Northrop Grumman to Sell TASC Consulting Business
On August 20, 2009 the Wall Street Journal reported that Northrop Grumman had announced it was seeking a buyer for its TASC consulting business. TASC is based in Herndon, Virginia, and employs roughly 5,000 people. Insiders say Northrop Grumman is hoping to sell the unit for $1 billion, and has retained Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG as advisers. The Wall Street Journal article says that a deal for TASC could emerge by the end of September, and "private-equity firms are among the interested parties." Why sell now? There are clearly several meta-trends that could impact TASC's business model. 1. Conflict of interest rules. In May, Congress moved to close conflict-of-interest (COI) loopholes by tightening the standards to be applied to contractor employee who act as augmented staff to the Federal workforce. Cutbacks in Federal acquisition and program management staff over the past 15 years have resulted in a need to hire contractors to do what had formerly been "inherently governmental" functions such as designing specifications, determining technical needs, and developing solicitations. Clearly, companies (such as Northrop Grumman) that both supplied staff and submitted bids faced potential COI issues (which can be mitigated); but the tougher rules would tend to make it harder to keep from straying over the line. Significantly, TASC's competition includes Booz-Allen Hamilton, who does not offer military hardware. TASC is in the unenviable position of being denied advisory opportunities in order to protect Northrop Grumman's competitive position, while simultaneously denying Northrop Grumman bid opportunities because of TASC's existing advisory role. Splitting the entities is in the best interest of both. 2. Insourcing. Recognizing that the Pentagon may have relied too much on contractors to fill its staffing shortages, SecDef Gates recently announced an intention to beef-up his acquisition corps, in order to return thousands of jobs back to the Federal government. Thus, the need for TASC's services might diminish in the future. 3. The Obama administration's budget balancing act is just getting started. Recent reports indicate that the Pentagon has to trim $60 billion, for starters. It is likely that future demand for TASC's services will flatten or decline in the near future. Given the foregoing, it is no surprise that Northrop Grumman wants to divest TASC. The question is, given the cloudy future facing defense companies, will NGC get the premium it is hoping for? When contemplating the acquisition of any business that sells goods and/or services to the Federal government, it is important to evaluate the probability of contingent liabilities, and factor them into the deal. Government contracts, by their very nature, have long tails. It can take literally years after completion of the work for "contract close-out" to take place. Even after contract close-out and receipt of final payment, contract clauses give the Government the right to assert claims for an additional three years. Thus, after an acquisition an allegation of wrongdoing can surface that relates to actions that took place literally years before. Records can be missing, personnel may have departed, but the acquiring company still has to deal with the issue(s). It is critical to structure the deal so as to protect the acquiring entity from such contingent liabilities. Typically this is done either through purchase price adjustment, establishment of an escrow fund, or both. During the due diligence phase of the acquisition, it is critical to evaluate existing internal and operational controls, administrative attention to detail, and to try to assess the probability that a contingent liability will surface after acquisition. Some areas to evaluate include: compliance with Truth-in-Negotiation Act (TINA), accuracy of timekeeping, accuracy of invoicing preparation, and integrity of the accounting system and related controls. Note that these areas have limited overlap with Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 internal controls, and require some degree of expertise in order to properly evaluate. In addition to the foregoing, considerable thought must be given to the post-acquisition control environment--particularly even two Government contractors are merging. Many operational control systems (e.g., estimating, accounting, billing, EVMS) have existing system descriptions that will need to be revised and resubmitted to Government oversight officials. The post-acquisition entity will need to allocate indirect costs and to calculate indirect cost rates; the cost impact(s) of the new rates on existing contracts cannot be ignored. Moreover, should one or both of the entities be subject to Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), then any changes to cost accounting practice must be carefully coordinated with Government customers, and may require revision of CASB Disclosure Statements and calculation of contract cost impacts in accordance with complex and very detailed process rules. In sum, there is quite a bit to think about and the traditional business-to-business M&A due diligence does not really address the necessary issues. Northrop Grumman is putting its TASC unit up for sale. They want to receive top-dollar (reportedly, $1 billion) for the business. Interested suitors will need to carefully weigh a myriad of detailed issues, as well as the impact of several mega-trends, when creating an offer. It will be interesting to see whether a deal that satisfies--and protects--both parties will be struck.
