DOD Announces that DCAA Director April Stephenson is Moving On
On October 26, 2009 DCAA Director April Stephenson transmitted an email from Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Mr. Robert Hale to all DCAA employees, announcing that she was leaving the agency she had helmed for 21 months, in order to accept “reassignment to an SES [Senior Executive Service] position” on Mr. Hale’s staff, effective November 8, 2009. Replacing Ms. Stephenson will be Mr. Pat Fitzgerald, currently the Auditor General of the U.S. Army. In making the announcement, Mr. Hale wrote:
DCAA remains a critical part of the acquisition process. The strong and capable staff at DCAA, coupled with hard work from all of you, helps DoDacquire the best goods and services for our warfighters at reasonable prices. We must carefully address the concerns raised about DCAA in recent reports issued by the GAO and the DoDIG. I want to work with Mr. Fitzgerald and the Agency's employees to address those concerns in ways thatstrengthen the organization and permit it to continue performing its important role.
In her transmittal, Ms. Stephenson wrote:
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the employees of DCAA for their tireless efforts in auditing contractor costs. … Without the efforts of all DCAA employees, billions of dollars of contractor overpayments and unallowable costs would go undetected. FY 2009 was a challenging year with the implementation of many improvements across the Agency. I appreciate the dedication and can-do attitude of the DCAA workforce. The many employee suggestions received throughout the year were essential in developing new initiatives and refining prior processes. Although I will be moving on to new challenges, the employees of DCAA will always be in my heart.
The move was not entirely unexpected. Followers of this site are aware of the intense barrage of criticism Ms. Stephenson and the DCAA have received over the past 15 months. Candidly, much of the criticism was misdirected, and in any case focused on issues that occurred literally years before Ms. Stephenson took over as Director, replacing Bill Reed, who had led the agency for more than 20 years. While there is certainly much to criticize regarding DCAA audit quality, surprisingly little attention was paid to the audit process that leads, time after time, to protracted disputes between the Defense Department and its contractors. We offered some suggestions as “lessons learned” here.
FederalTimes.com reported that Navy Commander Darryn James, DOD spokesperson, stated that the change is being made “because DoD leaders feel he [Fitzgerald] is the best-qualified person to continue making improvements at DCAA. This reassignment is intended to bring in a new leader at DCAA, with a fresh perspective and ideas.”
According to the FederalTimes.com article, Senator Joe Lieberman issued a statement in which he said: “I hope that the DoD comptroller as well as the incoming DCAA director will continue to bring outside auditing expertise into the agency, strengthen quality control, improve training at all levels of DCAA, and prioritize audits based on the risk of contractor over-billings as well as waste, fraud and abuse.”
So who is Mr. Patrick Fitzgerald? Currently, he leads the U.S. Army Audit Agency, established in 1946 to perform “auditing services on an Army-wide basis within the zone of the interior, including the civil appropriations of the War Department.” In 1947, “War Department General Order Number 83 stipulated that the Army Audit Agency was responsible for both the operational performance and technical supervision of audits within the zone of the interior. General Order No. 83 further stated that the Army Audit Agency was charged with the technical supervision of audit operations in oversea commands.” Currently, the Army Audit Agency’s staff of 600 “is organized into 17 functional audit teams and 6 smaller divisions” and includes 23 field offices, 3 overseas offices, and an operations center in Alexandria, Virginia. In a nutshell, the USAAA is the Army’s internal audit team.
Mr. Fitzgerald will face some immediate challenges, not the least of which is ramping up from managing a staff of 600 to managing a growing staff of 4,200. There is also the issue of managing the expectations of multiple customers. Instead of focusing solely on meeting the needs of the Army, DCAA has to meet the needs of a diverse set of stakeholders, including those from all military services as well as several from outside the Defense Department. Nonetheless, Mr. Fitzgerald has a running start, as he has been leading the DCAA Oversight Committee tasked with overseeing DCAA remedial management actions taken in response to the scathing July 2008 GAO report that first brought the audit agency’s shortcomings to the public’s eye. As Mr. Hale testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “The committee is made up of the Auditors General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP); and the DoD Deputy General Counsel for Acquisition and Technology. This senior group will assess DCAA’s activities and the actions taken to correct problems identified by GAO and others.”
