South Africa Cancels A400M Order

In a move termed a “complete surprise” to Airbus, South Africa’s government announced on November 5, 2009 that it had cancelled its multi-billion dollar contract to purchase eight Airbus A400M military transport aircraft. Readers of this website might be less surprised, as we have been reporting on allegations of procurement “irregularities” in connection with the acquisition, as well as the recent emphasis on cost containment by aerospace/defense programs. The South African government’s announcement involved both of those matters.
In our prior report (link above), we noted that allegations had surfaced in South Africa regarding potential “irregular expenditures” in connection with the A400M “tender process”. According to this report, the current armscor contract “threatened to blow up into another arms deal saga” because of the lack of “due tender processes.” But that is not the official reason for the cancellation.
The official reason for the cancellation is a schedule delay of four to five years, coupled with a forecasted cost growth of at least 25 percent, according to the official statement of South African Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Lindiwe Sisulu.
According to various sources, the original contract called for delivery of 8 aircraft between 2010 and 2012 for a cost of approximately 17.65 billion rand (roughly US $2.5 billion, or US $308 million per plane). The South African government stated that the current cost estimate was now 47 billion rand (US $6.1 billion, $763 million per plane).
South African industries had a piece of the A400M action, with Denel Saab Aerostructures in particular expecting future revenues of 13 billion rand over the next 15 years, according to Defense Industry Daily. However, the same article stated that “Denel Saab Aerostructures doesn’t see the cancellation having much effect on their business in the short term.”
The official South African announcement stated that it has been withholding progress payments to Airbus because of missed contract milestones, and further noted that it expects a 2.9 billion rand refund of payments previously made.
It is not clear what effect, if any, the cancellation will have on the overall A400M program, which has reported 186 international orders. Certainly, it cannot be seen as inspiring confidence in countries currently “on the bubble” with respect to A400M orders. For instance, Chile has expressed previous interest in acquiring three aircraft, but has yet to execute a contract. One wonders if they will, given the current status of the program.
Meanwhile, one report quotes an “industry source” as saying that “a Lockheed Martin sales team was recently in SA [South Africa] and was overheard to say there was a local requirement for five of the latest C130J variant of the aircraft. SA currently operate eight of the early B-models.”
Program execution is never easy. Poor program execution is unacceptable, however, and companies that fail to achieve operational excellence will pay a steep price.
April Stephenson Says Goodbye with One Last Testimony before Commission on Wartime Contracting
On November 2, 2009 the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CwC) held yet another hearing on “contractor accountability” in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most recent hearing, “Counting Contractors: Where are They and What are They Doing?” was a wide-ranging affair, featuring testimony from the GAO, military services, DCMA, OUSD (AT&L), and DCAA Director April Stephenson. The CWC divided the hearing into three parts, each with its own panel: (1) Problems gaining an accurate count of contractor employees supporting the warfighters in Southwest Asia, (2) Managing contractors during the drawdown of forces in Iraq, and (3) DCAA and DCMA “coordination and cooperation.”
With such an embarrassment of riches to write about, we hardly know where to start. We’re going to focus on just a few aspects of the hearing; the entire cornucopia of testimony can be found here. Our focus will be on the third panel, consisting of Mr. Shay Assad, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Mr. Charlie Williams (Director, Defense Contract Management Agency), and Ms. April Stephenson (Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency). We’ll note for the record (as CWC co-Chair Thibault did) that this would be Ms. Stephenson’s last official testimony before her reassignment to a position on the staff of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale. We’re focusing on this panel because of the importance of the testimony and its foretelling of impacts that will be felt by all DOD contractors, not just those supporting warfighters in Southwest Asia. Several bombshells were dropped and we will be quoting extensively from the written testimony.
Co-Chair Thibault (a former long-time employee of the DCAA) noted—
A Commission hearing in August on contractor business systems revealed significant differences between DCMA’s and DCAA’s evaluations and assessments of contractor systems for cost estimating, purchasing, subcontracting, and other functions. The evidence showed that DCMA frequently took untimely—or no— action on DCAA findings, or issued contrary opinions, and often failed to ensure that contractors took corrective actions for deficiencies.
