Lockheed Martin and EADS Add to Executive Ranks While Boeing and Honeywell Shuffle Deck Chairs
We have previously reported on recent executive departures at both Boeing and Honeywell. In those articles, we questioned the wisdom of letting seasoned veterans depart while the aerospace and defense industry was facing significant challenges. Now comes word that, while some companies were reducing executive ranks of their defense subsidiaries, both EADS and Lockheed Martin were augmenting their executive leadership teams to prepare for the upcoming challenges.
In Boeing’s case, the company moved the head of its defense business (IDS) over to its commercial aircraft business (BCA) in order to cover the early departure of Scott Carson—leaving a vacancy that was filled by Jim Albaugh, who transferred over to BCA from his previous role leading Boeing’s IDS business. Replacing Mr. Albaugh was Dennis Muilenberg (who was promoted after leading IDS’ global after-market services unit). In Honeywell’s case, it lost both the CEO and CFO of its aerospace business in the same week, as each left to pursue other (potentially more lucrative?) opportunities. The Honeywell Aerospace CEO was replaced by Mr. Tim Mahoney, the unit’s former Chief Technology Officer.
Now we are not saying that the executive replacements named above are any less competent than the men they replaced. What we are saying that the new leaders don’t have the deep experience and strong customer relationships that their predecessors had built up over time. Given the current economic pressures facing the industry, and likely near-term downturn, those relationships would seem to be more important than ever. The executive departures would seem to impact the ability to win new work and to provide program execution assurance.
In contrast to those two entities, Lockheed Martin and EADS are adding to their executive leadership teams. On October 15, 2009 Lockheed Martin announced the creation of a Chief Operating Officer (COO) position, to be filled by Chris Kubasik, who will also be given the title of President. Effective January 1, 2010 Lockheed Martin will also reorganize its management structure. Currently, the top six highest leadership positions all report to Bob Stevens (CEO). After the reorganization, they will all report to Mr. Kubasik, enabling Mr. Stevens to “devote greater attention to high-level customers and partners and to shape domestic and international business strategies. I also intend to increase my efforts to strengthen the corporation strategically, operationally and financially." According to Lockheed Martin, the new COO position and management structure is being created to “strengthen oversight of program performance across the corporation and take operational excellence to an even higher level as we support our customers in their global security missions. … [C]onsidering the budget climate and priorities of the administration and the need to pay really close attention to what our customers are saying, that we need at this time in history to have a COO again. … [The change] is going to enable Bob [Stevens] to focus at a higher level to the needs of the customers, and it would mean that Chris would then be able to oversee the business operations, day to day."
On October 20, 2009 the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) announced it was making former GE Aviation Vice President Sean O’Keefe the CEO of its North American subsidiary, replacing Ralph Crosby. Importantly, Mr. Crosby “will retain his position as Chairman of EADS North America” and will “devote the ‘lion's share’ of his time to winning the competition for the next U.S. Air Force refueling tanker.” EADS Global CEO Louis Gallois stated “"It's not only continuity, because Ralph is staying with us. It's more than that. It's reinforcement of EADS North America, because we have big ambitions in the U.S."
What makes the hiring of Mr. O’Keefe interesting is his background, and what that background tells us about EADS’ intentions. At GE Aviation, Mr. O’Keefe was head of the company’s Washington operations. As astute readers realize, such a position is generally a euphemism for lobbyist. Indeed, one report calls him GE Aviation’s “top lobbyist.” Mr. O’Keefe also served as NASA Administrator during President George W. Bush’s first term. Before that, he “served as a top deputy at the White House Office of Management of Budget in 2001 and Secretary of the Navy from 1992-93.” In other words, he is the epitome of a Washington insider.
EAD’s strategy is fairly clear: adding O’Keefe to the executive leadership team positions the company to build on his deep Washington relationships as it attempts to win the next US Air Force tanker competition. This was confirmed by Mr. Crosby, who commented—
The expansion of our senior team and the assumption of leadership of our activities in the United States by Sean does mark another key milestone in the development of the company. He obviously brings the kinds of experience, capability, strategic mindset and focus that will add materially to taking us forward. I have the leadership on the tanker campaign, and that's the leadership of the tanker activity. That's an expansion of the team.
