Obama Administration Issues Executive Order Getting Tough on Improper Payments
Recently the GAO reported on poor contract management and large amounts of “improper payments” by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Here is a link to an article discussing that report. Nearly simultaneously, the White House announced that the Federal government made $98 billion in improper payments in 2009, an increase of 38 percent compared to the prior year.
So it came as no real surprise that on November 20, 2009 President Obama issued an Executive Order entitled “Reducing Improper Payments and Eliminating Waste in Federal Programs” that announces his administration’s intention to reduce “payment errors” with respect to Federal grants and contracts. The Executive Order, found here, consists of four substantive sections (plus an introductory section as well as a two policy sections). Briefly, the content is as follows:
Section 2
Directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to identify those Federal programs in which the highest-dollar or majority of improper payments occur, designated as “high-priority programs”. Once those high-priority programs are identified for each Federal agency and/or Executive department, the OMB will establish annual targets (in coordination with the affected agency/department) for reducing the amount of improper payments. The OMB will also issue Government-wide guidance for various administrative aspects of the program—including the identification and publication of those entities that have received improper payments.
Also directs that the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, and Director of the OMB “shall publish on the Internet information about improper payments on high-priority programs. Various pieces of information are to be made available to the public—including (as noted above) identification of “entities that have received the greatest amount of outstanding improper payments (or, where improper payments are identified solely on the basis of a sample, the entities that have received the greatest amount of outstanding improper payments in the applicable sample).” Entities that are the subject of referrals to the Department of Justice are not to be identified, according to the Executive Order.
Also directs that the parties named above, in coordination with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), will establish a “central Internet-based method to collect from the public information concerning suspected incidents of waste, fraud, and abuse by an entity receiving Federal funds that have led or may lead to improper payments by the Federal Government.”
Section 3
Requires the head of each Federal agency responsible for operating a high-priority program to designate a point of contact/coordinator to be responsible for addressing improper payments and meeting the reduction targets. Requires the affected agencies to report to their respective Inspector General their plans for addressing improper payments and meeting the reduction targets. Among other things, requires the various stakeholders to recommend to the President “actions designed to reduce improper payments by improving information sharing among agencies and programs, and where applicable, State and local governments and other stakeholders. The recommendations shall address the ways in which information sharing may improve eligibility verification and pre-payment scrutiny, shall identify legal or regulatory impediments to effective information sharing….”
Section 4
Requires (among other actions) the various stakeholders to recommend to the President –
… actions designed to enhance contractor accountability for improper payments. The recommendations may include, but are not limited to, subjecting contractors to debarment, suspension, financial penalties, and identification through a public Internet website … for knowingly failing timely to disclose credible evidence of significant overpayments received on Government contracts.
Clearly, the Executive Order is designed to put pressure on the agencies to better manage their payments, while putting pressure on contractors to promptly report receipt and make timely restitution.
DCAA Independence Hits New Low, with Auditors Opining on Legal Entitlement

On November 11, 2009 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took the somewhat unusual step of affirming a prior decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in a nonprecedential decision without comment, pursuant to its Rule 36. Curious about the case that was so clearly correct that the Appellate Judges did not believe comment was warranted, we researched the original ASBCA case, and were taken aback by what we found.
But first, some background. Readers of this site are well aware of concerns raised by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s (DCAA) alleged failure to maintain “independence” from those it audits. In addition to the original July 2008 GAO audit report that first raised this issue, we have reported on this issue in August, in September, and several times in October. It’s fair to say that auditor independence has played a large role in Senate and House hearings on the quality and effectiveness of DCAA’s audits, and likely led to former Director April Stephenson’s reassignment in November of 2009.
Auditor independence is a big deal—or so we thought, until we read the original ASBCA decision in the matter of Beyley Construction Group Corporation (found here).
BCG’s Contract Dispute and Appeal to the ASBCA
Beyley Construction Group (BCG) was awarded a grounds maintenance contract by the US Army, to be performed at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. BCG, an 8(a) business (which is a small business which is owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals), received the contract, which included a base year and two option years. The contract included the clauses 52.212-4 and 52.212-5 (which indicated that it was a contract for a commercial item acquired pursuant to FAR Part 12)—but it also included the clause 52.222-41, incorporating the Service Contract Act. The inclusion of the Service Contract Act clause is interesting, because acquisitions of commercial services should have been exempted from the Service Contract Act (SCA) pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act Of 1994 (FASA), as this letter from the American Bar Association, Public Contract Law Section, makes clear.
