Honeywell Aerospace Loses CEO and CFO
 On Sept. 3, 2009 New Jersey-based Honeywell International reported that two highly placed executives were departing its Aerospace unit. Rob Gillette (Aerospace CEO) left to take the helm of First Solar, a multi-billion dollar manufacturer of solar and photovoltaic modules. Like Honeywell Aerospace, First Solar is based in Arizona. Mr. Gillette will be replaced by Tim Mahoney, formerly Chief Technology Officer. In the same release, Honeywell announced the departure of Aerospace CFO, Bob Hau, who will be joining Lennox International, a Texas-based manufacturer of heating and cooling equipment, as its CFO. Why did the two depart the successful Aerospace unit? At $11 billion in annual sales, the Aerospace unit accounted for roughly 34% of total Honeywell International sales, but also accounted for nearly half of the conglomerate's bottom-line earnings, according to The Wall Street Journal's MarketWatch column. Aviation Week quotes a Wall Street analyst as saying, "Opportunities for further promotion at Honeywell were limited in the medium-term." The analyst notes that the departures allow each executive to "step into full CEO and CFO roles." In other words, each of the executives had hit their ceiling at Honeywell. No matter how talented or what results they created, there was no room at the top for them. Assuming this explanation can be taken at face-value, it seems a shame that the Corporate compensation committee couldn't have found a creative way to retain these two executives. Given the current economic pressures and potential Aerospace/Defense industry downturn, one would have thought Honeywell International would need all the talent it could find, and would not be able to easily replace these two executives.
DOD Prepares for Pandemic by Telling Contractors They Better Not Get Sick
"I have an eye infection and I can't see the point of coming into work today." -- Anonymous Employee On August 27, 2009 the Department of Defense (DOD) issued another DFARS Class Deviation--this time in recognition of the "changing environment" and the "increased need for continuity of operations capabilities and plans that enable agencies to continue their essential functions across a broad spectrum of emergencies ... [including] the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic." This latest Class Deviation creates solicitation and contract clauses that put contractors on notice that, even in the midst of national emergencies, the DOD expects them to show up for work. The Class Deviation acknowledges that various contract clauses, including the "excusable delays" and "termination for default" clauses, generally relieve contractors from liability when a failure to perform arises from causes beyond their control. However, the document then states that, regardless of those legal niceties, "contractors providing services designated as essential contractor services by a DOD component are expected to use their best efforts to continue providing such services, in accordance with the terms and conditions of their contracts even during periods of crisis." The document defines "essential contractor services" as contractor-provided services that support DOD mission critical functions, "such as support of vital systems, including ships owned, leased, or operated in support of military missions or roles at sea; associated support activities, including installation, garrison, and base support services; and similar services provided to foreign military sales [FMS] customers under the Security Assistance Program." The document goes on to say that "Services are essential if the effectiveness of defense systems or operations may be seriously impaired by the interruption of these services." Further, the document defines "mission essential functions" as "those organizational activities that must be performed under all circumstances to achieve DOD component missions or responsibilities." The new contract clause, "Continuation of Essential Contractor Services" (AUG 2009), notifies contractors that some or all of the services performed under the contract are essential services . It requires the contractor to have a plan to ensure continued performance of the services during a crisis. In its plan, the contractor must identify provisions for "acquisition of necessary personnel and resources ... for continuity of operations up to 30 days, or until normal operations can be resumed." In the event the contractor cannot perform the services, the clause requires Government notification "as expeditiously as possible" and full efforts to cooperate with the Government's efforts to maintain continuity of operations. In crisis situations, the clause permits the Government to use Federal employees of other agencies or "contract support from other contractors or to enter into new contracts for essential contractor services." Finally, the clause must be flowed-down to all subcontracts for essential services. Well, what is one to make of the foregoing? On one hand, the DOD should be commended for proactively preparing for possible emergencies, such as the H1N1 pandemic. And it is a good idea to require contractors to begin planning and preparation for workforce management and mobilization during times of crisis. On the other hand, contractors will incur costs in developing their plans, and will expect to receive reimbursement for such costs from the DOD. Moreover, it is interesting that DOD expects contractors to support foreign governments (who are acquiring services via FMS contracts) in such emergency situations. Finally, it is nice to require "full cooperation" during times of emergency, but it is doubtful how much contractors can actually do to compel employees to come to work, if they choose not to. And what is the remedy for a contractor who breaches its contract by failing to exercise its best efforts to support essential DOD (or foreign government) services? The obvious remedy would seem to be a termination for default (T4D); however, as the Class Deviation itself notes, contractual T4D clauses generally relieve contractors of their duty to perform when the failure arises from causes beyond their control (e.g., pandemics). Thus, it is unclear if the DOD has any remedy other than to note the lack of performance and ensure that lack is input into the contractor past performance database. See the class deviation here.