According to an article on www.defensenews.com, Mr. O’Keefe commented: "Ralph's task is to win this. … My task is to make sure that we perform when that is accomplished."
To sum up, we have tried to present a contrast between several companies in transition. All four companies are entering into rough waters containing potential storms and icebergs. While entering these risky waters, two companies have thinned their executive ranks while two other companies have augmented theirs. Time will tell who has made the correct strategic choice, but our money is on the companies focusing on deepening the experience of their executive leadership teams and enhancing their customer relationships.
Does Review of UK Acquisition Problems Contain Lessons for the USA?
Recently an independent review of the processes by which the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) acquires military equipment was published. The review, headed by Bernard Gray, spanned a year, and addressed two main issues: (1) the need to align acquisition planning with resource availability, and (2) the need to improve acquisition planning, management, and delivery. The 297-page report was “welcomed” by the MoD, according to this article at www.defense-aerospace.com.
There have been dozens, if not scores, of similar reports on the US Defense acquisition system. Some have been commissioned by Congress, others by the Pentagon, and still others by the President. Many of them have identified problems and recommended appropriate solutions. Yet the problems remain. A couple of years ago, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that cost overruns and schedule delays on the largest DOD development programs had stayed within the same band over the past 40 years—regardless of which party controlled Congress, regardless of who was President, and regardless of which acquisition reform initiative was in vogue. So it is with some cynicism that we reviewed Mr. Gray’s report on what might be done in the UK.
As the report states, “The overall picture may be familiar, but it does not look pretty. On average, these programmes cost 40% more than they were originally expected to, and are delivered 80% later than first estimates predicted. In sum, this could be expected to add up to a cost overrun of approximately £35bn, and an average overrun of nearly 5 years.”
Here are some of the report’s key findings:
- “… the Ministry of Defence has a substantially overheated equipment programme, with too many types of equipment being ordered for too large a range of tasks at too high a specification. This programme is unaffordable on any likely projection of future budgets.” The situation originates from competition by the individual military services for scarce procurement dollars, which creates a “systematic incentive to underestimate” program costs, and is exacerbated by the MoD’s reluctance to terminate programs experiencing cost-overruns. As Mr. Gray notes, “Unfortunately the current system is not able to flush out at an early stage the real costs of this equipment, nor does it make effective prioritisation or rationalisation decisions.”
- Much like the process in the USA, the UK’s acquisition budget is “dominated by a ‘bottom up’ aggregation process, which makes it hard for ‘top down’ strategic guidance to control the balance of investment. Effective forums do not currently exist to allow top down guidance to control the evolution of the equipment programme. With each force bidding for the highest specification product as a result of the system incentives, there is insufficient clarity over which systems need to be the most technologically advanced, and which could be used sensibly with an ‘80% solution’ that would field a certain capability that could be grown over time. As well as increasing risk by encouraging great technical leaps, it also militates against making products exportable, since the most sophisticated products may not be affordable in many markets.”
As the result of the foregoing issues, Mr. Gray reports that –
These forces and incentives create an over-large equipment programme, which contains within it a significant underestimate of the likely out-turn, making the programme even less affordable than it appears at any given moment in time. When this over-large and inflating programme meets the hard cash planning totals that the MoD can spend each year, the Department is left with no choice but to slow down its rate of spend on programmes across the board. The result is that programmes take significantly longer than originally estimated, because the Department cannot afford to build them at the originally planned rate. They also cost more than they would otherwise, because the overhead and working capital costs of keeping teams within industry and the MoD working on programmes for a much longer period soaks up additional cash. The MoD also has to bear significant costs in running on old equipment because the new equipment is not yet ready for service. … As well as costing significant sums, this squeeze on short-term cash expenditure in an effort to manage an over large programme has a number of other undesirable impacts. It reduces funds available for technology demonstration or risk-reduction activities, which might reduce risk in new procurements. It depresses spend in areas such as Research & Technology, where by their nature, budgets tend to be committed less far ahead, and so are vulnerable to a cash squeeze.
