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GAO Criticizes DOD’s Satellite Programs

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STS044-71-18On October 29, 2009 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report entitled, “DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components” (GAO-10-55).  The report surveyed 8 DOD satellite programs with aggregate total mission costs currently expected to exceed $50 billion. The DOD satellite programs in the GAO study were:  Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite, Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), Space-based Space Surveillance (SBSS), and National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).

 

The table below summarizes the programs and the dollars associated with each.

Summary of DOD Satellite Systems Reviewed by GAO

FY 2009 Dollars in Millions

DOD Mission

Program Name

Total RDT&E Cost

Total Procurement Cost

Total Mission Cost

Communications

AEHF

$7,267.3

$3,150.1

$10,417.4

Communications

MUOS

3,807.7

2,671.4

6,479.1

Communications

WGS

377.9

1,738.0

2,115.9

Missile Warning/ Tracking

SBIRS

7,724.7

2,655.7

10,380.4

Missile Warning/ Tracking

STSS

2,174.0

N/A

2,174.0

Navigation/Timing

GPS

4,485.9

4,937.6

9.423.5

Space Object Tracking

SBSS

514.1

N/A

514.1

Weather

NPOESS

$8,125.5

$2,943.4

$11,068.9

Totals

$34,477.1

$18,096.2

$52,573.3

DOD satellite systems typically have up to three main components:  (1) satellites, (2) ground control systems, and (3) user terminals. According to GAO, ground control systems are generally used to download and process data from satellite sensors (and disseminate this information to warfighters and other users), and to maintain the health and status of the satellites (including steering the satellites and ensuring that they stay in assigned orbits).  User terminals are typically procured by the military services and managed separately from associated satellites and ground control systems; they can range from equipment hosted on backpacks to terminals mounted on Humvees, airborne assets, or ships.  Terminals can be used to help the warfighter determine longitude, latitude, and altitude via GPS satellites, or securely communicate with others via AEHF satellites. The GAO study focused on how DOD aligns (or fails to align) development and operational capability of each of those components, in order to maximize satellite utilization and deliver maximum capability to the warfighters.

 

GAO found that “for six of DOD’s eight major space system acquisitions, DOD has not been able to align delivery of space assets with ground assets, user assets, or both.… For the five space systems requiring user terminals, none were aligned. In some cases, capability gaps resulting from delays in the fielding of ground control systems or user terminals are 4 or more years.”

 

Unlike many GAO reports we have reviewed, in this one GAO took pains to provide context for its findings, stating—

 

Notwithstanding the fact that alignment gaps are undesirable, several factors provide insight into the inherent challenges associated with managing alignment. First, alignment may be relatively easier to achieve in some programs than in others. For example, some space systems may require only a ground system or few user terminals and may even manage these acquisitions within one organization. By contrast, other programs may require literally tens of thousands of terminals that must be installed on a wide span of weapon systems, including ships, planes, vehicles, and even other space systems—which are owned and controlled by various military services. Second, an inherent difficulty in aligning satellite launches with ground and user terminal programs is the lead time needed to schedule satellite launches—about 2 years—which makes it difficult to hold back satellite deployment if a ground or user terminal is experiencing a considerable delay…. Third, it is difficult to measure the extent to which warfighters and other users are being affected by delayed capability or even the extent to which capability is delayed. … satellites themselves only offer initial capabilities until enough satellites have been launched to provide the coverage needed to achieve full capability.  This process alone can take years and will vary system to system as the number of satellites required to achieve full operational capability depends on mission requirements and coverage offered by satellites, among other factors.  At the same time, ground control systems can be delivered in phases, the first of which may focus solely on controlling and maintaining the health of the satellite, with subsequent phases delivering software that can collect and process sensor data. User terminals can take years to install as they can span a broad spectrum of weapon systems and their installation is usually done alongside other upgrades.

