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Apogee Consulting Inc

Commission on Wartime Contracting to Hold Hearings on Contractor Internal Controls

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We previously reported on the Commission on Wartime Contracting's Interim report.  At that time we noted the Commission--headed by Michael Thibault (former Deputy Director, DCAA) and Christopher Shays (former member of Congress, Republican)--not only lambasted DOD for its management of contractors deployed on the battlefield, but also took aim at "inadequate" contractor business systems as well as a perceived lack of accountability associated with the use of subcontractors.  GovExec.com reports that the Commission will hold hearings on August 8, 2009 regarding "contractor business systems and subcontracting rules."  According to GovExec.com, the Commission "found investigators had deemed half the [contractor] systems for billing and compensation inadequate and prone to unallowable costs.  Panel staffers uncovered somewhat smaller problems with the [contractor] systems used for accounting, budget, electronic data processing, indirect and overhead costing, labor and purchasing."  The Commission's hearing will reportedly focus on the activities of three contractors: KBR, DynCorp International, and Fluor -- each of whom were awarded a large Logistics Capability ("LOGCAP IV") contract to support warfighters in the battlefield.  GovExec reports that April Stephenson (Director, DCAA), David Ricci (Director of Contract Business Operations, DCMA) and Jeff Parsons (Director of the Army Contracting Command) will also testify at the hearing.

The GovExec.com story can be found here
 


It is ironic that, at the same time Congress and taxpayers are upset at the costs of major weapon systems, contractors are under pressure to develop expensive operational control systems that, arguably, add no real value to the warfighter.  There are plenty of controls already in place to penalize contractors who knowingly or inadvertently include unallowable costs in proposals, billings and/or claims submitted to the Federal government.  Adding more layers of bureaucracy would not seem to be the right answer, unless perhaps one lives inside the Beltway.
 

DOD Is Too Bureaucratic to Meet Needs of Warfighter, Defense Science Board Tells SecDef

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Recently DOD published the final report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs.  The DSB Task Force, chaired by Dr, Jacques Gansler, made several conclusions that are surprising for their candor.  Among the Task Force's conclusions:

-- The DOD is "not geared to acquire and field capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat environment."

-- "Current long standing [DOD] business practices and regulations are poorly suited" to the dynamics of a rapidly shifting threat environment."

-- "Today, the DOD is saddled with processes and oversight built up over decades, and managers leading them who are often rewarded for risk aversion."

-- "All of DOD's acquisition needs cannot be met by the same acquisition processes."


Accordingly, the DSB Task Force made several recommendations, including:

-- The DOD should have two acquisition paths, one for "rapid" and "urgent" needs, and the other for "deliberate" needs.

-- Rapid acquisitions should be funded separately from deliberate acquisitions.

-- A new agency, the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA) should be created to oversee rapid acquisitions.  The existing acquisition agency (DCMA) should focus on deliberate acquisitions.


Some observations;

1.  If the DSB Task Force rhetoric sounds familiar, it's likely because Dr. Gansler was Under Secretary for Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) from 1997 to 2001 and participated in a number of acquisition innovations, from implementation of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) to implementation of Performance-Based Payments.  Under his leadership, the DOD aspired to "partner" with industry, an approach heavily criticized by others.

2.  It is not clear, because the report does not seem to address the issue, how the mission and staffing of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) would be affected, should the Secretary of Defense implement the recommendations.  One may assume that the DCMA would focus on administering "deliberate" acquisitions while the new agency (RAFA) focuses on the rapid acquisitions, but certainly DCMA's budget, staffing and program role would be impacted.

3.  The Task Force recommendations to not address the statutory basis for many of the bureaucratic processes it criticizes. Clearly, in order to roll back the oversight and bureaucracy, one must first revise the statutes that require them.

4.  Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) spent the last 6 years criticizing the Bush administration's handling of acquisition issues in Southwest Asia.  Moreover, every week the Department of Justice issues a press release reporting the indictment or plea bargain or settlement of somebody who accepted a bribe related to such acquisitions.  It is far from clear how such "rapid" acquisitions would guard against such problems.

See the entire DSB Task Force report here.
 

Rebirth of USAF's Strategic Air Command?