One of the report’s recommendations might be worth considering for adoption by U.S. policymakers. Among the various recommendations was the following:
- “… to give the MoD some chance of success … the MoD’s budgeting should be moved from the current short-term cycles to a 10-year rolling budget. The deal across government should be that the MoD’s programme should be brought into a genuine and transparent long-term balance, reported to Parliament and externally audited, and in return the MoD should be funded on a long-term basis that allows it to manage effectively. Parenthetically, the Review Team would also assert that this move to longterm budget control should also be used to reduce the excessive accuracy of in-year cash targets. The MoD, in trying to manage multi-billion pound, decade long programmes, is also required to hit short-term cash targets that would be considered impossibly precise in capital intensive industries in the private sector. Whilst the MoD is skilled at it, this targeting produces damaging programme management impacts and is extremely wasteful, both in terms of economic use of the available budget and processing/management effort, over the medium term.”
See the report here.
Just like in the U.S., the UK also has its industry groups, which work “to promote the interests of the defence sector and raise wider awareness of defence industrial issues.” A separate article on www.defense-aerospace.com reported that the UK Defence Industries Council “welcomes the publication of the report and the Government statements, and is strongly behind initiatives to reform defence procurement.” It has issued its own reports, which can be found here.
It seems that the USA is not alone in seeing an urgent need to reform the aerospace/defense acquisition system. The UK MoD faces similar problems and has received several recommendations to address them. Just as in the U.S., true reform will require a fundamental shift in how the legislative branch (i.e., Parliament) authorizes funds to the Defense Department (i.e., MoD). In the U.S., though, such heresy has not been well received. Perhaps the UK will undertake the difficult yet necessary reforms, and will reap commensurate benefits. We wish them the best of luck.
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Aerostats, Blimps, and Dreaded Zeppelins
The latest advance in battlefield intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is not the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). No, it’s the use of tethered aerostats as a platform for cameras, radars, and other surveillance equipment that monitor wide areas around important locations. In contrast to a blimp, which is a lighter-than-air powered vehicle, an aerostat has no ability to move under its own power and is tethered to the ground at a single location. Blimps (or dirigibles or zeppelins) were used on the battlefield in World War I, and aerostats were used in World War II as defenses against aerial assault, but such craft have rarely been seen on a battlefield since that time—until recently, when the US Military deployed them in Southwest Asia to enhance ISR systems. According to this story, something floating in the sky over Kandahar is “making the locals uneasy.” The article continues, “’Many people believe it's a spy blimp that can see through walls to look at our women,’ said [one Kandahar local] ‘People don't like it … some are saying they are going to shoot at it.’” The Afghan local is correct: it is a spy blimp—or, more accurately, an aerostat. And it’s not alone. It’s part of the RAID ISR system.

Since 2003, the Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) program has deployed more than 60 airborne systems (as well as 300 RAID towers) in Afghanistan, protecting Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and other critical locations as part of the US’ “persistent surveillance and dissemination system” (PSDS), used primarily by the Army and Marine Corps. The RAID system utilizes a 50-foot long aerostat carrying a 200 pound payload at heights of 1,000 feet. According to this article at Defense-Update.com:
RAID generally utilizes EO/IR sensors, radars, flash and acoustic gunshot detectors, to provide persistent, panoramic surveillance of the covered area, [that provide] timely warning of potential threats and other events …. The main sensor is an EO/IR payload, carrying a laser rangefinder, designator and target marker. In some configurations, radar, RF signal interceptors or gunshot detectors are employed, providing a primary scanning sensor pointing the EO/IR payload to points of interest, where movement or suspicious actions are detected. Other sensors can cue the RAID as well, including counter mortar radars such as the LCMR, which detects mortar attacks and can cue the RAID in seconds.
RAID sensor data is fed through standard radio links (SINCGARS and EPLRS) to the RAID ground control system, also known as Persistent Surveillance and Dissemination System (PSDS2) and Enhanced Tactical Automated Security System (eTASS). RAID systems provide essential situational awareness necessary for improved security and daily operations in and around the FOB. For example, convoy leaders check with RAID operators for 'road clear' indication before leaving the FOB.
