• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

DOD Inspector General Investigates DCAA Audit Quality and Work Environment Issues

E-mail Print PDF

DOD Inspector General Logo

 

In the litany of investigations and reviews covering DCAA’s ability to generate quality audits and to comply with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD IG) report issued on August 31, 2009 does not stand out for incendiary findings.  In fact, its findings seem so comparatively benign (and lacking new findings) that comments to the GovExec.com story from purported current and ex-DCAA auditors indicate they believe it to be essentially useless.  We don’t agree with their criticism.  If nothing else, the DOD IG provides another independent confirmation of many of the audit quality problems initially found by GAO.  Moreover, some of the IG findings and commentary may have implications for other DOD contractors.

 

The DOD IG conducted a “follow-up” review from the now infamous July 2008 GAO report finding widespread independence and audit quality issues in DCAA’s Western Region.  (The latest September 2009 GAO report will be the subject of a future article.)  In its 2008 report, GAO found (among other things) employee intimidation by DCAA management.  Subsequently, both the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, as well as Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), requested that the Inspector General (a) perform independent interviews of Western Region auditors, (b) evaluate 13 “cases” that GAO had alleged did not comply with GAGAS, and (c) assess DCAA’s actual and planned corrective actions in response to the issues identified by GAO.  As part of its efforts, the DOD IG reviewed 76 audits at three DCAA Western Region locations, covering eight contractors, two of whom were among the Top 10 DOD contractors in GFY 2008.  The DOD IG unsurprisingly confirmed many of the GAO’s 2008 findings, and moreover expressed the opinion that the DCAA Western Region may have had a “work environment not conducive to performing quality audits.”  Following are selected findings from the DOD IG report.

 

The DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “Contractor A, Case 2” that the audit findings were impaired because of auditor independence issues related to the Western Region Audit Manager (RAM), and that the audit working papers were insufficient to support the audit opinions.  (“Contractor A” is responsible for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle as well as the Delta IV rocket.)  Moreover, the DOD IG confirmed that original audit opinion was changed without sufficient documentation.  As a result (according to the DOD IG), the U.S. Air Force may have agreed to pay up to $271 million in unallowable costs either related to losses on other contracts or to costs incurred in prior cost accounting periods.  The USAF Space and Missiles Center (SMC) agreed to suspend further payments to Contractor A pending resolution of the matter.

 

The DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “Contractor B, Case 3” that DCAA “Location 2” issued three defective pricing audit reports covering “freight-out costs” that the contractor and its customer had previously agreed would be unallowable (but which were included as indirect costs in proposals submitted to the Government).  The three audit reports were rescinded after issuance of the original GAO report, but “DCAA did not explain to the contracting officer why [they were rescinded].”  In addition, the DOD IG concluded that “DCAA failed to provide effective audit services and advice to the contracting officer” with respect to attempts to quantify and resolve the issue, which was treated as a noncompliance with CAS 405. 

 

The DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “DCAA Location 3, Case 8” in which 17 of 18 audit reports related to contractor cost proposals “had one or more of the following deficiencies,” including (among others):  lack of professional judgment, inadequate documentation or sufficient evidence, and inadequate supervision.

 

In what may be a controversial finding, the DOD IG had this to say about labor floor check findings at “Contractor C, Case 12”—“The floor check audit included evidence that salaried employees worked uncompensated overtime but did not record all hours worked on their timesheets … a serious risk of mischarging exists when salaried employees do not record all hours worked.  DCAA still needs to determine the significance of the [control system] deficiency during the affected time period.”  Moreover, although DCAA did take some effective corrective actions to address the perceived control deficiency, it had not “identified all necessary actions to determine and mitigate the impact to the Government” with respect to the contractor’s submission of its incurred costs and final indirect cost rates for its FYs 2005 through 2008.  This issue is controversial because there is no statutory or regulatory requirement that contractors engage in what is called “total time accounting” for salaried exempt employees; and industry has fought this requirement for, quite literally, decades.  The DOD IG report ignored the controversy and painted a black and white picture that will be misleading to the casual reader.