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) opined that removing Ms. Stephenson “won’t fix the Agency’s problems.” POGO quickly released the following statement:
Contractors have been on a rampage fighting new requirements being placed upon them by DCAA for the past year. Removing the Director of DCAA does not address congressional and taxpayer concerns that this agency lacks the independence and clout necessary to serve taxpayer interests. It would be unfortunate and ironic if congressional inquiries into the independence and strength of DCAA ultimately serves to strengthen the hand of contractors.
An article on GovExec.com quoted POGO’s Executive Director as saying, “"I think this is a mistake. I don't think April was the problem. Removing the director of DCAA does not address congressional and taxpayer concerns that this agency lacks the independence and clout necessary to serve taxpayer interests. It would be unfortunate and ironic if congressional inquiries into the independence and strength of DCAA ultimately serves to strengthen the hand of contractors.”
In our view, Ms. Stephenson inherited an intractable set of problems from her predecessor, not the least of which was a dysfunctional management culture and a “check the box” audit mentality that penalized auditors for thoroughness at the same time it failed to penalize them for obvious quality problems. She had the helm of the ship for 21 months, however; and at some point it became her watch and her problem to solve. It became her management team and it became about her ability to empower the staff to excellence. But rather than making the fundamental changes necessary to address the root causes of the audit agency’s problems, she chose to focus instead on attacking DCMA contracting officers and DOD contractors, blaming them for many of the problems she faced. The audit guidance issued under her leadership was tainted with an air of draconian arbitrariness—to the point that even the audit supervisors in the field were uncomfortable implementing it. While Mr. Fitzgerald faces many of the same issues Ms. Stephenson faced, as an outsider he is beholden to nobody in the current management team and thus has the ability to make wholesale changes, if he wishes to do so. Moreover, one would suppose he has the backing of Under Secretary Hale—and perhaps Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Director Shay Assad—so he should have the clout to implement the necessary changes that will return DCAA to its former position as the preeminent Government audit agency.
Augustine Commission Releases Final Report: “It really is rocket science”
On October 22, 2009 the “Augustine Commission” (aka The Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee) released its final report entitled, “Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation.” We have previously reported on the Commission’s interim discussions and findings, here and here. Capping a nine month effort by a prestigious group of 10 members, the report painted a bleak picture. The Commission concluded—
The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources. Space operations are among the most demanding and unforgiving pursuits ever undertaken by humans. … Space operations become all the more difficult when means do not match aspirations. Such is the case today.
*****
Once the Shuttle is retired, there will be a gap in the capability of the United States itself to launch humans into space. That gap will extend until the next U.S. human-rated launch system becomes available. The Committee estimates that, under the current plan, this gap will be at least seven years. There has not been this long a gap in U.S. human launch capability since the U.S. human space program began. … The Committee did not identify any credible approach employing new capabilities that could shorten the gap to less than six years. The only way to significantly close the gap is to extend the life of the Shuttle Program. The Committee did not identify any credible approach employing new capabilities that could shorten the gap to less than six years. The only way to significantly close the gap is to extend the life of the Shuttle Program.
One of the key findings of the report was that NASA’s funding is insufficient to accomplish its mission. The table below illustrates that NASA”s budget, as a percentage of Federal spending, has declined from a high of 4.5% (in 1965) to approximately 0.5% today.

As the Commission stated, “Within the current structure of the budget, NASA essentially has the resources either to build a major new system or to operate one, but not to do both. This is the root cause of the gap in capability of launching crew to low-Earth orbit under the current budget and will likely be the source of other gaps in the future.”
