Wrestling with CAS and Pensions: The Court of Appeals Weighs In (Once Again) on Segment Closing Pension Adjustments
We’ve been known to tell audiences that preparing a CAS cost impact proposal and defending it through audit is the most difficult task to perform in the complex (and perhaps arcane) world of government contract cost accounting. It has recently come to our attention that we were wrong. Indeed, there is one calculation even more difficult to prepare and defend through audit, even less well-understood, and even more complex (and arcane) than a cost impact analysis—the segment closing pension adjustment calculation mandated by Cost Accounting Standard 413. When the second incarnation of the CAS Board revised Standards 412 and 413 in March, 1995 they took already ambiguous, complex and poorly understood Standards and made them even more onerous. In the words of former OFPP Administrator Angela Styles, the revisions “sparked an explosion of litigation” as the Government, contractors, and the Courts struggled to come to some understanding as to what the rules meant and how they could be executed in a practical sense by the contracting parties. One case, the matter of the General Electric Company’s pension adjustments related to sales of several of its businesses, celebrates this week its fourteenth year of litigation—rivaling the infamous A-12 termination case for length. The words of Cost Accounting Standard 413, at 48 C.F.R § 9904.413-50(c)(12), are relatively straight-forward, as is most of the CAS language. The Standard states (in part): If a segment is closed, if there is a pension plan termination, or if there is a curtailment of benefits, the contractor shall determine the difference between the actuarial accrued liability for the segment and the market value of the assets allocated to the segment, irrespective of whether or not the pension plan is terminated. The difference between the market value of the assets and the actuarial accrued liability for the segment represents an adjustment of previously determined pension costs. It is the interpretation of the foregoing words that has baffled for years the best minds in the business, as different parties litigate different aspects of the requirements. Most of what we know (or think) we know of how to comply with this requirement comes from Judge Nancy Firestone of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, a special (non-Article III) court established by the Tucker Acts to hear contract-related suits against the U.S. Government. Judge Firestone has waded through motions and briefs, and counter-motions and sur reply briefs, and expert report after expert report, trying to establish what the CAS Board intended the parties to do when a Government contractor (a) had a defined benefit pension plan, and (b) sold one or more of its CAS “segments” (or business units) to another business. Generally speaking, we applaud Judge Firestone’s acuity, wisdom, and perseverance; and the Court of Appeals has also looked favorably on her decisions, often accepting her decisions as written and denying appeals by one (or both) parties. Other cases have been tried in the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), where several judges have tackled the messy problems associated with this Standard, with a somewhat greater variation in success. The latest guidance from the Courts concerns decisions made by this latter judicial body. On September 14, 2009 the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, issued one of its relatively rare CAS 413 reversals of a lower court decision, one that is worth mentioning for several reasons. First, it should be noted that Apogee Consulting, Inc. is not a law firm and nobody here has any formal legal training. So what follows is simply a layperson’s attempt to discuss several points found in the Appellate Court’s decision. Second, it should also be noted that one (or both of the parties) may decide to appeal this decision further, perhaps requesting certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. (That’s not likely, nor is SCOTUS likely to accept the appeal if made. Nonetheless, the Appellate decision should not be treated as final until all rights of appeal have been waived or exhausted.) Finally, let’s be clear that this article is the personal opinion of the author, Nick Sanders, and in no way represents the opinion of The Raytheon Corporation (a party to the litigation) or any Apogee Consulting, Inc. client. That being said, let’s look at a few aspects of the Appellate decision. - The segment-closing pension adjustment is a current period adjustment. In order to comply with the requirements of CAS 413-50(c)(12), the contractor must evaluate its pension plan assets and actuarial liabilities, and determine whether the plan is over- or under-funded. It must determine the U.S. Government’s participation in any over- or under-funding (using a representative sample of prior years’ contract activity), and apply that participation ratio to the amount of the calculated pension “surplus” or “deficit” (after making certain adjustments such as excluding employee contributions). The amount so determined is a current period adjustment—either a credit or debit—that then flows to Government contracts in the indirect cost rates of the current period. What is striking about the Court’s decision is that a failure to make the required calculation and determine the resulting credit or debit, and to reflect that entry in the current period’s indirect cost rates—is a noncompliance with the requirements of the Standard. Moreover, the Court declared that simply making “an accounting allocation to the current period” is insufficient; what is required is an actual contract price adjustment—a “payment in the current period”.
