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Apogee Consulting Inc

GAO Reports Widespread Audit Quality Problems at DCAA

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Before getting into the September 23, 2009 hearing by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (which will be the subject of an upcoming article), we want to spend some time on the 148-page GAO audit report on which most of the testimony centered—GAO Audit Report GAO-09-468 (September 23, 2009) entitled “DCAA Audits: Widespread Problems with Audit Quality Require Significant Reform.” This was a follow-up report to last year’s now-infamous GAO report (GAO-08-857), and was designed to (1) conduct a “broad assessment of DCAA’s management environment and quality assurance structure,” (2) evaluate corrective actions taken in response to last year’s report (as well as internal reports by the Defense Business Board and other DOD stakeholders), and (3) identify potentials actions that might be taken by Congress (and others) that “could improve DCAA’s effectiveness and independence.”  As the title of the report indicates (and as was previously leaked), DCAA did not fare well in the GAO’s investigation.

The GAO looked at DCAA Contract Audit Manual (“CAM”) guidance and DCAA’s quality assurance program.  It examined internal quality assurance reviews. It examined the 2007 DOD Inspector General external quality “peer review” of DCAA audit quality (but did not review any DOD IG working papers). And it also reviewed 69 audit assignments from the period Government Fiscal Years (GFYs) 2004 through 2006, focusing on reports issued by “DCAA offices that reported predominantly adequate (‘clean’) opinions on contractor systems and related internal controls ….”  The 69 audit assignments that GAO reviewed were comprised of 37 audits of contractor internal controls and 32 “cost-related audits” issued from seven “geographically disperse DCAA field offices within the 5 DCAA regions.”  Notably, the GAO did not review assignments from DCAA’s Field Detachment (which audits classified contracts) nor did GAO review assignments from offices that issued reports with predominantly adverse contractor findings.  Consequently, GAO’s findings are admittedly “not statistical” in nature; the review covered less than 10 percent of the 76 offices in which contractor internal control-related audit reports were issued during the review period.

To summarize, the GAO examined a biased sample of reports from a small fraction of DCAA’s offices, issued in historical periods prior to the July 2008 GAO report (and thus prior to implementation of any DCAA corrective actions in response to that report).  Moreover, the management activities the GAO examined were issued prior to the issuance of Defense Business Board recommendations on changes to DCAA organizational strategy (and implementation of same).  Further (and more to the point with respect to certain Senators’ angry and pointed questions during the recent hearing), all of the audit reports and activities, and related findings, in the GAO report occurred prior to Ms. Stephenson assuming her current position as Director of DCAA.  These limitations didn’t stop GAO from generalizing from the findings, nor did they stop GAO from making sweeping generalizations and major policy recommendations for the Department of Defense and Congress. For example, the GAO report concluded “[we] found DCAA’s management environment and quality assurance structure were based on a production-oriented mission that put DCAA in the role of facilitating DOD contracting without also protecting the public interest.”

Notwithstanding the foregoing caveats, the GAO report was rife with damning anecdotes and findings. It is hard to dispute the overall conclusions of the report, which were summarized thusly:  “we found audit quality problems at DCAA offices nationwide, as demonstrated by serious quality problems in the 69 audits … we reviewed, DCAA’s ineffective audit quality assurance program, and DCAA’s rescission of 80 audit reports in response to our work.”

The GAO report stated that “we found audit quality problems … with all 37 audits of contractor internal controls and the 4 incurred cost and the 2 request for equitable adjustment audits we reviewed at 7 FAOs across the 5 DCAA regions ….”  Detailed findings included:

 

  • In 2004, a Western Region FAO planned a billing system audit of a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)—a “grantee” that receives $1.5 billion annually for its research services.  The planning “did not take into account the fact that grantees are funded through letters of credit and do not actually bill the government.”  Despite this “obvious mistake,” DCAA auditors “issued a report stating that the grantee had an ‘adequate billing system’.”  Another report issued by the same office on the same FFRDC addressed cash management practices under the Single Audit Act.  According to the GAO, “the auditors could have simply forwarded this report to the DOD contracting officer—a task that would take an hour at the most to complete.  Instead [they] charged over 530 staff hours to generate documentation to meet DCAA’s billing system audit requirements, even though there was no related ‘billing system’.”  The GAO noted “DCAA has not rescinded the audit report even though it expresses an opinion on a nonexistent system.”

