Allowability and Allocability of Costs in the War Zone

We recently posted an article regarding the allocability of indirect costs, in which the Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) ruled that a contractor’s IR&D costs were unallocable to its Government contracts. At the conclusion of that article, we noted, “although the Court’s continued insistence on a ‘bright line’ allocability ‘test’ should concern all government contract cost accountants, another contractor with a stronger fact pattern might well prevail.” While we don’t claim prescience, BearingPoint recently illustrated before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) how a government contractor might refute assertions that its costs were not allocable to a contract, and thus demonstrate cost allocability.
The ASBCA decision (found here in its entirety), captioned as ASBCA Nos. 55354 & 55555 and dated October 16, 2009, included a fairly complex set of facts and issues involving BearingPoint’s work in the Iraq theater of operations. BearingPoint was awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee, level-of-effort (CPFF/LOE) type contract by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) for “economic recovery, reform and sustained growth in Iraq.” In the first case (No. 55354), the USAID disallowed various costs incurred by BearingPoint in executing its contract. Among the disallowed costs were: labor costs associated with the subcontractor providing physical security for BearingPoint, rental costs associated with leasing ground transportation used to move about the countryside, housing costs for personnel in-country, and the cost of miscellaneous items such as “radio rental, telephone cards, equipment … and supplies.” The costs were disallowed (generally) because of a lack of sufficient supporting documentation or because they were unreasonable in amount. Regardless of the rationale for the contracting officer’s final decision, at trial the Government argued that the disputed costs were “unallocable for insufficient documentation“ to prove they were allocable to the contract.
The Government’s position was that “allocability determinations hinge upon contemporaneous documentation establishing a nexus between contract work and costs.” Since, as a general matter, “a contractor bears the burden of proof on the issue of allocability” (citing Lockheed-Georgia Co., A Div. Of Lockheed Corp., ASBCA No. 27660, 90-3 BCA ¶ 22,957 at 115,278), the Government argued that BearingPoint’s failure to provide robust documentation upon request led to a conclusion that the costs were unallocable to the contract, and thus unallowable.
In making its argument, the Government relied upon DCAA audit reports questioning more than $4.5 million of BearingPoint’s subcontraxtor’s costs because the subcontractor (Custer Battles) was “unable to provide sufficient supporting data” or DCAA was “unable to apply sufficient audit procedures to allow us to adequately verify the costs claimed” by Custer Battles. (The amount of questioned costs subsequently was reduced to $3.9 million.) DCAA’s position was that it needed to review 100% of Custer Battle’s claimed costs because the auditors deemed its accounting system to be inadequate. The parties became deadlocked; USAID insisted that BearingPoint support 100% of Custer Battles’ costs and BearingPoint said the documentation was both not required and not available. In the words of the USAID contracting officer (Ms. Kolstrom), she “could not determine allocability. [Although she had] all these [Custer Battles] invoices showing all these people, really there’s no proof that these people really existed and worked on the BearingPoint project, nothing.”
The ASBCA rejected the Government’s argument “that the disputed labor charges are unallocable for insufficient documentation.” The Court found that—
The contract clauses do not impose the stringent requirements of either “nice neat little files” that Ms. Kolstrom sought or the contemporaneous records for which AID appears to be arguing. Thus, the Allowable Cost and Payment clause, which was incorporated in the contract, imposed no requirement that BearingPoint substantiate labor costs with time sheets, as Ms. Kolstrom insisted. The Audit and Records clause, which was also part of the contract, looks to ‘all records and other evidence sufficient to reflect properly all costs claimed to have been incurred...in performance of this contract.’ The clause prescribes no form that the ‘records’ or the ‘other evidence’ must take, and in fact we have read the clause more liberally than AID’s position suggests. … And AID’s Documentation for Payment clause, which was incorporated, contemplates cost reporting ‘prepared from the books and records of the Contractor,’ without describing the requisite level of detail. These clauses are consistent with FAR 31.201-2(d), which speaks broadly of a contractor’s responsibility to maintain documentation ‘adequate to demonstrate that costs claimed...are allocable to the contract.’