Modern use of aerostats in the battlefield goes back at least 20 years to the early 1980’s, when (according to this report by the Congressional Research Service or CRS), “the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) [began] operating … at eight sites along the southern U.S. border and in the Caribbean. Currently, TARS’ primary mission is surveillance for drug interdiction. Each aerostat can lift 2,200 lbs of radar or other sensors to a height of 12,000 feet, and can detect targets out to 230 miles. The aerostat can stay aloft for months at a time.”
Another aerostat program called JLENS is an Army-led joint program that “seeks to use advanced sensor and networking technologies to conduct cruise missile defense.” According to the CRS report, “JLENS is seen by some to be an important test case for DOD’s network centric warfare approaches, because it is the centerpiece of a larger attempt to seamlessly link together numerous sensors across services to build a “single integrated air picture,” that will enable effective cruise missile defense.” (Emphasis in original.)
The High Altitude Airship or HAA is a Missile Defense Agency-funded Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration project focused on homeland defense. The CRS report states that “The HAA would operate at very high altitudes, up to 70,000 ft, and has been likened to a low flying, and relatively inexpensive satellite. This altitude might enable a small number of airships to surveill the entire United States.”
CRS also reports that “Since 1999, the Navy has explored a return to airships via the Littoral Airborne Sensor Hyperspectral (LASH) airship program. The LASH airship might be used for existing Navy missions such as anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, detecting chemical and biological weapons attacks, or mine countermeasures operations. Domestic agencies such as the Coast Guard may also be interested in LASH for antiterrorism and border security roles.”
On October 7, 2009 Lockheed Martin received a $133 million contract award for eight additional Persistent Threat Detection Systems (PTDS) to be added to the nine already deployed in theater. A PTDS aerostat is smaller than a TARS craft, according to an article at www.defenseindustrydaily.com. It is “115 feet long with 74,000 cubic feet of helium and a 1,102 pound payload.”
Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin proceeds with development of the Long-Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) in anticipation of a future contract award. Based on its existing P-791 design, the LEMV will be a 250 foot-long blimp (i.e., able to move under its own power) and will be designed to loiter at 20,000ft for up to 21 days carrying a 2,500lb ISR payload. The contract will require deployment within 18 months of award.
According to the linked AviationWeek.com article:
The LEMV is a hybrid airship - it's heavier than air, 80% of its lift coming from buoyancy and 20% from aerodynamics. Propulsion comes from six thrusters - three per side - powered by individual turbo-diesels for take-off and climb, and electrically from a central turbo-generator for loiter. And it's non-rigid, structural stability results from the three-lobe envelope design. The airship is also optionally piloted - flown manned for self-deployment and unmanned for persistent ISR missions.
An air cushion landing system allows the airship to be maneuvered for taxiing and take off, and sucks the vehicle down on to the ground - or sea surface - for landing, loading and unloading.
Hanging under the envelope, behind the sometimes-occupied cockpit, is a payload bay 40ft long, 15ft wide and 6-8ft tall - more than enough room to mount either a ground moving-target indication radar or multi-camera wide-area motion imagery sensor, plus a signals-intelligence payload and multiple EO/IR sensors.
It seems ironic that the latest ISR advance may harken back to century-old military technology. But sometimes old school is the way to go. (Though hopefully some lessons have been learned since then …)

DCAA Pile-on Redux: The House Armed Services Committee, Defense Acquisition Reform Panel
On October 15, 2009 the Defense Acquisition Reform Panel (DARP) of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) conducted a hearing entitled “Can the Department of Defense Protect Taxpayers When It Pays Its Contractors?” Unsurprisingly, the hearing was another pile-on for DCAA where the Government Accountability Office (GAO) rehashed its prior testimony before the Senate, the Committee Members went off, and DCAA Director Stephenson tried to deflect the attacks onto both DCMA and DOD contractors. In other words, it was just another day inside the Beltway.
