Quantum Cascade Lasers: Small Packages Pack Powerful Punches
One of our science friends (who happens to have a Ph.D in Physics) says that Moore’s Law is quickly coming to an end. Moore’s Law states that the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years. “It’s approaching its asymptote,” he says. (An asymptotic function is a function that “increases or decreases until it approaches some fixed value (i.e., the asymptote), at which point it levels off.” We know that because we looked it up.) According to our science friend, the ability to pack more transistors onto a chip is going to soon hit a roadblock having to do with mask size (we don’t pretend to understand that part); it will be the “end of silicon” and the beginning of – what? Our science friend likes the concept of “optical processors” and thinks that Quantum Cascade Lasers (QCLs) may be one way to get there.
Quantum Cascade Lasers (QCLs) are semiconductor lasers that emit in the mid- to far-infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Unlike traditional lasers, QCLs achieve laser emission “through the use of intersubband transitions in a repeated stack of semiconductor multiple quantum well heterostructures.” There is a whole lot more language like that in the article linked above. Terms such as “valence bands” and “conduction band” and “superlattice” and “one-dimensional multiple quantum well confinement” permeate and we’d be lying if we said it made sense. This part seemed to make some sense, though: “in a unipolar QCL, once an electron has undergone an intersubband transition and emitted a photon in one period of the superlattice, it can tunnel into the next period of the structure where another photon can be emitted. This process of a single electron causing the emission of multiple photons as it traverses through the QCL structure gives rise to the name cascade and makes a quantum efficiency of greater than unity possible which leads to higher output powers than semiconductor laser diodes.”
The October 2009 edition of National Defense magazine has an article on QCLs. The article does not focus on the efficiency noted above, but instead on the size of the laser. QCLs are a lot smaller than conventional lasers. Combine efficiency and flexibility and smaller size together, and you get a potential breakthrough. Our science friend thinks the breakthrough will revolutionize computer processing and perhaps he’s right. We also note that there are several near-term defense and homeland security applications inherent in the QCL concept, as well. The Wikipedia article (link above) states that “when used in multiple-laser systems, intrapulse QCL spectroscopy offers broadband spectral coverage that can potentially be used to identify and quantify complex heavy molecules such as those in toxic chemicals, explosives, and drugs.” In addition, the National Defense article predicts that “one day they [QCLs] may provide the military with directional infrared countermeasures, target illumination, chemical warfare warning and search-and-rescue capabilities ….”
The National Defense article discusses the work of Pranalytica, a small R&D contractor based in Santa Monica, CA. Pranalytica specializes in tunable laser spectroscopy-based gas sensing and in QCLs. According to its website, on May 19, 2009 the company shipped its first 2 Watt room temperature QCL system. The article states that Pranalytica’s QCL systems can produce the right wavelength needed to disable the guidance system of heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles, and can also produce long-range infrared illuminators using wavelengths that are invisible to commercial cameras commonly used by opposition forces as detectors. According to the article, “only NATO allies and U.S. forces have technologies that can see this kind of light ….”
On June 24, 2009 Pranalytica announced that DARPA had selected it to “continue its involvement in the Efficient Midinfrared Laser (EMIL) program.” According to the company’s press release, “The project was created to fill the need of the Department of Defense (DoD) for directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM), advanced stand-off chemical sensors, and Laser Radar (LADAR). Potential non-military applications include DIRCM protection of civilian airliners from shoulder-fired missiles, detection of toxic industrial gases, atmospheric pollution monitoring and free-space optical communications.” In addition to the DARPA contract, Pranalytica also claims a grant from the National Institutes of Health for medical diagnostics and various other contracts and grants from DARPA, NIST/ATP, and the Department of Agriculture. Clearly, Pranalytica’s products offer potential breakthroughs to a diverse set of stakeholders. The company’s future looks bright!
Congress Moves Closer to FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act
On October 8, 2009 the House of Representatives approved the Conference Report on H.R. 2647, the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. The Conference Report can be found here.
Program-specific highlights of the Conference Report include:
- Increases the Presidential budget request for Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles by $1.2 billion, to $6.7 billion.
- Provides an additional $512 million to buy eighteen F/A-18E/F aircraft, rather than nine aircraft as requested, and authorizes the full request for 22 EA-18G aircraft. In addition, provides a conditional authority for the Secretary of the Navy to enter into a multiyear procurement contract for F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft procurement, and provides an additional $108 million to support a possible multiyear procurement.
- Terminates production of the F-22 aircraft program.
