Boeing Commercial Aircraft Announces $1 Billion 3rd Quarter Charge
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“A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking about real money.” – Congressman Everett Dirksen
On October 6, 2009 Boeing Aircraft Company announced it was recording a $1 Billion charge in its third quarter related to “increased production costs” and “difficult market conditions” leading to lower than expected demand for its new 747-8 Freighter aircraft. Because the program is in a loss position, Boeing must record its entire forecasted loss upon identification.
This is not the first hint of trouble for Boeing Commercial Aircraft (BCA) and its aircraft programs. We previously posted that delays and overruns of BCA’s 787 and 747-8 programs may have led to the early departure of BCA’s President, Scott Carson. The program delays and other issues (e.g., the Machinists’ strike) also contributed to EADS overtaking Boeing as the No. 1 Aerospace/Defense company in the world, as we reported that “Boeing Commercial Aircraft (BCA) suffered a sales drop of 15.3% while Airbus' sales rose 18.9% (or 11.2% after currency adjustment).” We also noted that companies connected to the Boeing supply chain did not fare well either. For instance, Spirit Aerosystems, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Curtiss-Wright, and Fuji Heavy Industries each underperformed against their peers. In contrast, some Airbus suppliers such as Zodiac Aerospace, Latécoère, and Moog outperformed their peers.
What led to the charge being recorded? Boeing doesn’t have much to say on that score, offering only the explanation that “it became clear that late maturity of engineering designs has caused greater than expected re-work and disruption in manufacturing. This is resulting in additional resources being applied on the program and higher supplier expenses, which are the primary cost drivers.” Other reports, such as this one from Bloomberg.com, note that “about $640 million of the pretax charge reflects higher expenses to produce the 747-8 … Higher allocation of fixed expenses and volume- based penalties to suppliers are the main drivers of the additional costs … the remaining $360 million of the charge relates to ‘challenging market conditions’ and the decision to keep production at a rate of 1.5 airplanes per month for almost two years longer than planned, instead of increasing output to two per month.”
According to the Wall Street Journal, Boeing’s announcement “did not quell speculation that the U.S. aerospace company may still cancel the loss-making program as it wrestles with delays and production issues with its 787 Dreamliner, which, like the 747-8, has yet to fly.” Moreover, “The 747-8 replaces the profitable 747 jumbo and was seen as a simpler design challenge than the 787 as it involved stretching and adding new wings and other parts to the existing aircraft. However, Boeing has already had to boost investment in the program, which was hampered by a machinists strike last year, the need to pull some engineers onto the 787 program and supply-chain problems. “
Although Boeing’s announcement was careful to let investors know that it discovered its 747-8 problems in the 3rd quarter, some have speculated that Boeing was aware of looming problems earlier, and that the problems led to Mr. Carson’s ouster as BCA President. Obviously that is speculation without evidence, and Boeing would be in trouble with the SEC and other regulators if that were the case. Nonetheless, Boeing is developing a history of “program surprises” such as this one, and one can only wonder if the world’s premier program management company has lost the formula to managing large programs to successful outcomes.
DCAA Audit Quality: Lessons Learned from the Brouhaha
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Having waded through reports, testimony and reaction, we thought we’d see if there are any lessons to be learned from all the brouhaha surrounding alleged failures of DCAA audit quality and DOD contractor oversight.
Contractor Internal Control Systems
Generally, everybody got it right that the key to controlling the unholy trinity of waste, fraud, and abuse is the robustness of contractors’ internal control systems. The Commission on Wartime Contracting said that “contractor business systems and internal controls are the first line of defense … weak control systems increase the risk of unallowable and unreasonable costs on government contracts.”
But there was some confusion regarding exactly which “key business systems” a DOD contractor was supposed to have. The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) listed ten control systems from right out of the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM). But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that not every contractor has every one of these ten systems and pointed out how DCAA auditors had wasted considerable time auditing one Federally Funded Research and Development Center’s nonexistent billing system according to the requirements of the DCAA standard audit program, and recommended that the billing system be determined to be “adequate” even though it didn’t exist.
As the GAO reported, “a contractor must have an adequate accounting system to be awarded a government cost-reimbursement contract, an adequate billing system to submit invoices for payment without government review, and an acceptable estimating system to support a contracting officer’s approval of pricing proposals.” Other systems, such as purchasing controls, are mandated by FAR requirements. It is not at all clear why the other systems in the list of controls are audited by DCAA.