 

In addition to the confirmations noted above, the DOD IG interviewed 68 DCAA employees and managers at in the affected Western Region Field Audit Offices (FAOs).  According to the IG’s report, 18 percent of those interviewed “had a supervisor change or direct a change to audit results and opinions.”  Further, 47% of interviewees had “experienced pressure because of unreasonable performance measures,” and 62% had worked uncompensated overtime.  Finally, 68% of those interviewed had “witnessed unprofessional behavior in the office,” which the IG stated included instances of raised voices and yelling.  The report also noted instances of an administrative employee repeatedly “yelling and swearing” at an audit supervisor. 

 

According to a GovExec.com article, the DOD IG report consisted largely of “mundane stories” that hardly give rise to the DOD IG’s conclusion that DCAA’s workplace and environment “may have contributed to deficient audit work.”  The report also “indicates that the workforce problems might have been isolated to a handful of recalcitrant managers.”

 

Considering the scrutiny and attacks facing DCAA at the moment, this report does not seem particularly damaging.  Ultimately, the impact of the report may be determined by how DCAA uses it as support for positions and/or audit findings it takes in future audits of DOD contractors.


 

GAO Takes on DOD Oversight of Contractor Ethics Programs

E-mail Print PDF

We recently wrote about DCAA guidance that ostensibly discusses changes to the FAR.  The changes mandate (among other things) contractor codes of ethics/business conduct, ethics compliance employee training programs, effective internal control systems, and disclosure of contract-related wrongdoing to the appropriate Government agency Inspectors General.  (We noted that DCAA used the opportunity of disseminating its audit guidance to attempt to expand auditor access to contractor records, notwithstanding both FAR Council promulgating comments and judicial decisions to the contrary.)  Now comes a September 22, 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report card on DOD’s oversight of ethics programs, in which (unsurprisingly) GAO opines that DOD can do a better job.

 

We have written in the past, and will be writing quite a bit more in the upcoming days, about DOD oversight of its contractors.  Not only is this a topic of utmost interest to Apogee Consulting, Inc. and its clients, as they seek to comply with constantly evolving Federal Acquisition rules and judicial interpretations of existing language, but also because DOD contractor oversight (or lack thereof) is a topic of utmost interest to the Pentagon, the Obama Administration, Congress, and others.  This GAO report should be viewed in light of the overall context, in which reports of bribery, fraud, and contractor overcharging in Southwest Asia and elsewhere surface almost weekly and DOD is being accused of negligence for failing to better control its contractors.  That being said, the GAO report seems objective and straightforward, and its recommendations are well within the realm of reasonableness.

 

GAO Logo

 

In its report, GAO noted that surveyed 57 contractors, 55 of whom reported having ethics programs “that include many of the practices consistent with [FAR-required] standards….”  (GAO noted that its survey was taken prior to the new FAR rules coming into effect.)  The 57 contractors included such well known names as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, United Technologies, DRS Technologies, General Atomics, SAIC, CSC, ITT, URS, and GE.  The findings from the report are summarized below:

 

  • 55 of the contractors surveyed had codes of business ethics and conduct
  • 52 had codes that provide examples of disciplinary action for misconduct
  • 51 required ethics training for employees working on DOD programs
  • 52 had an ethics office or single point of accountability for ethics programs
  • 25 reported quarterly on ethics program matters to top company management
  • 52 had internal reviews or audits that tested the ethics program
  • 47 periodically “assessed risks” of improper or criminal conduct
  • 55 have internal reporting mechanisms, such as hotlines
  • 54 have a policy that permits employees to report anonymously or confidentially
  • 34 had formal policies for voluntary disclosure of contracts-related violations

 

The GAO report notes that the new FAR contractor ethics and disclosure requirements are based on U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Federal sentencing guidelinesImportantly, the GAO report notes on page 7 that “the sentencing guidelines … state that the failure to prevent or detect a particular offense does not necessarily mean that the program is generally ineffective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.”

