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Apogee Consulting Inc

Rebirth of USAF's Strategic Air Command?

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Strategic Air Command Movie PosterIn 1992, the Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) was "disestablished" as a major command.  Since 1946, SAC had managed the US' land-based and air-launched strategic nuclear forces, including strategic bombers and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).  After the fall of the Soviet Union, SAC went away and its assets were dispersed to other commands, such as the Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC).  The ICBM force was transferred several times, ending up at the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), a joint/unified command. This division of assets into various commands also led, apparently, to a loss of responsibility with respect to accountability and control over US nuclear weapons.

The DOD reports that:

"In a 2007 incident, nuclear weapons were loaded aboard a B-52 bomber at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., and flown to Barksdale before the mistake was discovered. In another incident, nuclear nose cones mistakenly were shipped to Taiwan. As a result, the service’s top civilian and military officials -- Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley -- resigned.  Multiple studies of the incidents and the Air Force’s atmosphere revealed that the service’s nuclear forces and the entire enterprise lacked clear lines of authority and responsibility."

On August 7, 2009 the DOD announced the creation of a new command, the Global Strike Command (GSC).  The GSC will be headquarted at Barksdale AFB (in Louisiana), and will be responsible for the Air Force's strategic bombers as well as ICBMs.  According to the DOD report, "Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz will command the organization. The headquarters will include 900 people, and is slated to reach full operating capability by Aug. 7, 2010. ... The 20th Air Force, the service’s missile organization, will come under the new command in December; and the 8th Air Force, the bomber component, will come under the command in April."  In addtion, the new command will have its own inspector general.

USAF Secretary Michael Donley said that, “This command will provide the combatant commanders the forces needed to conduct strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike operations through ICBM, B-2 and B-52 operations.”  This sounds an awful lot like the SAC's old mission.  

It looks like the SAC, like the mythical Phoenix, has risen once again from the ashes of Cold War history.

See the DOD announcement here.


 


See the history of the SAC here.


 
 

Draft GAO Report Findings Continue to Fault DCAA's Independence

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Government Executive (www.govexec.com) reported on August 6, 2009 that it had obtained an internal DCAA memoranda discussing the findings of the upcoming second GAO report--and (unsurprisingly) the GAO has found fault with DCAA's audits.  In July 2008, a similar GAO report was highly critical of DCAA's audits in its Western Region.  The 2008 report created a firestorm of controversy, including a denunciation of DCAA on the Senate floor, Congressional hearings, and a report from the independent Defense Business Board containing recommendations for reforms to "DCAA's culture, structure, and business practices."  According to the GovExec.com article, the DCAA memoranda state that GAO reviewers looked at 37 audit reports issued between 2004 and 2006, and every single report failed to comply with some aspect of Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS).

The article reports that "GAO focuses much of its attention on a lack of quantitative testing," and that the report will find that "auditors failed to review a sufficient amount of transactional data such as payroll records, vendor receipts and system invoices."  The article notes, however, that GAO may have failed to link these alleged audit failures to any monetary harm suffered by the DOD.  The article quotes a source asking, "'What did GAO find that the DCAA missed? ... The answer is, there is no answer.  They did not explain how the additional testing would have affected the results.'"

According to the internal DCAA memoranda, GAO will recommend that DCAA should be more independent from other DOD agencies "with greater power similar to that of an inspector general."  It is not clear that giving DCAA more independence and/or subpoena power will result in higher-quality audits.  To the contrary, the Government Executive article quotes an unnamed California DCAA auditor as saying, "The audits DCAA [are] issuing now are untimely and poor in quality. ... The metrics still control the audit risk, despite the better judgment of the senior auditors that do all the real heavy work at DCAA."

Although the final GAO report has yet to be issued, if the GovExec.com report is accurate, DCAA could be in for another rough time.  After the 2008 GAO report, DCAA implemented "reforms" that resulted in a loss of auditor discretion, harsh audit approaches, a proliferation of "flash" audit reports, and a bias toward disapproval of contractor internal control systems.  Consequently, DOD contractors should be alert for future changes to audit guidance that impact how they do business with the Department of Defense.

The GovExec.com article is here.
 

Proposed FAR Rule on Government Property Would Affect Profit Negotiations

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On August 6, 2009 a proposed FAR rule (FAR case 2008-011) was published for public comment.  The proposed rule results from the efforts of an Ad Hoc team formed by the Government to address "feedback" on the sweeping 2007 revisions to Government property rules, and is being proposed in order to "add clarity and correction to the previous FAR rule".  Among the many changes being proposed is a revision to FAR Part 15.404 (Proposal Analysis) that would require contracting officers to establish prenegotiation objectives for contract profit by excluding from consideration all contractor-acquired property, unless an item is expressly called out as a contract deliverable.  "Contractor-acquired property" is a term of art, and means property acquired, fabricated, or otherwise provided by the contractor for performing a contract, and to which the Government has title.  (Ref: FAR 45.101, Definitions.)  