Lesson Learned: DCAA needs to determine which internal control systems it will audit, and ground that determination in the requirements of the acquisition system. (Indeed, Director Stephenson testified that “we are currently assessing the type of systems DCAA will need to audit and the type of opinion to be provided.”) Further, DCAA needs to build flexibility into its standard audit programs. Not every contractor will have the same slate of business systems, and part of learning about a contractor should be the documentation of the contractor’s unique approach to establishing its internal controls.
Evaluating Contractors’ Internal Control Systems
This is another area that most stakeholders got right. The part they got right was agreeing that DCAA hasn’t gotten it right. DCAA’s December 2008 change to its audit programs, establishing a binary “pass/fail” rating system for contractor internal control systems has led to audit reports that “are not informative enough to help contracting officers make effective decisions,” according to the CWC. The CWC asserted that the new guidance resulted in “many more adverse audit opinions,” but also “undermined the significance of audit findings and weakening their effectiveness.” The DCAA’s approach “does not adequately depict relative degrees of impact … [and] contracting officers need audit opinions with clear and quantifiable risk information.” Further, DCAA’s failure to always “estimate a cost impact for the deficiencies it has identified” does not help the contracting officers who “balances the cost risk against the importance of the mission.” Finally, the CWC also noted that “there is no regulatory requirement for DCAA to render an overall opinion regarding the adequacy of many of the 10 business systems audited by DCAA. In fact, with respect to audit resolution procedures, DoD FAR Supplement (DFARS) 242.7502 instructs the contracting officer to consider significant deficiencies as opposed to an overall opinion regarding adequacy.”
The GAO agreed, reporting that “professional standards have long recognized different levels of severity with regard to reporting deficiencies and material weaknesses in internal controls.” Moreover, the GAO stated—
By eliminating the “inadequate-in-part” opinion, the new policy does not recognize different levels of severity and could unfairly penalize contractors whose systems have less severe deficiencies by giving them the same opinion—”inadequate”—as contractors having material weaknesses or serious deficiencies that in combination would constitute a material weakness.
Lesson Learned: The DCAA needs to revise its audit guidance with respect to evaluations of contractors’ internal control systems. The audit agency needs to focus on identification of control weaknesses and system deficiencies, and on giving DCMA contracting officers the necessary information to evaluate the overall adequacy of the control systems. If they feel compelled to make a recommendation to the contracting officers, it should be solidly grounded in testing of the internal controls.
Evaluating Contractors’ Codes of Ethics/Business Conduct and Internal Control Systems
The GAO surveyed 57 DOD contractors and found nearly 100% had established compliant codes of ethics and business conduct, as well as related internal control systems. The GAO report found that there was a bit of a gap in the verification of contractor compliance with the requirements; DCMA is relying on DCAA’s evaluation (which takes place as part of DCAA’s evaluation of the overall control environment and accounting system controls) but DCAA will be issuing its current “pass/fail” rating—which, as noted above—will not be particularly helpful to the DCMA contracting officers.
The GAO noted that ““the sentencing guidelines … state that the failure to prevent or detect a particular offense does not necessarily mean that the program is generally ineffective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.” Since the contractor ethics and disclosure requirements are based on those sentencing guidelines, one would hope that DCAA audit guidance would incorporate that philosophy. Unfortunately (as we reported), such is not the case. The current pass/fail DCAA system rating approach will not mesh with the U.S. Sentencing Commission guidance and, unless DCAA changes its approach, contracting officers are going to be stuck in the middle (once again).
Lesson Learned: DCAA needs to pull its evaluation of codes of ethics/business conduct and related contractor controls out of its current audit program and create a separate audit program to focus on this area. The audit program should accept that no system of internal controls will be perfect, and permit the reporting of individual deficiencies instead of an overall system rating.
Reactions to Allegations of DCAA Audit Quality Failures Run the Gamut from Pained to Hysterical
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We have posted enough articles on the recent “public discussions” regarding assertions of Department of Defense (DOD) oversight failures to fill a book. (Actually not a bad idea, but we’ll table it for another time.) This article will discuss reactions to the various reports and testimony, from Congress, public “watchdog” groups, and from other media outlets. Before we get into the fun fireworks, let’s recap the recent action so far.
August 6, 2009 – GovExec.com writes about leaked internal DCAA memoranda discussing the findings of the upcoming GAO report regarding DCAA audit quality. The findings do not sound good. See the article on that story here.