Another key aspect of the report was that the path to Mars goes through the Moon. In other words, the Commission endorsed a “moon-first” strategy, followed by what it called the “flexible path” to Mars strategy, which is illustrated below.

Another view of the “flexible path” strategy is illustrated below.

The Commission concluded: “Mars is the ultimate destination for human exploration of the inner solar system; but it is not the best first destination. Both visiting the Moon First and following the Flexible Path are viable exploration strategies. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive; before traveling to Mars, we might be well served to both extend our presence in free space and gain experience working on the lunar surface.”
The Augustine Commission reported the following conclusions:
- Human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline.
- Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less-constrained budget, ramping up to approximately $3 billion per year in real purchasing power above the FY 2010 guidance in total resources.
- Funding at the increased level would allow either an exploration program to explore the Moon First or one that follows a Flexible Path of exploration. Either could produce results in a reasonable timeframe.
See the entire, impressive, report here.
We can only hope that the Obama Administration considers the report, and its findings and recommendations, with the same care that was put into it.
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FAR Case 2008-020: Public Comments to the Proposed Rule
We previously posted our opinion of the FAR Councils’ proposed rule whose intent was ostensibly to “improve” the contract closeout process. As we noted at the time, the proposed FAR revisions would “significantly expand the powers of DCAA, and will force contractors to comply with arbitrary DCAA demands or risk monetary penalties.”
The public comment period closed October 19, 2009. The comments received by the FAR Councils were published on the Federal rulemaking site (www.regulations.gov). What did the commenters think about the proposed rule?
From LeGacy Resource Corporation (a Woman-owned 8(a) business currently under contract with NASA to perform contract close-outs):
Overall evaluation: The proposed changes may facilitate closeout in that additional guidance may reduce the number of inadequate indirect cost proposals. However, procurement regulations only address one side of the problem. To significantly improve the closeout process, government need to emphasize its role in closeout including the timely finalization of indirect rates which include that DCAA completing audits of indirect cost proposals and administrative contracting officers settling rates, signing off on reports, doing plant clearances, etc. etc.
From Mildred Klee (private citizen):
Adding the term ‘adequate’ to ‘the contractor shall submit …an adequate indirect cost rate proposal’ is inappropriate because DCAA has assigned a unique meaning to the term, a meaning inconsistent with other sections of the provision. DCAA has historically interpreted the term ‘adequate’ to mean identical to DCAA’s incurred cost model regardless of need, risk, or materiality. DCAA typically ignores provision requirements for flexibility, for considering business size and type and working ‘together’ to make the process as efficient as possible. As presented, the DCAA incurred cost model is an example; the model was never intended to dictate information content.
*****
The provision requires the cognizant auditor to make a written determination of adequacy but does not state a time limitation for doing so, nor does the provision require the auditor to explain determinations of inadequacy. Time limitations are required for the same reason limitations are placed on contractors; timely close-out reduces cost and risk. Moreover, time limitations should be established for completing audits.
*****
The proposed statement that ‘The proposal must be supported with adequate supporting data, which may be required subsequent to proposal submission’ is repetitious and unnecessary. The need for supporting data is well understood; there is little need to state the obvious. Moreover, the statement adds a level of subjectivity as contractors guess at what information ‘may be required’ subsequent to submission.
From Beason & Nalley (a regional accounting firm):
Although the proposed rule is ostensibly to streamline contract closeout, it appears to be a regulation to legitimize DCAA’s long standing insistence that an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal be inclusive of several mandatory schedules and supplemental information as represented by DCAA within its Model Incurred Cost Proposal (ICP), as stipulated in the DCAA Pamphlet No. 7641.90.
