Does Review of UK Acquisition Problems Contain Lessons for the USA?
 Recently an independent review of the processes by which the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) acquires military equipment was published. The review, headed by Bernard Gray, spanned a year, and addressed two main issues: (1) the need to align acquisition planning with resource availability, and (2) the need to improve acquisition planning, management, and delivery. The 297-page report was “welcomed” by the MoD, according to this article at www.defense-aerospace.com.
There have been dozens, if not scores, of similar reports on the US Defense acquisition system. Some have been commissioned by Congress, others by the Pentagon, and still others by the President. Many of them have identified problems and recommended appropriate solutions. Yet the problems remain. A couple of years ago, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that cost overruns and schedule delays on the largest DOD development programs had stayed within the same band over the past 40 years—regardless of which party controlled Congress, regardless of who was President, and regardless of which acquisition reform initiative was in vogue. So it is with some cynicism that we reviewed Mr. Gray’s report on what might be done in the UK.
As the report states, “The overall picture may be familiar, but it does not look pretty. On average, these programmes cost 40% more than they were originally expected to, and are delivered 80% later than first estimates predicted. In sum, this could be expected to add up to a cost overrun of approximately £35bn, and an average overrun of nearly 5 years.”
Here are some of the report’s key findings:
- “… the Ministry of Defence has a substantially overheated equipment programme, with too many types of equipment being ordered for too large a range of tasks at too high a specification. This programme is unaffordable on any likely projection of future budgets.” The situation originates from competition by the individual military services for scarce procurement dollars, which creates a “systematic incentive to underestimate” program costs, and is exacerbated by the MoD’s reluctance to terminate programs experiencing cost-overruns. As Mr. Gray notes, “Unfortunately the current system is not able to flush out at an early stage the real costs of this equipment, nor does it make effective prioritisation or rationalisation decisions.”
- Much like the process in the USA, the UK’s acquisition budget is “dominated by a ‘bottom up’ aggregation process, which makes it hard for ‘top down’ strategic guidance to control the balance of investment. Effective forums do not currently exist to allow top down guidance to control the evolution of the equipment programme. With each force bidding for the highest specification product as a result of the system incentives, there is insufficient clarity over which systems need to be the most technologically advanced, and which could be used sensibly with an ‘80% solution’ that would field a certain capability that could be grown over time. As well as increasing risk by encouraging great technical leaps, it also militates against making products exportable, since the most sophisticated products may not be affordable in many markets.”
As the result of the foregoing issues, Mr. Gray reports that –
These forces and incentives create an over-large equipment programme, which contains within it a significant underestimate of the likely out-turn, making the programme even less affordable than it appears at any given moment in time. When this over-large and inflating programme meets the hard cash planning totals that the MoD can spend each year, the Department is left with no choice but to slow down its rate of spend on programmes across the board. The result is that programmes take significantly longer than originally estimated, because the Department cannot afford to build them at the originally planned rate. They also cost more than they would otherwise, because the overhead and working capital costs of keeping teams within industry and the MoD working on programmes for a much longer period soaks up additional cash. The MoD also has to bear significant costs in running on old equipment because the new equipment is not yet ready for service. … As well as costing significant sums, this squeeze on short-term cash expenditure in an effort to manage an over large programme has a number of other undesirable impacts. It reduces funds available for technology demonstration or risk-reduction activities, which might reduce risk in new procurements. It depresses spend in areas such as Research & Technology, where by their nature, budgets tend to be committed less far ahead, and so are vulnerable to a cash squeeze.