 

GAO commented on individual satellite programs—

 

 

  • GPS achieved full operational capability in 1995…. However, the plan and the capabilities it is being designed to provide have been delayed and are significantly over budget. As a result, some new capabilities are not now available to the warfighter because the ground control system features needed to command and operate the capabilities have not been completely delivered. For example, updated user equipment possessing a capability to prevent spoofing of navigation information started being delivered to the warfighter in 2004. However, the Architecture Evolution Plan, representing the current ground control system, is not capable of providing two important aspects of this capability and is not expected to do so until early fiscal year 2010.

 

  • The first SBIRS satellite5 will carry scanning and staring sensors designed to provide early missile warning capabilities. However, DOD will not be able to fully utilize the data collected from the staring sensor when this first satellite launches, currently planned for September 2010, because the ground control software that is to process the sensor’s data is not planned to be fully functional until at least 2014. This means that complete, usable data from the staring sensor will not be available until about 4 years after the satellite is on orbit.

 

  • The first WGS satellite launched in October 2007, but its associated ground mission planning software—the Consolidated Network Planning Software—does not work properly. This planning software was designed to compute required bandwidth for all users simultaneously accessing WGS satellites. It would then disseminate that information to various satellite operation and support stations located globally so that all stations had a real-time view of the availability of WGS satellite capabilities. However, because the development of the mission planning software has had problems and is not well coordinated with WGS satellite capability, the dissemination of information does not occur as designed, and the information has to go through a time-consuming and labor-intensive work-around through a single ground station before it reaches the warfighter.

 

GAO commented on alignment of user terminals as follows—

 

 

  • The Air Force’s FAB-T program is designed to provide antijam and protected communications for nuclear and conventional forces as well as many airborne assets and ground command posts. As one of the primary user terminal programs associated with AEHF, FAB-T has recently experienced numerous problems and is not currently aligned with the AEHF satellite program. Specifically, contractor performance problems, which caused design teams to be restructured to improve performance and efficiency, caused a delay in the start of initial production from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010. In addition, design changes and contract cost growth have more than tripled development costs since the contract was first awarded. While AEHF will be able to provide capability through other user terminals, current estimates show that FAB-T will only have 2 percent of its terminals fielded when AEHF is scheduled to reach its initial operating capability in 2011. Further, estimates are that FAB-T will not have all of its terminals fielded until fiscal year 2019.

 

  • JTRS is a family of interoperable, digital, modular, and software-defined radios that is planned to provide the capability to receive, transmit, and relay voice, data, and video. In the past, tactical military radios could not work well with each other. The JTRS radio is also being designed as the primary user terminal for the new MUOS satellite capability to help the warfighter achieve information superiority. Although MUOS will be able to provide capability through other, legacy user terminals, DOD estimates that less than 20 percent of JTRS terminals will be available to access the MUOS satellite when it achieves operational on-orbit capability in December 2011. In 2014, when MUOS is expected to reach full operational capability, 32 percent of JTRS terminals are expected to be available to the warfighter. DOD expects to field all the needed JTRS terminals by 2021—about 7 years after MUOS is expected to be fully operational. … Officials from one warfighting command (users of the capability) told us that because of the 2-year gap between when all MUOS satellites reach on-orbit capability and when the MUOS-capable user terminals (JTRS) first become available, the MUOS satellites will have spent a portion of their expected lifespan less than fully utilized. This issue concerns the combatant command because MUOS is replacing the aging Ultra High Frequency Follow-On space system, which currently serves more military customers than it was originally designed to handle. While waiting for the JTRS capability, the command will likely have to lease commercial satellite capability and user terminals to increase bandwidth capacity and improve the speed and effectiveness of information and communication transfers.

 

GAO summed up other problems.  We report them here verbatim because of the potential to learn lessons from them.