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… the nub of the matter for us is the extraordinary imbalance in the cases presented by the parties. For its part, BearingPoint, as the party with the burden of proof on allocability, presented a robust prima facie case. Thus, BearingPoint presented credible testimony from Ms. Swan, Mr. Bourne and Mr. Dulle, supported by documents. … In the face of BearingPoint’s strong case, we are unable to repose confidence in AID’s evidence. Although other possible government witnesses could have shed light on the labor disallowances at issue, only Ms. Kolstrom testified. She offered confused testimony that we have not found credible, and it reasonably cannot be said that AID overcame BearingPoint’s strong prima facie showing.
To sum up, the DCAA’s inability to audit “outside the box” of its own audit program and its refusal to move beyond its finding that Custer Battles’ accounting system was inadequate, based on the realities of contracting in a war zone, coupled with a contracting officer’s unwillingness or inability to use the discretion given to her by statute and regulation, led to a “deadlock” and litigation. This time, the contractor prevailed (assuming no reversal on appeal). One would hope both DCAA and contracting officers would learn from this case and seek to avoid future litigation.
The second appeal (No. 55555) was also interesting, but addressed different issues. As part of its contract, BearingPoint employees worked six days per week “without premium pay.” Because the employees were working in a combat zone, they were entitled to salary “uplifts” of 25 percent for “danger pay” and 25 percent for being assigned to a permanent duty post in a hazardous area—i.e., a 50% salary increase. The question in the second appeal revolved around how the salary increase was to be calculated—whether it should be calculated on a 40 or a 48 hour-per-work week salary. The Government asserted (based on a DCAA audit report) that the annual employee salaries should have been uplifted by 50 percent and then divided by 52 weeks to arrive at the weekly employee labor cost, while BearingPoint argued that the annual salaries should have been divided by 2,080 hours (52 weeks of 40 hours each) and then uplifted by 50 percent and then multiplied by the actual hours work to arrive at the labor billing amount.
For example, assume an employee earns an annual salary of $100,000 per year. Under the Government’s methodology, the employee would receive an uplift of 50 percent to $150,000, which would then be divided by 52 to derive a weekly labor cost of $2,885. Under BearingPoint’s methodology, the employee’s annual salary of $100,000 would be divided by 2,080 hours to derive an hourly pay rate of $48.08, which would be uplifted by 50 percent to equal $72.12; that amount would be multiplied by a 48-hour work week to derive a weekly labor cost of $3,462. In this example, the difference between the two methods is $577 per week, or $30,000 per year per employee.
The Court found in favor of the Government on the second appeal. Without going into overmuch detail regarding the language of the Department of State Standardized Regulations (DSSR) or specific contract language, suffice it to say that the Court found that the applicable regulations and contract terms plainly called for the uplifts to be applied to employees’ salaries, not an hourly pay rate. As the Court reasoned—
The most that BearingPoint’s arguments lead to is ambiguity. Whether the arguments relate to the undefined nature of the workweek to which basic compensation applies or otherwise, ambiguity cannot yield recovery on this record. If the ambiguity were deemed patent, then BearingPoint must establish that it raised the issue before bidding. … We have found no evidence that BearingPoint did so. Alternatively, if the ambiguity were deemed latent, then BearingPoint must establish that it relied upon its current interpretation in bidding. We have likewise found no evidence that it did so.
In addition, the Court found that BearingPoint failed to cap the salaries of its employees, which was not in compliance with specific contract terms. Again, BearingPoint’s arguments to the contrary were unavailing. As before, the Court found that BearingPoint’s arguments led (at most) to a patent ambiguity, which created an obligation on BearingPoint’s part to raise the issue before bidding, which it had not done.
We have reported several times on the Commission on Wartime Contracting, and its views on both DCMA oversight of DOD contractors deployed in the battlefield and the adequacy of those contractors’ “business systems.” In her last testimony before the CWC, former DCAA Director April Stephenson accused contractor KBR of billing the Government for $19.7 million in prohibited “private security costs” and noted that “we completed our audit of KBR’s security cost submission and concluded that the information provided by KBR was not adequate for determining the amount and extent of prohibited private security costs billed to the government … but we estimated that the private security costs could be at least $100 million.” In the midst of ineffective audits, contracting officer timidity, and political grandstanding, it is up to the Courts to determine what the facts are and whether billed costs are reasonable, allowable and allocable.
As these two BearingPoint cases show, that is sometimes a difficult chore. We hope that both the Government and its contractors learn from these cases and reach a negotiated settlement on disputed issues before resorting to litigation.