 

  • In 2006, DCAA conducted a billing system review on a contractor generated approximately $76 million in annual sales to the U.S. Government; its last billing system review had been performed in 2000.  In the intervening six years, “the contractor had experienced significant downsizing and restructuring.”  The DCAA audit strategy was based on providing the contractor’s Information Systems Manager with six year-old audit documentation from its files and requesting that the documentation be updated and edited where necessary. Based on the contractor’s edited billing system internal control documentation and a walk-through, the DCAA auditor concluded that she could limit testing because the system was “strong.”  The GAO, however, that “the billing system was a software package that downloads accounting system data to spreadsheets [and] manual calculations were then used to develop invoice amounts—a process that is prone to errors….”  The contractor’s billing system internal controls were determined to be “adequate” even though no testing was performed on those controls.  Based on the GAO’s findings, the report was subsequently rescinded.

 

  • In 2004, a contractor objected to draft findings and recommendations in a DCAA review of its accounting system internal controls.  In response to the contractor’s objections, “the auditors revised and deleted some workpapers and created new workpapers. …  GAO also found evidence … that the final supervisor instructed the final lead auditor to insert the signature of a prior supervisor on an electronic workpaper after it had been revised, thereby making it apper that the prior supervisor had approved the workpaper revisions.”  In 2006, DCAA issued its report recommending that the accounting system be determined to be “adequate”—even though it had “’scrub[bed]’ the audit documentation … dropp[ed] five significant deficiencies and drowngrad[ed] three significant deficiencies to suggestions for improvement.”  The GAO reported that “the audit supervisor, who authorized the electronic recording of the prior supervisor’s name on the audit documentation and supervised the issuance of the audit report, was subsequently promoted to Western Region Quality Assurance Manager, where he went on to act as a quality control check over thousands of audits ….”

Findings such as those summarized above were used to support broad, generalized conclusions such as:

 

  • DCAA’s mission statement and strategic plan do not focus on the public interest
  • DCAA’s performance metrics were designed to measure output
  • DCAA’s audit quality assurance program was ineffective
  • DOD IG’s peer review opinion on DCAA’s audit quality control system is inconsistent with the underlying deficiencies reported
  • DCAA lacks a risk-based audit planning approach
  • DCAA lacks effective human capital management

As a result, the GAO recommended several actions that it asserted would “improve DCAA’s effectiveness and independence.”  Among these recommendations were the following:

 

  • Legislation should grant to DCAA “protections and authorities” equivalent to an agency Inspector General, such as “public reporting of audit results [and] rights to take statements from contractor and other personnel ….”
  • Legislators should consider “changes in organizational placement” of DCAA, either by elevating DCAA within DOD, or by moving the audit agency out of DOD altogether—creating an “independent, Governmentwide contract audit agency.”

In addition, the GAO made 15 “recommendations for executive action” to the Secretary of Defense designed to “improve the quality of the agency’s audits and strengthen auditor integrity, objectivity, and independence ….”  Notable among these was the recommendation to “ensure that auditors who make direct bill [authority] decisions are independent of DCAA employees who perform a DOD management function … thereby reducing situations where DCAA auditors are encouraged to reduce their office workload by approving contractors for the direct-bill program.”

 

In conclusion, the GAO report included sensational, headline-grabbing findings that seemed to support the assertion that DCAA audit reports were poorly planned, poorly supervised, and were the result of an assembly-line production environment where quantity was valued more highly than quality.  However, as we noted above, the GAO review sample was biased and of insufficient size to support an agency-wide indictment of management inadequacy.  As many contractors would willingly agree, DCAA has considerable room for improvement with respect to audit planning and quality, and is badly in need of a cultural transformation.  We’re not necessarily convinced that the audit quality problems are as terrible (or as endemic) as the GAO asserts.

 

Next up:  what the Senators heard and how they reacted to the GAO report findings.