One of the report’s recommendations might be worth considering for adoption by U.S. policymakers. Among the various recommendations was the following:
- “… to give the MoD some chance of success … the MoD’s budgeting should be moved from the current short-term cycles to a 10-year rolling budget. The deal across government should be that the MoD’s programme should be brought into a genuine and transparent long-term balance, reported to Parliament and externally audited, and in return the MoD should be funded on a long-term basis that allows it to manage effectively. Parenthetically, the Review Team would also assert that this move to longterm budget control should also be used to reduce the excessive accuracy of in-year cash targets. The MoD, in trying to manage multi-billion pound, decade long programmes, is also required to hit short-term cash targets that would be considered impossibly precise in capital intensive industries in the private sector. Whilst the MoD is skilled at it, this targeting produces damaging programme management impacts and is extremely wasteful, both in terms of economic use of the available budget and processing/management effort, over the medium term.”
See the report here.
Just like in the U.S., the UK also has its industry groups, which work “to promote the interests of the defence sector and raise wider awareness of defence industrial issues.” A separate article on www.defense-aerospace.com reported that the UK Defence Industries Council “welcomes the publication of the report and the Government statements, and is strongly behind initiatives to reform defence procurement.” It has issued its own reports, which can be found here.
It seems that the USA is not alone in seeing an urgent need to reform the aerospace/defense acquisition system. The UK MoD faces similar problems and has received several recommendations to address them. Just as in the U.S., true reform will require a fundamental shift in how the legislative branch (i.e., Parliament) authorizes funds to the Defense Department (i.e., MoD). In the U.S., though, such heresy has not been well received. Perhaps the UK will undertake the difficult yet necessary reforms, and will reap commensurate benefits. We wish them the best of luck.
FAC 2005-37: It’s Contractor Smackdown Time!
 On October 12, 2009 Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 2005-37 was published in the Federal Register, notifying Federal contractors that the FAR was (once again) being revised. The FAC announced implementation of several “interim rules” (i.e., rules having immediate effect but not considered to be final rules pending receipt of public comments). There were also a couple of final rules announced as well. As a broad characterization, we think the revisions are going to pose some difficulty for contractors. However, since the new rules mainly implement statutory direction from Congress, there is not much that can be done about them.
A summary of the FAC can be found here. It should be noted that each of the revisions discussed herein apply only to solicitations and/or contracts issued by the Department of Defense (DOD), General Services Administration (GSA), or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The revisions do not apply to any other Federal agency.
Of particular interest to Apogee Consulting, Inc. and its clients are the following rule changes:
- A final rule amends the FAR at 6.302-2 to require that any contracts awarded under the “unusual and compelling urgency” rule (which permits contracts to be awarded without full and open competition) must have periods of performance that are strictly limited to the time necessary to meet those circumstances. The rule further limits the periods of performance of such contracts to the time necessary to enter into another contract via use of competitive procedures. In any case, the rule limits the periods of performance of any unusual and compelling urgency noncompetitive awards to one year, unless the head of the contracting agency determines that “exceptional circumstances apply.” The rule applies to all awards in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold, but does not apply to all Federal agencies.
- A final rule amends the FAR to implement, without change, an interim rule originally published on March 31, 2009 at 74 FR 14649. The rule revises the “audit access to records” clauses (e.g., 52.214-26 and 52.215-2 to require contractors to permit “the Comptroller General of the United States, or authorized representatives,” to interview any current employee regarding transactions judged directly pertinent to the contract. I.e., this rule requires contractors to permit GAO personnel (but not DCAA auditors) access to current employees as part of their audits. The rule applies to all contracts that contain the revised clauses but does not apply to Part 12 commercial item contracts.
- An interim rule amends the FAR at 15.403-1 to revise the current prohibition on obtaining cost or pricing data for acquisitions of certain commercial services. Below is the full text of the modified rule:
(A) When purchasing services that are not offered and sold competitively in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace, but are of a type offered and sold competitively in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace, they may be considered commercial items (thus meeting the purpose of 41 U.S.C 254b and 10 U.S.C. 2306a for truth in negotiations) only if the contracting officer determines in writing that the offeror has submitted sufficient information to evaluate, through price analysis, the reasonableness of the price of such services.