Not Your Father’s War: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare

The November 9, 2009 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine featured a wide-ranging story on some of the challenges facing U.S. and allied forces in Southwest Asia and elsewhere. Ostensibly based on interviews and presentations from a recent meeting of the Association of Old Crows (a not-for-profit group claiming a membership of more than 13,500 individuals and more than 100 companies, focused on “the science and practice of Electronic Warfare, Information Operations, and related disciplines”), the article is essentially a litany of the threats and challenges facing U.S. and allied troops as they adapt to warfare in the new century.
The article quotes SecDef Gates as saying the future of warfare “will be more complex—where conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. We have to realize that the black-and-white distinction between conventional ware and irregular war is an outdated model.” The theories don’t match the reality of modern warfare.
For example, the article quotes Col. (ret.) Maxie McFarland, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as saying, “We [started out] talking about knowledge-centric operations … and being able to act with precise force and accurate weapons within a framework that would allow us to know pretty much everything. What we’ve discovered … is that is just not so. That framework of knowledge and information doesn’t exist. You [still] have to fight for information.” Although new Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technology and assets are being introduced into Afghanistan so fast as to constitute a “bow-wave”—in fact ISR analysis is still problematic because of various reasons. There is a lot of information, but the information is not always available to the warfighter.
Army Col. William Davis is quoted as saying, “Our Achilles’ heel is communications. Right now there are over 200 [coalition] systems at Bagram AB, Kandahar, and other places that don’t talk to each other. That’s not the basis for success.” The article notes that one industry official “had been asked to devise a communications algorithm that would allow seven types of intelligence gathering aircraft to exchange data.” Adding to the communication challenge (according to the AW&ST article) is the need to translate directives into as many as 20 different languages, as well as the “difficulty of sharing multilayered intelligence and a shortage of trained [analyst] manpower.” The article asserts that the coalition forces lack “automated intelligence tools, managing petabytes of data, frequency deconfliction, information sharing and collaborative operations.”
Efficient utilization of intelligence and reconnaissance information may be bogging down in a sort of “electronic soup” that actually hampers warfighting efforts instead of acting as a force multiplier. The article reports that “some warfighters are switching off technology because it is too complicated, distracting or interference-prone to be effective.” On the other hand, as we have previously noted, the installation of real-time ISR assets such as the Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) as part of the persistent surveillance and dissemination system (PSDS) provides enhanced situational awareness and improved security.
The AW&ST article also discusses other challenges of the 21st century battlefield, which extends well behind the front lines and, indeed, into cyberspace. The article reports that “during the past year, ever-mutating opponents have produced surprises for military organizations around the world.” The article notes that French Rafale aircraft were grounded when the “Conficker” worm invaded the French Navy’s mission planning system. The virus also was introduced into the French Navy’s computer network, the Villacoublay air base, and the 8th Transmissions Regiment when “someone in the navy had used an infected thumb drive.” In January 2009, “the British Defense Ministry was attacked by a virus that also infected computers at Royal Air Force bases and Royal Navy ships, including the aircraft carrier Ark Royal.” In November 2008, Pentagon computers were infected by a “cyber-worm” that caused 1,500 computers to be taken off-line, and led to a ban on the use of thumb drives.
In April 2009, hackers reportedly stole “terabytes of data” related to the design of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. As the article notes, “The hackers apparently used some vulnerabilities they encountered on the websites of some contractors that were helping with the construction of the $300-billion project. They employed a tool that encrypted data as it was being stolen, so officials couldn't immediately realize what was being defrauded.”
As the article notes, the attack on the French Navy planes “was a classic cyber-operation.” It quotes a source as saying, “That’s a perfect objective—to make sure they can’t update their folders. That’s the kind of effect that [senior planners] would like to see from cyber. It has nothing to do with whether I interdicted cyber-infrastructure. I figure out what processes I want to hit, what systems supported those processes, and then I find seams and vulnerabilities. It’s a fallacy that a cyber-attack can be dealt with by a cyber-defense. It’s not about IT; it’s about operations.”
