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Apogee Consulting Inc

Can Lockheed Martin Ramp-up F-35 Production to Record Levels?

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In its August 13, 3009 edition of Flight Daily News, Flight International magazine asks whether Lockheed Martin can actually ramp-up production of its F-35 “Lightning II” Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) from its current pace of one aircraft per month to an unprecedented pace of 20 aircraft per month, assembling three production variants on the same line while managing a global supply chain. Unsurprisingly, Lockheed Martin says it can—by learning from Airbus and Toyota.


While the program is currently struggling to hold schedule in its system design/development (SDD) prototyping phase, Flight International notes that “current acquisition plans call for dramatically raising output until a new fighter is delivered every working day, excluding holidays and weekends, or about 240 jets in a year.” The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that “problems and delays are largely the residual effects from the late release of engineering drawings, design changes, delays in establishing a supplier base, and parts shortages, which continue to cause delays and force inefficient production line work-arounds where unfinished work is completed out o f station.”


Moreover, Flight International reports that the JSF’s manufacturing system is still “struggling to overcome the design changes imposed by the [Short Take-off/Vertical Landing (STOVL)] weight attack team (SWAT)” which designed-out nearly 5,000 pounds of weight from the STOVL version—which also affected the design of the other two JSF variants (Conventional Take-off/Landing, or CTOL, and Carrier Variant (CV). The JSF program variants are discussed here. As part of its redesign efforts, the JSF team executed a “major redesign” on the wing’s production method, which saved weight by reducing tolerances for the machined components. One problem: the program’s supply chain “lacked the tools required to meet the new specifications,” which caused schedule slippage. The article quotes the JSF spokesperson as saying – “It’s really about the parts … not arriving on time. It’s not the producibility. The parts did not arrive on time so you have out of station work. … So you’re not doing it in the process you want and it takes longer.” In sum, the JSF program team saved itself significant weight, but only at the cost of disrupting its supply chain and, ultimately, its production line.


Airbus knows about production delays stemming from design issues. Its A380 aircraft deliveries were delayed by nearly two years, because of configuration management and change control problems (different facilities were using different versions of CATIA software). Another issue facing Airbus is management of its far-flung global supply chain. In 2006, the company announced that it was initiating a “full review of the supply chain for its A380 superjumbo following production difficulties which have led to a delay in deliveries ….”


Similarly, Boeing’s 787 supply chain issues have been called a “nightmare”  and have resulted in delays to aircraft deliveries. An aerospace-technology.c om article points out that Boeing’s supply chain leads individual suppliers to maximize their own self interest at the expense of the program’s objectives. In the 787 supply chain, “a complicated array of companies share the risk and the profits of the new airliner. That means financial burdens will inevitably shift up and down the line as each company protects its own interest.” Moreover, the article quotes an observer as saying, “If Boeing mismanaged anything, it is that they have tried to introduce an innovation in their supply systems at the same time they have innovated in product and assembly. Boeing should have held all systems and suppliers close to their assembly lines to facilitate cooperation between suppliers and Boeing.” In addition, “Boeing probably underestimated the size of the risks involved,” according to another quote in the aerospace-technology.com article.


So if Airbus and Boeing both stumbled, in terms of program management, supply chain management, and change control, what makes the JSF team think it can do any better. According to the Flight International article, three little words: Toyota Production System. The JSF program team “has sought out lessons from the Toyota Production System,” which is generally considered the leader of lean manufacturing processes and principles. In fact, the JSF team intention is to create a “Fighter Production System” that will be the benchmark for other defense production lines.


The JSF team will need it. They will need to deliver one aircraft every working day; the previous modern-day record was held by the F-16 jet, in which production peaked at 15 per month. Moreover, the plan calls for the unprecedented volume to come from a single production line handling three different variants. Though Lean Principles envision (and even encourage) production line diversity, it will be a first for a defense program—and it will make supply chain and logistics management even more crucial to program success. Is the JSF team up to the challenge?


They are working on it. The Flight International article notes that the JSF program “wants to create a single flowpath inside the final assembly centre for all sections of the F-35.” Certainly that would seem to be a step in the right direction, but the Toyota Production System Lean Principles would seem to dictate that the program work to create a single flow throughout its supply chain, ensuring that parts arrive in time but not so early as to build wasteful inventory buffers between production steps. As Boeing learned to its detriment, focusing on internal management and internal factory efficiencies, while ignoring bottle-necks and inefficiencies in the supply chain, is a fundamental program management error.