 

 

Augustine Commission Forecasts Six to Seven-Year "Space Gap"

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Analysis and Opinion

Aviation Week reported on July 29, 2009 that the "space gap" in U.S. manned space flight will be wider than NASA has previously estimated.  On July 28th, the Augustine Commission hosted a public meeting at which former astronaut Sally Ride presented findings from a "quick reaction" group formed to address this issue.  The group, composed of members from the Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded Research & Development Center supporting the US Air Force) and NASA's Program Analysis & Evaluation Office, reported the disappointing news.  Following are key findings from the report --

1.  NASA has estimated retiring the existing space shuttle program by September 2010.  The group forecasted a March 2011 retirement, forecasting a schedule slip of six months.

2.  NASA has estimated reaching "initial operational capability" (IOC) for the replacement programs, the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew capsule by March 2015.  The group forecasted a new IOC date of March 2017 -- a two-year schedule slip primarily caused by "inadequate budgets" for NASA's Constellation program (which is overseeing the Ares 1/Orion development).

3.  NASA has announced its intention to "deorbit" the International Space Station (ISS) by 2016.  If it does so, then the slipped Ares 1/Orion schedule will mean that the new spacecraft will "have nothing to fly to," according to Ms. Ride.

4.  Ms. Ride's group advocated extending the ISS beyond 2016, stating that it made no sense to spend 25 years in development, only to gain five years of benefit.  Moreover, keeping the ISS in orbit would provide a destination for other programs, including ones being developed by private industry (e.g., SpaceX and Orbital Sciences).

5.  The group stated that other options being studied by the Augustine Commission -- which include use of a human-rated Delta IV vehicle and/or use of a shuttle-derived heavy lift vehicle -- will have only a "negligible impact" on the space gap, perhaps closing the gap by no more than a year or eighteen months.

6.  Ride's group recommended extending the existing shuttle program beyond 2010 or 2011, to 2014.  This could be done by various methods, including utilizing the one available extra external tank, or by restarting production of external tanks in New Orleans.  Ride's group recommended studying this option in concert with development of a shuttle-derived heavy lift vehicle.

In summary, whether the problem stems from inadequate budgets, lack of attention in the post-9/11 environment, or a lack of political vision is beside the point.  The truth is that the US leadership position in manned spaceflight is threatened and the current budget fights inside the Beltway will exacerbate the crisis.  We are looking at a "space gap" that is reminiscent of the "missile gap" of the late 1950's and early 1960's -- only this gap is real and requires the immediate attention of the citizens and their elected public servants.

 

GAO Takes on DOD Oversight of Contractor Ethics Programs

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We recently wrote about DCAA guidance that ostensibly discusses changes to the FAR.  The changes mandate (among other things) contractor codes of ethics/business conduct, ethics compliance employee training programs, effective internal control systems, and disclosure of contract-related wrongdoing to the appropriate Government agency Inspectors General.  (We noted that DCAA used the opportunity of disseminating its audit guidance to attempt to expand auditor access to contractor records, notwithstanding both FAR Council promulgating comments and judicial decisions to the contrary.)  Now comes a September 22, 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report card on DOD’s oversight of ethics programs, in which (unsurprisingly) GAO opines that DOD can do a better job.

 

We have written in the past, and will be writing quite a bit more in the upcoming days, about DOD oversight of its contractors.  Not only is this a topic of utmost interest to Apogee Consulting, Inc. and its clients, as they seek to comply with constantly evolving Federal Acquisition rules and judicial interpretations of existing language, but also because DOD contractor oversight (or lack thereof) is a topic of utmost interest to the Pentagon, the Obama Administration, Congress, and others.  This GAO report should be viewed in light of the overall context, in which reports of bribery, fraud, and contractor overcharging in Southwest Asia and elsewhere surface almost weekly and DOD is being accused of negligence for failing to better control its contractors.  That being said, the GAO report seems objective and straightforward, and its recommendations are well within the realm of reasonableness.