 

The GAO report also notes challenges that contractors face in implementing their ethics programs.  Among those challenges are:

 

  • The overpayment provisions create operational difficulties “because (1) contracts are subject to reconciliation processes with payments [being] audited and adjusted over time and (2) the routine nature of contract payment issues, which are daily events, with errors on both sides, is simply unworkable.”
  • Interpreting “vague language” may “tie up government resources in meaningless trivia.”
  • Checking the existence of subcontractor ethics awareness programs and internal control systems.

 

The GAO report discussed the challenges facing contractors with overseas contract operations.  Forty-one of the 57 contractors surveyed reported such overseas operations, yet 26 of those reported “experiencing challenges implementing ethics programs overseas, including differences in legal and regulatory environments relating to, for example, employee privacy, cultural and language barriers, and technical or hostile conditions impeding computer-based training.”

 

The GAO report noted that DCAA had implemented its new audit guidance covering internal controls for contract integrity and ethical values, as we have previously noted.  Interestingly, the GAO report provided a history of DCAA’s approach to this audit area.  Initially, in February 2009 DCAA headquarters officials told GAO “that they planned to make only minor changes” to audit guidance, because “in their view … many of the new FAR requirements were already in the DFARS section upon which the earlier audit program was based.”  During subsequent discussions (in June 2009), “the Chief, Auditing Standards Division, told us that the agency had reconsidered its approach and was then proceeding to develop much more extensive audit guidance ….”  In July 2009, according to GAO, “Senior headquarters policy and planning managers “indicated that the impact of the FAR contractor ethics rules on DCAA contract audits has been to improve audit guidance.”

 

The GAO report concludes that the new FAR contractor ethics and internal control rules omit any discussion of who should provide oversight of the contractors’ programs during contract performance.  For example, the FAR fails to address how Government oversight officials should verify that a contractor has implemented a compliant business ethics program.  Because “the new FAR rules are silent with regard to contracting officer review or standards for examining contractor ethics programs during contract administration,” the GAO reported that “the impact of the new FAR rules on changing the CAO [contract administration office] function to include some degree of oversight … has been negligible.”  The GAO report concludes that, consequently, “CAO staff will continue as before the new FAR rules were implemented with limited oversight of contractors’ ethics programs.”  But the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) was not as worried about the situation as GAO seemed to be, stating “that is it not their agency’s functional responsibility to verify compliance with the new contractor ethics requirements” and indicating that “it would be better to assign responsibility for this function to DCAA’s contract audit services that assess the adequacy of contractor internal controls for integrity and ethical values.”

 

Although the GAO concluded that DOD could improve its oversight, the report fails to address the role of the FAR Councils in promulgating revised FAR language that would address the administrative omissions it identified.  In other words, GAO recommended band-aids instead of addressing the root cause of the alleged problem(s).

 

Like many issues associated with contractor internal control systems (called by some “contractor business systems” and by others “contactor operational control systems”), the DOD is wrestling with how to provide effective oversight over its contractors while minimizing undue interference in contractor affairs.  The oversight “turf war” between DCAA and DCMA has been frequently reported on this site.  Both agencies have been criticized for failing to provide adequate oversight on its contractors, typically with incendiary language alleging all sorts of dire consequences resulting from such negligence.  In contrast to the finger-pointing of other parties, this GAO report appears restrained and professional.

 

 

 

DCAA Audit Guidance on Contractors Ethics Programs Attempts to Expand Audit Access

E-mail Print PDF
As we previously reported, the FAR was revised in December 2008 to require contractors to have (1) a written code of business ethics and conduct, (2) a business ethics and compliance training program, and (3) an internal control system that facilitates timely discovery and disclosure of improper conduct, and ensures corrective measures are promptly instituted and carried out. On July 23, 2009 DCAA revised its audit programs, audit guidance, and internal control matrices to address the impact of the revised requirements on the control environment and overall accounting system controls of Federal contractors. The revised DCAA audit guidance provides a good recap of some of the new requirements.