(B) In order to make this determination, the contracting officer may request the offeror to submit prices paid for the same or similar commercial items under comparable terms and conditions by both Government and commercial customers; and
(C) If the contracting officer determines that the information described in paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(B) of this section is not sufficient to determine the reasonableness of price, other relevant information regarding the basis for price or cost, including information on labor costs, material costs and overhead rates may be requested.
- An interim rule amends the FAR at 15.408 and 31.203 to make unallowable indirect costs that meet the definition of “excessive pass-through charge” as defined in a new solicitation provision (52.215-22) and contract clause (52.215-23). The new provision defines “excessive pass-through charge” as “a charge to the Government by the Contractor or subcontractor that is for indirect costs or profit/fee on work performed by a subcontractor (other than charges for the costs of managing subcontracts and any applicable indirect costs and associated profit/fee based on such costs)” when the contractor or subcontractor “adds no or negligible value” to a contract or subcontract. It requires a contractor or subcontractor to notify the government contracting officer when the value of subcontracts exceed (or are planned to exceed) 70 percent of the total cost of work to be performed under any contract, task order or delivery order. The notification must include “verification” that the contractor or subcontractor will add value. Moreover, if the actual amount of subcontracted work exceeds 70 percent of total contract cost during performance (even though that amount of subcontracting was not initially planned), then the contractor or subcontractor must report to the contracting officer as it would have during the proposal phase. These requirements are similar to those imposed on DOD contractors through prior revisions to the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS), but now the rules apply to GSA and NASA contracts as well.
- An interim rule amends the FAR at Part 16 to:
(1) Link award fees to acquisition objectives in the areas of cost, schedule, and technical performance;
(2) Clarify that a base fee amount greater than zero may be included in a cost plus award fee type contract at the discretion of the contracting officer;
(3) Prescribe narrative ratings that will be utilized in award fee evaluations;
(4) Prohibit the issuance of award fees for a rating period if the contractor's performance is judged to be below satisfactory;
(5) Conduct a risk and cost benefit analysis and consider the results of the analysis when determining whether to use an award-fee type contract or not;
(6) Include specific content in the award-fee plans; and
(7) Prohibit the rolling over of unearned award fees to subsequent rating periods.
The revisions create a new Table 16-1 to standardize adjectival rating/description and associated award fees to be awarded to contractors.
For those rules issued as “interim,” public comments may be submitted to http://www.regulations.gov as provided in the Federal Register promulgations (see the links above).
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DCAA Pile-on Redux: The House Armed Services Committee, Defense Acquisition Reform Panel
On October 15, 2009 the Defense Acquisition Reform Panel (DARP) of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) conducted a hearing entitled “Can the Department of Defense Protect Taxpayers When It Pays Its Contractors?” Unsurprisingly, the hearing was another pile-on for DCAA where the Government Accountability Office (GAO) rehashed its prior testimony before the Senate, the Committee Members went off, and DCAA Director Stephenson tried to deflect the attacks onto both DCMA and DOD contractors. In other words, it was just another day inside the Beltway.
DARP Chair Rob Andrews (D-New Jersey) opened the hearing with a “hypothesis” that “DOD will enter into risky contract types when they are not necessary” and that “DOD’s process for auditing and correctly paying bills submitted under riskier contracts will break down.” Chairman Andrews continued—
Today’s hearing is important not just because these problems have occurred, but because there is substantial disagreement between DOD and GAO over how best to mitigate risk in reimbursing its contractors. I anticipate that we will hear a vigorous debate today about how DOD can best organize its audit and contract management functions to both protect the taxpayer and serve the warfighter. And I should emphasize that this committee, as always, is highly attuned to the mission of serving the warfighter. In mitigating the risks of overpayment, we must not impede the timely delivery of critical war materiel. With the help of our witnesses today, we will try and find the right balance of these priorities.