- Provides $430 million to continue development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine.
- As we have previously forecasted, the House penalized programs with cost, schedule or technical problems, by “supporting termination” of the following programs:
- Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program
- Energy Interceptor (KEI) program
- The second Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft
- In addition:
- Reduces $209.5 million for the C-130 avionics modernization program (AMP) due to delays in the production program.
- Reduces $27 million from the FCS Non-Line of Sight Cannon and $184 million FCS Manned Ground Vehicle programs for excess termination liability.
On the acquisition policy front, the Conference Report directs the following changes:
- Prohibits award of a sole-source contract valued at more than $20 million, unless a written justification is made and approved, and that justification is made public pursuant to existing statutory requirements.
- Requires that the DFARS be revised to extend the mandatory use of the contract clause 52.216-26 (“Payments of Allowable Costs Before Definitization”) from use by only cost-reimbursement undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) to use by all UCAs, including undefinitized task orders. The clause limits Government reimbursement of contractor costs to 85 percent of costs incurred (except for certain costs).
- Extends the term of the Commission on Wartime Contracting by an additional year, and requires the Department of Defense to provide administrative support (as well as travel and lodging in combat theaters) to the Commission. Also permits other Federal agencies to support the CWC “as the head … considers advisable.”
- Permits the Secretary of Defense to reduce or deny award fees (or to recover all or part of award fees previously paid) on the basis of any “covered incident” where the contactor (or its subcontractor) “has been determined, through a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding that results in a disposition … in the performance of a covered contract to have caused serious bodily injury or death to any civilian or military personnel of the Government through gross negligence or with reckless disregard for the safety of such personnel.”
- Requires the Comptroller General to study the “structure and management of major subcontracts” which shall include:
(1) The number of major subcontracts under each prime contract reviewed.
(2) The manner in which the prime contractor addressed decisions to conduct work in-house or through subcontracts.
(3) The manner in which any potential organizational conflicts of interest were addressed and the Government's role (if any) in selecting the approach chosen.
(4) The manner in which such subcontracts were awarded (including the degree of competition) and the Government's role (if any) in such award decisions.
(5) Any recommendations that the Comptroller General may have for improving Government oversight, reducing the oversight burden on the acquisition workforce, or otherwise improving the management of subcontractors under contracts for the acquisition of major weapon systems.
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Focus on International Public Procurement Corruption
While many law enforcement agencies in the United States are focused on allegations of corruption in connection with contracts awarded for work in Southwest Asia, others are looking at public procurement corruption on an international scale. For instance, Europe’s biggest defense contractor, BAE Systems, is currently in a showdown with the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) over allegations of “bribery and corruption in arms deals in South Africa, Romania, and the Czech Republic dating back to the 1990’s.” According to one news source, “in December 2006, the SFO dropped an investigation of allegations of bribery of Saudi Arabian officials in an arms deal involving BAE after then-Prime Minister Tony Blair said the probe threatened national security. The investigation continued, however, into bribery allegations related to BAE sales to the other four countries.”
In 2008 German industrial conglomerate Siemens agreed to pay just over U.S. $1.3 billion to settle corruption probes related to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
Like Siemens, BAE Systems faces allegations that it violated the FCPA by offering bribes to foreign officials in return for awards of contracts. And like Siemens, BAE Systems faces suspension or debarment in the United States should it be convicted. However, unlike Siemens, BAE Systems has tried to brazen it out by insisting that its executives know of no wrongdoing. According to this article, “the SFO is seeking an admission of guilt and £500 million to £1 billion (U.S. $1.6 billion to $3.2 billion) in fines, which would be the largest such fines ever levied against a British firm.” BAE Systems’ U.S. subsidiary, from which it reportedly derives slightly more than half of its £18.5 billion pounds annual revenue, is not implicated in the scandals. However, media reports indicate that the U.S. Department of Justice “continues to investigation allegations that BAE used a U.S. bank to funnel bribes to Saudi Arabian officials.” Given the current U.S. government stance on contractor integrity and ethical conduct, a sustained finding in this area could prove problematic for the company.
Meanwhile, in South Africa, at least one report indicates that another procurement scandal may be surfacing with respect to the acquisition of EADS’ A400M cargo aircraft. A Member of Parliament (MP), David Maynier, has called for a probe of South Africa’s Department of Defense by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) because of “its tenth successive qualified audit opinion” and for allegations by the Auditor-General of “irregular expenditures,” and “fruitless and wasteful expenditures” in connection with acquisition of eight Airbus A400M aircraft by the DOD’s procurement agency, Armscor. Allegations include:
- Possible irregular expenditure of R2.9 billion (U.S. $393.5 million) may have occurred in the acquisition of the Airbus A400M aircraft “as a result of the tender process.”