Importantly, the audit guidance directs that a contractor's failure to disclose wrongdoing under the mandatory disclosure requirements should be treated as an internal control deficiency, calling into question the adequacy of the contractor's accounting system. In addition, the guidance claims that the new contract clause 52.203-13(c)(2)(ii)(G) requires "full cooperation with any Government agencies responsible for audits, investigations, or corrective actions" and implies that this cooperation should be extended to DCAA auditors. [Emphasis in original.]

In fact, in the FAR revision promulgating comments, the FAR Councils stated--

The proposed rule was not intended to have any application or impact on the Government's exercise of its audit and access to records rights in the routine contract administration context except as the issue arises when a contractor discloses fraud or corruption or the Government independently has evidence sufficient to open an investigation of fraud and solicit the contractor's cooperation. The issue of contractor cooperation in this rule arises primarily in the context of Government investigation of contract fraud and corruption and any application of this rule in any other context by the Government would be clearly overreaching.

Another new aspect of the DCAA audit guidance is the direction to auditors to "verify that the business ethics awareness and compliance program includes an ethics training program for all principals and employees, and as appropriate, the contractor’s agents and subcontractors. Selectively test this control by evaluating training program materials and training records of completion." Moreover, the audit guidance directs auditors to "verify that the contractor performs periodic reviews (i.e., at least annually) of company business practices, procedures, and internal controls for compliance with the contractor’s code of business ethics and conduct and special requirements of Government contracting, including the specific requirements in FAR 52.203-13(c)(2)(ii)(C). Review the results of the recent reviews and assess any impact on this audit." The former requirement assumes individual auditors can evaluate contractor's training program materials without providing them any specific guidance on how to do so, while the latter requirement ignores well-settled case law that contractors' internal audit reports are protected from DCAA review.

In summary, the new DCAA audit guidance addresses the new FAR requirements, but in such a way as to attempt to expand DCAA audit access beyond that contemplated by the FAR Councils or by the Courts. Contractors should establish their position(s) with respect to the new DCAA audit guidance, and be prepared to "push back" when it is in their interests to do so. On the other hand, many contractors will find that their position(s) lie on the path of least resistance, and will give in to DCAA demands in order to avoid "access to records" issues and potential litigation. An early internal discussion of these potential land mine issues will permit contractors to react timely and crisply to DCAA internal control evaluations of their accounting systems.
 

Commission on Wartime Contracting: Well-Informed, Independent, Bipartisan—or Out of Touch with Reality?

E-mail Print PDF

CWC HearingOur old friends at the self-described independent and bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (“CWC”) were back in the news on September 21, 2009, issuing another report on Government oversight of contractors deployed in the battlefields of Southwest Asia, entitled “Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse.” We’ve posted several articles on the activities of the CWC, here, here and here.  The first CWC report, entitled “At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan," can be found here.

The latest report was a mostly a recap of testimony at prior hearings, summarized and spun to meet the needs of the CWC. The first report focused on Government oversight of contractors in the battlefield, only mentioning contractor “business systems” in passing.  In contrast, the latest report focused almost exclusively on contractor internal control system adequacy, and used that subject to score points on all parties, from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to the LOGCAP IV contractors supporting troops in the battlefield.  According to the CWC, there are no heroes in the Department of Defense (DOD) oversight of contractors, only several dysfunctional players struggling to work a poorly designed regulatory regime with inadequate resources.

The report contained five findings, as discussed below.