In fact, research tells us that the SCA was on the list of public laws which were exempted from application to commercial item acquisitions, until it was removed from the list of exemptions in July 2000. Subsequently there was a somewhat confusing parade of DOD class deviations, interim rules and final rules, which ended with the SCA being applicable to some (but not all) prime contracts for commercial services, and to some (but not all) subcontracts for commercial services. At the end of the day, it appears that BCG’s contract was, indeed subject to the SCA, even though it was a Part 12 “commercial item” acquisition. (But even this conclusion is subject to some doubt, as we will discuss later in this article.)
The gist of the SCA requirements was discussed by the judge in BCG’s case, and is as follows—
Each service employee employed in the performance of this contract … shall be paid not less than the minimum monetary wages and shall be furnished fringe benefits in accordance with the wages and fringe benefits … as specified in any wage determination attached to this contract. … In the absence of a minimum wage attachment for this contract, neither the Contractor nor any subcontractor under this contract shall pay any person performing work under this contract … less than the minimum wage specified by … the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. [Emphasis added.]
As the judge noted, “The contract did not attach any wage determination and, accordingly, the minimum wage—$5.15—was applicable. Had it been made a part of the contract, the proper wage determination (WD) would have established a wage of $6.13 plus $2.02 in health and welfare benefits.”
BCG was the low bidder and, after confirmation by the Government of its price, it was awarded a contract in September 2001. (Note the timing. It is possible that the SCA was not applicable to the acquisition during formulation of the government’s requirements and request for proposal, but became applicable by the time the contract was awarded. Interestingly, there was no discussion of the acquisition time line and/or SCA applicability in the ASBCA decision.)
It became clear during the first six months of performance that BCG had “forgotten” to include an estimate for health and welfare benefits in its bid. The judge found that “BCG included a wage rate of $6.13 plus 40% for [fringe benefits]. … Beyley testified that had BCG included health and welfare benefits, the fringe benefit portion of its service employees’ pay ‘would have been like around 72 percent instead of 40 percent’.” It became clear that not only had BCG not included the full amount of prevailing wages pursuant to the SCA, neither had the government’s Independent Government Estimate (IGE). It began to look like there had been a mutual mistake in contract formation, as opposed to a unilateral mistake by the bidder, discovered after contract award. Nonetheless, failing to get a favorable decision from the Contracting Officer (using the FAR language at 14.407-4(a) as support for its position), BCG filed a certified claim pursuant to the Contracts Dispute Act. (We note for the record that it is unlikely BCG’s interpretation of that FAR Part 14 language would have been upheld by the Court.)
In its pleading before the ASBCA, the government said, “With respect to the claim for omitted DOL wage rates, the contracting officer will issue a modification that compensates Appellant for the difference between the amount Appellant received from the Army and the prevailing DOL wage rate for health and welfare benefits plus interest in accordance with the Prompt Payment Act.…” In other words, the government conceded during its arguments the merits of BCG’s claim and notified the Court that it would make BCG whole.
Then DCAA got involved.
DCAA’s Audit of BCG’s Claim
The judge found that “DCAA issued its audit report (No. 1271-2008F17200001) on 29 February 2008. Even though it found that BCG actually incurred $343,020 in health and welfare payments, more than the $322,085 originally claimed, DCAA questioned the entire amount claimed. It found that ‘[t]he contractor failed to include these costs,’ in its bid, and that it signed the contract, ‘either knowingly or unknowingly, omitting the costs.’” Based on the DCAA audit report, the government reversed its previous position and now asserted “that it has no obligation to pay said amount and intends to litigate this issue before the Board.” The government’s change of position was warranted, in its view, “because its concession on the health and welfare costs was ‘based upon a then incomplete understanding of Appellant’s claim’ since clarified by the [DCAA] audit [opinion].”