- Over R15.24 million (U.S. $2.1 million) in irregular expenditure on the Airbus A400m aircraft programme is being investigated “with a view to disciplinary action or criminal proceedings.”
The South African defense agency is subject to the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), which is a statute that imposes transparency and accountability on governmental entities. According to this article,
The PFMA was one of the first pieces of legislation to demand monthly actual expenditure reports from departments to treasuries, and audited financial statements to the legislatures within seven months of the end of the fiscal year. It sought to bring state-owned enterprises under the transparent scrutiny and accountability not yet exercised by the legislature.
South Africa’s PFMA defines certain terms. For instance, “fruitless and wasteful expenditure” means an expenditure which was made in vain and would have been avoided had reasonable care been exercised. An “irregular expenditure” is an expenditure (other than an authorized expenditure) incurred in contravention of, or not in accordance with, a requirement of any applicable legislation. Among other things, the PFMA also mandates that accounting officers of entities subject to the Act must have and maintain “effective, efficient, and transparent systems of financial and risk management and internal control … an appropriate procurement and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective ….” The PFMA also mandates that accounting officers must “take effective and appropriate disciplinary steps against any official … who … makes or permits an unauthorized expenditure, irregular expenditure, or fruitless and wasteful expenditure.” Consequently, the allegations reported above, although couched in language unfamiliar to many U.S. readers, may lead to serious repercussions.
To sum up, despite the efforts of various domestic and international law enforcement agencies, corruption in the public procurement process remains widespread. Many of those entities accused of corruption in the international stage also operate in the United States, where their actions could impact their ability to compete for future defense contracts. Even for allegedly corrupt entities operating in far-away South Africa, the rule of law still applies in the public procurement arena.
DOD Inches Closer to Fixed-Price Development Contracting
The September 14, 2009 edition ofAviation Week & Space Technology magazine had an interesting article regarding implementation of fixed-price development contracting. A fixed-price contract is generally considered to be a type of contract where the agreed-upon price does not change, regardless of the contractor’s actual cost of performing the work. Of course, there are several flavors of fixed-price contracts and some actually do permit price redetermination in certain circumstances. Further, even a firm-fixed price contract may have its price changed if the Government makes a change to the underlying contract statement of work, through exercise of the contract’s Changes clause. That being said, a fixed-price contract type is not usually used for development contracts because it’s nearly impossible for the parties to agree on a fixed price when the work to be performed is only vaguely known at the time of negotiation. Thus, contractors take on enormous risks when they agree to such an arrangement and, as was demonstrated in the 1980’s when fixed-price development contracts were last in vogue, they have experienced enormous losses when doing so. (See, for one example, the history of the U.S. Navy A-12 stealth attack fighter.)
Regardless of history’s warning lessons, the Obama Administration and its Pentagon military chiefs have declared that fixed-price contracts—including fixed-price development contracts—are preferred contracting agreements, and that Federal agencies must cut-back on the use of such “high-risk contracting authorities” as cost-reimbursement, T&M, or labor-hour contract types. As we pointed at the time, that shift puts the risk of cost containment squarely on the shoulders of the contractors.
The Aviation Week article quoted David Berteau, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who says that successful implementation of the fixed-price development strategy will driven by the alignment of four elements:
- Stable, detailed, and technically sophisticated customer requirements definition
- Clear understanding of those requirements by the contractor(s)
- Savvy and skilled contract negotiating by the Government
- A willingness to adjust requirements to meet the fixed price, if necessary
In addition to the foregoing, Aviation Week asserted that “the theory is that technologies should be mature enough (technology readiness level 6, or tested in an operationally relevant environment …) to enable accurate cost and schedule estimates by industry bidders competing for a development contract. … For the Pentagon … requirements must be well-articulated and not altered … Once change orders are requested, leverage over contract price is lost.”