Those who have dealt with this series of actuarial analyses, contract participation reviews, and various calculations understand what the Court apparently did not. Calculating the requirement pension adjustment does not happen in a few hours or even days. It takes months to analyze the data and determine the status of the pension plan using the rules of CAS 413. It takes months to determine what years contributed to the pension plan over- or under-funding. It takes months to determine a representative sample of years, to determine the Government’s participation in pension plan expenses for those years, and to then calculate the Government’s overall percentage of current period pension surplus or deficit. If a contractor were to sell a business in the fourth quarter of its Fiscal Year, it would be near impossible to complete the required analyses and calculations by year-end. Even when one considers the six-month period after the books close (provided by the Allowable Cost and Payment clause, FAR 52.216-7) to be used for preparation of the year’s final indirect cost rate proposal, one is hard-pressed to believe nine months is sufficient time. Indeed, given how few contractors survive DCAA audit of its segment-closing pension adjustment by DCAA without a CAS 413 noncompliance (leading in almost every instance to a protracted legal dispute), even a full year might not be enough time to calculate the adjustment in a manner deemed by DCAA to be in full compliance with the Standard as written and as interpreted by the Courts. Yet, the Appellate Decision is clear: contractors who do not complete their efforts in time to adjust the final indirect cost rates—and contract billings—for the fiscal year in which the sale took place are in noncompliance with CAS 413. Accordingly, the Government is entitled to recover overpayments and interest on those overpayments in accordance with the CAS clauses and underlying statute. - The noncompliance is created when the fiscal year ends without the required adjustment being made, but compound interest starts accruing on the day the segment is sold. There was a school of thought that believed a contractor could not be in noncompliance with CAS until a contracting officer (variously called an “ACO” or “CFAO” in the regulations) issued a final decision officially determining that the contractor was in noncompliance. Generally, this would follow a DCAA audit report alleging noncompliance or recommending that the contractor be found to be in noncompliance, to which the contractor would have a chance to rebut or convince the contracting officer why DCAA was wrong in its audit finding(s). Given that interest on a contractor claim made under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) does not start running until a contracting officer has issued (or is deemed to have issued) a final decision (and the contractor formally appeals that decision to the ASBCA or Court of Federal Claims), there was some sense of logic and inherent fairness that the Government should not be entitled to receive interest until the contracting officer had heard the stories of both DCAA and the contractor, and rendered a final decision. Another possible date could have been the contractor’s fiscal year-end, or six months after year-end (when the contractor was required to submit it final indirect cost rate proposal, unless given an extension by the contracting officer). The Court found none of these dates meaningful, choosing instead to declare that the CAS 413 noncompliance took place when the contractor failed to make the required segment closing adjustment in the current period, and its segment closing date started the interest clock ticking. The rationale for this position was that the contractor has active contracts in the period in which its segment is closed; therefore failure to adjust one or more of those active contracts in the current period creates the noncompliance and results in Government overpayments. Remembering that pension plan cases involve millions (or sometimes hundreds of millions) of dollars, and that at least one of these cases has run for fourteen years without complete resolution, one quickly sees that this decision has a huge impact on the amount of money at stake.
Disposing of a business unit by sale or other means is a difficult endeavor. Contractors often spend considerable sums hiring outside advisors, consultants, and/or subject matter experts to conduct due diligence reviews or to help shape the final deal. We have previously discussed the importance of a rigorous due diligence review when acquisition or divestiture of a government contractor is being considered. To this discussion we now add the following warning, based on this recent Federal Circuit decision: When considering acquisition or divestiture of a CAS-covered government contracting business unit (or segment) where a defined-benefit pension plan is involved, you must take into consideration the CAS 413 implications. This means that, in addition to parceling out the pension plan assets and liabilities between buyer and seller, the parties must agree to cooperate in developing the segment closing adjustment. Further, the buyer and seller must plan on considerable devoting time and resources—and funds—to completing the adjustment and processing any credits/debits before the end of the fiscal years of one (or both) of the parties. Obviously, the deal structure (e.g., which party retains responsibility for pension plan assets and liabilities, and which party retains ownership of physically completed contracts) will determine who has the most to gain (or lose) from any noncompliance with the requirements of CAS 413. All of which will lead to more expensive deals, and thus to fewer deals. While it is true that there are not many contractors who still maintain active defined benefit pension plans, there are still enough to warrant this cautionary note. Moreover, it is not necessarily the active plans that will lead to the most troublesome calculations, but the plans for inactive and active legacy employees which, although closed to new participants, still must be addressed when the affected government contactor businesses are bought and sold.