Mr. Greg Kutz of the GAO added nothing new to his prior testimony before the Senate. He testified, “GAO found substantial evidence of widespread audit quality problems at DCAA. In the face of this evidence, DOD, Congress, and American taxpayers lack reasonable assurance that billions of dollars in federal contract payments are being appropriately scrutinized for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.”
DCAA Director April Stephenson offered a mixed bag of testimony spanning 30 double-spaced pages. She provided background on the audit agency, discussed “audit challenges,” and offered DCAA’s assessment on “vulnerabilities in the acquisition process.” In addition, she discussed actions the audit agency is taking in response to the various findings contained in recent GAO and DOD Inspector General reports. Following are some selected quotes that may be of interest.
- DCAA audit procedures include tests of key contractor internal controls that we believe a contractor business system should possess to ensure the Government’s interests are protected and the risk of contractor overpayments is minimized. DCAA performs these audits at contractor locations that charge significant contract costs to the Government. Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards require DCAA to report all significant deficiencies identified during its review of contractor business systems and to determine whether the deficiencies are considered material weaknesses. Comment: In fact, DCAA does NOT report all significant deficiencies in its internal control system review, nor does it distinguish between deficiencies and material weaknesses. Instead, it considers all findings to be significant deficiencies and assigns a binary pass/fail rating to the control systems. Its approach has been consistently criticized by GAO, DOD IG, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting.
- … of the top 100 DoD contractor segments that are audited by DCAA, approximately 69 percent have at least one business system with a significant internal control deficiency. Comment: DCAA audit metrics expect that 45 percent of all audits will contain at least one finding. Moreover, as GAO and DOD IG have both found significant issues with DCAA audit quality and support for its findings, such statistics should be considered suspect.
- During the life of cost reimbursable contracts, DCAA performs a number of audits covering contractor compliance with contract terms depending on the size of the contract and risk associated with the contractor. Comment: Outside of testing of direct costs incurred by contractors in Iraq and other Southwest Asia battlefields, DCAA does not normally perform testing of contract costs. Let’s repeat that for clarity: The Defense Contract Audit Agency does not normally audit contract costs. The audit agency does not even have an activity code for such audits.
- Although contractors recognize the need for DCAA access to records, there is often a disconnect on the expectation for “timely” access and contractors often delay auditors access to information in an attempt to stall the timely completion of audits. Such delays are unacceptable. One of the more significant complaints contractors have with DCAA is that we request too much data and have unrealistic due dates. These complaints are without merit and represent an attempt to impede DCAA audits. DCAA needs to be given real-time access to contractor records and people in order to perform effective audits. Comment: There is little evidence that DCAA’s lack of audit quality is tied to any attempt by contractors to “delay” or “impede” audits. To the contrary, contractors often point to DCAA’s delays in issuing audit reports as a source of frustration. Further, there is no evidence that DCAA’s audit quality would improve if it had “real-time access” to contractor records and personnel. Lack of access has not been a critical issue cited by GAO and DOD IG; instead, lack of evidentiary support for conclusions and lack of documentation related to changes in audit findings have been reported as key concerns by those two oversight agencies.
- Commercial item procurements are exempt from the protection of cost overpayments and excessive contract prices under the acquisition regulations, the Cost Accounting Standards, and the Truth in Negotiations Act. … The situation cannot be rectified unless the statutory definition of “commercial item” is amended and clarified appropriately. … DCAA believes that this language is a contract pricing vulnerability where fair and reasonable prices may not be established due to the lack of competition and the lack of a requirement for cost or pricing data. Comment: Although there have been some well-publicized misclassifications of acquisitions as commercial items, Ms. Stephenson ignores recent revisions to the FAR designed to remedy those problems. Moreover, the determination of what is (and what is not) a “commercial item” is a contracting officer determination, not an auditor determination – and there is no evidence of systemic misapplication of contracting officer judgment in this area.