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Strategic Air Command Movie PosterIn 1992, the Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) was "disestablished" as a major command.  Since 1946, SAC had managed the US' land-based and air-launched strategic nuclear forces, including strategic bombers and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).  After the fall of the Soviet Union, SAC went away and its assets were dispersed to other commands, such as the Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC).  The ICBM force was transferred several times, ending up at the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), a joint/unified command. This division of assets into various commands also led, apparently, to a loss of responsibility with respect to accountability and control over US nuclear weapons.

The DOD reports that:

"In a 2007 incident, nuclear weapons were loaded aboard a B-52 bomber at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., and flown to Barksdale before the mistake was discovered. In another incident, nuclear nose cones mistakenly were shipped to Taiwan. As a result, the service’s top civilian and military officials -- Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley -- resigned.  Multiple studies of the incidents and the Air Force’s atmosphere revealed that the service’s nuclear forces and the entire enterprise lacked clear lines of authority and responsibility."

On August 7, 2009 the DOD announced the creation of a new command, the Global Strike Command (GSC).  The GSC will be headquarted at Barksdale AFB (in Louisiana), and will be responsible for the Air Force's strategic bombers as well as ICBMs.  According to the DOD report, "Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz will command the organization. The headquarters will include 900 people, and is slated to reach full operating capability by Aug. 7, 2010. ... The 20th Air Force, the service’s missile organization, will come under the new command in December; and the 8th Air Force, the bomber component, will come under the command in April."  In addtion, the new command will have its own inspector general.

USAF Secretary Michael Donley said that, “This command will provide the combatant commanders the forces needed to conduct strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike operations through ICBM, B-2 and B-52 operations.”  This sounds an awful lot like the SAC's old mission.  

It looks like the SAC, like the mythical Phoenix, has risen once again from the ashes of Cold War history.

See the DOD announcement here.


 


See the history of the SAC here.


 
 

New DCAA Audit Guidance Targets Contractors' Unallowable Health Benefit Costs

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Continuing a trend started in late 2008, DCAA audit guidance issued August 4, 2009 spells trouble for Government contractors.  The guidance warns DCAA auditors of contractors that are "inappropriately charging" costs associated with ineligible dependents and/or spouses to the Government.  The audit guidance directs that auditors should question costs associated with ineligible dependents in both forward pricing rate proposals and annual incurred cost submissions.  Ineligible dependents/spouses include those that are (1) too old to receive benefits, (2) divorced or deceased, or (3) covered by another plan but did not notify the contractor of that fact.  Auditors will be developing tests to assure that only spouses and dependents that are eligible for benefits in accordance with the contractor's policies are receiving benefits.

The guidance notes that some contractors offer employees "grace periods" in which to report status changes, and directs that _all_ costs associated with ineligible dependents should be questioned, even if incurred during grace periods that are otherwise consistent with company policy.  Contractors that offer employees such grace periods must calculate the "cost impacts" associated with their practice "even if the contractor will not seek restitution from the [ineligible] employees."  Where contractors refuse to calculate those impacts, DCAA auditors are directed to "develop a reasonable estimate" of the unallowable health benefit costs and "suspend the costs until the contractor provides a cost impact and/or an audit is complete."

Moreover, the audit guidance asserts that costs associated with ineligible spouses/dependents are not only unallowable, they are expressly unallowable, and thus subject to the penalty provisions of FAR 42.709.  Court decisions on this matter tend to favor a contractor, basically saying that penalties should not be imposed where there are reasonable differences of opinion about the allowability of certain costs.(Ref. _General Dynamics Corp._, ASBCA No. 49372, June 2002.)  That being said, it is far from clear that inclusion of costs associated with patently ineligible dependents in claimed health care expenses results from a matter of judgment or opinion.  (The "grace period" issue may be subject to more judgment.)  In any case, who wants to litigate the issue?

There are other troubling aspects of the audit guidance:

-- DCAA auditors are advised that many contractors use third-party plan administrators.  When auditing health plan costs, auditors are directed that the contractor must provide "the same level of access to the third party service provider records that he or she would receive from contractor maintained records."  Auditors are reminded to initiate "access to records" procedures should a contractor deny them access to the third party's records.  Previous DCAA audit guidance imposes a course of action that can lead to suspended costs, for an unresolved "access to records" issue.  (Ref. MRD 08-PAS-042(R) dated 12/19/2008.)