The AW&ST article reports that the U.S. is under such constant cyber-attack that “the definition of ‘success’ has shifted to containing intrusions instead of eliminating them. As SecDef Gates noted in a June 2009 memo, “our increasing dependency on cyberspace, alongside a growing array of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, adds a new element of risk to our national security.” This article reports that the Pentagon has spent more than $100 million in the past six years, “not on new technology or weapon systems, but on repairing the damage done [to] its computers from cyber attacks that occur almost every day.” To address this pervasive threat, in that same June 2009 memo, the Pentagon established a “cyber command” (USCYBERCOM) as a subordinate unified command under the U.S. Strategic Command. SecDef Gates directed that the new command was to reach initial operating capability by October 2009 and full operating capability by October 2010.
We frequently report on advances in aerospace and defense technology. As the AW&ST article reminds us, our adversaries are making advances as well, perhaps in areas in which we are vulnerable to exploitation. In 21st century warfare, securing the lines of command, control, communications, and computers (C4) and making effective use of ISR informationi may be more important than securing the lines of supply.
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Proposed FAR Rule Prohibits Personal Conflicts of Interest
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (at § 9.5) historically has focused on “organizational” conflicts of interest. An organizational conflict of interest (OCI) exists where a person (i.e., a contractor) cannot render impartial advice or assistance to the government. Generally, OCIs fall into three broad categories: (1) Unequal access to information, (2) Biased ground rules, and (3) Impaired objectivity. We have previously noted that OCIs have been under increasing scrutiny in recent years. In June 2008, FAR Case 2007-018 was published as an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; the objective of the ANPRM was to seek information from the public to determine whether the existing regulation “adequately addresses the current needs of the acquisition community or whether providing standard provisions and/or clauses, or a set of such standard provisions and clauses, might be beneficial.” The public comments to the ANPRM can be found here. Now, in response to a statutory requirement found in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, the FAR Councils are proposing to revise the FAR rules to address “personal” conflicts of interest.
On November 13, 2009 FAR Case 2008-025 was published at 74 Federal Register 218 (pages 58584 – 58589) that would, if finalized as drafted, add a new FAR subpart at § 3.11 to –
… require each contractor that has employees performing acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions to identify and prevent personal conflicts of interest for such employees. In addition, such contractors will be required to prohibit covered employees with access to non-public Government information from using it for personal gain. The proposed rule also makes contractors responsible for (1) Having procedures to screen for potential conflicts of interest, (2) informing covered employees of their obligations with regard to these policies, (3) maintaining effective oversight to verify compliance, (4) reporting any personal conflict-of-interest violations to the contracting officer, and (5) taking appropriate disciplinary action with employees who fail to comply with these policies.
The proposed rule would define a “personal conflict of interest” as “a situation in which a covered employee has a financial interest, personal activity, or relationship that could impair the employee's ability to act impartially and in the best interest of the Government when performing under the contract.” The proposed rule lists several sources of PCIs. A “covered employee” is “an individual who--
(1) Is an employee of the contractor or subcontractor, a consultant, a partner, or a sole proprietor; and (2) Performs an acquisition function closely associated with inherently governmental functions.” The rule would further define “closely associated with inherently governmental functions” as supporting or providing advice or recommendations with regard to certain listed Federal agency activities (including planning, evaluating or awarding Federal contracts).
Essentially, the proposed rule would compel service contractors supporting Federal agencies to establish controls on their employees, to prevent those employees from having PCIs in which their personal situations could impair their objectivity. The controls and constraints would be similar to those imposed on external auditors of publicly traded companies.
The proposed rule includes a new contract clause (52.203-16) that, when included in a contract, would require the contractor to –
Have procedures in place to screen covered employees for potential personal conflicts of interest including--
(i) Obtaining and maintaining a financial disclosure statement from each covered employee when the employee is initially assigned to the task under the contract;
(ii) Ensuring that the disclosure statements are updated by the covered employees at least on an annual basis; and
(iii) Requiring each covered employee to update the disclosure statement whenever a new personal conflict of interest occurs.
The contract clause with be a “mandatory flowdown clause,” meaning that the clause must be included in all subcontracts that exceed $100,000 in value and are those “in which subcontractor employees may perform acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions.”
In addition to the foregoing, the contractors must prevent PCIs, prohibit use of non-public Government information for personal gain, and obtain a non-disclosure agreement from covered employees. There are other requirements in the proposed rule, such as the need to “report to the contracting officer any [PCI] violation as soon as identified” and “take appropriate disciplinary action in the case of covered employees who fail to comply” with the contractor’s PCI policies.