- For example, a DCAA audit disclosed where a major contractor was earning profit in excess of 30 percent for a “competitively” awarded firm-fixed price contract. The contracting officer awarded the contract expecting to use full and open competition, which exempted the contractor from submitting cost or pricing data. However, the incumbent was the only contractor to bid on the contract. Due to the absence of other competitive bids and the absence of analysis of cost or pricing data, the contractor earned a windfall profit in excess of 30 percent. Comment: According to the FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii), the situation described met the definition of adequate competition. If the contractor received a “windfall profit” it was not because of a lack of competition.
- We recognize the GAO’s concerns and initiated a project in 2009 to reassess the manner in which DCAA tests contractor business systems. Although the auditing standards do not require that DCAA express an opinion on the adequacy of the contractors’ internal control systems, we did so to provide contracting officials meaningful information to approve or disapprove a contractor’s system as stipulated under the Federal Acquisition Regulations (i.e., the adequacy of the contractor’s internal control systems affects the accuracy and reliability of the underlying data processed and generated by the accounting system). We are currently assessing the type of systems DCAA will need to audit and the type of opinion to be provided. … We anticipate our revised processes will be tested in early FY 2010 starting with the contractor’s system for preparing interim and final billings to the Government. We envision the revised processes will consolidate testing of contractor billings currently performed in three different types of audits into a single audit. Comment: One of the most consistent criticisms of DCAA has been that the audit agency recently has created a binary pass/fail overall control system adequacy determination/recommendation without providing any discrimination between significant and insignificant findings. Another criticism has been that DCAA’s list of 10 contractor internal control systems is not based on regulatory guidance. Importantly, Ms. Stephenson did not address those concerns in her testimony; however, the potential reassessment of “the type of systems” and “the type of opinion” may lead to improvements in this area.
- In its recent review, the GAO concluded that DCAA’s independence was impaired primarily due to auditors providing input on draft corrections to internal control policies and procedures and then auditing the final policies and procedures. In several instances, the auditors issued a no-exception audit report when the contractor corrected the deficiencies during the audit. It is not uncommon for contractors with system deficiencies to seek input from the auditors while they are developing corrections to the systems. In many instances, providing feedback throughout the process expedites the correction of the deficiencies. However, the GAO has concluded that this “feedback” impairs the auditors’ objectivity as they will audit information that they have provided feedback on prior to implementation. We have corrected both of these issues. Auditors no longer provide feedback to contractors on draft corrections to systems and no longer remove deficiencies from audit reports when the deficiencies are corrected during the audit. Comment: This is an area in which GAO pressure is impeding the audit process; the “independence” issues that GAO identified are nothing more than communication between auditor and auditee, and should not be considered to be GAGAS violations. Performing a high-quality audit requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the auditor. Despite GAO’s concerns, it is patently ridiculous to prohibit auditors from identifying deficiencies that require corrective action, identifying the necessary action(s) that would result in the deficiencies being corrected (and communicating them to the contractor), and then confirming that those corrective actions have been implemented effectively. If the auditors can’t identify what corrective actions are necessary, how can they determine that the deficiencies have been corrected? Rather than acquiesce to GAO’s pressure, DCAA needs to rethink its position. If necessary, it should stop asserting that such audits are performed according to GAO’s idea of GAGAS.
Finally, Mr. Shay Assad (Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, & Technology) testified in a relatively reasonable and forthright manner. Following are some selected quotes that may be of interest.
- Occasionally, there are differences of opinion between the DCAA auditor and the contracting officer on audit findings. That is to be expected as DCAA is accounting oriented, while the contracting officer is business oriented, and must balance many factors and considers input from many technical advisors, including DCAA, in his decision-making process. Comment: Mr. Assad offered his office as arbiter between the two agencies. It is unclear whether Ms. Stephenson has, or would, agree to that offer—she may consider Mr. Assad’s position to be biased in favor of DCMA.