 

The satellite, ground system, and user terminal programs we studied have had execution problems that have caused substantial delays in schedule that in turn have made it more difficult to align delivery of all three space system components. Most prominent are requirements changes, technical problems resulting from underestimation of complexity, and poor contractor oversight. The first satellite delivery of SBIRS, for instance, has been delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight, technical complexities, and rework. The first satellite delivery for NPOESS is over 4 years late. AEHF has experienced delays of about 3 years for these reasons along with requirements changes that occurred earlier in the program and difficulties meeting information assurance requirements for its satellite. The GPS IIF system has also had about a 3-year delay because of technical and workmanship problems and requirements changes. Ground systems and user terminals have experienced similar problems. JTRS, for example, has experienced significant delays because of problems in maturing critical technologies, and as noted earlier, FAB-T delays have occurred because of contractor performance problems. Also, as noted earlier, the WGS ground system has experienced technical problems that have prevented it from working properly with WGS satellites now in orbit.

 

*****

 

Underestimating software complexity has also been a problem. The complexity of software on any system, including space systems, is often denoted by the amount of software, or number of lines of software code. Generally, the greater the number of lines of code, the more complicated the software system development, and ground control systems typically require significantly more software than the satellites. This means that software development for ground control systems is oftentimes the higher risk. In some cases, unanticipated software complexity can lead to lack of synchronization between the satellite and ground systems of space system acquisitions. For example, on the AEHF space system, the prime contractor has experienced quality control problems with the software for the mission planning element of the ground control system. In testing so far, the government has identified numerous significant software deficiencies and continues to find deficiencies as testing continues. Ground control system fielding will be delayed until the deficiencies are corrected. Also, our past work has shown that the MUOS ground control software represented one of the greatest risks to the program because of the size and complexity of the design. On SBIRS, the total estimated lines of code on the ground control system software grew from approximately 1.55 million in August 2004 to approximately 1.88 million in December 2008.

 

*****

 

Space system acquisition programs sometimes shift funds from the development of ground control systems to their associated satellite development efforts to meet unexpected obstacles—an action that can create new problems. For example, when the GPS IIF satellite program encountered development problems, the program shifted funds set aside for the GPS ground control system to address the satellite problems, causing a delay in the delivery of some ground control capabilities. Similarly, SBIRS officials reallocated funding from the ground control system to address satellite software issues, which may have contributed to the system’s initial inability to utilize the staring sensor data from the first geosynchronous earth orbit satellite. Program officials told us that they like the flexibility of being able to move funds from ground control systems to the satellites if priorities warrant. However, as we indicated above, this can put the development of ground control systems at a disadvantage compared to development of the satellites for space systems, for example, GPS and SBIRS.

 

We don’t have much to add to GAO’s insights.  We continue to be proud of America’s technological prowess and worried about the apparent lack of management oversight given to DOD’s satellite programs.  These are important—critical—space systems, and it is important that they be given appropriate attention by the various stakeholders.  See the entire 37 page GAO report here.

 

 

New GAO Report Features Oblique Attack on DCAA

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Cost Plus Fixed Fee ContractOn September 30, 2009 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report to the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The report, “CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Extent of Federal Spending under Cost-Reimbursement Contracts Unclear and Key Controls Not Always Used” (GAO-09-921), assessed (1) the extent of agencies’ obligations under cost-type contracts, (2) the rationales given for using this contract type, (3) whether the awarding agencies had determined that the contractors’ accounting systems were adequate, and (4) contractor monitoring procedures and controls used by the agencies. GAO reviewed 92 contracts at eleven military and civilian agencies, including the Air Force, Navy, Environmental Protection Agency, Treasury Department, NASA, Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Science Foundation.  In its report, GAO found numerous issues, not the least of which was yet another allegation that DCAA was failing to support the DOD acquisition process.