 

GAO Logo

 

In its report, GAO noted that surveyed 57 contractors, 55 of whom reported having ethics programs “that include many of the practices consistent with [FAR-required] standards….”  (GAO noted that its survey was taken prior to the new FAR rules coming into effect.)  The 57 contractors included such well known names as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, United Technologies, DRS Technologies, General Atomics, SAIC, CSC, ITT, URS, and GE.  The findings from the report are summarized below:

 

  • 55 of the contractors surveyed had codes of business ethics and conduct
  • 52 had codes that provide examples of disciplinary action for misconduct
  • 51 required ethics training for employees working on DOD programs
  • 52 had an ethics office or single point of accountability for ethics programs
  • 25 reported quarterly on ethics program matters to top company management
  • 52 had internal reviews or audits that tested the ethics program
  • 47 periodically “assessed risks” of improper or criminal conduct
  • 55 have internal reporting mechanisms, such as hotlines
  • 54 have a policy that permits employees to report anonymously or confidentially
  • 34 had formal policies for voluntary disclosure of contracts-related violations

 

The GAO report notes that the new FAR contractor ethics and disclosure requirements are based on U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Federal sentencing guidelines.  Importantly, the GAO report notes on page 7 that “the sentencing guidelines … state that the failure to prevent or detect a particular offense does not necessarily mean that the program is generally ineffective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.”

 

The GAO report also notes challenges that contractors face in implementing their ethics programs.  Among those challenges are:

 

  • The overpayment provisions create operational difficulties “because (1) contracts are subject to reconciliation processes with payments [being] audited and adjusted over time and (2) the routine nature of contract payment issues, which are daily events, with errors on both sides, is simply unworkable.”
  • Interpreting “vague language” may “tie up government resources in meaningless trivia.”
  • Checking the existence of subcontractor ethics awareness programs and internal control systems.

 

The GAO report discussed the challenges facing contractors with overseas contract operations.  Forty-one of the 57 contractors surveyed reported such overseas operations, yet 26 of those reported “experiencing challenges implementing ethics programs overseas, including differences in legal and regulatory environments relating to, for example, employee privacy, cultural and language barriers, and technical or hostile conditions impeding computer-based training.”

 

The GAO report noted that DCAA had implemented its new audit guidance covering internal controls for contract integrity and ethical values, as we have previously noted.  Interestingly, the GAO report provided a history of DCAA’s approach to this audit area.  Initially, in February 2009 DCAA headquarters officials told GAO “that they planned to make only minor changes” to audit guidance, because “in their view … many of the new FAR requirements were already in the DFARS section upon which the earlier audit program was based.”  During subsequent discussions (in June 2009), “the Chief, Auditing Standards Division, told us that the agency had reconsidered its approach and was then proceeding to develop much more extensive audit guidance ….”  In July 2009, according to GAO, “Senior headquarters policy and planning managers “indicated that the impact of the FAR contractor ethics rules on DCAA contract audits has been to improve audit guidance.”

 

The GAO report concludes that the new FAR contractor ethics and internal control rules omit any discussion of who should provide oversight of the contractors’ programs during contract performance.  For example, the FAR fails to address how Government oversight officials should verify that a contractor has implemented a compliant business ethics program.  Because “the new FAR rules are silent with regard to contracting officer review or standards for examining contractor ethics programs during contract administration,” the GAO reported that “the impact of the new FAR rules on changing the CAO [contract administration office] function to include some degree of oversight … has been negligible.”  The GAO report concludes that, consequently, “CAO staff will continue as before the new FAR rules were implemented with limited oversight of contractors’ ethics programs.”  But the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) was not as worried about the situation as GAO seemed to be, stating “that is it not their agency’s functional responsibility to verify compliance with the new contractor ethics requirements” and indicating that “it would be better to assign responsibility for this function to DCAA’s contract audit services that assess the adequacy of contractor internal controls for integrity and ethical values.”

 

Although the GAO concluded that DOD could improve its oversight, the report fails to address the role of the FAR Councils in promulgating revised FAR language that would address the administrative omissions it identified.  In other words, GAO recommended band-aids instead of addressing the root cause of the alleged problem(s).

 

Like many issues associated with contractor internal control systems (called by some “contractor business systems” and by others “contactor operational control systems”), the DOD is wrestling with how to provide effective oversight over its contractors while minimizing undue interference in contractor affairs.  The oversight “turf war” between DCAA and DCMA has been frequently reported on this site.  Both agencies have been criticized for failing to provide adequate oversight on its contractors, typically with incendiary language alleging all sorts of dire consequences resulting from such negligence.  In contrast to the finger-pointing of other parties, this GAO report appears restrained and professional.