Unsurprisingly BCG opposed the government’s change of position, arguing that since “the audit cannot express any opinion on the contractor’s [legal] entitlement,” the audit report could only be used to determine quantum but not legal entitlement. The judge was not persuaded by BCG’s argument, and permitted the government to change its position. In other words, DCAA’s opinion of the legal issues involved was allowed to affect the litigation.
Generally, Government claims are divided into two basic parts: "entitlement" and “quantum”. Entitlement is the legal determination of whether the claim has merit, while quantum is the determination of how much money (or time) is involved. As a general rule, if entitlement is not established, there is no need to address quantum. Almost universally, accountants involved in litigation support roles are focused exclusively on the quantum and do not express any opinion on the legal entitlement or merits of the case, because doing so is essentially practicing law without a license. Not so DCAA, who apparently feel free to advise the government attorney on the legal merits of the contractor’s entitlement to the quantum involved.
A review of the June 2009 edition of the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) finds the following audit guidance—
Entitlement is a legal question; however, the auditor should provide the requestor with any meaningful observations regarding the question of the contractor's entitlement to recover delay damages …. These observations may be provided in the audit report explanatory notes or in an appendix on other matters to be reported. (CAM 12-802.1a. Emphasis added.)
The CAM also contains the following guidance –
Report any meaningful observations regarding the question of the contractor’s entitlement to recover unabsorbed overhead damages to assist Government officials in determining entitlement issues. Facts or circumstances that could assist the contracting officer in determining entitlement, may include:
· Evidence that the asserted Government delay/suspension did not cause any extension in the actual time of performance beyond the original or previously revised contract performance date.
· Evidence that the contractor was or was not able to begin work on the next new contract in the extension period because of continuing work on the delayed/suspended contract.
· Evidence that the contractor did or did not secure a replacement contract(s) or other substituted work between the start of the delay/suspension period and the end of the period of extension beyond the original or previously revised contract performance date.
· Evidence of contractor-caused delays that were concurrent with the alleged Government delay or suspension.
· Evidence that the contractor was aware of differing site conditions or other causes of the asserted Government-caused delay prior to the original bid submission.
· Evidence that the contractor was unable to obtain replacement work because its bonding capacity was limited due to circumstances unrelated to the Government-caused delay/suspension.
Provide observations on any evidence as discussed above in the audit report explanatory notes or in an appendix on other matters to be reported.
[Emphasis added.]
Importantly, the foregoing guidance (found at CAM 12-804c and d) permits the DCAA auditor to “report … observations” with respect to the contractor’s entitlement—but only to the contracting officer and only with respect to audits of claims for unabsorbed overhead in claims for government delays and/or disruptions. Thus, it is doubtful that the DCAA audit report discussing BCG’s SCA costs could be said to have been prepared in full compliance with applicable audit guidance. In our view, the questioning of the contractor’s entire claim by the DCAA auditor, based on the auditor’s opinion of the contractor’s legal entitlement to its additional costs, is more than a lack of independence; it brings into question whether the auditor followed applicable professional standards.
The Court’s Decision
The ASBCA judge permitted the Government to change its position with respect to BCG’s claim for the additional health and welfare costs it failed to include in its bid. Characterizing the situation as a “unilateral mistake in bid,” it found there was “insufficient proof” that the Government knew (or should have known) that BCG”s bid was too low. Accordingly, the Court found that BCG was not entitled to a reformation of its contract to cover the omitted health and welfare costs. There were other claim elements, each of which was addressed and denied seriatim.
As we noted at the beginning of this article, the ASBCA decision was appealed and adjudicated by the Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) without comment, pursuant to Rule 36. The Federal Circuit’s Rule 36 permits an Entry of Judgment without Opinion when “an opinion would have no precedential value” and when one of several conditions are determined to exist. Among those decisions are “findings that are not clearly erroneous,” and where there was no error of law in the original judgment.
Based on our reading of the ASBCA case, we beg to differ with the Appellate Court’s opinion. We hope this article has raised a number of questions in the readers’ minds—among them whether this was a case of a unilateral or mutual mistake, and whether or not the SCA should have been incorporated into BCG’s commercial item contract. Additionally, we trust we have raised awareness and concern regarding a DCAA report that (apparently) offered a legal opinion on the contractor’s entitlement, and which significantly influenced the outcome of the litigation.