 

 

The Procurement Data is Flawed

 

The first finding of the report was that “the complete picture of the government’s use of cost-reimbursement contracts is unclear,” because “we found billions of dollars reported as missing a contract type (i.e., no specific contract type was indicated) or indicating ‘other’ as the contract type” in the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG). Consequently, although the use of cost-type contracts apparently decreased between 2003 and 2008 (from 34 to 26 percent of total obligations), GAO found that the reported decrease was misleading.  GAO found that, in fact, use of “combination” contract types had increased over the same period—from 1 percent to almost 8 percent of obligations—and that trend distorted the FPDS-NG data.  As GAO reported:

 

We analyzed fiscal year 2008 FPDS-NG obligations coded as combination contracts and found that half of the $39 billion was obligated under contracts that had at least some cost-type actions, and about a quarter of this amount ($9 billion) went to contracts that had 50 percent or more cost-type obligations. These obligations were not recorded as cost-reimbursement in FPDS-NG.

 

As GAO proudly stated, “According to a response to a draft of this report by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), a change was recently approved to FPDS-NG … to be effective for all new contracts awarded in fiscal year 2010, that will eliminate ‘combination’ as a contract type.  Contracts containing more than one contract type will be coded as the contract type representing the preponderance of obligations.”

 

Unsurprisingly, GAO also found that “Contracting officials frequently did not document contract files to show why they awarded cost-reimbursement contracts. The documentation we did find, for the most part, used boilerplate language; was short, vague, and repetitive; and did not show why a cost-reimbursement contract was selected.”

 

GAO also reported that—

 

Of the 92 contract files we reviewed, we found that 28, or 30 percent, contained no documentation showing why a cost-reimbursement contract was selected for award, including in the acquisition plans. Contracting officers frequently could not provide an explanation for its absence, were unaware of the need for documentation, or stated that they inherited the contract from contracting officers who had retired or otherwise left the agency.

 

 

Contracting Officers Don’t Check the Adequacy of Contractor’s Accounting Systems

 

As GAO noted, cost-type contracts may only be used when a contractor’s accounting system is found to be adequate for determining costs applicable to the contract.  (See FAR 16.301-3.)  The contracting officer is responsible for verifying that the contractor has an adequate accounting system.  The verification step can be accomplished via various means; however, GAO reported that “For most of the contracts we reviewed, this verification was based on a DCAA opinion stemming from its review of the contractor’s accounting system and related internal control policies and procedures….” According to GAO, “Regular accounting system reviews are necessary to help ensure that changes to the contractor’s accounting practices are considered by the government and evaluated for compliance with government contract cost principles.” GAO found that 20 of the 92 contracts it reviewed had no evidence that the adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system was ever considered by the contracting officer. In addition, in seven instances the contracting officer had relied on an adequacy determination made more than four years before the contract award.  Nearly one-third of the contracts reviewed had been awarded to contractors without the required accounting system due diligence.

 

As GAO noted:

 

As an example of what can occur when the determination of adequacy is not made or the contractor’s accounting systems are not deemed adequate, in August 2007, a contractor disclosed to the Air Force that it had periodically overbilled on the Joint Strike Fighter Systems Development and Demonstration cost-reimbursement contract since its inception. The amount overbilled was about $267 million. In this case, DCAA had rendered the opinion that the contractor’s accounting system was ‘inadequate in part.’ The contractor reimbursed the Air Force for the amount overbilled and paid an additional $28 million in interest.

 

But enough of the preliminaries. Let’s get to the DCAA bashing.

 

 

DOD Relies on DCAA for Cost Monitoring, to Its Detriment

 

Per FAR 16.301-3, cost-type contracts can only be awarded if two conditions are met – (1) a finding that the contractor’s accounting system is adequate (discussed above), and (2) use of “appropriate government surveillance during performance” that provides “reasonable assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls” are being utilized. GAO found DOD relies on contractor-provided monthly Earned Value Management (EVM) reports and EVM data to perform cost surveillance.  According to GAO, “analysis of EVM data alone does not satisfy FAR requirements for cost surveillance under cost-reimbursement contracts.”  Therefore, DOD supplements its EVM analyses with reviews of contractor systems, internal controls, and actual invoices—primarily conducted by DCAA.