AEHF … WTF?
On August 17, 2009 DefenseNews.com published an article (authored by William Matthews) that had such an eye-catching lead-in, we had to see for ourselves whether or not it was for real. The article started as follows: In April, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates terminated TSAT, an ambitious communications satellite program that was over budget, behind schedule and plagued by technical problems. In its place, he substituted AEHF - the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite - a less ambitious communications satellite program that also is over budget, behind schedule and plagued by technical problems. … TSAT, the Transformational Satellite communications system, cost U.S. taxpayers $2.5 billion before Gates pulled its plug. AEHF was expected to cost $5.6 billion in 2001 when the program was getting under way, but today the price tag is more than $10 billion for fewer satellites, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO). TSAT was at least four years behind schedule. Launch of the first satellite had been pushed back to 2019. The first AEHF was supposed to be launched in 2008, then 2009, and now Lockheed is aiming for late 2010. Now that’s how to write a story! So what’s the story behind the story? Let’s look. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite is designed to replace the 20 year-old MILSTAR military satellite communication system by providing “near-worldwide, secure, survivable satellite communications to support strategic and tactical forces of the United States and its international partners during all levels of conflict,” according to globalsecurity.org. The website notes that the AEHF system will provide 12 times the data throughput of the MILSTAR system, so that “for every one link of the old Milstar, the Air Force now has 12 operating at four times the speed.” After the loss of MILSTAR Flight 3 in April, 1999, the Department of Defense (DOD) created the AEHF program consisting of a consortium of Lockheed Martin, Hughes Aircraft Co., and TRW (now Northrop Grumman). GlobalSecurity.org reports that – On 16 November 2001 the U.S. Air Force awarded a $2.698 billion System Development and Demonstration [SDD] contract for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program to a team comprised of Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space, Sunnyvale, Calif. and TRW Inc., Space and Electronics, Redondo Beach, Calif. The contractor team is led by Lockheed Martin as the prime integrator and provider of the Spacecraft Bus and ground command and control segments with TRW providing the satellite payload. The contract will culminate in the delivery of two AEHF satellites and the ground command and control system. The first of two satellites under this contract was scheduled for launch in 2006. Since early system definition studies in 1999, the AEHF program has gone through a series of design changes. For example, GlobalSecurity.org reports that on May 18, 2004 Lockheed Martin Corp., Space Systems Co. and Northrop Grumman Space Technology, were (together) awarded a $149 million contract modification which incorporated within-scope changes resulting from a revision to the AEHF KI-54 Cryptographic Interface Control Document (ICD). The KI-54 ICD modification required to AEHF team to redesign the Host Accessory Logic Application Specific Integrated Circuit (HAL ASIC) in the AEHF communication payload. This effort also led to a four months program extension. In December 2004, the U.S. Air Force reported that the AEHF program had experienced unavoidable delays and cost growth because of delayed delivery of signal-encryption products, which had resulted in a delay of command and control terminals. As a result of these schedule impacts, the AEHF program was delayed by 12 months. Additional reports noted that the program incurred cost growth from unplanned payload component testing and replacement of existing critical electronic components that were disqualified for space flight. The cost and schedule impacts were expected to increase