DARP Chair Rob Andrews (D-New Jersey) opened the hearing with a “hypothesis” that “DOD will enter into risky contract types when they are not necessary” and that “DOD’s process for auditing and correctly paying bills submitted under riskier contracts will break down.” Chairman Andrews continued—
Today’s hearing is important not just because these problems have occurred, but because there is substantial disagreement between DOD and GAO over how best to mitigate risk in reimbursing its contractors. I anticipate that we will hear a vigorous debate today about how DOD can best organize its audit and contract management functions to both protect the taxpayer and serve the warfighter. And I should emphasize that this committee, as always, is highly attuned to the mission of serving the warfighter. In mitigating the risks of overpayment, we must not impede the timely delivery of critical war materiel. With the help of our witnesses today, we will try and find the right balance of these priorities.
Mr. Greg Kutz of the GAO added nothing new to his prior testimony before the Senate. He testified, “GAO found substantial evidence of widespread audit quality problems at DCAA. In the face of this evidence, DOD, Congress, and American taxpayers lack reasonable assurance that billions of dollars in federal contract payments are being appropriately scrutinized for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.”
DCAA Director April Stephenson offered a mixed bag of testimony spanning 30 double-spaced pages. She provided background on the audit agency, discussed “audit challenges,” and offered DCAA’s assessment on “vulnerabilities in the acquisition process.” In addition, she discussed actions the audit agency is taking in response to the various findings contained in recent GAO and DOD Inspector General reports. Following are some selected quotes that may be of interest.
- DCAA audit procedures include tests of key contractor internal controls that we believe a contractor business system should possess to ensure the Government’s interests are protected and the risk of contractor overpayments is minimized. DCAA performs these audits at contractor locations that charge significant contract costs to the Government. Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards require DCAA to report all significant deficiencies identified during its review of contractor business systems and to determine whether the deficiencies are considered material weaknesses. Comment: In fact, DCAA does NOT report all significant deficiencies in its internal control system review, nor does it distinguish between deficiencies and material weaknesses. Instead, it considers all findings to be significant deficiencies and assigns a binary pass/fail rating to the control systems. Its approach has been consistently criticized by GAO, DOD IG, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting.
- … of the top 100 DoD contractor segments that are audited by DCAA, approximately 69 percent have at least one business system with a significant internal control deficiency. Comment: DCAA audit metrics expect that 45 percent of all audits will contain at least one finding. Moreover, as GAO and DOD IG have both found significant issues with DCAA audit quality and support for its findings, such statistics should be considered suspect.
- During the life of cost reimbursable contracts, DCAA performs a number of audits covering contractor compliance with contract terms depending on the size of the contract and risk associated with the contractor. Comment: Outside of testing of direct costs incurred by contractors in Iraq and other Southwest Asia battlefields, DCAA does not normally perform testing of contract costs. Let’s repeat that for clarity: The Defense Contract Audit Agency does not normally audit contract costs. The audit agency does not even have an activity code for such audits.
- Although contractors recognize the need for DCAA access to records, there is often a disconnect on the expectation for “timely” access and contractors often delay auditors access to information in an attempt to stall the timely completion of audits. Such delays are unacceptable. One of the more significant complaints contractors have with DCAA is that we request too much data and have unrealistic due dates. These complaints are without merit and represent an attempt to impede DCAA audits. DCAA needs to be given real-time access to contractor records and people in order to perform effective audits. Comment: There is little evidence that DCAA’s lack of audit quality is tied to any attempt by contractors to “delay” or “impede” audits. To the contrary, contractors often point to DCAA’s delays in issuing audit reports as a source of frustration. Further, there is no evidence that DCAA’s audit quality would improve if it had “real-time access” to contractor records and personnel. Lack of access has not been a critical issue cited by GAO and DOD IG; instead, lack of evidentiary support for conclusions and lack of documentation related to changes in audit findings have been reported as key concerns by those two oversight agencies.
- Commercial item procurements are exempt from the protection of cost overpayments and excessive contract prices under the acquisition regulations, the Cost Accounting Standards, and the Truth in Negotiations Act. … The situation cannot be rectified unless the statutory definition of “commercial item” is amended and clarified appropriately. … DCAA believes that this language is a contract pricing vulnerability where fair and reasonable prices may not be established due to the lack of competition and the lack of a requirement for cost or pricing data. Comment: Although there have been some well-publicized misclassifications of acquisitions as commercial items, Ms. Stephenson ignores recent revisions to the FAR designed to remedy those problems. Moreover, the determination of what is (and what is not) a “commercial item” is a contracting officer determination, not an auditor determination – and there is no evidence of systemic misapplication of contracting officer judgment in this area.