 

 

 

DOD Inspector General Investigates DCAA Audit Quality and Work Environment Issues

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DOD Inspector General Logo

 

In the litany of investigations and reviews covering DCAA’s ability to generate quality audits and to comply with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD IG) report issued on August 31, 2009 does not stand out for incendiary findings.  In fact, its findings seem so comparatively benign (and lacking new findings) that comments to the GovExec.com story from purported current and ex-DCAA auditors indicate they believe it to be essentially useless.  We don’t agree with their criticism.  If nothing else, the DOD IG provides another independent confirmation of many of the audit quality problems initially found by GAO.  Moreover, some of the IG findings and commentary may have implications for other DOD contractors.

 

The DOD IG conducted a “follow-up” review from the now infamous July 2008 GAO report finding widespread independence and audit quality issues in DCAA’s Western Region.  (The latest September 2009 GAO report will be the subject of a future article.)  In its 2008 report, GAO found (among other things) employee intimidation by DCAA management.  Subsequently, both the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, as well as Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), requested that the Inspector General (a) perform independent interviews of Western Region auditors, (b) evaluate 13 “cases” that GAO had alleged did not comply with GAGAS, and (c) assess DCAA’s actual and planned corrective actions in response to the issues identified by GAO.  As part of its efforts, the DOD IG reviewed 76 audits at three DCAA Western Region locations, covering eight contractors, two of whom were among the Top 10 DOD contractors in GFY 2008.  The DOD IG unsurprisingly confirmed many of the GAO’s 2008 findings, and moreover expressed the opinion that the DCAA Western Region may have had a “work environment not conducive to performing quality audits.”  Following are selected findings from the DOD IG report.

 

The DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “Contractor A, Case 2” that the audit findings were impaired because of auditor independence issues related to the Western Region Audit Manager (RAM), and that the audit working papers were insufficient to support the audit opinions.  (“Contractor A” is responsible for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle as well as the Delta IV rocket.)  Moreover, the DOD IG confirmed that original audit opinion was changed without sufficient documentation.  As a result (according to the DOD IG), the U.S. Air Force may have agreed to pay up to $271 million in unallowable costs either related to losses on other contracts or to costs incurred in prior cost accounting periods.  The USAF Space and Missiles Center (SMC) agreed to suspend further payments to “Contractor A” pending resolution of the matter.

 

The DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “Contractor B, Case 3” that DCAA “Location 2” issued three defective pricing audit reports covering “freight-out costs” that the contractor and its customer had previously agreed would be unallowable (but which were included as indirect costs in proposals submitted to the Government).  The three audit reports were rescinded after issuance of the original GAO report, but “DCAA did not explain to the contracting officer why [they were rescinded].”  In addition, the DOD IG concluded that “DCAA failed to provide effective audit services and advice to the contracting officer” with respect to attempts to quantify and resolve the issue, which was treated as a noncompliance with CAS 405. 

 

The DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “DCAA Location 3, Case 8” in which 17 of 18 audit reports related to contractor cost proposals “had one or more of the following deficiencies,” including (among others):  lack of professional judgment, inadequate documentation or sufficient evidence, and inadequate supervision.

 

In what may be a controversial finding, the DOD IG had this to say about labor floor check findings at “Contractor C, Case 12”—“The floor check audit included evidence that salaried employees worked uncompensated overtime but did not record all hours worked on their timesheets … a serious risk of mischarging exists when salaried employees do not record all hours worked.  DCAA still needs to determine the significance of the [control system] deficiency during the affected time period.”  Moreover, although DCAA did take some effective corrective actions to address the perceived control deficiency, it had not “identified all necessary actions to determine and mitigate the impact to the Government” with respect to the contractor’s submission of its incurred costs and final indirect cost rates for its FYs 2005 through 2008.  This issue is controversial because there is no statutory or regulatory requirement that contractors engage in what is called “total time accounting” for salaried exempt employees; and industry has fought this requirement for, quite literally, decades.  The DOD IG report ignored the controversy and painted a black and white picture that will be misleading to the casual reader.

 

In addition to the confirmations noted above, the DOD IG interviewed 68 DCAA employees and managers at in the affected Western Region Field Audit Offices (FAOs).  According to the IG’s report, 18 percent of those interviewed “had a supervisor change or direct a change to audit results and opinions.”  Further, 47% of interviewees had “experienced pressure because of unreasonable performance measures,” and 62% had worked uncompensated overtime.  Finally, 68% of those interviewed had “witnessed unprofessional behavior in the office,” which the IG stated included instances of raised voices and yelling.  The report also noted instances of an administrative employee repeatedly “yelling and swearing” at an audit supervisor. 