 

As GAO reported—

 

The effectiveness of DOD’s cost surveillance process depends, to a large extent, on the adequacy of [ ] DCAA procedures. Our recent work has raised concerns in this regard. For example, rather than documenting the population of invoices, preparing sampling plans, and testing a random (statistical) sample, as should be done, [DCAA] auditors generally used a nonrepresentative selection of invoices in deciding the number of invoices they would review and the extent of testing they would perform to support conclusions in their work. For example, we found that for one contractor that generated $1.1 billion in annual billings to the government, the DCAA auditor only reviewed 3 invoices totaling $88,000 out of 222 invoices submitted for payment from March 2003 through February 2004, tested the first invoice selected, and performed limited testing on the remaining 2 invoices. Despite this limited testing, DCAA prepared a memorandum for the record, stating that ‘continued reliance can be placed on the contractor’s procedures for the preparation of interim vouchers (invoices)’ and ‘the contractor has met the criteria for continued participation in the direct billing program.’

 

In other words, DOD’s reliance on DCAA’s audit procedures has placed it in a vulnerable situation, where it may not have appropriate insight into how a contractor is spending government funds.  GAO provided an allegory of what happens when the government lacks appropriate insight.

 

In our review, we found an additional example of what can happen when adequate cost surveillance is not in place. NSF awarded a $1.1 billion, 10-year 5-month cost-reimbursement contract (with options) for logistic and operational support for the U.S. Antarctic Program. As discussed in a series of NSF Office of Inspector General audit reports, DCAA found that the contractor was billing indirect costs as direct costs, billing over the negotiated ceiling limitations, and not providing supporting documentation for other costs. To compound these issues, NSF had not determined that the contractor’s accounting system was adequate for determining costs applicable to its contract. In November 2007, an independent auditor reported that NSF had significant weaknesses in its contract monitoring policies and procedures, meaning that the agency did not know whether the costs it was paying the contractor were allowable and reasonable. NSF officials acknowledged the weaknesses and have begun to take corrective action.

 

Lest the contractors escape unscathed, GAO provided one final cautionary tale.

 

… in January 2009, the DOE Inspector General reported weaknesses in a contractor’s internal audit, which DOE relies on to help ensure that contractors’ costs charged to DOE are allowable under the terms of the contract.33 For fiscal year 2007, the contractor had expended and claimed over $1.4 billion. The Inspector General found that the contractor’s internal audit during fiscal year 2007 was not satisfactory in several material respects. Specifically:

  • Procurements were not properly approved, but the contractor’s internal audit management permitted the contractor to provide approvals 3 years after the fact. Questioned costs associated with the procurements were omitted from the contractor’s audit report.
  • The contractor’s internal audit manager encouraged the omission of information that confirmed improper labor cost allocations.
  • After the completion of audit testing, the contractor’s internal audit management directed the modification of the testing attribute related to independent receipt of procured goods and services, an action that caused some of the questioned costs to be excluded from reporting.

 

In conclusion, GAO found that contracting officers aren’t always doing their job when awarding cost-type contracts.  Too many times, they don’t properly document files and they don’t check the adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system.  After award, mandatory surveillance is lacking, particularly when DCAA is involved.  And reliance on a contractor’s self-governance reviews is also misplaced.  What’s a poor Federal government to do?

 

 

SBA Proposes Revisions to 8(a) and SDB Contracting Programs

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SBA LogoOn October 29, 2009 the Small Business Administration (SBA) issued a proposed rule to significantly revise the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), affecting 8(a) and Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB) programs, as well as changing Small Business size standards.  The proposed rule, if finalized as written, will have significant impacts to a number of small and small disadvantaged businesses.