- For example, a DCAA audit disclosed where a major contractor was earning profit in excess of 30 percent for a “competitively” awarded firm-fixed price contract. The contracting officer awarded the contract expecting to use full and open competition, which exempted the contractor from submitting cost or pricing data. However, the incumbent was the only contractor to bid on the contract. Due to the absence of other competitive bids and the absence of analysis of cost or pricing data, the contractor earned a windfall profit in excess of 30 percent. Comment: According to the FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii), the situation described met the definition of adequate competition. If the contractor received a “windfall profit” it was not because of a lack of competition.
- We recognize the GAO’s concerns and initiated a project in 2009 to reassess the manner in which DCAA tests contractor business systems. Although the auditing standards do not require that DCAA express an opinion on the adequacy of the contractors’ internal control systems, we did so to provide contracting officials meaningful information to approve or disapprove a contractor’s system as stipulated under the Federal Acquisition Regulations (i.e., the adequacy of the contractor’s internal control systems affects the accuracy and reliability of the underlying data processed and generated by the accounting system). We are currently assessing the type of systems DCAA will need to audit and the type of opinion to be provided. … We anticipate our revised processes will be tested in early FY 2010 starting with the contractor’s system for preparing interim and final billings to the Government. We envision the revised processes will consolidate testing of contractor billings currently performed in three different types of audits into a single audit. Comment: One of the most consistent criticisms of DCAA has been that the audit agency recently has created a binary pass/fail overall control system adequacy determination/recommendation without providing any discrimination between significant and insignificant findings. Another criticism has been that DCAA’s list of 10 contractor internal control systems is not based on regulatory guidance. Importantly, Ms. Stephenson did not address those concerns in her testimony; however, the potential reassessment of “the type of systems” and “the type of opinion” may lead to improvements in this area.
- In its recent review, the GAO concluded that DCAA’s independence was impaired primarily due to auditors providing input on draft corrections to internal control policies and procedures and then auditing the final policies and procedures. In several instances, the auditors issued a no-exception audit report when the contractor corrected the deficiencies during the audit. It is not uncommon for contractors with system deficiencies to seek input from the auditors while they are developing corrections to the systems. In many instances, providing feedback throughout the process expedites the correction of the deficiencies. However, the GAO has concluded that this “feedback” impairs the auditors’ objectivity as they will audit information that they have provided feedback on prior to implementation. We have corrected both of these issues. Auditors no longer provide feedback to contractors on draft corrections to systems and no longer remove deficiencies from audit reports when the deficiencies are corrected during the audit. Comment: This is an area in which GAO pressure is impeding the audit process; the “independence” issues that GAO identified are nothing more than communication between auditor and auditee, and should not be considered to be GAGAS violations. Performing a high-quality audit requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the auditor. Despite GAO’s concerns, it is patently ridiculous to prohibit auditors from identifying deficiencies that require corrective action, identifying the necessary action(s) that would result in the deficiencies being corrected (and communicating them to the contractor), and then confirming that those corrective actions have been implemented effectively. If the auditors can’t identify what corrective actions are necessary, how can they determine that the deficiencies have been corrected? Rather than acquiesce to GAO’s pressure, DCAA needs to rethink its position. If necessary, it should stop asserting that such audits are performed according to GAO’s idea of GAGAS.
Finally, Mr. Shay Assad (Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, & Technology) testified in a relatively reasonable and forthright manner. Following are some selected quotes that may be of interest.
- Occasionally, there are differences of opinion between the DCAA auditor and the contracting officer on audit findings. That is to be expected as DCAA is accounting oriented, while the contracting officer is business oriented, and must balance many factors and considers input from many technical advisors, including DCAA, in his decision-making process. Comment: Mr. Assad offered his office as arbiter between the two agencies. It is unclear whether Ms. Stephenson has, or would, agree to that offer—she may consider Mr. Assad’s position to be biased in favor of DCMA.