DOD’s Subcommittee on [Contractor] Business Systems
Mr. Assad started his testimony by noting actions DOD has taken in response to various issues raised by the GAO and others. In particular, he noted the creation of the Panel on Contracting Integrity and its Subcommittee on Business Systems, which will be chaired by the DPAP Deputy Director for Cost, Pricing, and Finance (Brian George). Other members of the panel will include the new Director of the DCAA (Pat Fitzgerald), Mr. David Ricci (DCMA), and a “senior representative” from the U.S. Army, and other DOD employees. According to Mr. Assad’s testimony, “The new subcommittee has a broad mandate to explore issues related to contractor business systems and the roles and responsibilities of DCAA and the DCMA administrative contracting officers (ACO’s) in determining and correcting deficiencies in contractor business systems.” Mr. Assad continued—
Key focus areas for the subcommittee include:
- Clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the DCMA contracting officer and DCAA auditor in determining the adequacy of contractor business systems;
- Assessing the need for standards, such as those already published for Earned Value Management System (EVMS), for the various business systems;
- Recommending procedures for higher level adjudication of differences between audit recommendations and the DCMA contracting officer determinations of adequacy; and
- Recommending appropriate contract remedies that DCMA contracting officers can use when a business system has been determined to be deficient.
The subcommittee will review current policy, processes, and practices within the DoD regarding the audit, evaluation, and administration of contractor’s business systems to include contractor internal control systems or other contractor systems the subcommittee may identify. In order to ensure consistency in the Department’s oversight of contractor business systems, the subcommittee will examine the need to establish a “common list” of contractor business systems with defined expectations or criteria for each system to determine adequacy. In addition to establishing a common set of standards for measuring the adequacy of contractor business systems, the subcommittee will determine the need for additional contract clauses or regulations for each system to include remedies such as withholds and guidelines for audit frequency. Currently, contractor business systems are not specifically defined in our regulations. We expect the work of the subcommittee will result in recommendations for new regulatory language in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) or the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS). For example, the DFARS may need to be revised to prescribe roles and responsibilities and standards that will be employed to determine compliance. I expect the subcommittee will be examining the existing FAR and DFARS contract clauses used for enforcement and remedies for non-compliance.
Mr. Assad continued in a like vein, discussing an adjudication process to be used when DCAA auditors and DCMA contracting officers disagree on how to evaluate a contractor’s business system. Moreover, Mr. Assad testified that “Audits of contractor business systems comprise only 5 % of DCAA’s audit workload based on 2009 incurred hours, which also include CAS non-compliances, and cost proposals for cost impacts, indirect rates, forwarding pricing rates, and other contract negotiations or awards. We will be working with DCAA to determine if some work currently being performed by DCAA could be performed by others or if the priority for some reviews should be lowered until additional resources can be made available.”
Mr. Assad also testified that –
The subcommittee will also focus on the type of input the DCMA contracting officer needs from DCAA in order to make decisions regarding adequacy of contractor business systems. We know for certain that DCMA contracting officers need to know the specific deficiencies in contractor business systems and the significance of those deficiencies on defense contracts. One approach that is under consideration is having DCAA report on the materiality of the deficiency it finds instead of opining on the overall system. That would enable DCMA contracting officers to use audit reports to determine what needs to be corrected and the degree of risk the deficiency imposes on the government.
He concluded his testimony by discussing the “chronically short staffed” agencies and how the lack of resources has impacted both DCAA and DCMA. He testified that “Until the staffing issues are resolved, it will not be possible for DCAA to perform at the level of quality and efficiency that is desired.”
DCMA Initiatives
Next Mr. Williams spoke to the CWC, testifying “I fully support guidance and regulatory changes in this area and believe the entire DoD procurement community needs to work together to send a clear message of compliance and accountability to contractors.” He also offered the following initiatives that DCMA is currently pursuing:
- We plan to expand the DCMA Contractor Purchasing System Review Center that over the next two years will triple the size of that organization as well as provide for additional managerial oversight of its operations. This expansion is planned to increase our ability to accomplish our reviews more frequently, and not because the reviews have been found inadequate. Further, when we are aware of issues with a certain contractor, this will provide us the capacity to expand the scope of our reviews.
- We are implementing a stronger set of internal controls through establishment of a “Board of Review” process. This process … mandates that any determination inconsistent with DCAA recommendations is subject to a higher level review within DCMA. Complementing this is an Office of the Secretary of Defense policy currently being coordinated that provides a process for resolving contracting officer disagreement with DCAA audit findings.