Security Assistance - FMS, FMF, and IMET
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as authorized by law, engages in Security Assistance, which is broadly defined as a group of programs in which either the DOD or its contractors provide defense articles and services to certain international organizations and foreign governments "in support of national policies and objectives." Security Assistance (SA) "includes such diverse efforts as the delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign governments, U.S. Service school training to international students, U.S. personnel advice to other governments on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities, and U.S. personnel guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability." Defense articles, including major defense systems, subsystems, support equipment, repair parts, and publications are available under SA. Defense services, including training in U.S. military schools or through mobile training teams, construction, engineering, contract administration, program management, technical support, and repair are also av ailable. Which entities participate in SA, and to what extent, are determining by the U.S. Department of State. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the implementing agency for DOD. Within the SA umbrella there are several programs, including: Foreign Military Sales (FMS). FMS programs are authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and managed by DOD on a cost-plus 3.8% basis. When defense articles and/or services are required, the requesting country's representative provides a Letter of Request (LOR) to the U.S. counterpart. Copies are sent to the (Depart Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the DSCA. The original is furnished to the DoD Military Department or other implementing Defense Agency that will prepare the response in the form of a LOA. To encourage standardization and interoperability among U.S. and SA countries, FMS normally involves the transfer of those articles that have been fielded by U.S. forces. Under certain conditions, foreign customers can elect to co-produce or co-assemble defense articles in lieu of transfer. Also, defense articles are occasionally leased to foreign entities instead of being sold. A list of recent FMS awards can be found here. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants or loans. Congress appropriates FMF funds in the International Affairs Budget, the Department of State allocates the funds for eligible foreign entities; and the DOD executes the program. According to the DSCA, "FMF helps countries meet their legitimate defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and allies, cements cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with U.S. forces." The DSCA further notes that, "because FMF monies are used to purchase U.S. military equipment and training, FMF contributes to a strong U.S. defense industrial base, which benefits both America’s armed forces and American workers." International Military Education and Training (IMET). According to the DSCA, the objectives of the IMET program are to further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries; and to increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights." Students are exposed to U.S. military procedures and the manner in which the military functions under civilian control. DSCA has published several guides to help foreign customers and U.S. contractors navigate the intricacies of SA programs. In August 2009, the latest version of DSCA's Guidelines for Foreign Military Financing of Direct Commercial Contracts was published. The Guidelines establish compliance criteria for contractors participating in SA programs. Importantly, the compliance criteria include the following: In order for a DCC to be approved for FMF funding, the defense articles purchased must be manufactured and assembled in the United States, or the defense services purchased must be performed by U.S. manufacturers and suppliers, purchased from U.S. manufacturers or suppliers, and composed of U.S.-origin materiel, components, goods, and services (hereafter “U.S. content”). Prime contractors must maintain and provide, if requested, supporting documentation for the value of both U.S. and non-U.S. origin content. In the event the purchase of a U.S. end item consists of both U.S. and non-U.S. origin content, only the value of the U.S. origin content will normally be financed. Direct Commercial Contracts must specify all non-U.S. origin content. If not identified in the contract, non-U.S. content must be identified to DSCA by the Purchaser in supporting documents. To facilitate this: A. The prime contractor is required to identify to the Purchaser any non-U.S. content, the corresponding value contained in the contract, and where applicable, supporting documentation to demonstrate that the USG has procured or is procuring the same non-U.S. content or non-U.S. origin items, components, or services from the same non-U.S. source for the same end item the USG has procured or is procuring. Supporting documentation should include the USG contract number(s) under which the non-U.S. content/item(s) was purchased, if appropriate, and any other pertinent information. B. If raw materials, components, or items used in the manufacturing process are procured from both U.S. and non-U.S. sources, and are not segregated as to origin, and are incorporated on an interchangeable basis into the prime contractor’s articles or services, the actual dollar value need not be identified. Instead, a non-U.S. content estimating methodology or system (for example, an annual survey) may be used by the prime contractor. The use of such a methodology must be approved by DSCA prior to DSCA processing the DCC. C. The non-U.S. content of spare parts that are acquired separately by the Purchaser in a stand-alone DCC, not as part of an end item or as part of a “system” procurement, will not be approved for FMF funding. The non-U.S. content of a spare part cannot be funded under the COTS items exception unless the same spare part meets the requirement for being considered a COTS item. To conclude, SA programs offer another sales channel to DOD contractors. There are additional compliance requirements and risks associated with the programs, as exemplified by the foregoing; however, savvy contractors are willing to accept the additional requirements and risks in return for the opportunity to diversify their customer base and to sell their products and services in the international marketplace, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Government.
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Strategy Like Peanut Butter? Consider a Radical Reorganization!