August 12, 2009 – The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (co-chaired by long-time DCAA executive Michael Thibault) hears testimony from (among others) DCAA Director April Stephenson, blaming "faulty accounting, cost-estimating, purchasing and other business systems" for "millions of dollars" of contractor overbillings to the DOD. Rather than focusing on DCAA, the Commissioners accused DCMA of “caving to the contractors and not acting properly on the Defense Department’s behalf,” according to an article on FederalTimes.com. See the article on that story here.
September 21, 2009 – The Commission on Wartime Contracting issues a Special Report (“Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse”) recapping the August testimony and managing to blame all parties—from DCAA to DCMA and the contractors—for “unreliable data” from contrators’ “weak control systems”. According to the Commission, DCAA auditors “are recognized experts on accounting matters, internal controls, and business systems,” while DCMA contracting officers “are not typically trained in these complex audit and accounting procedures and sometimes make questionable decisions, seemingly ignoring DCAA recommendations.” The dysfunctional relationship between the two DOD agencies allegedly “creates an environment in which contractors can exploit the agencies’ mixed messages and game the system to their advantage.” See the article on that story here.
September 22, 2009 – The GAO issues a report addressing the adequacy of contractors’ ethics and business conduct policies, and their related internal control systems. While reporting that nearly 100 percent of contractors surveyed had adequate policies, GAO castigated both DCAA and DCMA for failing to verify that their contractors had implemented a compliant business ethics program. GAO also alludes to a bit of bureaucratic finger-pointing, with DCMA telling GAO auditors that DCAA should be responsible for assuring that contractors have compliant business ethics programs, not them. See the article on that story here.
September 22, 2009 – The DOD Inspector General’s (DOD IG) August 31, 2009 report is released to the public. This report was a follow-up effort to the DCAA audit deficiencies identified by GAO in its July 2008 report, and designed to address allegations regarding employee intimidation by management and an abusive work environment. In its report, the DOD IG confirmed many of GAO’s initial findings and asserted that impaired independence by a DCAA Regional Audit Manager (RAM) led to the U.S. Air Force paying up to $271 million in unallowable costs. With respect to the DCAA work environment, the DOD IG reported scattered employee concerns that “may have contributed to deficient audit work,” but only 18 percent of those auditors interviewed “had a supervisor change or direct a change to audit results or opinions.” (We note that the survey question did not address whether or not the supervisor changes were appropriate.) It’s our view that the DOD IG’s survey results do not support their conclusion in this area. See the article on that story here.
September 23, 2009 – The GAO releases its expanded report on DCAA audit quality problems, in which it reports “widespread” audit quality problems based on its review of 69 audits performed by seven DCAA FAOs. To be sure, the anecdotal evidence is damning. But in our view, GAO was overreaching by basing its general indictments of the audit agency on such a small, admittedly “not statistical” sample. More importantly, GAO examined audit reports only from offices that issued predominantly “clean” opinions of contractors’ internal control systems; there is every reason to believe that there was a many errors in reports adverse to contractors as there were in reports favorable to them. The GAO also took a shot at the DOD IG, asserting that its conclusion from a peer review of DCAA audit quality—that DCAA had “adequate” quality controls—was controverted by the actual findings of the DOD IG’s review. See the article on that story here.
All of which leads us to the September 23, 2009 hearing by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Our article on the hearings is here.
So with the foregoing in mind, let’s take a look at the reactions to the story.
GovExec.com published a generally objective article by Robert Brodsky entitled “DCAA Called Out Again Over Mismanagement” which started with: “The Defense Contract Audit Agency needs a complete overhaul, including new leadership and more independence from the Pentagon ….” See the article here. The article reported various reactions from the Senate Committee members, “ranged from disappointment to rage.” The article reported the following:
From Committee Chair Lieberman: "Perhaps in an effort to do too much, they are doing everything badly.” DCAA "still seems driven by a culture that emphasizes speed and production of audits over the quality of results.”
From Ranking Minority Member Collins: The GAO's findings are "an epic failure by the agency and the department."
From Committee Member Coburn, who “got sick” reading the GAO report: "I can't understand why the management of this agency hasn't been completely changed."
From Committee Member Claire McCaskill, who last year led the outrage over the initial GAO findings: "In the world of auditing, what has been happen[ing] here is a capital crime. There can be no bigger indictment of an agency than this GAO report. … At this point, DCAA audits are a joke. If someone is not fired over this, I don't think anyone should ever take this agency seriously again."