 

The proposed revisions are numerous and complex; the Federal Register publication, found here, takes up 29 pages of densely packed information.  There are six proposed changes to SBA’s size regulations, two dealing with mentor/protégé situations, one amending the requirements for joint ventures, one clarifying how a procurement should be classified, one further explaining the nonmanufacturer rule, and one relating to who may request a formal size determination. The remaining proposed changes are to the regulations governing SBA’s 8(a) BD and SDB programs.  Following are some highlights of the proposed rule:

 

  • Clarifies that protégé firms may only be considered to be not affiliated with their mentors (based on assistance received from the mentor firms) when they are made via an SBA approved 8(a) BD mentor/protégé agreement, or similar mentor/protégé program under another Federal agency that contains the exception in their authorizing statute (e.g., the Defense Department). Clarifies that only the SBA may exempt firms from the affiliation rules.
  • Clarifies that firms in a joint venture may be found to be generally affiliated if they pursue and/or receive contract awards in excess of the specific rule limitations.
  • Clarifies that while a joint venture may or may not be a separate legal entity, it must exist through a written document. Clarifies that a joint venture may or may not be populated (i.e., have its own separate employees). Whether a joint venture needs to be populated or have separate employees depends upon the legal structure of the joint venture. If a joint venture is a separate legal entity, then it must have its own employees. If a joint venture merely exists through a written agreement between two or more individual business entities, then it need not have its own separate employees and employees of each of the individual business entities may perform work for the joint venture.
  • Clarifies that any joint venture seeking to use the 8(a) mentor/protégé status as a basis for an exception to the affiliation requirements must follow the requirements of the 8(a) program—i.e., structure the joint venture agreement in accordance with 13 C.F.R. § 124.513 and submit the joint venture agreement for prior SBA approval.
  • Clarifies the “nonmanufacturer rule” to require that a firm that is not itself the manufacturer of the end item being procured must provide the product of a small business manufacturer only where a procuring agency has classified a procurement as a manufacturing procurement by assigning it a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code under Sectors 31 to 33—and clarifies that procurements not classified as manufacturing procurements are not subject to the nonmanufacturer rule.
  • Amends the current rule to specify that an 8(a) firm does not graduate from the program merely by completing its nine-year term, but instead will be considered to graduate only upon completion of the entity’s business plan goals, thus demonstrating its ability to compete in the marketplace without 8(a) assistance.
  • Amends the current rule defining economic disadvantage to (among other things) exempt income from an S Corporation from the calculation of both income and net worth to the extent such income is reinvested in the firm or used to pay taxes arising from the normal course of operations of an S corporation. Therefore, while the income of an S corporation flows through and is taxed to individual shareholders in accordance with their interest in the S corporation for Federal tax purposes, SBA will take such income into account for economic disadvantage purposes only if it is actually distributed to the particular shareholder. This change would result in equal treatment of corporate income for C and S corporations.
  • Revises the current rule to state that non-8(a) joint venture partners to 8(a) sole source contracts cannot also be subcontractors under the joint venture prime contract. If a non-8(a) joint venture partner seeks to perform more work under the contract, then the amount of work done by the 8(a) partner to the joint venture must also increase.
  • Amends the current rule to establish an absolute limit of three protégés per mentor.

 

The proposed revisions are discussed at GovExec.com in this article.  The article takes a generally positive tone, approving of the proposed changes as closing regulatory loopholes that allow “multibillion-dollar corporations to partner with Alaska native corporations -- which are considered permanent small disadvantaged businesses -- on contracts in which the larger firm does virtually all of the work.”


 

 

How Much Will the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Cost?

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F-35We have previously expressed some concern about the F-35 program’s plan to ramp-up production to a record-setting level of one plane per working day, producing 3 different variants on one single production line. We have reported, several times, the determination of the Pentagon and Congress to penalize programs that don’t deliver on cost and schedule commitments. Now comes word of a Pentagon Joint Estimate Team (JET) report that indicates the program “will require billions of dollars more than planned, and more time.”  According to InsideDefense.com, the JET found that the program’s performance “is not markedly improving.”  The InsideDefense.com story stated that “A new assessment of the Joint Strike Fighter program affirms earlier findings that substantially more money and time are required for the Pentagon's largest acquisition effort….”  The story reported that the JET report found the program would need at least two more years and nearly $15 billion more than the current estimate.