We are indebted to Scott Eblin and Govexec.com for bringing to our attention an amazing call for action--a internal memo leaked to the media and originally published by The Wall Street Journal on its front page in November, 2006. Although written for his leadership team colleagues at Yahoo!, Brad Garlinghouse's memo ought to ring true for many of those in the Aerospace/Defense industry, burdened by bureaucracy and a lack of accountability for results. But before the memo, a bit of context .... Recently, a young lady left one of the Top 5 A&D companies for a new career at one of the large oil companies. This young lady had graduated a year before from the University of Southern California with a B.S. in Industrial Systems Engineering, and had been hired as a Manufacturing Engineer. Roughly a year later, she departed, frustrated with the company environment. In her words, Business units did not work together so the teams I worked on were very dysfunctional. It was always a blame game between different units when problems arose, and every group was constantly trying to get out of doing work by saying it was another groups responsibility. I am a person who will jump to fix something when I see a problem, but in this environment I was discouraged from doing this because "it was not our job." Also, people did not show up on time to meetings even when they were with third party companies, which I thought was embarrassingly unprofessional. ... I talked to some people at [company] about it; several people were on my page but others were very anti-change. I [think] the majority of upper management understands the problem, but there is an inability to implement cultural change because the majority of employees have been there 20 plus years and are very stuck in their ways. Hopefully they [will start] to work together or I am afraid more individuals will leave the company out of frustration.
Does this sound familiar? Is this disillusioned young engineer describing your company? Is there anything that can be done?  Now, back to the memo, written by Brad Garlinghouse (a Senior Vice President at Yahoo!) in 2006. It describes how Yahoo! suffered from some of the problems described above, and what he proposed to do about it. With hindsight, we can note that his "peanut butter manifesto" was not fully implemented, nor was it entirely successful--but it nonetheless stands out as clarion call for management action that should be trumpeted by many (if not all) leaders in A&D management, if they are to address the issues facing the industry. Mr. Garlinghouse wrote the following to his colleagues: I believe that we must embrace our problems and challenges and that we must take decisive action. We have the opportunity -- in fact the invitation -- to send a strong, clear and powerful message ... that we recognize and understand our problems, and that we are charting a course for fundamental change. Our current course and speed simply will not get us there. Short-term band-aids will not get us there.
We lack a focused, cohesive vision for our company. We want to do everything and be everything -- to everyone. ... We are reactive instead of charting an unwavering course. We are separated into silos that far too frequently don't talk to each other. And when we do talk, it isn't to collaborate on a clearly focused strategy, but rather to argue and fight about ownership, strategies and tactics. Our inclination and proclivity to repeatedly hire leaders from outside the company results in disparate visions of what winning looks like -- rather than a leadership team rallying around a single cohesive strategy. I've heard our strategy described as spreading peanut butter across the myriad opportunities...The result: a thin layer of investment spread across everything we do and thus we focus on nothing in particular....
We lack clarity of ownership and accountability. The most painful manifestation of this is the massive redundancy that exists throughout the organization. We now operate in an organization structure -- admittedly created with the best of intentions -- that has become overly bureaucratic. For far too many employees, there is another person with dramatically similar and overlapping responsibilities. This slows us down and burdens our company with unnecessary costs. Equally problematic, at what point in the organization does someone really OWN the success of their product or service or feature? ... there are so many people in charge (or believe that they are in charge) that it's not clear if anyone is in charge. This forces decisions to be pushed up -- rather than down. It forces decisions by committee or consensus and discourages the innovators from breaking the mold ... thinking outside the box. ...
We lack decisiveness. Combine a lack of focus with unclear ownership, and the result is that decisions are either not made or are made when it is already too late. Without a clear and focused vision, and without complete clarity of ownership, we lack a macro perspective to guide our decisions and visibility into who should make those decisions. We are repeatedly stymied by challenging and hairy decisions. We are held hostage by our analysis paralysis. We end up with competing (or redundant) initiatives and synergistic opportunities living in different silos of our company. ...
We have lost our passion to win. Far too many employees are "phoning" it in, lacking the passion and commitment to be part of the solution. We sit idly by while -- at all levels -- employees are enabled to "hang around". Where is the accountability? ... As a result, employees that we really need to stay (leaders, risk-takers, innovators, passionate) become discouraged and leave. ...
If we get back up, embrace dramatic change, we will win. ... 1. Focus the vision. We need to boldly declare what we are and what we are not. ... We can't simply ask each BU to figure out what they should stop doing. ... The direction needs to come decisively from the top. We need to place our bets and not second guess. ... We need to make the tough decisions, articulate them and stick with them -- acknowledging that some people ... will not like it. Change is hard.