Moreover, the JSF team also needs to focus on deploying risk indicators and controls as deeply into its supply chain as possible. They will need real-time status (or as close to is as possible) on parts and components and sub-assemblies in a disparate number of far-flung factories and shop floors, and they won’t get it at a weekly Ft. Worth staff meeting. In my view, they should take a hard look at the Production Control Center Boeing (finally) developed for its 787 program, which I believe is a revolutionary and much needed approach for managing a dispersed supply chain.


To sum up, the JSF program team has set for itself an incredibly ambitious goal of producing a finished aircraft every single working day. It’s set the goal despite early design and supply chain problems, and despite almost universal history among other aircraft programs that says it can’t be done. But at least the team has identified some worthy companies to benchmark against and learn lessons from. The question remains, however, whether the program team can forget the defense industry’s historical program management practices – that don’t work well in the 21st century – and deploy a truly innovative approach that breaks new ground. If they can, then they may have a chance.

 

An F-35 Lightning II aircraft flies over Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., April 23, 2009. The aircraft is the first of its type to visit the base, which will be the future home of the Joint Strike Fighter training facility. (DoD photo by Senior Airman Julianne Showalter, U.S. Air Force/Released)

F35 Lightning II

A Lockheed Martin Corporation vintage P-38F Lightning, World War II fighter aircraft, left, and an F-35 Lightning II aircraft are displayed at the Lockheed Martin Corporation facility in Fort Worth, Texas, Feb. 29, 2008, The aircraft are on display during a special ceremony in recognition of the past and present success of the company’s production of fighter aircraft. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class D. Keith Simmons/Released)

 P38 Lightning and F35 Lightning II

 


 

 

Augustine Panel Finds NASA Budget "Not Friendly" to Human Space Exploration

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We reported previously that the President's panel on human spaceflight, headed by former Lockheed Martin CEO Norm Augustine, concluded that the U.S. "space gap" in manned space flight (the time between the retirement of the current space shuttle and the first launch of the next-generation Constellation program vehicles) would be longer than NASA has admitted.  Now comes word from Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST) that the panel has found no "palatable options" within the current NASA budget plan for human space flight. According to AW&ST (as reported in its online Aerospace Daily & Defense Report on August 12, 2009), the Augustine panel heard testimony from former Astronaut Sally Ride that "NASA's current program of record -- retiring the shuttle and closing down the International Space Station (ISS) by 2016, developing the Ares I/Orion system as a shuttle replacement, and mounting a lunar return by 2020 -- simply doesn't fit" within the Obama Administration's FY2010 budget guidance. The AW&ST article quotes Ms. Ride as saying, "There was not enough money to even start the lunar systems."


Should the Obama Administration provide NASA with another $2 billion annually, then a return to the moon is possible by 2025, according to Ms. Ride, who chaired a subcommittee that worked with cost analysts at NASA and the Aerospace Corporation. The AW&ST article reported:

"More promising were the so-called 'Deep Space' options, which would defer lunar exploration in the near-term in favor of trips to other locations in the solar system. Within the 'less constrained' [NASA] budget, and using a dual Ares V “lite” heavy-lift approach, astronauts could visit a Lagrange Point by 2025, a near-Earth object (NEO) in 2030, and perform a Mars flyby in 2035, according to Ride. Another 'Deep Space' option would abandon Ares in favor of a large, 75-metric ton capable hydrocarbon-fueld heavy lifter and could allow the deep space sites to be visited a bit earlier, but this change of approach would 'significantly disrupt' NASA, and require facility shutdown and workforce reduction costs of $3 billion - $11 billion. Nonetheless, 'Deep Space’ appears to be the most cost effective of the exploration scenarios, and it has earlier return also,' Ride said."

Given the historic U.S. leadership in manned space flight, it is disappointing that more is not being done to assist NASA in getting off the ground. If the Obama Administration wants to speed the recovery, it should consider redirecting some of the ARRA funds to NASA and its contractors.

 

Boeing Agrees to Pay U.S. $25 Million in Qui Tam Settlement

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On August 13, 2009 the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a $25 million dollar settlement agreement with Boeing related to a qui tam (whistleblower) lawsuit originally filed by two former Boeing employees.  The suit alleged that Boeing installed defective insulation blankets in U.S. Air Force KC-10 aerial refueling aircraft while performing depot maintenance.  The DOJ press release also noted that "Auditors found that Boeing inflated estimates of the number of hours needed to perform the blanket kit work and charged an excessive hourly rate for the work."
 