  1. DCAA and DCMA “send mixed messages to contractors” through their “divergent and often contradictory behaviors.”  The CWC discussed the advisory role of DCAA and the regulatory authority of DCMA to “enforce contract terms and conditions.”  From this starting point, the CWC asserted that DCAA auditors “are recognized experts on accounting matters, internal controls, and business systems,” while DCMA contracting officers “are not typically trained in these complex audit and accounting procedures and sometimes make questionable decisions, seemingly ignoring DCAA recommendations.”  According to the CWC, the dysfunctional relationship between the two DOD agencies “creates an environment in which contractors can exploit the agencies’ mixed messages and game the system to their advantage.”
  2. The separate lines of authority for each agency “contribute to a lack of interagency cooperation and collaboration, and make it difficult for the oversight process to work as well as it should.”  Exacerbating the problem is the lack of any arbiter between DCAA and DCMA, since “their common point of resolution is the Office of the Secretary of Defense—a level too high in the organization structure to effectively resolve differences that continually occur.”
  3. DCAA audit reports “are not informative enough to help contracting officers make effective decisions.”  The CWC noted the December 2008 changes to DCAA audit guidance, in which contractor internal control systems were only to be rated on a pass/fail basis (adequate or inadequate).  According to the CWC—

 

Now, all deficiencies reported by DCAA will render the contractor’s system inadequate, resulting in many more adverse audit opinions. But this does not improve matters.  Rather than giving system deficiencies more importance, it seems to have the opposite effect—undermining the significance of the audit findings and weakening their effectiveness. Use of a binary system involving a pass/fail rating does not adequately depict relative degrees of impact.  Without any reasonable provision for more accurately describing systems that are less than perfect, contractors and contracting officers find the adequate/inadequate options too restrictive. Moreover, since only significant deficiencies are now reported, there is no provision to report and track recommendations for other desirableimprovements. Contracting officers need audit opinions with clear and quantifiable risk information. They need DCAA’s expert opinion about the relative impact or dollar value (or even an estimated range of risk) of the deficiency in order to consider making a contract award or a contract-incentive determination in the face of an inadequate audit opinion.

 

  1. DCMA is not “aggressive in motivating contractors to improve business systems.”  The CWC reported that “when confronted with significant audit findings, contractors generally promise to improve their business systems by providing corrective-action plans to contracting officers.  These plans, as opposed to completed corrective actions, are often accepted by contracting officers, thus effectively rendering a[n inadequate] system adequate.”
  2. The two agencies “are under-resourced to respond effectively to wartime needs.”  The CWC noted that “as a result of personnel shortfalls, DCAA system reviews and follow-ups are not always timely; therefore, the real-time status of contractor business systems cannot always be determined.”  In addition to personnel shortages at both agencies, “the Commission believes that many of the untimely reviews are due to the failure of both DCAA and DCMA to prioritize their business-system workload in a wartime environment.”  The CWC concluded, with the following (almost plaintive) statement—

 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been going on for many years and the Commission is at a loss to understand why leadership has not aggressively pursued additional staffing until recently.  In addition, it is the job of DCMA and DCAA leadership to reallocate existing, albeit limited resources in accordance with mission priorities.  Timely oversight of contingency contractors’ business systems should be a priority for both agencies during wartime.

 

The CWC made several recommendations to remedy the findings reported above.  Highlights are summarized below –