- We are developing a quality assurance plan for the resolution and disposition of reportable audit findings. It is unacceptable to me that we do not accomplish timely follow-up. This plan will ensure appropriate and timely administrative contracting officer resolution and disposition of reportable audit findings and employee and contract leadership accountability.
- We are establishing a Cost and Pricing Center primarily responsible for forward pricing and indirect cost issues, and proposal and data analysis. The Center will serve as a repository for cost and pricing data across the Department of Defense and conduct special cost reviews for the DoD enterprise. It will centrally manage the recruitment and education of cost monitors and price analysts across the Agency. The Center efforts will increase accountability for accuracy and predictability of rates, improve business base forecasting, and reduce the backlog of final overhead rate settlements, cost accounting standards issues and other reportable audits.
Last to speak was Ms. Stephenson. In her testimony she focused first on alleged misbilling by KBR of at least $20 million (and perhaps as much as $400 million) in private security costs under its LOGCAP III contract. This issue is currently in litigation, as KBR filed an appeal with the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) over the matter. She also accused KBR of failing to drawdown its support staff in levels commensurate with the military force drawdown. (We note that the CWC itself predicted that contractor support levels would actually increase as military forces decreased.) Ms. Stephenson asserted that KBR’s “excessive” staff levels would result in $193 million in “excessive costs” that would be paid by the U.S. Government.
Important Changes in DCAA’s Approach to Auditing Contractor Internal Controls
Ms. Stephenson also discussed the controversial approach DCAA has recently taken with respect to its audit of contractor internal control systems. She testified—
Based on our analysis of the relevant auditing standards, we determined that DCAA is not required to audit and report on the overall adequacy of the contractor’s system and related internal controls. We believe reporting significant deficiencies/material weaknesses on contractors’ various subsystems comprising the overall accounting system (e.g., billing, purchasing), as opposed to an overall audit opinion on the adequacy of each of those systems, may be a better approach because it would place the focus on the significant deficiencies/ material weaknesses instead of the contractor’s system as a whole. This revised audit approach would eliminate the concerns of a pass/fail rating as was raised at the hearing in August. We believe this audit approach would help DCMA and DCAA work together to ensure the contractor takes the appropriate corrective actions. [But] until we have completed this assessment, we will continue to issue audit reports on internal controls with two opinions – adequate and inadequate. We believe it would be counter-productive to revise the process for a month or two and then revise it again at the end of the calendar year when we complete our analysis of the revised auditing process and procedures. To ensure our FY 2010 audits of contractor business systems reflects the revised audit process, no new internal control audits will be started until the revised audit process is tested and distributed to the field audit offices.
Ms. Stephenson closed with the following statement: “DCAA will continue to work closely with all acquisition organizations to promote an integrated, well-managed contract audit process in-theatre. I believe Mr. Assad’s establishment of the new subcommittee is a positive step to improving the oversight of contractor systems.” Although we have in the past disagreed (rather vehemently) with her posture on various audit issues, we wish her well in her new assignment.
In conclusion, we believe the testimony proffered to the CWC by the third panel offered a bit of hope for DOD contractors while threatening them in a number of areas. We recommend that the testimony of each of the three speakers (to which we have linked) be reviewed in detail, and that contractors brace for a reinvigorated focus on internal control systems. We look forward to elimination of the current binary pass/fail overall assessment, where every mistake is deemed a significant system deficiency. However, the penalty for inadequate control systems is likely to increase in the near future, and may include imposition of significant monetary penalties.
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Firm Settles Case of Fraudulently Misreporting Socioeconomic Awards
Socioeconomic reporting is a pain. It’s not just reporting one’s subcontract awards made to small businesses versus those made to large businesses; it’s much more complicated than that. Federal and state governments have created many different “flavors” of small business, from the classic small “disadvantaged” business to small woman-owned businesses, and from “historically underutilized businesses” (“HUBzone”) to service-disabled veteran-owned businesses. Each recipient of a subcontract award needs to be properly categorized and properly reported. Moreover, many agencies (and prime contracts) contain socioeconomic “goals” that must be attained. Failure to attain those goals may affect award or incentive fees. Failure to make “good faith efforts” to achieve those goals can lead to liquidated damages being imposed.