- The [GAO] report adopts a position that because DCAA is serving the interests of Contracting Officers, that DCAA is not auditing in the interest of the public. DCAA is a service organization created to provide financial information, audits, and advice to support decision making by DoD Contracting Officers. DCAA serves the public interest by providing timely and useful information to Contracting Officers. It is erroneous to imply that contracting officers do not seek to protect the public interest. The contracting officer is bound by regulation to meet the public interest in the broadest sense, for the entire matter surrounding a contract. The contracting officer, in the award and administration of a contract, is the government official responsible for insuring that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met. Any logic that presumes that by focusing on supporting contracting officials, DCAA somehow failed to act in the public interest is inappropriate in our view. … In order to perform these responsibilities, contracting officers should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgment. Comment: We agree with Mr. Assad’s assessment. The DCMA contracting officers have warrants for a reason: to act as authorized acquisition agents on behalf of the Federal government. To state (or imply) that they do not protect the public interest when they disagree with a DCAA audit recommendation betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of their role in the acquisition process.
- Timeliness is a critical element of quality. Delays in award have consequences to the warfighter. Contracting officers are required to consider those consequences and hence, they are very concerned that DCAA has not been able to consistently deliver timely reports and advice. … A contracting officer knows that delays can impact funding decisions and disrupt program management plans. Contracts are often interrelated and codependent, such that a delay in awarding one contract can delay an entire system and put off fielding dates, with consequences distributed and cascading through a range of other contracts and plans, and might ultimately result in mission failure. The contracting officer, also by regulation, has to consider and respect the opinions of other specialists and not just that of the auditor. A good audit in time is better than an extraordinary audit that is late and never used. An audit is a tool the contracting officer uses to negotiate a contract, but in order to realize the benefits of the auditor’s work, the audit must be timely. (Emphasis in original.) Comment: We agree with Mr. Assad’s comments; however, we are concerned that such sound bites will not play well and thus they may be ignored. DCAA has walked back from timeliness metrics imposed on its auditors, while focusing on timeliness standards imposed on contractors. Meanwhile, it still has not found the formula to issuing high quality audit reports and instead imposed multiple layers of management reviews, thus delaying audit reports that are still of dubious quality and usefulness to its DCMA contracting officer customers.
- DCAA should use auditing standards and techniques that produce creditable information that can be relied upon by the contracting community in the awarding and administrating of contracting. However, we believe that all DCAA reports and reviews types should be examined to determine if the standard being applied and reported by DCAA is the appropriate standard given the requirement causing the audit or review to be performed. Comment: Again we agree and urge DCAA to consider excluding certain audits/reviews from GAGAS in order to permit auditors to exercise sound discretion and engage in open communication with those being audited, in order to minimize unnecessarily duplicative audits and follow-ups.
- The nature of the review program for any given contractor should not have changed due to placement on Direct Billing. … Where DCAA believed based on past performance or poor systems that there was a significant chance of improper billing, the contractor was not to be included in the Direct Billing program. The review program for the contractors should have been the same as it would have been based on risk factors even if there was no Direct Billing program. The problem with voucher reviews both before the Direct Billing program and after the initiation of the program is that DCAA did not have sufficient staff to perform the reviews required by the risk-based analysis. New contractors and problem contractors should have voucher reviews before payment just as required by DCAA policy. Established contractors with adequate past performance should have vouchers reviewed after payment using a reasonable plan tailored to the contractor’s circumstances just as required by DCAA guidance. Changing the decision authority for participation in Direct Billing should have no impact on what vouchers are reviewed. Taking a contractor off of the program does not ensure that the vouchers will be properly reviewed prior to payment if there is not sufficient staff to perform the reviews. Comment: Again we agree but note that DCAA has not implemented this point of view in their audits of contractors who are not authorized for Direct Billing. In our experience, DCAA auditors spend the majority of their time either auditing new business cost proposals or invoices/vouchers related to existing contracts, leaving little time to address contractor internal control systems, compliance with CAS, or other matters.