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO), a nonprofit organization that focuses on exposing government corruption, expressed its “concern” about DCAA’s “ability to effectively oversee DoD contracts. We are particularly troubled by DCAA Director Stephenson's testimony that despite the concerns raised by last year's GAO report, DCAA still only has enough funding to perform 65 percent of the audits they are required to complete. This raises questions as to whether the Comptroller's office is properly prioritizing resources and support for this agency. This may be due in part to a conflict of mission between the Comptroller's office and DCAA.”
Daniel Shulman, writing in Mother Jones, bastion of “smart, fearless journalism,” didn’t let facts interfere with the story. His story, based on the Commission on Wartime Contracting’s report just a day before the Senate hearings, confused DCMA CPSR auditors with DCAA contract auditors, and said:
This explains a lot: Little league teams have more players than the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has staffers overseeing how military contractors are spending the government's money. Contract transactions have spiked 328 percent since 2000, but there are presently a mere 14 contracting officials monitoring them. … Not only do Pentagon contractors lack adequate ‘internal controls’ to insure they are billing the government correctly, resulting in billions in costs that auditors can't verify, but the DCMA and DCAA ‘are not effectively working together to protect’ the government from getting bilked. Like feuding siblings, the agencies can't seem to agree on much and wind up sending ‘mixed signals’ to military contractors.
But perhaps the most telling response came (once again from Sen. McCaskill) who Tweeted the following:
Gonna be some tuf ?s for witnesses in a few at this hearng. Unbelievable problms at Def Contrctng Agncy. Top of my head is about to pop off.
Followed by:
Complete failure of Def Contrct Audt Agency to meet auditng standards,no one fired. Hard to believe. Was I too mad?
So where do we (the taxpayers) go from here? Will we be reading again, next year, about the same issues at the same audit agency? Or will there be a new audit agency, more “independent” from its DCMA customers … or perhaps led by somebody from “outside” the “insular” entity? Based on conversations with several DOD contractors, the primary emotion is one of anxiety, as they wonder if the government is about to throw away the playbook that’s been developed over the past 45 years. The bottom line is that all partiers, from DCAA to DCMA and from contractors to taxpayers, want the same thing. They all want quality audits, based on facts and evidence, interpreted by the same standards applied to everybody. The difficulty lies in agreeing on how to get there.
Entering a Full-Spin Zone: Washington Insiders Offer Unique Perspectives on the DOD Oversight Situation
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Our previous article recapped the varied activity over the past several weeks, as the DOD contract oversight process has come under fire from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Inspector General (DOD IG), the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGA).
After we went to press another reaction emerged, one with such a unique perspective that we wanted to make it the subject of its own article. What we are talking about is a “commentary” published on FederalTimes.com entitled “Give DCAA More Resources”. Readers can find the entire commentary here. Calling it a commentary is misleading; a better description would be apologia, which is loosely defined as a defense or justification. According to Thesaurus.com, other possible synonyms for apologia might be: apology, excuse, explanation, rationalization, exculpation, fish story, jive, song and dance, and whitewash.
According to the commentary by Professor Charles Tiefer and Adjunct Professor Richard Loeb (both of the University of Baltimore Law School), DCAA is “a tough and independent auditor that does quality oversight on the biggest and potentially the most errant of defense contractors, from KBR in Iraq to the builders of major weapons systems plagued by cost overruns.” Apparently, we are to believe that all of DCAA’s problems stem from the government’s relaxation of “vital laws, regulations and practices in favor of contractors ….” The Professors assert that “now that the auditing risks in ‘acquisition reform,’ like the auditing risks in derivatives and mortgage instruments have been exposed, the public has less tolerance for the excesses of unregulated contracting.”
By implication, it is unnamed principals in “the government” whose “acquisition reform” (quotations in original) led to the current “unregulated contracting” environment. It was they who created an environment of “relaxed vital laws, regulations and practices” that “favor” defense contractors. Ignore the fact that these unnamed “government” officials included members of Congress; ignore the fact that as part of the public-rulemaking process, both DOD and DCAA had a chance to comment on the so-called “relaxed” laws and regulations. Let’s focus on the statement that the current contracting environment is “unregulated” akin to that experienced by Enron. (Think that comparison is an example of over-reaching? That’s the one they used.)