The Government holds title to contractor work in process (WIP) in many circumstances, depending on contract type and whether the Government is providing contract financing payments.  Title passage is a complex topic and has sparked much controversy and litigation.  That said, the Government property clause (52.245-1, June 2007) can help in making some general statements regarding passage of title.  For instance, in cost-reimburseable contracts, title generally passes to the Government as costs are reimbursed.  Title passes to the Government in fixed-price contracts only if the item is called out as a deliverable.  (No doubt Government property purists are shaking their heads while reading this.  Let me emphasize once again that the foregoing are general statements, subject to much refinement and nuance.)  As noted, title passes to the Government--on a temporary basis--when a fixed-price contract contains contract financing clauses.  For example, when performance-based payments (PBPs) are in use, title passes to the Government upon payment of a PBP and returns to the contractor upon liquidation of the PBP payments.  (Ref. the PBP contract clause at 52.232-32.) 


There are some, mostly attorneys, who claim that the term "title" as used in the Government property clauses actually means "lien"--as in, the Government does not actually take title to the items or to indirect costs allocated to those Government contracts, but instead holds a lien against them.  Many other people point out that "title" means "title."  More importantly, the Department of Defense has taken the position that "title" does, indeed, mean "title".

(I did say this was a complex topic.  Some people lead happy, productive lives, have successful careers, and never have to deal with Government property issues.  Others, such as the author, are not as lucky.)

In sum, should this proposed FAR rule become final as drafted, it is likely that any given proposal will have to address the new requirement.  Further, it is likely that most contractors will be dealing with  Government negotiators whose position(s) exclude fee or profit on the costs of contractor-acquired property.  That is not to say that the Government's prenegotiation objectives must prevail in the negotiations, but this rule will almost certainly make it harder for contractors to achieve the levels of contract fee/profit that they have historically experienced.

One last note:  the proposed rule says these changes to the Government's profit objective calculations are being made to FAR 15.404-4(a)(3).  This makes no sense to me, as that is a section that contains only general statements regarding the Government's policy on contractor profit, and does not provide any detailed guidance.  One would think that the appropriate home for this new direction would have been 15.404-4(c), which covers contracting officer responsibilities, and discusses the "how to" of creating a prenegotiation position on contractor profit. Perhaps this issue will be addressed in the final rule. ...

See the proposed rule here.

Comments on the proposed rule may be submitted here


in accordance with the directions for doing so, found in the proposed rule.

 

Recent DOD Report on Iraq Cites Progress and "Uneven " Gains

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A recent report by the Department of Defense, entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" paints a picture of progress while acknowledging that there is still some distance to go before reaching President Obama's goal of
"an Iraq that is
sovereign, stable, and self-reliant; an Iraq with
a just, representative, and accountable
government; neither a safe haven for, nor
sponsor of, terrorism; integrated into the global
economy; and a long-term partner contributing
to regional peace and security."
The report has quite a bit to say and is certainly worth reading.  Highlights include a statement that the U.S. forces are on track to cease combat and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations by August 2010 and that all troops will be "redeployed" by December 31, 2011.
See the entire report here.
 

Study Finds that Recovery Act Funds Go to Companies Prepared to Receive Them

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A study conducted by Government Executive magazine, using data from the website www.USAspending.gov, revealed what should have been obvious:  roughly 25 percent of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds have gone to a small group of 17 "large, well-connected" government contractors, as reported by www.govexec.com.

The study showed that, $1.6 billion of the roughly $7 billion issued through July 15, 2009 has gone to 17 companies previously ranked among the Top 100 government contractors -- including such familiar names as Lockheed Martin, URS Corporation, Hewlett-Packard, Jacobs Engineering, CH2M Hill, and the Bechtel Group.  In comparison, the study reports that the amount of ARRA funds issued to 1,137 small businesses in various socioeconomic categories was $1.45 billion. 

The study further reports that much of the ARRA funds received by the large contractors are being issued by the Department of Energy (DOE) in order to accelerate environmental clean-up at former nuclear weapons sites.  In fact, GovExec reports that the DOE plans to spend more than $39 billion in ARRA funds over the next two years, a figure "greater than its annual appropriation."  The funds will likely continue to flow to large businesses instead of small businesses, as the DOE's needs (as well as the ability to pay for liability protection at the nuclear sites) favor "one-stop shops".

Although the news report claims ARRA funds are being disproportionately issued to large companies, creating a situation where "the rich are getting richer," in fact the statistics reported above should surprise nobody.  The large government contractors know how to do business with the Federal government, they understand how to prepare proposals and grant applications, and they have the project management and accounting-related control systems to effectively manage the funds and meet mandatory reporting requirements.  Compliance with the complex rules and regulations has always been a barrier to entering the Federal marketplace, and the ARRA legislation did nothing to bring down those barriers.  To the contrary, ARRA funds carry with them additional and somewhat onerous reporting requirements that may prove difficult for those companies new to the Federal arena to comply with.

The lesson, once again, is that companies willing to invest in themselves will reap the rewards of contract and grant awards, while companies who fail to understand what is required (or to ignore those requirements) will see very little, if anything.

See the entire Govexec.com story here.

 

 

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.