Failure to comply with the contract clause requirements may subject the contractor to –
(1) Suspension of contract payments; (2) Loss of award fee, consistent with the award fee plan, for the performance period in which the Government determined Contractor non-compliance; (3) Termination of the contract for default or cause, in accordance with the termination clause of this contract; (4) Disqualification of the Contractor from subsequent related contractual efforts; or (5) Suspension or debarment.
Clearly, the proposed rule (which can be reviewed in its entirety here) will be onerous. The FAR Councils note, however, that new requirements “are limited to service contractors whose employees are performing acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions for or on behalf of Federal agencies.” As the Councils note, “This class is a minority of Government contractors and is becoming smaller as Government agencies bring more such functions back in house, e.g., DOD announced in April that it is bringing 10,000 acquisition positions back in house.”
Public comments may be submitted (as always) to www.regulations.gov. The comment period ends January 12, 2010.
KC-X Tanker RFP in Jeopardy?
The U.S. Air Force’s attempt to develop a replacement for its KC-135 “Stratotanker” refueling planes is a poster child for what’s wrong with the modern Defense acquisition system. The original plan (announced in 2003) was to provide 100 Boeing K-767 tankers under a 10-year lease to the Air Force, with an option to purchase the planes at the end of the lease term. Critics immediately pointed out that the lease/purchase plan was much more expensive than an outright purchase. The Air Force subsequently announced it would purchase 80 planes and lease 20 of them, which did nothing to placate the critics. It was reported at the time that the planes would cost $150 million each if purchased, while the cost of the lease/purchase contract would be $216 million per aircraft. Senator McCain called the planned acquisition a “sweet deal” for Boeing.
In November 2003 the Air Force announced that it had “frozen” its acquisition plans while it investigated a senior Air Force acquisition officer, Ms. Darlene Druyun, who had left her government position to join Boeing in January 2003 at an annual salary of US $250,000.
The Druyun scandal was later called the “biggest Pentagon scandal in 20 years” and led to her pleading guilty to providing Boeing with sensitive bid information about its competitor (Airbus) and to inflating the contract price to favor Boeing (her future employer). Ms. Druyun was sentenced in 2004 to nine months in jail, fined $50,000 and given 150 hours of community service. According to this Wikipedia entry, “The ramifications extended to Boeing CFO Michael M. Sears, who was fired from Boeing, and Boeing CEO Phil Condit, who resigned. On February 18, 2005, Sears was sentenced to four months in prison. Boeing ended up paying a $615 million fine for [its] involvement.”
It addition, the procurement scandal significantly undercut the credibility of so-called “commercial item pricing” because Boeing allegedly claimed its 767 aircraft were commercial items, which exempted the company from having to disclose its “cost or pricing data” to Pentagon negotiators. This situation led to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) being revised, and to suspicion about the bona fides of commercial item acquisitions that is still being felt years later.
In early 2007 the Air Force attempted another procurement for its much-needed tanker fleet. There were two competing teams: Boeing and a joint venture between Northrop Grumman and EADS. (EADS stands for European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company and is now the world’s largest aerospace/defense company. It is the parent of Airbus, Boeing’s biggest competitor.) Boeing proposed (once again) a version of its 767 aircraft, while the EADS/Northrop Grumman team proposed a version of the Airbus 330 aircraft.
To prepare for a “rigorous” evaluation of the competing bids, the Air Force announced that had assigned more than 150 experts in order to make sure that every step of the process was done “by the book.” As this story reports, “’The program office is being extra cautious in ensuring that each step of the source selection process is thoroughly documented,’ said Joe Leising, contracts chief for the 653rd Aeronautical Systems Squadron at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, where the evaluation team is sequestered.” The story continued—
Terry Kasten, director of the 653rd Aeronautical Systems Squadron, said in a statement that his team was keen to avoid any problems with the tanker competition. "When the dust settles, we'll have spent many tens of thousands of man-hours scrubbing the content of these proposals, conducting a legal review and preparing summary information for both an independent advisory council assessment and ... a source selection authority decision," he said.
Kasten said senior Air Force legal and contracting advisers were standing by to "answer questions, capture lessons from other programs, including the recent experience with the CSAR-X (helicopter) source selection, and ensure we do everything by the book."