Anybody who works in the world of Defense contracting knows just how fully regulated that environment actually is. From the Truth-in-Negotiation Act (TINA) to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and from the Cost Accounting Standards to the False Claims Act, there is hardly a more regulated environment in existence anywhere in the world. In the mid 90’s, Coopers & Lybrand estimated that DOD paid a price premium equal to roughly 20% over would it would have paid, but for the regulations imposed on its contractors. It is true that a part of the Clinton-era acquisition reforms was to emphasize acquisition of so-called “commercial items” with minimum regulatory oversight; but these reforms were based on lessons learned in the First Gulf War, where the DOD was unable to acquire items such as radios because the suppliers wouldn’t agree to provide such bureaucratic items as (for instance) “cost or pricing data” as was then required by TINA.
The point here is that, far from a series of negligent actions taken by “the government” or actions taken at the behest of defense industry lobbyists, Clinton-era acquisition reform was a studied roll-back of non value-added bureaucratic impediments that kept warfighters from receiving necessary equipment. Moreover, the DOD Defense Science Board (DSB) recently informed the Secretary of Defense that the DOD was still too bureaucratic to meet the needs of the warfighter. According to the DSB—
The DOD is "not geared to acquire and field capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat environment."
"Current long standing [DOD] business practices and regulations are poorly suited" to the dynamics of a “rapidly shifting threat environment."
"Today, the DOD is saddled with processes and oversight built up over decades, and managers leading them who are often rewarded for risk aversion."
So, far from an “unregulated” contracting environment, as Professors Tiefer and Loeb allege, the DOD contracting environment still suffers from overregulation (at least according to the DSB). The answer to DCAA audit quality problems is not to add more regulations.
Nor is the answer to add more auditors. According to the two apologists, “Congress can assist the agency by providing adequate resources ….” While we agree that DCAA staffing has lagged DOD contract spending in a dramatic and unacceptable fashion, the same is also true of DCMA contracting officer staffing. Adding staff to both DOD agencies must be done to assure proper government oversight. But simply adding staff won’t change an organization’s culture. More is not different. If the seemingly pervasive audit quality problems are to be addressed in an effective manner, DCAA must do things differently. (More on that in an upcoming article.)
Further, we have seen the additional staff added this summer, and they are (almost without exception) brand new trainee auditors just out of school. There’s nothing wrong with these individuals and we wish them well. But what DCAA needs is seasoned, experienced auditors with the ability to use independent judgment to conduct appropriate audit procedures. The new trainees need training and mentoring; they won’t be able to use independent judgment for at least a few years. In the meantime, DCAA continues to churn out audit reports, hoping that multiple layers of management review will ensure that the agency complies with GAGAS.
The two apologists conclude with an assertion that “DCAA has intensified its audit work with contractors and contracting officers. These actions should be applauded.” It’s unclear what they mean by “intensified”. If “intensified” means to change audit guidance to reduce auditor discretion, to threaten contractors with forfeiture of outstanding contract payments for failure to turn over data fast enough, and to call one-off mistakes serious “control system deficiencies,” then yes, we agree DCAA has “intensified” its audit work. But another viewpoint is to see such changes as window-dressing that do not address the fundamental issues of generating audit reports of high quality based on accurate assessments of facts and circumstances. That’s what contractors want to see, and that’s what DCMA contracting officers want to receive.
It’s not really surprising that Professors Tiefer and Loeb are apologists for the DCAA. From the Iran-Contra scandal of the ‘80s to “Bosniagate,” Professor Tiefer has long been a vocal critic of DOD and its contractors. He has routinely offered testimony and regulatory comments advocating more oversight, and he has been quoted as saying, “Our Defense Department has continued to pay, through pliant contractors, for a flock of Iraqi political exiles as our paid political agents in Iraq.” Professor Loeb was former Acting Deputy Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)—and Executive Secretary of the Cost Accounting Standards Board. His high-handed management style drew a rebuke from the American Bar Association, who noted that the CAS Board did not follow the rule-making procedures required by law. While acting in his CAS Board role, Professor Loeb was directly responsible for implementing the revisions to the Cost Accounting Standards that exempted commercial item contracts from CAS. In other words, he is one of those government principals who is directly responsible for implementing the very regulatory changes of which he is now complaining.
Coming up: Are there any lessons to be learned from the brouhaha?