the overall cost of the AEHF program by roughly 20 percent. The number of planned AEHF satellites has fluctuated over time as well. The original SDD contract called for a “pathfinder” satellite followed by four, higher-capability, satellites, for a total constellation of five. In reality, the number of AEHF satellites would depend on the progress of another satellite program, the “transformational” communication satellite, or TSAT, program. In 2002 the Air Force decided not to acquire two AEHF satellites. In October 2004 the Air Force decided not to acquire the fourth AEHF satellite in order to proceed more quickly with the TSAT program. The TSAT program was terminated by Secretary of Defense Gates in October 2008, after incurring approximately $2.5 billion in costs. (DefenseNews.com reported that the TSAT program was “at least four years behind schedule” and that “launch of the first satellite had been pushed back to 2019” at the time of program termination.) In 2005 a third satellite was added back to the program, at a reported cost of $491 million. After the TSAT program termination a fourth AEHF satellite was added back to the program resulting in additional cost and schedule impacts that triggered a “Nunn-McCurdy” breach and mandatory Pentagon program review. According to a September 2008 article in Aviation Week & Space Technology, “The fourth satellite accounts for four-fifths of the FY '09 cost increase in the program. The spacecraft's high price is due to the expense associated with restarting Lockheed Martin's production line.” Impacts to the program’s cost and schedule, as well as the impacts from the fluctuating number of satellites, compelled the contractors to initiate a program “rebaseline” or “replan” that resulted, in April 2006, in an $454.9 million contract modification to compensate the contractors for the changes as well as the delay of the first AEHF launch date from 2006 to April 2008. Current reports indicate a planned launch date of 2010 with a total program cost of $9.2 billion. So to sum up, the DefenseNews.com article had its facts correct, but seems to have taken them out of context. Like many high-tech developmental programs, the AEHF program has been the victim of Pentagon budget wars. While the program undoubtedly suffered from many of the pains associated with trying put a highly secure, classified payload into space, it also suffered from a lack of firm strategic leadership from the Pentagon. The fluctuations in the number of satellites and budgetary uncertainty clearly impacted the contractors at least as much (if not more) than the technical challenges. While it might serve as a good example of out-of-control defense programs, it might also serve as a good example of the impacts of failed leadership. It seems that the DefenseNews.com article missed the mark, choosing to take cheap shots rather than dig for the truth.
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Is the Vulcan Hypersonic Engine a Game-Changer?
In May 2009 the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA) announced the kick-off of its Vulcan program by awarding eight-month system requirements development contracts to four contractors: Alliant TechSystems (ATK), General Electric (GE), Rolls Royce, and United Technologies Corporation (UTC). The Vulcan program aims to develop a “constant volume combustion” (CVC) engine that will accelerate a vehicle from rest to Mach 4+. (Some reports say the program aims to achieve Mach 6, which would be equal to a true airspeed of about 3,700 at a flight level of 50,000 feet, or a true airspeed of about 4,600 MPH at sea level. In other words, Vulcan aircraft will be very fast.) According to DARPA, the Vulcan engine will integrate an existing production turbine engine (such as a F100-229, F110-129, F119 or F414 engine) with a CVC engine. DARPA says that the Vulcan engine will “enable full scale hypersonic cruise vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike, or other critical national missions.” A DARPA briefing calls the Vulcan engine “a game changer.”