-- DCAA auditors "should verify that contractors have adequate procedures to ensure payment of insurance premiums or claims are only being made related to employees and their eligible dependents."  A contractor's failure to have adequate procedures in this area will treated as "an internal control deficiency in the contractor's accounting system and a CAS 405 noncompliance, if applicable."  Further, inclusion of costs related to ineligible dependents/spouses in cost estimates may be teated as inadequacies in the contractor's estimating system.  Previous DCAA audit guidance (MRD 08-PAS-403(R), dated 12/19/2008) directs that a single control objective failure should lead to a recommendation o system inadequacy.  An inadequate estimating system is a nuisance, but an inadequate accounting system can prevent a contractor from receiving any cost-reimbursement contract.  (Ref. FAR 16.301-3(a)(1).)  Accordingly, a threat to the adequacy of a contractor's accounting system internal controls must be taken very seriously.

Finally (as if the above was not sufficient to cause worry), the audit guidance reminds DCAA auditors that the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) should be "notified of any potential risks related to ineligible dependent care costs in prior fiscal years" so as to "ensure that active negotiations of open incurred cost years are put on hold until any necessary adjustments are made."  In other words, an audit finding in a current year can affect the finalization of prior years' indirect cost rates, which could delay final contract close-outs and submission of final invoices.

Given the foregoing, contractors should immediately review their procedures associated with verifying dependent eligibility and shore them up as appropriate.  To the extent costs associated with ineligible dependents/spouses are identified, they should be treated as unallowable costs.  Contractors should also consider consulting with legal counsel to determine their position regarding DCAA access to the records of any third party service providers.  In cases where it is decided to grant access to those records, it may be necessary to renegotiate or even amend existing service agreements.

See the troubling audit guidance here.
 

Draft GAO Report Findings Continue to Fault DCAA's Independence

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Government Executive (www.govexec.com) reported on August 6, 2009 that it had obtained an internal DCAA memoranda discussing the findings of the upcoming second GAO report--and (unsurprisingly) the GAO has found fault with DCAA's audits.  In July 2008, a similar GAO report was highly critical of DCAA's audits in its Western Region.  The 2008 report created a firestorm of controversy, including a denunciation of DCAA on the Senate floor, Congressional hearings, and a report from the independent Defense Business Board containing recommendations for reforms to "DCAA's culture, structure, and business practices."  According to the GovExec.com article, the DCAA memoranda state that GAO reviewers looked at 37 audit reports issued between 2004 and 2006, and every single report failed to comply with some aspect of Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS).

The article reports that "GAO focuses much of its attention on a lack of quantitative testing," and that the report will find that "auditors failed to review a sufficient amount of transactional data such as payroll records, vendor receipts and system invoices."  The article notes, however, that GAO may have failed to link these alleged audit failures to any monetary harm suffered by the DOD.  The article quotes a source asking, "'What did GAO find that the DCAA missed? ... The answer is, there is no answer.  They did not explain how the additional testing would have affected the results.'"

According to the internal DCAA memoranda, GAO will recommend that DCAA should be more independent from other DOD agencies "with greater power similar to that of an inspector general."  It is not clear that giving DCAA more independence and/or subpoena power will result in higher-quality audits.  To the contrary, the Government Executive article quotes an unnamed California DCAA auditor as saying, "The audits DCAA [are] issuing now are untimely and poor in quality. ... The metrics still control the audit risk, despite the better judgment of the senior auditors that do all the real heavy work at DCAA."

Although the final GAO report has yet to be issued, if the GovExec.com report is accurate, DCAA could be in for another rough time.  After the 2008 GAO report, DCAA implemented "reforms" that resulted in a loss of auditor discretion, harsh audit approaches, a proliferation of "flash" audit reports, and a bias toward disapproval of contractor internal control systems.  Consequently, DOD contractors should be alert for future changes to audit guidance that impact how they do business with the Department of Defense.

The GovExec.com article is here.
 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.