The Senate Discusses the Past and Future of DCAA—Testimony
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In July 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported significant audit quality and independence issues at the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)—setting off a firestorm of controversy. That’s not the only set of problems facing DCAA these days. The DOD Inspector General (DOD IG) recently issued a follow-up report, confirming many of GAO’s 2008 findings and asserting that DCAA’s workplace and environment “may have contributed to deficient audit work” even though (in our view) the evidence cited in the report didn’t seem to support such a conclusion. To add fuel to the fire, the GAO issued a separate report concluding that the Department of Defense has failed to assure that its contractors have compliant codes of ethics/business conduct and effective internal control systems, because ““the new FAR rules are silent with regard to contracting officer review or standards for examining contractor ethics programs during contract administration,” and also because DCAA and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) can’t agree on who should be responsible for conducting the assessments. (Even though the GAO was concerned that DOD didn’t have its act together, we note that this would seem to be a very low risk area because nearly 100 percent of the contractors surveyed by the GAO already had ethics programs and related internal controls that “include many of the practices consistent with [FAR-required] standards.”) Finally, the GAO also issued its long-expected report expanding on its review of DCAA audit quality, in which it alleged “we found audit quality problems at DCAA offices nationwide, as demonstrated by serious quality problems in the 69 audits … we reviewed, DCAA’s ineffective audit quality assurance program, and DCAA’s rescission of 80 audit reports in response to our work.”
The foregoing establishes background for the September 23, 2009 hearing by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Joe Lieberman-I, Chair, and Susan Collins-R, Ranking Minority Member) called “Defense Contract Audit Agency: Who is Responsible for Reform?” Testifying for the Committee were (1) Gregory Kurtz, representing the GAO, (2) Gordon Heddell, DOD Inspector General, (3) Robert Hale, Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), and (4) April Stephenson, Director, DCAA. As expected, DCAA was in for a very rough ride.
Senator Lieberman opened the hearing, quickly setting the stage: “Good morning and welcome to this hearing where we will examine the potential that billions of taxpayer dollars are at risk of being wasted because of the inadequate auditing procedures at the … DCAA.” Senator Lieberman continued—
This is the 5th major report sounding the alarm on DCAA. … all showing that an important watchdog agency, DCAA, is in need of an overhaul. Washington, we’ve got a problem. In my opinion DCAA is in need of a complete cultural transformation. DCAA still seems driven by a culture that emphasizes speed and production of audits over the quality of results. And DCAA appears to be an incredibly insular agency, with little or no infusion of skills from outside the agency. It’s time for us to make sure we change this environment with specific steps, such as improving audit quality control, increasing training opportunities, and developing a strategy to target resources, rather than simply churn out audits to hit numerical goals. … Certainly, due to DCAA’s unique role, it must have the independence it needs to stand up to pressures from both agencies and contractors. And perhaps that independence should be strengthened. Perhaps it’s time for us to consider separating DCAA from the Department of Defense and making it an independent auditing agency. But what is also needed right now is strong leadership from the top ranks of DOD to help DCAA achieve the necessary transformation and reforms. We do not want to be sitting here a year from now discussing the same old problems. Let’s identify the root causes and get on to the solutions that the taxpayers demand and certainly deserve.
Next, Senator Collins spoke in the same vein as Senator Lieberman, saying, “A well-functioning DCAA is … vital to our government’s responsibility to be frugal stewards of taxpayer funds. It plays a necessary role in ensuring the accountability and transparency of federal contracts. Unfortunately, the GAO report contains the haunting refrain of disturbing past reports.” She continued—
The Department of Defense and other federal agencies rely on DCAA to detect waste, fraud, and abuse. It is, therefore, unacceptable for this federal policing agency to continue to have significant performance failures. With more than a little frustration, I note that we are here almost one year to the day since the Committee’s last hearing on this very same topic – DCAA’s poor performance. During the 2008 hearing, I raised significant concerns about mismanagement at DCAA. And yet, here we are again. … There are many principled and dedicated auditors at DCAA who endeavor to conduct themselves with the highest possible ethical standards. The management and culture at DCAA should support these efforts, not undermine them. … I am concerned … that simply adding resources will not address fundamental failings. Indeed, the consequences of mismanagement may only multiply with these additional resources. Less than a month ago, the [DOD IG] completed an investigation that found evidence of such mismanagement. It cited time pressure, uncompensated overtime, unauthorized changes to audit results, and other unprofessional behavior that had created a work environment not conducive to performing quality audits. What will it take to see progress? DCAA’s inability to remedy its mismanagement, despite numerous hearings, investigations, and reports, is truly an epic failure by the agency and the Department. … To make matters worse, I am told some supervisors responsible for deficient audits were given performance ratings ranging from “exceeds fully successful” to “outstanding.” Let me repeat that. For supervising these questionable audits, these managers were given marks of excellence. This is an outrage, plain and simple. We rely on the many honest and dedicated employees at DCAA to be the first line of defense to the abuse of tax dollars. When the audit agency fails, the fallout can cascade through the system, and ultimately shortchange our troops in the field. Congress must carefully consider what reforms are needed at DCAA in light of these disclosures. Reestablishing DCAA as a first-rate audit agency is critical. To date, I have been very disappointed with the lack of leadership from the Office of the Comptroller, which is responsible for overseeing and supporting DCAA.