Agencies are closely monitored by Congress to assure that the proper proportion of Federal dollars is going to the various socioeconomic business categories. At the state and local levels the same close scrutiny exists. The ability to consistently achieve socioeconomic goals is a competitive advantage. Conversely, a history of failure can keep a company from winning new work. Rarely, though, does one hear about a company facing criminal or civil charges related to its socioeconomic reporting.
This is one of those rare times.
On November 5, 2009 the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York reported that the Tutor Perini Corporation had agreed to settle a civil fraud suit for the sum of $9.75 million. According to Wikipedia, Tutor Perini (formerly Tutor Corporation) is one of the largest general contractors in the United States, with 2008 revenues of $5.6 billion. It is headquartered in Framingham, MA. The article reveals a dynamic history, with numerous changes of ownership and control. The entity is currently listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
According to the Department of Justice press release, Tutor Perini was performing on several “public works projects” for the City and State of New York. Those contracts were funded, at least partially, through grants made by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT)—making them federally funded contracts. The USDOT issued regulations “to increase the participation” of “disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs)” in federally funded public construction contracts related to transportation. Accordingly, the NY government entities established “goals for the percentage of work to be awarded to DBEs” and were also required to “ensure that good faith efforts [were] made by general contractors to engage qualified DBEs as subcontractors.” The regulations require that not less than 10 percent of authorized funds must be awarded to DBEs.
The press release reports that Tutor Perini “falsely and fraudulently reported that certain minority and disadvantaged business enterprises … were performing subcontracted work ….” Tutor Perini settled the case for $9.75 million, but “the settlement does not constitute an admission of liability by Perini.”
Oh, really. The company settled for nearly $10 million but expects its shareholders and the SEC to believe that it wasn’t really liable? One wonders what DOJ’s initial litigation position was, to make a $10 million settlement the appropriate business decision? And of course, the $9.75 million settlement is just the entire amount at issue. All the internal and external costs associated with litigating the case are unallowable pursuant to the Cost Principle at 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-47 (“Costs related to legal and other proceedings”).
It may be that Tutor Perini made the right decision. The DOJ press release made no mention of any alleged violations of the False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001), which is the statute one normally thinks of when false reporting is being alleged. Similarly, no mention was made of any violations of the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729). Often, when a false statement is alleged, each invoice that is “tainted” by that false statement is alleged to be a claim submitted under false pretenses. As one source notes—
The False Claims Act also imposes liability on an individual who may knowingly submit a false record in order to obtain payment from the government. An example of this may include a government contractor who submits a record that he knows (or should know) is false and that indicates compliance with certain contractual or regulatory requirements.
Consequently, Tutor Perini may have dodged a bullet. If each individual invoice submitted in connection with its NYDOT construction projects was deemed to be a false claim, the total penalties it might have been facing could easily be double or triple the amount of its settlement. Only management (and its counsel) know for sure.
Socioeconomic reporting is a pain. It seems to add little (if any) value to the work being done, and is usually treated like a bureaucratic waste of time. But as this press release shows, a contractor must take pains to get it right. The cost of noncompliance is just too high.
SIGIR Alleges Weak DOD Oversight and Contractor Overbillings for Iraq Reconstruction Work

On October 30, 2009 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) issued a report entitled “Iraq Security Forces Fund: Weak Contract Oversight Allowed Potential Overcharges by AECOM to Go Undetected” (SIGIR 10-005). SIGIR’s audit of the Global Maintenance and Supply Services (GMASS) contract found weak contractor invoice review processes by the U.S. Army Contracting Command. The GMASS contract is a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) ID/IQ contract that includes 3 Task Orders to assist the Iraqi Army in developing a self-sufficient logistics capability, and is one of the largest contracts funded by the Iraqi Security Forces Fund. As of September 2009, more than $567 million had been paid to the GMASS prime contractor, AECOM Government Services, via payment of 139 invoices. Under the GMASS Task Orders, AECOM was responsible for establishing ten maintenance centers, developing a repair parts supply system, repairing and maintaining Iraqi military vehicles, and refurbishing 8.500 Humvees.