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FAR Case 2008-016: Proposed Rule Implements OMB Direction to Get Serious About Past Performance Reporting
We previously discussed recent OMB guidance that directed Federal agencies to get serious about reporting contractor past performance information into the Past Performance Information System (PPIRS). On September 2, 2009 the FAR Council published in the Federal Register a proposed FAR revision that would provide guidance to Contracting Officers regarding how and when to report contractors that have been terminated for default or have been determined (by the Contracting Officer) to have submitted defective cost or pricing data. There is not much more to be said regarding the proposed rule changes, except that they affect several parts of the FAR, including Parts 8, 12, 15, 42, and 49. The central language change is at 42.1503(f), which would read "Within 10 days after a contracting officer determines that a contractor has submitted defective cost or pricing data, or a termination for cause or default notice has been issued or any subsequent conversions or withdrawals have been issued, agencies shall ensure information related to these issues are provided for inclusion in PPIRS." As a general matter, we applaud the Government's newfound focus on recording contractor past performance information and then subsequently using that information to evaluate future offers. That said, it is a poorly kept secret that certain large contractors cannot be kept from winning contract awards in the name of "national security". Previous suspensions from contract awards have proven to be paper tigers; and the Government has all be but admitted that Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and others are too big to be debarred. For example, were Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilders to be debarred, who would build the nation's nuclear aircraft carriers? There's only one place in America that has the capability to build such ships, and thus it is a practical impossibility to debar the shipyard (though of course the Department of Justice can make their lives miserable and the cost of doing business expensive). So it won't be the top-tier contractors who are affected by this rulemaking exercise; instead, it will be the smaller and mid-tier contractors. See the proposed rule here. Comment on the proposed rule here.
Head of Boeing Commercial Aircraft Latest Casualty in Dreamliner Drama
On August 31, 2009 Boeing announced the retirement of Scott Carson, President of Boeing Commercial Aircraft (BCA). Mr. Carson will be replaced by Jim Albaugh, the current President of Boeing's Integrated Defense Systems (IDS). Mr. Dennis Muilenberg will succeed Mr. Albaugh as President of IDS. This executive shuffle is the latest move in the nearly three-year year struggle to capitalize on delays in the Airbus A380 program.
Mr. Carson's three-year tenure at BCA was marked by program setbacks in both the 747-8 and 787 "Dreamliner" programs. In September 2007, Boeing announced a three-month delay to the Dreamliner program, blaming both a shortage of aerospace fastners as well as incomplete software. One month later, the company announced a further three-month delay to flight testing as well as a six-month delay to aircraft deliveries, this time blaming "traveled work" -- work that suppliers had failed to accomplish. In April 2008, Boeing announced another 15-month delay to aircraft deliveries. In November 2008, yet another delay was announced, this time due to incorrectly installed fastners and the recent machinists' strike. In December 2008, Boeing announced a further delay to test flights, this time for another six-month period. In May 2009, Boeing announced a further slip to delivery schedules of another six months, because of delays in ramping up production. On June 15, 2009 Boeing announced that the 787 would make its first flight in two weeks; however, on June 23rd the company announced a postponement of the first flight "due to a need to reinforce an area within the side-of-body section of the aircraft." According to a July 30, 2009 Seattle Times report, the wing structural problem was worse than stated in the company's June 23rd press release. Boeing's customers are reported to be "dismayed" by the continued schedule slippages.
What makes the Dreamliner so interesting is that it marked Boeing's attempt to develop a new method of supply chain management. According to Wikipedia,
Boeing manufactures the 787's tail fin at its plant in Frederickson, Washington, the ailerons and flaps at Boeing Australia, and fairings at Boeing Canada Technology. This was a new and daring step for Boeing, which has historically guarded its techniques for designing and mass producing commercial jetliner wings. ... the wings are manufactured by Japanese companies in Nagoya such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which also makes the central wing box. The horizontal stabilizers are manufactured by Alenia Aeronautica in Italy; and the fuselage sections by Global Aeronautica and Boeing Charleston in Charleston, South Carolina (USA), Kawasaki Heavy Industries in Japan and Spirit AeroSystems, in Wichita, Kansas (USA).
The passenger doors are made by Latécoère (France), and the cargo doors, access doors, and crew escape door are made by Saab (Sweden). Japanese industrial participation is very important to the project, with a 35% work share, and many of the subcontractors supported and funded by the Japanese government. On April 26, 2006, Japanese manufacturer Toray Industries and Boeing announced a production agreement involving $6 billion worth of carbon fiber. ... On February 6, 2008, TAL Manufacturing Solutions Limited, a subsidiary of the Tata Group (India) announced a deal to deliver floor beams for the 787 from their factory at Mihan, near Nagpur, India to assembly plants in Italy, Japan and the United States.
Messier-Dowty (France) builds the landing gear, which includes titanium forged in Russia, and brake parts from Italy, and Thales supplies the integrated standby flight display and electrical power conversion system. Honeywell and Rockwell-Collins provide flight control, guidance, and other avionics systems, including standard dual head up guidance systems. Future integration of forward-looking infrared is being considered by Flight Dynamics allowing improved visibility using thermal sensing as part of the HUD system, allowing pilots to "see" through the clouds. Connecticut (USA)-based Hamilton Sundstrand provides power distribution and management systems for the aircraft, including manufacture and production of Generator Control Units (GCUs) as well as integration of power transfer systems that can move power from the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and the main engines to the necessary parts and machinery of the aircraft. Cold weather test of the APU took place in Alaska. Boeing's supply chain management situation has been called a "nightmare". Although recent reports indicate that Boeing has belatedly developed innovative program management techniques to manage its far-flung suppliers-- including use of hand-held video cameras from shop floors to assess real-time production progress and extensive use of web-based conferencing from a Command Center that operates 24 hours a day. These innovations came too late, apparently, to save Mr. Carson.
In a late-breaking addition to this article, on September 2, 2009 TheStreet.com carried a brief story. Following is an exact quote of that story.
"Boeing Co. CEO Jim McNerney told an investors' conference Wednesday that the company 'lost the handle a little bit' in managing the 787 program. But Jim Albaugh, the newly appointed chief of the commercial airplane division, 'has been managing hundreds of programs for the last eight years,' McNerney said, promising improved execution in the 787 program."
It may now be said that "lost the handle a little bit" can join "hiking the Appalachian Trail" in the 2009 list of euphemisms.
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