealing with Time & Materials (T&M) contract types. In such contracts, each hourly billing rate is essentially a fixed price per labor hour, and a separate hourly billing rate is established for various categories of labor, as defined by the contract. Thus, the contract defines the qualifications associated with each hourly billing rate. For example, there may be separate hourly billing rates for senior engineers, mid-level engineers, and junior engineers. The differences between those three engineering levels will be defined by the contract, typically by parameters such as years of experience, education, and/or responsibility. Often, the contractor proposes its hourly billing rates in accordance with qualifying parameters defined by the Request for Proposals (RFP), and then has to “map” its employees to each hourly billing rate it is proposing.

That’s well and good—but what happens if, during contract performance, an individual employee gains sufficient experience or responsibility (or education) to then map to a higher labor category and associated higher hourly billing rate? The answer is (again) going to depend on what the contract says. Sometimes the contractor can simply remap that employee and bill at the higher rate without notification and without customer permission; but other times the contractor will need to notify the customer (at a minimum) and may even need a formal contract modification.

In other instances, the contractor will miss the opportunity to bill its employee at the higher rate, because nobody is monitoring the employees for such changes. Nobody is looking for the impact of promotions or additional years of experience. Oops! Opportunity missed.

Why are opportunities missed? Because nobody is looking. Nobody is looking because nobody has that responsibility. Is it the Program Manager’s job? Probably not, because most PMs have too many other things to worry about. Is it Accounting’s job? Probably not. If you work at a savvy contractor, you probably set forth the employee qualifications one time, at the beginning of performance, and document the qualifications and/or mapping in the Contract Brief. But many contractors don’t even do that. So how would Accounting know to change the employee mapping? You’re right; they wouldn’t know unless somebody tells them.

Maybe it’s Contracts’ job. Maybe the Contract Administrator or Contract Manager or whatever you call those folks have a responsibility to monitor employees to ensure that they are meeting contractual requirements. But I bet if you asked them, they would say “Not my job. That’s HR’s job.” And indeed, that may be the case—but if that is the case then HR needs to know what the contract qualifications are, and they need to know who’s working on that contract, and they need to know whom to inform when things change. In our experience, HR is busy doing other things (such overseeing the annual performance review process) and they are not likely to be thinking about how to partner with operations in the required area.

So we are left with the thought that it may be the job of Compliance to ensure that employee labor for which government reimbursement is being sought meets the contractual qualifications for doing so. It would seem that any robust compliance program ought to be testing to see whether billed labor meets contractual requirements. You test for cost allowability, why wouldn’t you test for labor allowability?

And if you did robust labor allowability testing you might identify opportunities to bill employees’ time at a higher hourly billing rate! Hopefully, though, you would (at a minimum) catch employees who didn’t meet contractual labor qualifications. You could then recommend that any non-compliant labor dollars be credited from customer billings and recorded as being unallowable direct labor.

That would be nice, wouldn’t it?

In order to accomplish that task, you would probably need some additional Compliance resources. Often, adding Compliance resources is a difficult conversation to have with your management team, because Compliance is seen as a necessary evil whose cost must be minimized to the lowest level possible.

One argument you might advance in support of your request is that government auditors are being trained to look for billed labor that doesn’t meet contractual qualifications. Several DCAA audit programs now include this area; and it’s relatively easy for them to identify non-compliant labor once they obtain resumes and other HR information. Employee interviews are a quick way to have employees confirm whether they have what the resume says they have. So you might consider telling your management team that DCAA is going to be looking for this, sooner or later, and it would be beneficial to the company if it looked first. Plus—maybe identify opportunities to bill at higher rates! (Now Compliance is a profit center.)

Another argument you might advance in support of your request to add more Compliance resources to look at this area is “what happens if we have been mis-billing for years, and we didn’t know it?” To answer that question, you should produce this press release from the Department of Justice.

In that press release, DoJ announced that it had reached a $6.4 million settlement with CH2M Hill, a large engineering services firm, “to resolve allegations that CH2M Hill overbilled the U.S. Air Force for environmental consulting work.” What was the nature of the overbilling?