The relators (whistleblowers) will share a bounty of $2.6 million, according to the announcement, which can be found here.
 

Dynamics Research Corp. to Pay U.S. $15 Million to Resolve Kick-Back and False Claims Allegations

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On August 13, 2009 the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a $15 million settlement with Dynamics Research Corporation (DRC) of Andover, MA to resolve allegations that two former vice presidents "steered Air Force contracts for computer equipment and services to companies owned by themselves, [one executive's] wife, and others, in exchange for kickbacks and inflated contract prices that produced windfall profits for the two DRC executives. In one of the schemes, [the executives] allegedly substituted inexpensive memory modules for those required by the contract, causing the Air Force to overpay for the nonconforming modules."  The announcement states that the U.S. filed a civil suit against DRC, "seeking damages and penalties under the Anti-Kickback Act, the False Claims Act, and for breach of contract."  In addition, the announcement notes that in related criminal proceedings "in 2001, [the executives] pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the government. Both received prison sentences and were ordered to pay restitution."
 
See the DOJ announcement here.
 

Will VASIMR© Revolutionize Space Flight?

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In June 2009, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) named the Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR©) one of the “Top 10” emerging aerospace technologies of 2009.  The August 10, 2009 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST) carried a 2 ½ page article on the technology and the company that is developing it, Ad Astra Rocket Co. (located near Houston, Texas with a subsidiary lab in Guanacaste, Costa Rica).  The AW&ST article reported that Ad Astra’s technology “offers a potentially less expensive alternative to chemical propulsion” and—more importantly—the technology might lead to vastly increased speeds and thus to incredibly reduced space flight durations.  As in:  Earth to Mars in 39 days flat.  Interested in new technology with such potential, we visited the Ad Astra website to see if the concepts were real and achievable, or if they were simply the starry-eyed dreams of theoretical physicists.

 

Once we finished slowly downloading the company’s content-heavy home page, we learned about Ad Astra (“to the stars”) and its mission, which is “to revolutionize space transportation and exploration”.  A lofty goal, indeed.  Ad Astra’s proprietary VASIMR© propulsion system consists of three modules: (1) a plasma source cell that injects neutral gases (typically hydrogen, but it could also utilize deuterium, helium, xenon, or argon) and an ionization subsystem that work to create the “stage one” plasma, (2) an “RF Booster” module that uses electromagnetic waves to “energize” (or disassociate atoms) the gas into “stage two” plasma, and (3) a “Magnetic Nozzle” module that directs the plasma into useful thrust via the magnetic field lines of a surrounding superconducting magnet. 

 

The company boasts that its technology “has two additional important features that distinguish it from other plasma propulsion systems: 1. Ability to vary the exhaust parameters (thrust and specific impulse) in order to optimally match mission requirements. This results in the lowest trip time with the highest payload for a given fuel load. [and] 2. VASIMR® is driven by electromagnetic (RF) waves and has no physical material electrodes in contact with the hot plasma. This results in greater reliability and longer life and enables a much higher power density than competing designs.”

vasimr.jpg

©Ad Astra Rocket Co.

Pretty cool, but is it for real?  According to AW&ST and the company’s website, it is.  In July 2009, Ad Astra completed maximum power operation testing of its first 30-kw first stage and started producing thrust with the engine’s 170-kw. second stage.  AW&ST reports that, “If successful, efforts to achieve full rated power with combined firing of both stages … will pave the way for a preliminary design review of the first operational Ad Astra hardware early next year.”  At that point, the company will begin development of a flight version of its engine, for delivery to the International Space Station (ISS) in 2013.  The engine would then undergo space trials, being used to “reboost” the ISS to counter atmospheric drag.  AW&ST reports that the company is currently in negotiations with both SpaceX and Orbital Sciences for transportation of the VX-200 engine to the ISS.

 

The space test plans for VASIMR® envision a solar powered plasma rocket.  But Ad Astra’s aspirations do not stop there.  The company has a dream of nuclear powered space plasma drives that will dramatically change how space flights are conducted by increasing speed and lowering flight durations.  And all of this is being done by private industry, NASA having “redirected” its plasma propulsion funding toward the Constellation program.

 

It’s perhaps too early to jump on the Ad Astra VASIMR® bandwagon.  But then again, looking at the upcoming U.S. manned space flight “space gap,” perhaps it is several years too late.

 

Visit the Ad Astra website here: 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.