 

According to a GovExec.com article, the DOD IG report consisted largely of “mundane stories” that hardly give rise to the DOD IG’s conclusion that DCAA’s workplace and environment “may have contributed to deficient audit work.”  The report also “indicates that the workforce problems might have been isolated to a handful of recalcitrant managers.”

 

Considering the scrutiny and attacks facing DCAA at the moment, this report does not seem particularly damaging.  Ultimately, the impact of the report may be determined by how DCAA uses it as support for positions and/or audit findings it takes in future audits of DOD contractors.


 

Commission on Wartime Contracting: Well-Informed, Independent, Bipartisan—or Out of Touch with Reality?

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CWC HearingOur old friends at the self-described independent and bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (“CWC”) were back in the news on September 21, 2009, issuing another report on Government oversight of contractors deployed in the battlefields of Southwest Asia, entitled “Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse.” We’ve posted several articles on the activities of the CWC, here, here and here.  The first CWC report, entitled “At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan," can be found here.

The latest report was a mostly a recap of testimony at prior hearings, summarized and spun to meet the needs of the CWC. The first report focused on Government oversight of contractors in the battlefield, only mentioning contractor “business systems” in passing.  In contrast, the latest report focused almost exclusively on contractor internal control system adequacy, and used that subject to score points on all parties, from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to the LOGCAP IV contractors supporting troops in the battlefield.  According to the CWC, there are no heroes in the Department of Defense (DOD) oversight of contractors, only several dysfunctional players struggling to work a poorly designed regulatory regime with inadequate resources.

The report contained five findings, as discussed below.

  1. DCAA and DCMA “send mixed messages to contractors” through their “divergent and often contradictory behaviors.”  The CWC discussed the advisory role of DCAA and the regulatory authority of DCMA to “enforce contract terms and conditions.”  From this starting point, the CWC asserted that DCAA auditors “are recognized experts on accounting matters, internal controls, and business systems,” while DCMA contracting officers “are not typically trained in these complex audit and accounting procedures and sometimes make questionable decisions, seemingly ignoring DCAA recommendations.”  According to the CWC, the dysfunctional relationship between the two DOD agencies “creates an environment in which contractors can exploit the agencies’ mixed messages and game the system to their advantage.”
  2. The separate lines of authority for each agency “contribute to a lack of interagency cooperation and collaboration, and make it difficult for the oversight process to work as well as it should.”  Exacerbating the problem is the lack of any arbiter between DCAA and DCMA, since “their common point of resolution is the Office of the Secretary of Defense—a level too high in the organization structure to effectively resolve differences that continually occur.”
  3. DCAA audit reports “are not informative enough to help contracting officers make effective decisions.”  The CWC noted the December 2008 changes to DCAA audit guidance, in which contractor internal control systems were only to be rated on a pass/fail basis (adequate or inadequate).  According to the CWC—

 

Now, all deficiencies reported by DCAA will render the contractor’s system ‘inadequate,’ resulting in many more adverse audit opinions. But this does not improve matters.  Rather than giving system deficiencies more importance, it seems to have the opposite effect—undermining the significance of the audit findings and weakening their effectiveness. Use of a binary system involving a pass/fail rating does not adequately depict relative degrees of impact.  Without any reasonable provision for more accurately describing systems that are less than perfect, contractors and contracting officers find the ‘adequate/inadequate’ options too restrictive. Moreover, since only significant deficiencies are now reported, there is no provision to report and track recommendations for other desirableimprovements. Contracting officers need audit opinions with clear and quantifiable risk information. They need DCAA’s expert opinion about the relative impact or dollar value (or even an estimated range of risk) of the deficiency in order to consider making a contract award or a contract-incentive determination in the face of an ‘inadequate’ audit opinion.