The SIGIR found that the U.S. Army Contracting Command’s process for reviewing AECOM’s GMASS invoices “improved over time. However, the Contracting Office lacked sufficient experienced personnel to review invoices thoroughly ….” According to the SIGIR, only one person reviewed AECOM’s billings—which was insufficient in that one invoice contained more than 11,000 line items for parts alone. As the review process improved, the Contracting Office denied payment in higher amounts, culminating in a disallowance of as much as 33% of AECOM’s invoices. Regardless, the SIGIR found that even the improved review process would not have found what the SIGIR found, which included roughly $4 million in “potential overbillings” – including $2.1 million in subcontractor pass-through costs that exceeded the subcontractor’s contractual “mark-up” amounts, $332,000 in billings “above contractually agreed-upon prices,” $1.4 million in billings “above reasonable market rates,” and $177,000 in duplicate and triplicate billings. See the entire SIGIR report here.
As specific examples supporting its findings, the SIGIR reported the following—
- AECOM billed the U.S. government $25.00 for a liter of coolant that cost the contractor $2.16, and thus should have been billed at $2.64 after the allowable maximum markup. This resulted in $1.7 million in potentially overbilled coolant costs for the four invoices.
- AECOM billed the U.S. government between $102 and $190 per tire for tires that should have been billed at $85.61 after the allowable markup. As a result, the U.S. government was potentially overbilled $101,834 for the four invoices.
- Although the price of a package of 10 common 7/16” hardware washers was $1.22 after the allowable markup, the contractor charged $196.50 for each package, or $19,650 for 100 packages.
- AECOM billed $29.60 each for oil filters that had an agreed price of $14.80 each—100% over the allowable rate.
- AECOM billed $210.00 each for inner-tubes that SIGIR identified on the open market priced at $19.70 each. After adding the allowable markup, AECOM billed 772% over the market rate. This amounted to about $103,000 in potential overbillings.
- SIGIR’s analysis … found over 200 instances where specific parts, ordered for a specific vehicle, were double- and triple- billed. In one case, AECOM charged for 3 windshields, 12 headlamps, and 3 batteries for the same Nissan vehicle, on the same day.
According to SIGIR, AECOM acknowledged billing errors but stated that it had credited the U.S. Government for them. The SIGIR was not entirely convinced by AECOM’s response, reporting—
AECOM officials indicated that billing errors occurred early in the contract and that they credited about $4 million back to the U.S. government as an adjustment. SIGIR’s analysis found that about $2.4 million of the overcharges we identified are covered by these credits. Additionally, AECOM’s invoice that included these credits also contained $5.3 million in additional charges. SIGIR’s review of these charges identified problems similar to those in our original review including about $39,000 in billings above the contractor’s cost plus allowable markup, $239,000 in billings above contractually agreed rates, and $426,000 above market rates. For example, a credit appears on AECOM’s invoice for the previously noted coolant overbilling, which the contactor billed at $25.00 per liter when it should have billed at $2.64, but then raises the cost for coolant to $58.56 per liter in an additional charge. We also identified seven part charges that appear to have been billed on a previous invoice. For example, we identified a charge for a clutch assembly with the same delivery location, delivery date, part number, part description and quantity delivered as one from April 2006. Consequently, since AECOM’s $4 million credit was combined with questionable charges from the $5.3 million, SIGIR cannot verify the U.S. government received a full credit for prior overbillings.
SIGIR concluded its report by noting that lack of a robust review process by the Contracting Office, coupled with AECOM’s problematic billings “clearly illustrate the need for a thorough review of the invoices submitted in support of the GMASS contract.” That may be, but we have some additional questions, based on the SIGIR report.
- What is the GMASS contract type? Is it CPFF or ID/IQ Task Order? Why were repair and maintenance services procured via cost-type contracts, when they would seem to be amenable to fixed-price repair orders.
- If the contract was cost-reimbursable, why did AECOM agree to fix-price certain items at “contractually agreed-upon prices”?
- Work orders are commonly used to manage depot repair and maintenance services. But why was AECOM using repair work orders as support for its cost-plus invoices?
- If AECOM’s subcontractor (Anham, LLC) was generating “over 93% of the costs billed” on AECOM’s invoices, then what value was AECOM adding? Was there a violation of the DFARS prohibition against excessive pass-through charges?
In summary, we don’t know if AECOM has properly billed its customer or not. We don’t know whether AECOM had already credited its customer for improper billings prior to SIGIR’s audit, or not. But we think that the contracting process was cumbersome (at best), and the confusion quite likely led to billing problems. We believe the lesson is clear: simplicity facilitates compliance. Unnecessary complexity facilitates administrative problems.
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