  • DCAA and DCMA must work together to develop agreed-upon standards and processes that communicate the same message to both the individual contractor and the contracting community and help contractors achieve “adequate” systems.  Ideally, the process should be defined in the FAR (in a way similar to the material-management and accounting system standards called out in the DFARS 252.242.7004) so they are visible to all stakeholders.
  • The Department of Defense needs to re-establish control of the oversight process to the government by developing better internal-resolution processes.  The DoD process should ensure that disagreements between DCAA and DCMA are rapidly resolved, with consideration for DCAA’s independent audit expertise as well as for the DCMA contracting officer’s decision-making authority and the operational mission.
  • DCAA should revisit its policy with respect to its binary “adequate/inadequate” opinions for business system reports and provide a mechanism for reporting any deficiency that warrants formal notification and tracking.  Also, whenever possible, audit reports should include an assessment of audit risk and cost impact associated with reported deficiencies.  Further, DCAA should re-examine the need to express opinions on the overall adequacy of business system audits beyond those explicitly required by the FAR.
  • DCMA, with DCAA advice, should develop a reliable and aggressive process for reaching consistent decisions on business systems and any corrective action needed.  The process should recognize the contracting officer as the final authority but also acknowledge DCAA auditors as the business-system experts chartered to advise government contracting organizations, as noted in the DCAA mission statement. Disagreements with audit recommendations should be discussed at appropriate leadership levels within DCMA and DCAA and documented accordingly.  As part of their decision process, DCMA contracting officers should also consider any risk analysis provided by DCAA and thoroughly address it in documenting their decisions.  Finally, DCMA should ensure timely follow-up on contractor corrective-action plans and validate that the contractor actions actually correct the deficient business system.  If not, the contracting officer should pursue such contractual remedies as withholds, and DCMA leadership should ensure that this occurs.

  • The Commission strongly encourages each organization to aggressively pursue additional staff, but also to immediately prioritize its current workload to meet government oversight needs in the contingency-contracting arena. This is imperative to address the risks of waste, fraud, and abuse.

 

There is much that could be said about the latest CWC report. Some of the findings and recommendations—particularly those that would eliminate pass/fail internal control system DCAA audit reports—would be a big step in the right direction.  Other matters seem less helpful. A future article will contrast the CWC characterization of DCAA auditors as “recognized experts on accounting matters, internal controls, and business systems” with recent testimony of GAO and other Government officials before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, at which Senators heard that DCAA had to rescind 80 audit reports after GAO found significant faults with each of them. A GovExec.com article reported the following reactions from the Committee members—

 

‘In the world of auditing, what has been happen[ing] here [at DCAA] is a capital crime,’ said Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., a former state auditor for Missouri.  ‘There can be no bigger indictment of an agency than this GAO report.’  Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, called GAO's findings ‘an epic failure by the agency and the [DCAA],’ while Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., said he ‘got sick’ reading the report. ‘I can't understand why the management of [DCAA] hasn't been completely changed,’ Coburn said.

 

It seems that the Commission on Wartime Contracting is so independent, it is not in touch with GAO report findings or the perceptions of Senate Committee charged with oversight over the DOD oversight agency.  Perhaps they ought to get together and collaborate with each other, before the CWC places too much faith in DCAA’s characterization of contractor internal control systems or forces DCMA to give undue weight to DCAA recommendations.


 


 

Wrestling with CAS and Pensions: The Court of Appeals Weighs In (Once Again) on Segment Closing Pension Adjustments

E-mail Print PDF

We’ve been known to tell audiences that preparing a CAS cost impact proposal and defending it through audit is the most difficult task to perform in the complex (and perhaps arcane) world of government contract cost accounting. It has recently come to our attention that we were wrong. Indeed, there is one calculation even more difficult to prepare and defend through audit, even less well-understood, and even more complex (and arcane) than a cost impact analysis—the segment closing pension adjustment calculation mandated by Cost Accounting Standard 413.

 

When the second incarnation of the CAS Board revised Standards 412 and 413 in March, 1995 they took already ambiguous, complex and poorly understood Standards and made them even more onerous. In the words of former OFPP Administrator Angela Styles, the revisions “sparked an explosion of litigation” as the Government, contractors, and the Courts struggled to come to some understanding as to what the rules meant and how they could be executed in a practical sense by the contracting parties. One case, the matter of the General Electric Company’s pension adjustments related to sales of several of its businesses, celebrates this week its fourteenth year of litigation—rivaling the infamous A-12 termination case for length.