Subsequent to the FAR Council’s publication of FAC 97-03, which rejected DCAA’s suggestion for a number of mandatory schedules, DCAA has made numerous revisions to the Model ICP with such revisions operating outside the bounds of the rulemaking process. Nonetheless, DCAA field auditors and field offices continue to assert that its Model ICP is a contractual requirement based upon the current wording in FAR 42.705 and the then current Model ICPpublished in a DCAA document. Given DCAA’s track record of misinterpreting existing regulations, it is inconceivable that FAR 42.705-1 would also be revised to solely assign DCAA the responsibility of determining the adequacy of contractor ICPs. In fact, assigning DCAA sole responsibility will be in direct conflict with FAR 42.705-1(b)(1) which states ‘The contractor, contracting officer and auditor must work together to make the proposal, audit, and negotiation process as efficient as possible’. As currently interpreted by DCAA and as stated in FAR Case 2008-020, the definition of an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal is designed almost exclusively for audit efficiency regardless of the administrative cost and inefficiencies for a contractor to develop certain schedules and regardless of the lack of any demonstrated connection to streamlining contract closeout.
*****
Although the Model ICP requirements have long been asserted by DCAA as a key component in solving contract close-out issues, there is little empirical evidence supporting that assertion. There has been success in closing out large numbers of contracts; however, the single factor in achieving such success had little or nothing to do with the expansive ‘requirements’ for extensive cost schedules identified within the DCAA Model ICP. In fact, the most noteworthysuccess was merely the application of common sense in closing out huge numbers of task orders (individually a contract); specifically, the use of audit sampling applied to batch processing of final vouchers as opposed to audits of 100% of the task orders. Similarly, quick close-out rates appropriately used have facilitated contract close-outs.
*****
… access to records and the associated audit(s) should be of the contractor’s ‘books and records’ as was the case for years before DCAA created and continuously modified the Model ICP to primarily achieve audit efficiencies with no regard for the hidden costs for contractors faced with constantly changing definitions of adequate ICPs.
*****
… the Model ICP (the required and the supplemental schedules) should be recognized for its primary purpose which has only a tangential connection to facilitating contract closeouts. The majority of the schedules were designed or otherwise evolved to shift resource costs from DCAA to the contractor at a time when DCAA was faced with declining resources. The strategy is to require the contractor to complete a schedule(s) in a very specific DCAA format, thus reducing or eliminating DCAA auditor time to perform an audit step.
From Rockwell Collins (a mid-size defense contractor):
The Performance Standards published at FAR 1.102-2 list (a) minimizing administrative operating costs, (b) risk avoidance versus risk management, (c) the exercise of discretion and sound business judgment, and (d) the desire to maximize efficiencies by promulgating rules, regulations and policies only when their benefits clearly exceed the costs of their development, implementation, administration and enforcement. The volume of information required, and the level of detail required by the proposed rule is unprecedented, unreasonable, far beyond that required to protect the interests of the Government, and clearly does not comply with the intent and spirit of FAR Part 1 in general and FAR Subpart 1.102-2 …
*****
FAR 1.102-2(c)(3) provides that all contractors will be treated fairly but need not be treated the same. FAR 1.102-4(d) provides that the FAR system will foster cooperative relationships between the Government and its contractors. Using the regulatory process to mandate over-reaching, intrusive audit guidance violates these overarching principles.
From the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA):
The approach taken fails to improve the process and unnecessarily creates additional and very significant process and administrative problems. It:
- Creates a review process within which there is little latitude for contracting officers to resolve administrative disagreements between auditors and contractors,
- Does not define time requirements which all parties, not just contractors, must meet,
- Establishes excessive and unnecessary data requirements, and
- Creates a punitive set of penalties which appear to be based on the predetermined assumption that only one party, the contractor, is delaying the process.
*****
The Councils state that these changes do not impose additional information collection requirements to the paperwork burden. We do not concur. The specific requirement that the myriad of schedules must be completed in order to receive a determination of adequacy, the specificity of each schedule requirement and the lack of flexibility for the contracting officer to mitigate a requirement which is even greater than what is currently only a suggested format will result in significant additional effort to produce reports that contractors, in part, do not now produce.