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Lt. Gen. Jack Hudson, the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Aircraft at Wright-Patterson air base, said senior Pentagon officials had carefully monitored the tanker program. "Our leadership is very aware of our efforts and they have ensured we proceed in a deliberate and transparent manner, every step of the way, so that at the end of the day we have a program in which we all have high confidence that we can execute successfully," he said.
The proposals were submitted in April, 2007 and in February, 2008 the Air Force announced that the EADS/Northrop Grumman team had won the competition—to the consternation of Congress and others who were concerned about a “foreign” manufacturer building planes for the Air Force. Published reports stated that Northrop Grumman spent $100 million on its bid for the $40 billion program.
Boeing protested the award decision before the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and its protest was sustained; GAO recommended that the tanker award be recompeted based on a number of fundamental flaws in the Air Force’s bid evaluation. The protest effort involved 15 lawyers on Boeing’s side, nine lawyers on Northrop’s side, and 19 lawyers from the Air Force. According to the GAO, the Air Force’s bid evaluation (1) did not credit Boeing with satisfying more technical requirements than the EADS team, even though the RFP called for satisfying as many as possible; (2) the Air Force credited EADS with exceeding a key performance parameter (KPP), even though the RFP said that the KPP would not be treated that way; (3) the Air Force conducted “misleading and unequal” discussions with Boeing—among other fundamental “blocking and tackling” errors.
In mid 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates put the KC-X competition into an “expedited recompetition” with DOD Under Secretary of Defense John Young put in charge of the evaluation. In essence, the Air Force was stripped of its authority and responsibility to choose its aerial tanker. Selection of the new winner would be made by the end of 2008. However, in September 2008 SecDef Gates cancelled the new RFP, calling for a “cooling-off” period and essentially punting the competition to the incoming Obama administration. According to one report, the Air Force was forced to pay the EADS/Northrop Grumman team “tens of millions of dollars” in termination fees.
One year later, in September 2009, SecDef Gates announced a new restart to the tanker competition, with source selection authority being returned to the Air Force. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense would maintain a “robust oversight role.”
What is interesting about the latest round of competition is that the draft Request for Proposal (RFP) reportedly has led to “grumbles” by both teams. According to an article in the November 9, 2009 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine, more than 200 questions were submitted to the Air Force by the bidders. In addition, Northrop Grumman has complained that its prior bid prices were released to the Boeing team during the 2008 protest process, jeopardizing its competitive position. Moreover, the EADS/Northrop Grumman team was unhappy with the 373 pass/fail attributes described in the draft RFP; reportedly, each of the attributes was equally weighted vice the prior competition, in which requirements were individually weighted. For example, water flow in the sink and toilet were just as important as fuel offload rate. In the words of the Northrop spokesperson, “If everything is important, is anything important?”
Notably, the draft RFP calls for fixed-price development efforts, vice the prior contract which was cost-reimbursable. We have previously discussed this recent trend in Defense contracting. The AW&ST article quoted Air Force Secretary Michael Donley as saying, “As we go forward, I think we’ll try to put more pressure on our suppliers to keep cost down. There are cases out there, and I think tanker is one of them, where the technology should be pretty mature.” Our position on this has been consistent: fixed-price contracts don’t control cost growth unless the customer controls requirements growth and other contract changes. Believing that developing new defense technology can be done on a fixed-price basis ignores the past 50 years of U.S. acquisition history. It is naïve at best and negligent at worst.
If the Air Force significantly revises the draft RFP, it may lead to an additional delay in developing, testing, and fielding the replacement tankers. Moreover, it is possible that one of the bidders could pull out of the competition if it believes the playing field is not level. If that happens, it will be less than surprising and entirely consistent with the history of this troubled acquisition.
Meanwhile, the Air Force continues to fly its 52 year-old KC-135 planes. Although it has been reported that the planes can continue flying until 2040 (albeit with increased maintenance costs), the KC-135 fleet is currently flying double its planned yearly flying hour program to meet airborne refueling requirements, which has resulted in higher than forecasted usage and sustainment costs. A 2007 Los Angeles Times story quoted Su Payton (then the Air Force’s chief acquisition officer): "There is a saying out there that 'you can't kick ass without tanker gas,’ [but] we have tankers that should be flying around with an AARP card."
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