According to the announcement, “CH2M Hill admits that it billed under the government contract for employees who did not meet the educational and work experience qualifications in the contract.” The subheadline of the press release is very clear: “CH2M Hill overbilled U.S. Air Force for work done by unqualified staff.”

Yeah, that’s not a good headline. More to the point, how many new Compliance resources could CH2M Hill have deployed for $6.4 million? We’re guessing quite a few.

But what makes this announcement interesting (to us) is that the $6.4 million settlement resolved the False Claims Act exposure but the settlement came after CH2M Hill had already refunded to the Air Force $10.5 million. (We believe that prior invoice credit was made pursuant to the mandatory disclosure requirement found in the contract clause 52.203-13.) Thus, this was not a $6.4 million issue; it was actually a $16.9 million issue.

And that value excludes the undoubtedly millions of unallowable dollars paid to attorneys to negotiate the settlement.

Now how many new Compliance resources would you add to mitigate that risk?

One more point. The DoJ announcement went out of its way to allege that CH2M Hill delayed reporting the overbilling for several years. According to the announcement, “CH2M Hill knew of the overpayment as early as 2011, but attempted to keep the information secret by claiming that an audit of its labor practices was privileged information” before finally self-reporting the issue (and refunding the non-compliant labor dollars plus interest on the associated overpayments) in 2017.

Those of you who have to contend with Legal Departments that insist that all internal compliance investigations must be undertaken under Attorney-Client Privilege may want to keep this settlement in mind. We’re just saying….

Employee labor qualifications. Easy to detect problems during an external audit; harder to manage during ongoing contract performance. Thus, an area of high risk to which government contractors should devote resources.

If their management permits them to do so.

 

Culture Change

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We’ve all seen that meme on LinkedIn. You know, that Peter Drucker quote: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.” It shows up every week, at least once. There’s a zillion memes and images, all saying the same thing. There’s even a book: “Culture Eats Strategy for Lunch”—but the book wasn’t written by Peter Drucker.

Who’s Peter Drucker, anyway?

Peter Drucker is a relatively famous author and consultant whose contribution to modern management theory is undeniable. Born in Austria and educated in Germany, Drucker fled the Nazis and emigrated to England, where his interest in the behavior of people (as opposed to commodities) distinguished him from other economists and management philosophers. He moved to the United States in 1937, where he taught economics and later became a professor of politics and philosophy at Bennington College. During the 1940’s he focused on management of the modern corporation. According to a website, “In 1954, he published The Practice of Management, widely considered to be the first book to organize the art and science of management into an integrated body of knowledge.”

In 1966, he published The Effective Executive. In essence, he was creating the field that many of know today as the philosophy of leadership. But more he was doing more than that. He was making predictions. In 1968, he wrote, “The impact of cheap, reliable, fast, and universally available information will easily be as great as the impact of electricity. Certainly, young people, a few years hence, will use information systems as their normal tools, much as they now use typewriters or the telephone.” That prediction was made 50 years ago.

I could go on, but you get the drift. Drucker was a widely respected and incredibly influential thinker, and we all would do well to read a couple of his many books.

So when Peter Drucker said, “Culture eats strategy for breakfast,” that is a powerful statement that resonates with many business leaders.

Unfortunately, he may not have actually said it.

Nobody can produce a citation for this widely circulated quote.

What he did say is less catchy: “Often, change management involves changing ways of thinking and doing and, in essence, changing culture.”

Hard to fit that phrase on a meme.

He also said:

  • Management is doing things right; leadership is doing the right things.

  • There is nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at all.

  • Whenever you see a successful business, someone once made a courageous decision.

  • Effective leadership is not about making speeches or being liked; leadership is defined by results not attributes.

  • Plans are only good intentions unless they immediately degenerate into hard work.

Strong quotes, to be sure. But not as strong as the apocryphal “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.”

He didn’t say that; but he should have.

Because it’s true.

The greatest strategy in the world won’t lead to anything if there’s no execution; and to create execution you need a culture of execution. That should be obvious.

But now let’s talk about change and change management. As Drucker noted, change management is often dependent on culture. To create change, the company must be open to change. People must be open to change. People embedded in “the way it’s always been done” tend to be resistant to change. This is especially true in a successful company, where the company’s historical success may be a function of its early culture. Think about Microsoft, or Apple or Google or Facebook. Incredibly successful companies with a culture of success. Why would they even want to change?