*****
We believe that the proposed rule will result in a significant reduction in the number of contracts that can be closed out using this procedure and thus, instead of improving the contract closeout process, will achieve the opposite effect.
From the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA):
… the proposed rule is disappointing because it fails to balance the shared contractor, contracting officer, and auditor responsibility for the contract closeout process. Instead, the proposed rule shifts contract closeout from a collaborative process to a confrontational one by mandating fee withholds, allowing auditors to make unilateral determinations and imposing submission of unrelated data requirements for final indirect cost rate proposals, which go beyond the definition of a ‘record’ necessary to support those proposals.
*****
Preparing and providing unnecessary information would be a costly and counterproductive distraction and would likely degrade the timeliness of indirect rate settlement agreements.
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The Federal Register notice states that ‘The Councils do not expect this proposed rule to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities … because the rule does not impose any additional requirements on small businesses.’ We disagree strongly with this conclusion. By requiring preparation and submittal of DCAA’s Model Incurred Cost Proposal and by withholding fees this proposed rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
From Darrell Oyer & Co (Government contract accounting consulting firm):
Some of the information proposed to be required for an adequate submission is not necessary … The purpose of the Indirect Cost Submission is not to prepare work papers for the cognizant auditor. Preparation of work papers is the purview of the auditor, whose independence could be challenged if a contractor is required or permitted to prepare the work papers.
From the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA):
We do not believe that the proposed revision … to the Quick-closeout limitation relating to unsettled costs protects the Government’s interests. The current FAR limitation states that the unsettled indirect costs allocated to the contract cannot exceed 15% of the total contractor unsettled indirect costs. The proposed rule states that unsettled direct and indirect costs cannot exceed 20% of the total contract costs. DCAA believes that setting the limitation at 20% of contract costs violates the intent of the quick-closeout provision and places the Government in a position of unacceptable risk. … Although we concur that the base for determining the significance of costs should be revised to contract costs in lieu of the contractor’s total costs, we believe the percentage is too high. We recommend a percentage of 10 percent or less. … The Government should not sacrifice due diligence in protecting the taxpayers from potential overcharges with the need for contract closeout. [Emphasis in original.]
Based on the foregoing, it seems clear that the majority of commenters opposed the proposed FAR revisions. We can only hope that the FAR Councils are listening to the public input, and that they make significant revisions to the proposed rules before finalization. Better the current molasses-like state than the prescriptive, restrictive, and wholly unworkable structure outlined in the initial rulemaking effort.
See all the public comments here.
Looking for Fraud in All the Wrong Places

Mr. Gregory Garrett, CPCM, C.P.M., PMP, and NCMA Fellow, wrote an article entitled “Risk Management in Government Contracting: Common Myths and Best Practices” in the October 2009 edition of Contract Management magazine. The article was a “modified extract” from his book Risk Management for Complex U.S. Government Contracts (NCMA, 2009). While there was much to commend (and some areas to nitpick), we thought one of his “common myths” was interesting enough to write about.
Myth #8: All government contractors are crooks!
According to Mr. Garrett, “Most government contractors are honest, reliable, and dedicated companies … [u]nfortunately, there is a relatively small percentage of government contractors who do act illegally and their bad actions are frequently and widely publicized … creating a very negative perception of the industry as a whole.”
We think Mr. Garrett is spot-on. Moreover, we think too much Government time, resources and money have been devoted to detecting contractor misdeeds, while not enough time, resources and money have been devoted to detecting misdeeds on the part of government officials. Our perception is that there are nearly as many bad actors in the ranks of the military and civil servants as there are in the contractors that support them. Two recent stories are offered as evidence for our position.
In the first story, on October 20, 2009 the Department of Justice (DoJ) announced that an Army Sergeant who had been deployed at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan had pleaded guilty to charges of “bribery and a money-laundering conspiracy arising out of her work administering transportation services.”