 

According to various online sources and the Pentagon, the program’s Estimate-at-Completion (EAC) is impacted by the assumptions used to develop it—with the JET report utilizing “pessimistic” assumptions that emphasize current production efficiencies and program spend rates, while the F-35 Program Office utilizes more optimistic assumptions that include future production efficiencies.  According to this story, Air Force Major General C.D. Moore (F-35 Deputy Program Manager) acknowledged that the program is currently “three to five months behind the master schedule,” but asserted that “we are seeing improved production line efficiencies.”

 

We should note that the JET report has not been officially released, so it is difficult to parse the facts.  According to this report, the JET EAC showed a $7 billion increase, not $15 billion.”  Regardless, DOD spokesperson Geoff Morrell was quoted as acknowledging that the JET EAC “continues to raise concerns about the course the program is on. … If the Joint Estimate Team provided especially good news, we would be trumpeting it.”

 

Unsurprisingly, the Lockheed Martin-led program team disagreed with the JET analysis.  They released the following statement:

 

Lockheed Martin and our industry partners recognize the Joint Estimate Team's earnest efforts to predict F-35 program costs and schedules as part of the annual DoD budget planning process. However, we disagree with their conclusions, which we believe are driven by legacy-based assumptions regarding the time required to deliver the remaining SDD aircraft, complete development, and conduct the flight test campaign.  The program is early in the flight test phase, so it is much too soon conclude that the expected payoffs will not be realized. Lockheed Martin acknowledges that modest risks to our cost and schedule baselines exist, but we envision no scenario that would justify a substantial delay to completion of development or transition to production milestones.

 

Speaking of pessimistic, the folks over at the Center for Defense Information (CDI) have posted what may the mother of all pessimistic articles, called “Combat Aviation’s Gloomy Future.”  That post refers to a story on the F-35 STOVLinfamous Huffington Post website called “What Now, Icarus? Is Western Combat Aviation Falling Out of the Sky?”  In the story, the authors make some alarming assertions, including this doozy:  “The F-35 is unaffordable. It is a technological kluge that will be less effective than airplanes it replaces. And it will increase our own combat losses.”

 

Addressing the JET report’s findings, the authors assert—

 

Those findings address only the known problems; there's a huge iceberg floating just under the surface. With F-35 flight testing barely three percent complete, new problems - and new costs - are sure to emerge. Worse, only 17 percent of the aircraft's characteristics will be validated by flight testing by the time the Pentagon has signed contracts for more than 500 aircraft. Operational squadron pilots will have the thrill of discovering the remaining problems, in training or in combat. No one should be surprised if the final F-35 total program unit cost reaches $200 million per aircraft after all the fixes are paid for.

 

Finally comes a teaser from DefenseInsider.com (the bunch that broke the original JET EAC story), reporting that “A senior Pentagon official with access to details of a closely held new cost assessment of the Joint Strike Fighter program is advising Defense Department colleagues that the F-35 development program ‘will likely breach’ a key congressionally mandated cost threshold, a step that could require dramatic remedial action for the U.S. military's costliest weapon program.” The article is referring to a Nunn-McCurdy breach.

 

A Nunn-McCurdy breach occurs when a program’s acquisition unit cost overrun exceeds 15% (i.e., 115% of the baseline budget).  When that happens, statute requires that the Secretary of Defense must notify Congress.  According to the legislation, should an acquisition unit cost overrun exceed 25%, the program must be terminated, unless the Secretary of Defense provides Congress with a detailed justification as to why the program is critical to national security.  A Nunn-McCurdy breach is not in any sense good news, and tends to have career-limiting impacts to those involved in programs that incur them.  Moreover, as we noted, Congress and the Obama Administration have taken dim views of programs that exhibit cost growth and/or schedule delays.