 

The words of Cost Accounting Standard 413, at 48 C.F.R § 9904.413-50(c)(12), are relatively straight-forward, as is most of the CAS language. The Standard states (in part):

 

If a segment is closed, if there is a pension plan termination, or if there is a curtailment of benefits, the contractor shall determine the difference between the actuarial accrued liability for the segment and the market value of the assets allocated to the segment, irrespective of whether or not the pension plan is terminated. The difference between the market value of the assets and the actuarial accrued liability for the segment represents an adjustment of previously determined pension costs.

 

It is the interpretation of the foregoing words that has baffled for years the best minds in the business, as different parties litigate different aspects of the requirements. Most of what we know (or think) we know of how to comply with this requirement comes from Judge Nancy Firestone of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, a special (non-Article III) court established by the Tucker Acts to hear contract-related suits against the U.S. Government. Judge Firestone has waded through motions and briefs, and counter-motions and sur reply briefs, and expert report after expert report, trying to establish what the CAS Board intended the parties to do when a Government contractor (a) had a defined benefit pension plan, and (b) sold one or more of its CAS “segments” (or business units) to another business. Generally speaking, we applaud Judge Firestone’s acuity, wisdom, and perseverance; and the Court of Appeals has also looked favorably on her decisions, often accepting her decisions as written and denying appeals by one (or both) parties. Other cases have been tried in the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), where several judges have tackled the messy problems associated with this Standard, with a somewhat greater variation in success. The latest guidance from the Courts concerns decisions made by this latter judicial body.

 

On September 14, 2009 the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, issued one of its relatively rare CAS 413 reversals of a lower court decision, one that is worth mentioning for several reasons. First, it should be noted that Apogee Consulting, Inc. is not a law firm and nobody here has any formal legal training. So what follows is simply a layperson’s attempt to discuss several points found in the Appellate Court’s decision. Second, it should also be noted that one (or both of the parties) may decide to appeal this decision further, perhaps requesting certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. (That’s not likely, nor is SCOTUS likely to accept the appeal if made. Nonetheless, the Appellate decision should not be treated as final until all rights of appeal have been waived or exhausted.) Finally, let’s be clear that this article is the personal opinion of the author, Nick Sanders, and in no way represents the opinion of The Raytheon Corporation (a party to the litigation) or any Apogee Consulting, Inc. client. That being said, let’s look at a few aspects of the Appellate decision.

 

  1. The segment-closing pension adjustment is a current period adjustment. In order to comply with the requirements of CAS 413-50(c)(12), the contractor must evaluate its pension plan assets and actuarial liabilities, and determine whether the plan is over- or under-funded. It must determine the U.S. Government’s participation in any over- or under-funding (using a representative sample of prior years’ contract activity), and apply that participation ratio to the amount of the calculated pension “surplus” or “deficit” (after making certain adjustments such as excluding employee contributions). The amount so determined is a current period adjustment—either a credit or debit—that then flows to Government contracts in the indirect cost rates of the current period. What is striking about the Court’s decision is that a failure to make the required calculation and determine the resulting credit or debit, and to reflect that entry in the current period’s indirect cost rates—is a noncompliance with the requirements of the Standard. Moreover, the Court declared that simply making “an accounting allocation to the current period” is insufficient; what is required is an actual contract price adjustment—a “payment in the current period”.

 