2. Restore accountability and clarity of ownership. Existing business owneres must be held accountable for where we find ourselves today -- heads must roll. ... We must redesign our performance and incentive systems. I believe there are too many BU leaders who have gotten away with unacceptable results and worse -- unacceptable leadership. ... We must signal to both the employees and to our shareholders that we will hold those leaders (ourselves) accountable and implement change. ... It must be very clear to everyone in the organization who is empowered to make a decision and ownership must be transparent. With that empowerment comes increased accountability -- leaders make decisions, the rest of the company supports thosse decisions, and the leaders ultimately live/die by the results of those decisions. My view is that far too often our compensation and rewards are just spreading more peanut butter. We need to be much more aggressive about performance based compensation. This will only help accelerate our ability to weed out our lowest performers and better reward our hungry, motivated and productive employees.
3. Execute a radical reorganization. The current business unit structure must go away. We must dramatically decentralize and eliminate as much of the matrix as possible. ... I emphatically believe we simply must eliminate the reduncancies we have created and the first step in doing this is by restructuring the organization. We can be more efficient with fewer people and we can get more done, more quickly. We need to return decision-making to a new set of business units and their leadership. But we can't achieve this with baby step changes. We need to fundamentally rethink how we organize to win. ... two key principles must be represented:
Blow up the matrix. Empower a new generation and ... leave no doubt about where accountability lies.
Kill the redundancies. Align a new set of BUs so that they are not competing against each other.
I don't pretend that I have the only available answers, but we need to get a discussion going; change is needed and it is needed soon. We can be a stronger and faster company -- a company with a clearer vision and clearer ownership and clearer accountability. ... I don't pretend this will be easy. It will take courage, conviction, insight and tremendous commitment. I very much look forward to the challenge. So let's get back up. Catch the balls. And stop eating peanut butter.
Is this executive describing your company? Does your company suffer from uncommunicative--or even competing--silos, excess bureaucracy, decision by committee, and a lack of passion to win? Are responsibility, authority, and accountability misaligned? Does incentive compensation reward those playing to win, or only those who are playing not to lose? If so, then perhaps some of the organizational fixes proposed (or declared) by Mr. Garlinghouse might be worth considering. Suppose you were to "blow up" your management matrix? What might the next generation management structure look like? Would decision-making be pushed down to program managers, who would be the mini-CEOs of their program fiefdoms? Or would you create program portfolios, with support matrixed to the programs only for a relatively limited organizational subset? If you had a blank sheet of paper, what org chart would you create?  There may be no "correct" answer to the foregoing questions. But we know from experience that organizational silos are the bane of effective and efficient leadership. Moreover, where silos exist, the spaces between the silos are "no-man's lands" of ambiguity and non-accountability, where nobody takes responsibility because decision-making authority is unclear. Time after time, we have seen the distance between the silos--measured in terms of geography, job function/title, and hierarchy--defeat the best management intentions. Consider Mr. Garlinghouse's call to action. Is he calling to you?
False/Inflated Invoices on Government Subcontract Leads to Fines and Jail Time for Executives
On September 9, 2009 the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a press release announcing that Delmar Spier (CEO of United States Protection and Investigations, LLC (USPI) and his wife Barbara Spier (President of USPI) had entered guilty pleas in the U.S. District Court (District of Columbia) for conspiracy, major fraud, and wire fraud in connection with USPI's subcontract with the U.S. Agency for International Development's (US AID) rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. USPI provided security and protection services to a US AID contractor under a cost plus fixed fee contract. This contract type requires the contractor to invoice only for the actual costs it incurs, subject to the allowability criteria of FAR Part 31.2. USPI invoiced its prime contractor for "inflated expenses ... for rental vehicles, fuel and security personnel [and for] fabricate[d] invoices from fictitious companies..." over a period of four years, from June 2003 to July 2007. According to the DOJ press release, the fraud was worth $3 million, which the Spiers agreed to disgorge back to the U.S. government.
Sentencing has yet to occur, but the press release notes that "The conspiracy charge carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The charge of wire fraud carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The charge of major fraud carries a maximum sentence of 10 years and a $1 million fine." Two other USPI employees were indicted along with the Spiers; one of those employees (William Dupre) is scheduled to be tried in December 2009.
See the DOJ press release here.
This is a timely reminder that corporate executives will be held responsible for violations of Federal statutes and regulations in connection with the contracts they receive, and that compliance is almost always the less expensive option. Moreover, prime contractors are responsible for providing oversight over the activities of their subcontractors, particularly when those subcontractors have cost-reimbursement contract types.
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