 

Should the F-35 incur a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the timing of the reporting will be quite interesting.  Had the breach been reported in the first half of 2009, it would have been more difficult to assert that the program was critical to national security, because there would have been the competing F-22 program.  Now that additional production of the F-22 program has been stopped, there is no competition to the F-35 program and it is obvious the program will need to continue, regardless of cost growth.  In the words of Pierre Sprey and Winslow Wheeler, the program may be deemed “too big to fail.”

 

This is a critical juncture for the large international aircraft program, and time will tell who has the best at-completion estimate, the Pentagon JET evaluators or the program team.



 

OMB Issues Guidance to Help Federal Agencies Increase Use of Competition and Decrease Use of Flexibly Priced Contract Types

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On October 27, 2009 the OMB issued new guidance to Federal agencies designed to help them implement a previously issued directive to “reduce by at least 10 percent the combined share of dollars obligated through new contracts in FY 2010 that are: (1) awarded non-competitively and/or receive only one bid in response to a solicitation or a request for quote, (2) cost-reimbursement contracts, or (2) T&M/LH contracts.” The new guidance consists of “guidelines to help [agencies] evaluate the effectiveness of their competition practices and processes for selecting contract types.”  The guidelines consist of three questions and a set of considerations for addressing each question.

 

Generally, the guidelines and considerations are a combination of common sense and fundamental best practices.  For example, one consideration calls for agencies to “focus on requirements development and outreach to vendors” in order to maximize the effective use of competition.  In order to choose the best contract type for an acquisition, agencies are encouraged to “determine the level of uncertainty” and to “use incentives to motivate lower costs with improved delivery or technical performance and to discourage contractor inefficiency and waste.”

 

That said, other aspects of the guidance are worth noting.  For instance, contract risk can be limited in noncompetitive situations by limiting contract length and regularly assess contractor performance.  The guidance encourages use of “contract review boards, peer reviews, or contract type advocates” to help transition from flexibly priced contract types to “lower risk” contract types.

 

An interesting (and perhaps controversial) aspect of the guidance encourages agencies to use “hybrid contracts” in order to better match requirements and pricing.  Hybrid contracts contain Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) or Task Ordering procedures that permit different contract types to be used for different aspects of the work.  As the guidance notes, “Work for which there is a basis for firm pricing can be awarded for a firm-fixed price while requirements for which there remains considerable uncertainty can be acquired on a cost or T&M/LH basis.”  One potential problem with this approach is that the contract’s price is unknown at the time of award and, because the price is unknown it may be unclear whether the contract is subject to Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) or not.  In addition, the potential for multiple contract types increases uncertainty—i.e., risk—and makes it difficult for a contractor to price.

 

The guidance offers an alternative approach:  “an agency could competitively award a series of contracts addressing smaller increments or modules of work.” This alternative is not very appealing, given the cost and schedule impacts associated with the current contract award process.

 

In summary, we would file the guidance under “motherhood and apple pie” in the binder on the bookshelf.  There are some small nuggets of wisdom, and a few clunkers—but the majority of the “guidance” breaks no new ground.

 

See the new OMB guidance here.

 

Post Script:  GovExec.com reported in this story that the Senate on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (from whom we heard much on the DCAA audit quality issue) held a hearing on October 28, 2009 in which “lawmakers from both sides of the aisle expressed concerns about the Obama administration's new contracting guidance….”  The article reported that Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) had “serious concerns” and “significant problems” with the OMB guidance, among which were “a lack of concrete direction on how agencies should achieve necessary reforms to improve procurement” and a failure “to hold agencies accountable for reforms by setting concrete deadlines.”  The article quotes Senator McCaskill as saying that the guidance "lacks adequate analysis and substance in my view.  It really is boiler plate -- it's standard material, it reiterates a list of human capital planning guidelines, it creates various interagency working groups. I'm tired of studies, I'm tired of working groups, I want to see action and in my view this plan simply delegates to each agency what the law required OFPP to do itself."

 

Documents associated with the Senate hearing are linked.  Senator McCaskill’s opening statement can be found at the hearing site, or here.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.