This concept has been described as the integrated combination of a turbo jet and a scramjet. Current engines, including advance turbine engines, operate on the principle of constant pressure combustion (CPC). According to DARPA, CVC engines “offer potentially very significant performance improvements over conventional cycles, have the ability to operate statically through high Mach numbers and offer significant design flexibility.” In particular, CVC engines should be able to achieve a 35% improvement in thermal efficiency when compared to traditional CPC engines. However, an aircraft needs to attain Mach 2+ before the CVC engine can begin to operate. Thus, the need to combine a traditional turbine engine with the CVC engine in order to provide continuous thrust from take-off through the higher Mach velocities. DARPA states that a key objective of the program will be ”to integrate the turbine engine into the Vulcan engine system with minimal modification to the turbine engine, operate the turbine engine from rest to its upper Mach limit and cocoon the turbine engine when it is not in use during flight.” DARPA’s vision is that the turbine and CVC engines will share a common inlet and nozzle. There are, of course, technical challenges that will need to be overcome. As DARPA itself notes, the challenges include “efficient detonation initiation, low total pressure loss detonation initiation devices, low total pressure loss air valves, thermal management systems, efficient nozzles, and control systems.” Among the other challenges is deciding on the appropriate configuration for the CVC engine, which could consist of pulsed detonation engines (PDEs), Continuous Detonation Engines (CDEs), or another “unsteady CVC” method. Flight International magazine (FlightGlobal.com) reports that the Vulcan configuration decision will be made in December 2009. According to a FlightGlobal.com report, The Vulcan's configuration will be selected from a number of different options, some of which were presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics' 45th Joint Propulsion Conference held in Denver, Colorado. What is decided is that the engine will use a turbojet and a constant volume combustion engine (CVC) in combination. Examples of CVC are Continuous Detonation Engines (CDE) and Pulse Detonation Engines (PDE). The basic operation for a CDE or PDE is a propellant injected into a tube, open at one end and the fuel is ignited. The detonation wave travelling down the tube generates the thrust. After selection of the configuration, the program will begin an eighteen-month Phase 2 to include preliminary design, trade studies, and a demonstration of the CVC components. Phase 3 is forecasted to last another eighteen months and will include detailed designs, simulations, and tests of the CVC engine components. Phase 4 (another 18-month phase) will include fabrication, assembly and test/demonstration of the integrated Vulcan engine. If all goes according to plan, by 2014 the Vulcan engine should be proven and demonstrated technology. At that point, we should know whether the Vulcan engine is truly the “game changer” that DARPA believes it can be.
Recipients of Recovery Act Funds -- Time to Register!
Effective August 17, 2009 recipients (and sub-recipients) of American Recovery and Reinvestment (ARRA) funds are required to begin to register at FederalReporting.gov. This is the Federal government's website that acts as a central government-wide data collection system for both Federal agencies and recipients of Federal awards under Section 1512 of ARRA. Recipients (and sub-recipients) are required to register on the site, and then to enter required data on a quarterly basis for Recovery Act grants, loans, and contracts they have received. The first reporting period will begin October 1 and end October 10, 2009. Effective October 11, 2009 the public will be able to view information via the Recovery.gov website. But prior to registering at the FederalReporting.gov website, recipients must first jump through a few hoops. Prime recipients (those that receive funds directly from the Federal government) must first do the following steps prior to registering: 1. Have a valid email address. 2. Obtain a 9-digit DUNS number from the Dun & Bradstreet website here. 3. Register in the Federal government's Central Contractor Registration (CCR) database here. For sub-recipients (those that receive funds from a prime recipient) the pre-registration steps are identical to those for prime recipients. For reporting, the subs will need to also know their prime's DUNS number and Award number. This is a bold experiment in Federal contract transparency, and it is likely there will be some initial "bumps" as the process is implemented. To help ease the strain, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board has created a "Recipient Reporting Data Model" to standardize reporting data. The Recipient Reporting Data Model can be downloaded from the "Downloads" tab of FederalReporting.gov and is also accessible via Recovery.gov. There are other interesting challenges involved in entering and reporting use of Recovery Act funds. For example, GovExec.com reports that "The 28 federal agencies that have distributed the stimulus funds also must sign up at FederalReporting.gov to review information submitted by recipients and discuss with them any errors or corrections. While agencies can view the information, only recipients will be able to change the data once it is submitted, and only for a short period of time after the Oct. 10 reporting dead-line.". The same article also notes that "The [Recovery Accountability and Transparency] board expects 150,000 to 200,000 recipients to file reports by the Oct. 10 deadline." Recipients and sub-recipients should begin the registration process now and get familiar with the Recipient Reporting Data Model, in order to ensure that they are reporting accurate information on time, and in the right format, beginning October 1st. Although it is not clear whether the Federal government will be able to identify those recipients who fail to report, it is a near certainty that those recalcitrant recipients that are identified may be accused of breaching the terms and conditions of their Recovery fund award, and that may lead to a "rough ride" that is otherwise completely avoidable. Just as importantly, recipients and sub-recipients must ensure that they have implemented internal accounting and other operational control systems to track how their Recovery Act funds are used.
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