Everybody with experience in change management understands that, to be effective, any change management initiative must have an executive sponsor. Without executive sponsorship, many if not most change management efforts are doomed to failure. How does one get executive sponsorship when the executives do not see a compelling business case for making change?

We wrote about this a few years ago, in this article. Our focus then was compliance (as it tends to be), and we wrote—

… the real issue is not the knowledge or expertise of the team; the real issue is that the actual practices may need to change to match the compliance requirements of the newer contracts. The company may need to make fundamental changes to the way in which it does business. … One problem is that the business may have become accustomed to how it has operated over time. It may not understand the need for change—or it may not want to change. “If the wheel ain’t broke, why fix it?” may be the reply to the consultant who recommends changes to business practices in order to better assure compliance with new contract terms.

Therefore, change management is tied to culture, and the culture may have been created over years of successful operation and growth. Assuming that it’s now time for a culture change, how does one even get started?

Moving back to compliance, let’s look at the notion of “tone at the top.” It’s a tough concept to define in a single sentence. One site says, it is “a term that is used to define management's leadership and commitment towards openness, honesty, integrity, and ethical behavior.” DCAA calls it “overall control environment,” and evaluates such things as integrity and ethical values, commitment to competence, management philosophy and operating style, and alignment of authority and responsibility. The DCAA Contract Audit Manual (2000 version) states “The control environment sets the tone of an organization, influencing the control consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other components of internal control, providing discipline and structure.”

Thus “tone at the top” is critical for compliance practitioners to understand. It is foundational. We would therefore assert that “tone at the top” is the single most influential aspect of culture.

If that’s true, and if you accept that change management is inextricably intertwined with culture, and you accept that change management may often mean culture change, then you are left with a problem when the culture is established by executive leadership and that leadership is resistant to change.

What do you do?

Well, here’s my take on it. Here’s a new meme for you all to consider.

Tone at the top is critical. It is so critical that changing the culture may require a change at the top.

In other words, in many cases culture change may need to start with a regime change.

regine_change

 

Rule-Making Like Molasses

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Well, finally. On October 2, 2019, the FAR Councils finally published two proposed rules that would implement the statutory changes made by the 2017 and 2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). Hey, it’s good news!

It’s good news even though these mandated rule-making revisions should have sailed through like a hot knife through butter. Instead, like molasses, they moved slowly—leaving contracting officers and their contractors to rely on controversial theories (such as whether a statutory threshold trumped the regulatory threshold upon which it was based) and Class Deviations issued by individual Federal agencies.

Okay, what are we talking about?

  • FAR Case 2018-004 would increase the micro-purchase and simplified acquisition thresholds to $10,000 and $250,000 (respectively).

  • FAR Case 2018-005 would increase the threshold at which certified cost or pricing data is required to be provided to $2,000,000. In addition, the threshold at which Cost Accounting Standards is applicable is also raised to $2 million.

Right, good news.

But if you’ve read this blog before, you know it wasn’t easy getting these regulatory changes made. We devoted several articles (rants? pleas?) to this topic. Our last article was posted in June, 2018—about sixteen months ago. In that article, we discussed changes to the DOD Class Deviation implementing the statutory changes ahead of the regulatory changes. In the months leading up to that article, we posted article after article, documenting the situation faced by acquisition professionals when the statute changed but not the implementing regulations.

For example, see this one. In it, we wrote:

Do Contracting Officers need to follow the statute or the regulation? If they follow the statute and not the regulation, do they need an official FAR deviation? What about the sentence at FAR 1.602-1(b), which states “No contract shall be entered into unless the contracting officer ensures that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met.” How can a Contracting Officer comply with that requirement if a statute and its implementing regulation are in conflict?

The job of the two FAR Councils and the FAR Secretariat is to make sure those conflicts are few and far between.

So here we are, nearly two years later. And now—only now—have the two FAR Councils and FAR Secretariat published rules that would address the concerns noted above. And they weren’t even published as interim rules!

Like molasses, I tell you.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.