For those interested, we offer a video record of the hearing here.
Quantum Cascade Lasers: Small Packages Pack Powerful Punches
One of our science friends (who happens to have a Ph.D in Physics) says that Moore’s Law is quickly coming to an end. Moore’s Law states that the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years. “It’s approaching its asymptote,” he says. (An asymptotic function is a function that “increases or decreases until it approaches some fixed value (i.e., the asymptote), at which point it levels off.” We know that because we looked it up.) According to our science friend, the ability to pack more transistors onto a chip is going to soon hit a roadblock having to do with mask size (we don’t pretend to understand that part); it will be the “end of silicon” and the beginning of – what? Our science friend likes the concept of “optical processors” and thinks that Quantum Cascade Lasers (QCLs) may be one way to get there.
 Quantum Cascade Lasers (QCLs) are semiconductor lasers that emit in the mid- to far-infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Unlike traditional lasers, QCLs achieve laser emission “through the use of intersubband transitions in a repeated stack of semiconductor multiple quantum well heterostructures.” There is a whole lot more language like that in the article linked above. Terms such as “valence bands” and “conduction band” and “superlattice” and “one-dimensional multiple quantum well confinement” permeate and we’d be lying if we said it made sense. This part seemed to make some sense, though: “in a unipolar QCL, once an electron has undergone an intersubband transition and emitted a photon in one period of the superlattice, it can tunnel into the next period of the structure where another photon can be emitted. This process of a single electron causing the emission of multiple photons as it traverses through the QCL structure gives rise to the name cascade and makes a quantum efficiency of greater than unity possible which leads to higher output powers than semiconductor laser diodes.”
The October 2009 edition of National Defense magazine has an article on QCLs. The article does not focus on the efficiency noted above, but instead on the size of the laser. QCLs are a lot smaller than conventional lasers. Combine efficiency and flexibility and smaller size together, and you get a potential breakthrough. Our science friend thinks the breakthrough will revolutionize computer processing and perhaps he’s right. We also note that there are several near-term defense and homeland security applications inherent in the QCL concept, as well. The Wikipedia article (link above) states that “when used in multiple-laser systems, intrapulse QCL spectroscopy offers broadband spectral coverage that can potentially be used to identify and quantify complex heavy molecules such as those in toxic chemicals, explosives, and drugs.” In addition, the National Defense article predicts that “one day they [QCLs] may provide the military with directional infrared countermeasures, target illumination, chemical warfare warning and search-and-rescue capabilities ….”
The National Defense article discusses the work of Pranalytica, a small R&D contractor based in Santa Monica, CA. Pranalytica specializes in tunable laser spectroscopy-based gas sensing and in QCLs. According to its website, on May 19, 2009 the company shipped its first 2 Watt room temperature QCL system. The article states that Pranalytica’s QCL systems can produce the right wavelength needed to disable the guidance system of heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles, and can also produce long-range infrared illuminators using wavelengths that are invisible to commercial cameras commonly used by opposition forces as detectors. According to the article, “only NATO allies and U.S. forces have technologies that can see this kind of light ….”
On June 24, 2009 Pranalytica announced that DARPA had selected it to “continue its involvement in the Efficient Midinfrared Laser (EMIL) program.” According to the company’s press release, “The project was created to fill the need of the Department of Defense (DoD) for directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM), advanced stand-off chemical sensors, and Laser Radar (LADAR). Potential non-military applications include DIRCM protection of civilian airliners from shoulder-fired missiles, detection of toxic industrial gases, atmospheric pollution monitoring and free-space optical communications.” In addition to the DARPA contract, Pranalytica also claims a grant from the National Institutes of Health for medical diagnostics and various other contracts and grants from DARPA, NIST/ATP, and the Department of Agriculture. Clearly, Pranalytica’s products offer potential breakthroughs to a diverse set of stakeholders. The company’s future looks bright!
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