According to the charges, Ana C. Chavez accepted $90,000 in cash and wire transfers as a bribe from an unnamed DOD contractor in return for Chavez exercising her influence at the Transportation Operations Support Office in the award of contracts and work orders to that contractor’s company. “Chavez gave a portion of the bribe proceeds to another DOD contractor working at Bagram Airfield, with whom she conspired to launder the money through various bank accounts held by Chavez’s associates in the United States. According to the court documents, the alleged conduct began at least in or about February 2005 and continued until September 2006.”
Chavez agreed to pay the $90,000 to the U.S. Government as restitution, and faces up to 35 years in prison, plus a potential fine that could range up to $770,000, depending on circumstances.
In the second story, GovExec.com posted on October 21, 2009 an AP wire story reporting that a State Department program manager was arrested for allegedly “taking tens of thousands of dollars in bribes and kickbacks on contracts for Iraq reconstruction work.” According to the article, Mr. Richard Razo began taking bribes from a subcontractor (Hayder Al Batat starting in 2005 while Mr. Razo worked as a security and logistics manager in Iraq for Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc., (ITSI) a government contractor headquartered in Walnut Creek, Calif. An affidavit filed with the court revealed that "Razo provided H. Al Batat with contract documents, assisted H. Al Batat in preparing his company's bids and shared competitors' bid information with H. Al Batat thereby enabling H. Al Batat to underbid competitors.” Mr. Razo joined the State Department in August 2008, where "continued his scheme to obtain bribes in return for the award of U.S. government contracts to Iraqi contractors,” according to the affidavit.
The article reports that, according to the affidavit:
[Razo] used his new authority to pressure Al Batat's brother, Yahya, who also owned a construction and did work in the area Razo had been assigned to…. In numerous e-mails, Razo told Yahya Al Batat he wanted the $22,500 his brother allegedly owed him ‘prior to his award of any future business.’ The court records also allege that Razo targeted seven contracts worth $2.7 million that would go to Yahya Al Batat's company and another firm. Razo would take a total of $144,000 in fees for the arrangement. The contracts were awarded in that order. It's not clear how much Razo received, however. The affidavit states that while home in the U.S. on leave in late 2008, he made three separate cash deposits into his bank account totaling $13,500.
How was Mr. Razo caught? According to the article, Al Batat “was the subject of a previous federal investigation into alleged kickbacks on construction contracts. That inquiry led investigators to e-mails between Al Batat and Razo.” So it wasn’t any management oversight or internal controls that identified Razo’s wrongdoings; it was old-fashioned detective work.
As savvy readers know, the FAR was recently revised to mandate that contractors have codes of ethics/business conduct, have effective control systems that detect violations, and (when criminal violations related to a contract are detected) mandate reporting of those violations. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) recently revised its audit guidance to focus on evaluations of those contractor systems. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in which it opined that DOD wasn’t doing enough to verify the effectiveness of those systems. The Commission on Wartime Contracting blasted everybody in sight for ineffective contractor “business systems” that allegedly permitted “millions of dollars” of Iraq/Afghanistan battlefield support contractor overbillings to the DOD. It’s a rare week when somebody (usually a politician) is not attacking DOD contractors for fraud, waste, and/or abuse.
Which brings us back to our original point: Where is a similar focus on Governmental wrongdoing? Why does the spotlight only point at contractors, and not those who manage them? For every stone cast at a contractor, it seems that another one could be thrown at the Federal government’s house of glass. Yet the magnifying glass of scrutiny and accompanying outrage seems directed solely in one direction. We think that situation needs to change. We think the Federal government needs to get serious about cleaning its own house, by implementing and enforcing strong internal controls designed to detect and deter wrongdoing committed by its employees. When both contractor and Government manager are subject to the same level of scrutiny and outrage, we might see a real reduction in procurement corruption.
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