Next, Mr. Kurtz from the GAO testified about the findings from the GAO report on DCAA audit quality. Those who read our article focusing on the GAO report will be unsurprised by his words. He testified—
A management environment and agency culture that focused on facilitating the award of contracts and an ineffective audit quality assurance structure are at the root of the agencywide audit failures we identified. DCAA’s focus on a production-oriented mission led DCAA management to establish policies, procedures, and training that emphasized performing a large quantity of audits to support contracting decisions and gave inadequate attention to performing quality audits. … In seven audits, independence was compromised because auditors provided material nonaudit services to a contractor they later audited …. 33 of 37 internal control audits did not include sufficient testing of internal controls to support auditor conclusions and opinions … for many controls, DCAA did not perform any testing at all. … DCAA’s current approach of performing 30,000 to 35,000 audits and issuing over 22,000 audit reports with 3,600 auditors substantially contributed to the widespread audit quality problems we identified.
Notably, Mr. Kurtz opined that “DCAA’s policy to eliminate the ‘inadequate-in-part’ opinion for contractor internal control systems audits does not recognize different levels of severity of control deficiencies and weaknesses and could unfairly penalize contractors whose systems have less severe deficiencies by giving them all the same opinion—‘inadequate’—as contractors having material weaknesses or significant deficiencies that in combination would constitute a material weakness.”
Next, Mr. Heddell testified regarding the DOD IG’s efforts to monitor DCAA’s audit quality, saying “We recognize, based on our efforts and those of the Government Accountability Office, that significant vulnerabilities continue to exist in DCAA’s implementation of auditing standards in terms of guidance and execution.” He continued in a similar manner, testifying—
My office conducted a senior official investigation and concluded that the former Regional Audit Manager [RAM] with responsibility for DCAA’s Resident Officeat Boeing, Huntington Beach, California, was not free from external impairments to independence as required by GAGAS and DCAA audit policy. Her directionresulted in a flawed audit that could have allowed Boeing to recover $271 million in unallowable costs. Additionally, we received allegations that she created an abusive working environment. Because this Regional Audit Manager was promoted to Deputy Director, Western Region, DCAA, the allegations were addressed in a senior official investigation that resulted in a report issued September 11, 2009. The investigation concluded that the individual failed to meet GAGAS standards for independence and objectivity by improperly directing changes to the audit report and that she engaged in conduct that was inconsistent with established leadership standards for senior officials. The report was provided to the Director, DCAA, for review and appropriate action. We also conducted separate investigations into allegations that two other DCAA senior officials abused their authority by improperly directing changes to audit opinions. Those allegations were not substantiated.
Mr. Heddell concluded:
Based on the recent review of DCAA by GAO together with deficiencies indentified in our May 2007 peer review, I took the extraordinary action of notifying DCAA that our May 2007 ‘adequate’ opinion on DCAA’s system of quality control would expire as of August 26, 2009. On the basis of our action, Irecommended that DCAA immediately begin to qualify its audits with a statement noting an exception to compliance with the Quality Control and AssuranceStandard. Additionally, I recommended that DCAA publicly disclose the concerns of the GAO, including the questioning of the reliability of audit reports issuedduring the period ending September 30, 2006.
Next, Under Secretary Hale (DOD Comptroller) testified. Mr. Hale is Ms. Stephenson’s supervisor in the DOD chain of command. His testimony largely consisted of acknowledging the issues identified by the GAO and DOD IG, and identifying corrective actions that he and DCAA were taking in response. His testimony was notable not for where he agreed with the audit agency detractors, but for where he disagreed. He testified –
GAO suggested that Congress consider providing DCAA with independence similar to that of the Department’s Inspector General (IG). We respectfully disagree. We do not believe that the DCAA Director should be a Senate-confirmed position unless DCAA is independent of DoD. Presidential appointment with Senate confirmation will inject an inappropriate political element into DCAA, and it will inevitably create lengthy periods when there would be no Director. … While we do not support IG-like independence, we are taking steps to strengthen DCAA’s independence internally by assessing improvements to the process used by contracting officials to resolve DCAA audit findings. Under this process, for highly significant issues, DCAA may appeal to the Director of DPAP. If DCAA disagrees with the DPAP decision, further appeal could be made to the Under Secretary (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), who would act together as a team. We expect that appeals to the Under Secretary level would involve only the most important issues.