- The [GAO] report adopts a position that because DCAA is serving the interests of Contracting Officers, that DCAA is not auditing in the interest of the public. DCAA is a service organization created to provide financial information, audits, and advice to support decision making by DoD Contracting Officers. DCAA serves the public interest by providing timely and useful information to Contracting Officers. It is erroneous to imply that contracting officers do not seek to protect the public interest. The contracting officer is bound by regulation to meet the public interest in the broadest sense, for the entire matter surrounding a contract. The contracting officer, in the award and administration of a contract, is the government official responsible for insuring that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met. Any logic that presumes that by focusing on supporting contracting officials, DCAA somehow failed to act in the public interest is inappropriate in our view. … In order to perform these responsibilities, contracting officers should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgment. Comment: We agree with Mr. Assad’s assessment. The DCMA contracting officers have warrants for a reason: to act as authorized acquisition agents on behalf of the Federal government. To state (or imply) that they do not protect the public interest when they disagree with a DCAA audit recommendation betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of their role in the acquisition process.
- Timeliness is a critical element of quality. Delays in award have consequences to the warfighter. Contracting officers are required to consider those consequences and hence, they are very concerned that DCAA has not been able to consistently deliver timely reports and advice. … A contracting officer knows that delays can impact funding decisions and disrupt program management plans. Contracts are often interrelated and codependent, such that a delay in awarding one contract can delay an entire system and put off fielding dates, with consequences distributed and cascading through a range of other contracts and plans, and might ultimately result in mission failure. The contracting officer, also by regulation, has to consider and respect the opinions of other specialists and not just that of the auditor. A good audit in time is better than an extraordinary audit that is late and never used. An audit is a tool the contracting officer uses to negotiate a contract, but in order to realize the benefits of the auditor’s work, the audit must be timely. (Emphasis in original.) Comment: We agree with Mr. Assad’s comments; however, we are concerned that such sound bites will not play well and thus they may be ignored. DCAA has walked back from timeliness metrics imposed on its auditors, while focusing on timeliness standards imposed on contractors. Meanwhile, it still has not found the formula to issuing high quality audit reports and instead imposed multiple layers of management reviews, thus delaying audit reports that are still of dubious quality and usefulness to its DCMA contracting officer customers.
- DCAA should use auditing standards and techniques that produce creditable information that can be relied upon by the contracting community in the awarding and administrating of contracting. However, we believe that all DCAA reports and reviews types should be examined to determine if the standard being applied and reported by DCAA is the appropriate standard given the requirement causing the audit or review to be performed. Comment: Again we agree and urge DCAA to consider excluding certain audits/reviews from GAGAS in order to permit auditors to exercise sound discretion and engage in open communication with those being audited, in order to minimize unnecessarily duplicative audits and follow-ups.
- The nature of the review program for any given contractor should not have changed due to placement on Direct Billing. … Where DCAA believed based on past performance or poor systems that there was a significant chance of improper billing, the contractor was not to be included in the Direct Billing program. The review program for the contractors should have been the same as it would have been based on risk factors even if there was no Direct Billing program. The problem with voucher reviews both before the Direct Billing program and after the initiation of the program is that DCAA did not have sufficient staff to perform the reviews required by the risk-based analysis. New contractors and problem contractors should have voucher reviews before payment just as required by DCAA policy. Established contractors with adequate past performance should have vouchers reviewed after payment using a reasonable plan tailored to the contractor’s circumstances just as required by DCAA guidance. Changing the decision authority for participation in Direct Billing should have no impact on what vouchers are reviewed. Taking a contractor off of the program does not ensure that the vouchers will be properly reviewed prior to payment if there is not sufficient staff to perform the reviews. Comment: Again we agree but note that DCAA has not implemented this point of view in their audits of contractors who are not authorized for Direct Billing. In our experience, DCAA auditors spend the majority of their time either auditing new business cost proposals or invoices/vouchers related to existing contracts, leaving little time to address contractor internal control systems, compliance with CAS, or other matters.
For those interested, we offer a video record of the hearing here.
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