Aviation Week pointed out that the Small Diameter Bomb, Increment II (SDB II) (aka GBU-40) will be the “pathfinder” for fixed-price development contracting. The procurement history of the program was tainted by the Darlene Druyun scandal. Originally conceived as a competition between Lockheed Martin and Boeing, Ms. Druyun allegedly manipulated the moving target tracking requirements to favor Boeing, and then awarded Boeing the sole-source contract. Subsequently, the program evolved into a completion between a combined team of Boeing and Lockheed Martin versus Raytheon. In 2006 the DOD awarded 42-month, $250 million cost-plus-fixed-fee Risk Reduction contracts to each of the two teams, with the best resulting design expected to take the remainder of the development and production work. The selected contractor will be asked to perform on a fixed-price-incentive fee (FPIF) basis.
Aviation Week quoted Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Davis, as saying that the Air Force believes “the maturity and technology [on the SDB II program] was to the point where it was of better interest to the government to go to a fixed-price with an incentive fee on that contract.” We note that Maj. Gen. Davis did not say that the technology was judged to be at readiness level 6. Aviation Week noted, however, that “concern about pricing development is not about immature technology—both teams have been … required to demonstrate key technologies in an operationally relevant environment.”
According to GlobalSecurity.org—
The Government is buying the SDB II based on contractor-developed, Government-approved System Performance Specification (SPS) which will become contractually binding at downselect. The contractor will be accountable for system performance as defined in the SPS [which] may include a system warranty. Accordingly, the contractor is responsible not only for the design of the weapon system, but also for planning and executing the Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) program to verify the system performance. The Government formally arranges and funds the use of Government flight test support for DT&E. Although funded by the Government, flight test support funds are part of the negotiated commitment between the contractor and the Government ensuring the contractor is able to execute the DT&E Program according to the scope of the [Risk Reduction/System Design & Development] RR/SDD contract.
Based on the foregoing, there are number of variables that the final contractor will need to price into its cost estimate. Aviation Week noted that “industry executives have expressed some worry about pricing the contract and maintaining a competitive edge within the fixed-price constraint.” Among the variables that will have to be priced and managed will be the ability to arrange for timely flight test support from the Air Force. In addition to that issue, Aviation Week also noted that “the unknown in this particular contract will be integrating the SDB II onto the F-35, which itself is not fully developed.”
The Air Force is not oblivious to the contractors’ quandary. In the Aviation Week article, Maj. Gen. Davis opined, “You have to make sure that fixed-price contract is affordable. If the contractor is smart, he is going to price what he really thinks that is going to cost into [the bid]. So, the question becomes, did he price a lot of risk in there that he is not going to need, or did he price less than he will need and are we going to have a problem down the road?”
The issue with Maj. Gen. Davis’ remark is that it is self-contradictory. The Air Force wants an “affordable” contract, but expect the contractors to price some amount of “risk” into their bids. Risk is one of the hardest things to price out in the world of government contracting. In fact, the FAR (at 31.205-7) states that a “contingency” (defined as “a possible future event or condition arising from presently known or unknown causes, the outcome of which is indeterminable at the present time”) cannot be priced, but instead must be “disclosed separately … to facilitate the negotiation of appropriate contractual coverage.” So it’s difficult to understand how the contractors will be able to “price risk” into their bids.
What we are left with is the distinct impression that use of a fixed-price contract type on developmental programs is a mistake, one that will not lead to good financial results for the “winning” contractor. And the Pentagon will have yet another program with “cost growth” to explain to Congress. We are mindful of the policy statements in Part 35 of the FAR (concerning contracting for Research & Development efforts):
Although the Government ordinarily prefers fixed-price arrangements in contracting, this preference applies in R&D contracting only to the extent that goals, objectives, specifications, and cost estimates are sufficient to permit such a preference. The precision with which the goals, performance objectives, and specifications for the work can be defined will largely determine the type of contract employed. The contract type must be selected to fit the work required.
Because the absence of precise specifications and difficulties in estimating costs with accuracy (resulting in a lack of confidence in cost estimates) normally precludes using fixed-price contracting for R&D, the use of cost-reimbursement contracts is usually appropriate …. The nature of development work often requires a cost-reimbursement completion arrangement …. When the use of cost and performance incentives is desirable and practicable, fixed-price incentive and cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts should be considered in that order of preference.
Projects having production requirements as a follow-on to R&D efforts normally should progress from cost-reimbursement contracts to fixed-price contracts as designs become more firmly established, risks are reduced, and production tooling, equipment, and processes are developed and proven .…
In its zeal to control program costs, the Pentagon seems to have forgotten the policy statements quoted above, as well as the painful lessons of 20 years ago. Congress and the Obama Administration seem to have forgotten them as well. We expect we’ll be hearing more about the SDB II program (and other similar fixed-price development programs) in the future.
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