Mr. Hale concluded with a bit of a plea to the Senators weighing DCAA’s future role as defense acquisition watchdogs: “as we go forward it is also essential that we keep in mind the value of the services DCAA provides to DoD and other organizations. I have spoken personally to the Director of DPAP – one of DCAA’s key customers – and he informed me that DCAA products are necessary and critical to the acquisition process. The Wartime Commission on Contracting has made similar comments. As we strive to resolve issues raised by GAO, we must be careful not to undermine the unique value of DCAA.”
Finally, DCAA Director Stephenson spoke on behalf of her agency. We would characterize her testimony as straight-forward and to the point; and perhaps a bit resigned to the beating she was about to take. She started with a simple statement: “Please be assured that we have taken the GAO’s findings very seriously. We have worked diligently since late 2008 to accomplish a number of actions to improve the quality of the audit services and to improve the working environment for our employees.” She then addressed the GAO report findings, discussing four distinct problems: (1) insufficient testing of contractor internal controls, (2) ineffective [DCAA] quality assurance program, (3) lack of independence, and (4) management abuses of employees/impediments to the 2008 GAO investigations. Following are selected quotes from Ms. Stephenson’s testimony.
Although the auditing standards do not require that DCAA express an opinion on the adequacy of the contractors’ internal control systems, we did so to provide contracting officials meaningful information to approve or disapprove a contractor’s system as stipulated under the Federal Acquisition Regulations. We are currently assessing the type of systems DCAA will need to audit and the type of opinion to be provided. We will continue to seek advice from the GAO and the DOD Inspector General. We anticipate our revised processes will be tested in early FY 2010 starting with the contractor’s system for preparing interim and final billings to the Government. We envision the revised processes will consolidate testing of contractor billings currently performed in three different types of audits into a single audit.
In August 2008, we centralized the quality assurance function by moving it to Headquarters and reassigned all quality assurance employees to the new Headquarters directorate. However, centralizing the functions was not enough. We also changed the manner in which we performed the quality assurance reviews. We more than doubled the number of assignments reviewed for each office.
In its recent review, the GAO concluded that DCAA’s independence was impaired primarily due to auditors providing input on draft corrections to internal control policies and procedures and then auditing the final policies and procedures. In several instances, the auditors issued a no-exception audit report when the contractor corrected the deficiencies during the audit. It is not uncommon for contractors with system deficiencies to seek input from the auditors while they are developing corrections to the systems. In many instances, providing feedback throughout the processes expedites the correction of the deficiencies. However, the GAO has concluded that this “feedback” impairs the auditors’ objectivity as they will audit information that they have provided feedback on prior to implementation. We have corrected both of these issues. Auditors no longer provide feedback to contractors on draft corrections to systems and no longer remove deficiencies from audit reports when the deficiencies are corrected during the audit.
We were approved to hire 300 new auditor trainees in FY 2009, and 200 in FY 2010. We have tentative approval for 200 in 2011 depending on budget priorities, for a total of 700 new trainees by the end of FY 2011. We have met our hiring goal in FY 2009 and anticipate easily meeting the hiring goals in FY 2010 and 2011.
Based on the audits required under laws and regulations and an estimate of the audits required to meet contracting officials’ demand requests, the field audit offices developed the hours necessary to accomplish the workload, taking into consideration the risk of the various contractors, the skill level of the audit staff and an estimate of the additional hours required to comply with the auditing standards. Based on the hours, we developed Agency-wide priorities. Since our funding provides for only about 65% of the audits that are required to be completed, we based the FY 2010 priorities on the audits of highest risk. [Emphasis added.]
The Administration is considering whether it would make sense legislatively to expand the DCAA subpoena authority to be similar to the subpoena authority provided to the DoD IG. Under the proposal, DCAA would be provided access to the contractor accounting records and other information necessary to accomplish the contract audit function.
Ms. Stephenson closed her testimony much as she started it, saying “I want to underscore the seriousness with which DCAA is taking this matter. Inadequate work is unacceptable, and disciplinary and personnel actions will be taken as appropriate.”
The entire hearing, all 106 minutes of it, can be viewed from the Senate Committee website (link above). Below is a five minute snippet of the hearing, where Senator Claire McCaskill asks Ms. Stephenson some pointed questions.
Our next article will address reactions to the testimony.
Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.