Those who have dealt with this series of actuarial analyses, contract participation reviews, and various calculations understand what the Court apparently did not. Calculating the requirement pension adjustment does not happen in a few hours or even days. It takes months to analyze the data and determine the status of the pension plan using the rules of CAS 413. It takes months to determine what years contributed to the pension plan over- or under-funding. It takes months to determine a representative sample of years, to determine the Government’s participation in pension plan expenses for those years, and to then calculate the Government’s overall percentage of current period pension surplus or deficit. If a contractor were to sell a business in the fourth quarter of its Fiscal Year, it would be near impossible to complete the required analyses and calculations by year-end. Even when one considers the six-month period after the books close (provided by the Allowable Cost and Payment clause, FAR 52.216-7) to be used for preparation of the year’s final indirect cost rate proposal, one is hard-pressed to believe nine months is sufficient time. Indeed, given how few contractors survive DCAA audit of its segment-closing pension adjustment by DCAA without a CAS 413 noncompliance (leading in almost every instance to a protracted legal dispute), even a full year might not be enough time to calculate the adjustment in a manner deemed by DCAA to be in full compliance with the Standard as written and as interpreted by the Courts. Yet, the Appellate Decision is clear: contractors who do not complete their efforts in time to adjust the final indirect cost rates—and contract billings—for the fiscal year in which the sale took place are in noncompliance with CAS 413. Accordingly, the Government is entitled to recover overpayments and interest on those overpayments in accordance with the CAS clauses and underlying statute.

 

  1. The noncompliance is created when the fiscal year ends without the required adjustment being made, but compound interest starts accruing on the day the segment is sold. There was a school of thought that believed a contractor could not be in noncompliance with CAS until a contracting officer (variously called an “ACO” or “CFAO” in the regulations) issued a final decision officially determining that the contractor was in noncompliance. Generally, this would follow a DCAA audit report alleging noncompliance or recommending that the contractor be found to be in noncompliance, to which the contractor would have a chance to rebut or convince the contracting officer why DCAA was wrong in its audit finding(s). Given that interest on a contractor claim made under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) does not start running until a contracting officer has issued (or is deemed to have issued) a final decision (and the contractor formally appeals that decision to the ASBCA or Court of Federal Claims), there was some sense of logic and inherent fairness that the Government should not be entitled to receive interest until the contracting officer had heard the stories of both DCAA and the contractor, and rendered a final decision. Another possible date could have been the contractor’s fiscal year-end, or six months after year-end (when the contractor was required to submit it final indirect cost rate proposal, unless given an extension by the contracting officer). The Court found none of these dates meaningful, choosing instead to declare that the CAS 413 noncompliance took place when the contractor failed to make the required segment closing adjustment in the current period, and its segment closing date started the interest clock ticking. The rationale for this position was that the contractor has active contracts in the period in which its segment is closed; therefore failure to adjust one or more of those active contracts in the current period creates the noncompliance and results in Government overpayments. Remembering that pension plan cases involve millions (or sometimes hundreds of millions) of dollars, and that at least one of these cases has run for fourteen years without complete resolution, one quickly sees that this decision has a huge impact on the amount of money at stake.

 

Disposing of a business unit by sale or other means is a difficult endeavor. Contractors often spend considerable sums hiring outside advisors, consultants, and/or subject matter experts to conduct due diligence reviews or to help shape the final deal. We have previously discussed the importance of a rigorous due diligence review when acquisition or divestiture of a government contractor is being considered. To this discussion we now add the following warning, based on this recent Federal Circuit decision:

 

When considering acquisition or divestiture of a CAS-covered government contracting business unit (or segment) where a defined-benefit pension plan is involved, you must take into consideration the CAS 413 implications. This means that, in addition to parceling out the pension plan assets and liabilities between buyer and seller, the parties must agree to cooperate in developing the segment closing adjustment. Further, the buyer and seller must plan on considerable devoting time and resources—and funds—to completing the adjustment and processing any credits/debits before the end of the fiscal years of one (or both) of the parties. Obviously, the deal structure (e.g., which party retains responsibility for pension plan assets and liabilities, and which party retains ownership of physically completed contracts) will determine who has the most to gain (or lose) from any noncompliance with the requirements of CAS 413. All of which will lead to more expensive deals, and thus to fewer deals. While it is true that there are not many contractors who still maintain active defined benefit pension plans, there are still enough to warrant this cautionary note. Moreover, it is not necessarily the active plans that will lead to the most troublesome calculations, but the plans for inactive and active legacy employees which, although closed to new participants, still must be addressed when the affected government contactor businesses are bought and sold.

 


Page 267 of 278

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.