 

  1. DCMA is not “aggressive in motivating contractors to improve business systems.”  The CWC reported that “when confronted with significant audit findings, contractors generally promise to improve their business systems by providing corrective-action plans to contracting officers.  These plans, as opposed to completed corrective actions, are often accepted by contracting officers, thus effectively rendering a[n inadequate] system adequate.”
  2. The two agencies “are under-resourced to respond effectively to wartime needs.”  The CWC noted that “as a result of personnel shortfalls, DCAA system reviews and follow-ups are not always timely; therefore, the real-time status of contractor business systems cannot always be determined.”  In addition to personnel shortages at both agencies, “the Commission believes that many of the untimely reviews are due to the failure of both DCAA and DCMA to prioritize their business-system workload in a wartime environment.”  The CWC concluded, with the following (almost plaintive) statement—

 

… the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been going on for many years and the Commission is at a loss to understand why leadership has not aggressively pursued additional staffing until recently.  In addition, it is the job of DCMA and DCAA leadership to reallocate existing, albeit limited resources in accordance with mission priorities.  Timely oversight of contingency contractors’ business systems should be a priority for both agencies during wartime.

 

The CWC made several recommendations to remedy the findings reported above.  Highlights are summarized below –

  • DCAA and DCMA must work together to develop agreed-upon standards and processes that communicate the same message to both the individual contractor and the contracting community and help contractors achieve “adequate” systems.  Ideally, the process should be defined in the FAR (in a way similar to the material-management and accounting system standards called out in the DFARS 252.242.7004) so they are visible to all stakeholders.
  • The Department of Defense needs to re-establish control of the oversight process to the government by developing better internal-resolution processes.  The DoD process should ensure that disagreements between DCAA and DCMA are rapidly resolved, with consideration for DCAA’s independent audit expertise as well as for the DCMA contracting officer’s decision-making authority and the operational mission.
  • DCAA should revisit its policy with respect to its binary “adequate/inadequate” opinions for business system reports and provide a mechanism for reporting any deficiency that warrants formal notification and tracking.  Also, whenever possible, audit reports should include an assessment of audit risk and cost impact associated with reported deficiencies.  Further, DCAA should re-examine the need to express opinions on the overall adequacy of business system audits beyond those explicitly required by the FAR.
  • DCMA, with DCAA advice, should develop a reliable and aggressive process for reaching consistent decisions on business systems and any corrective action needed.  The process should recognize the contracting officer as the final authority but also acknowledge DCAA auditors as the business-system experts chartered to advise government contracting organizations, as noted in the DCAA mission statement. Disagreements with audit recommendations should be discussed at appropriate leadership levels within DCMA and DCAA and documented accordingly.  As part of their decision process, DCMA contracting officers should also consider any risk analysis provided by DCAA and thoroughly address it in documenting their decisions.  Finally, DCMA should ensure timely follow-up on contractor corrective-action plans and validate that the contractor actions actually correct the deficient business system.  If not, the contracting officer should pursue such contractual remedies as withholds, and DCMA leadership should ensure that this occurs.

  • The Commission strongly encourages each organization to aggressively pursue additional staff, but also to immediately prioritize its current workload to meet government oversight needs in the contingency-contracting arena. This is imperative to address the risks of waste, fraud, and abuse.

 

There is much that could be said about the latest CWC report. Some of the findings and recommendations—particularly those that would eliminate pass/fail internal control system DCAA audit reports—would be a big step in the right direction.  Other matters seem less helpful. A future article will contrast the CWC characterization of DCAA auditors as “recognized experts on accounting matters, internal controls, and business systems” with recent testimony of GAO and other Government officials before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, at which Senators heard that DCAA had to rescind 80 audit reports after GAO found significant faults with each of them. A GovExec.com article reported the following reactions from the Committee members—

 

‘In the world of auditing, what has been happen[ing] here [at DCAA] is a capital crime,’ said Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., a former state auditor for Missouri.  ‘There can be no bigger indictment of an agency than this GAO report.’  Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, called GAO's findings ‘an epic failure by the agency and the [DCAA],’ while Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., said he ‘got sick’ reading the report. ‘I can't understand why the management of [DCAA] hasn't been completely changed,’ Coburn said.

 

It seems that the Commission on Wartime Contracting is so independent, it is not in touch with GAO report findings or the perceptions of Senate Committee charged with oversight over the DOD oversight agency.  Perhaps they ought to get together and collaborate with each other, before the CWC places too much faith in DCAA’s characterization of contractor internal control systems or forces DCMA to give undue weight to DCAA recommendations.


 


 


Page 268 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.