DISCLAIMER: Nobody at Apogee Consulting, Inc. is an attorney and (unlike DCAA) we are not offering any opinions of law. We are simply reporting the personal opinion of the author, which may not reflect the views of Raytheon Company or any client of Apogee Consulting, Inc. In fact, as laypersons, we probably got the whole legal analysis wrong. If we were you, we wouldn’t rely on it. Except the part about DCAA issuing opinions on legal entitlement—that’s the issue we think you should be prepared for when you file a claim pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act.
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What does it take to Succeed in U.S. Defense Contracting? A European Perspective

At Apogee Consulting, Inc. we are focused on driving excellence into all aspects of program performance—from proposal preparation to invoicing, and from program management to supply chain management. We view the entire series of program execution steps as being integrated and interdependent, as opposed to many who see independent silos and “fiefdoms” that only grudgingly work and share information with each other. Lean principles focus on elimination of muda (waste) from processes, and our belief is that muda exists in all business processes, and that all processes are fit subjects for continuous improvement.
So when we report, over and over, that program execution is of paramount importance, we mean it. But we also acknowledge that program execution is dependent on myriad business processes that, like the cylinders in a combustion engine, all need to be working at maximum efficiency to ensure that the program execution team is positioned for success.
This is especially true when one is a contractor supporting the U.S. Defense Department. To succeed in that complex and difficult environment, a company must surmount many obstacles, from achieving expected “contract outcomes” (i.e., cost, schedule, and performance/quality requirements), to successfully passing audits by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), to managing changing customer requirements. The U.S. defense environment is (generally) poorly understood by those entities outside the country’s borders, and consequently the acquisition environment is (generally) viewed as a barrier to entry by those entities who want to sell goods and services to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).
One European company, however, claims to have found the secret to succeeding as a DOD Prime Contractor, and this article in FlightGlobal.com discusses the lesions it learned along the way. The article reports on AleniaAeronautica’s experience in manufacturing 18 G222s light transport planes for delivery to the Afghan Army Air Corps., performing as Prime under a US $287 million contract awarded by the U.S. Air Force.
AleniaAeronautica is a subsidiary of Finmeccanica, a global A&D company with 2008 revenues of € $15.billion (roughly US $22 billion at today’s conversion rates). Alenia was part of a team (that included L-3 Communications) who was awarded the contract in 2007. As Prime Contractor, Alenia was responsible all aspects of the program, from change and configuration control to quality assurance, including (most especially) supply chain management. It was a daunting challenge, yet the article reports that Alenia saw the G222s program as a critical part of its “strategic push” into the lucrative U.S. defense market (whose annual value is equal to the aggregate defense spending of the rest of the world combined). As the old cliché goes, failure was not an option. The FlightGlobal article reported, “Finmeccanica executives knew they could not afford a cost overrun or a major schedule delay on its first prime contract. The US military records how contractors perform, and poor marks damage future bids.”
Even though Alenia suffered setbacks in program execution, it absorbed them (instead of passing them onto its customer), because of the strategic importance of performing well on its first DOD prime contract. The article reports—
· The G222s arrived at Alenia's factory in Capodichino requiring far more work than the company's engineers had predicted. Alenia absorbed the financial impact of a 150% increase in contract work scope. (It is unclear if this was based on a decision by executive management, or because of the contract type.)
· After the DCAA refused to accept Alenia’s financial statements (which, like all European companies are based on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) not U.S.-based Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)) and declared Alenia’s accounting system inadequate, the company found itself ineligible for progress payments or submission of cost-reimbursement vouchers. Thus, according to the article, “Alenia officials agreed to internally finance the programme for nearly nine months, a big departure from Finmeccanica's corporate practice.”
To us, one important lesson that stands out from the foregoing is the involvement of Alenia and Finmeccanica’s executive management in sponsoring the program. When the program plan met the reality of execution, the executives bent the corporate rules in order to help the program succeed. Key to the flexibility was the context: the executives didn’t measure success based solely on the results of this particular program, but instead saw it as a part of a strategic portfolio of programs they were attempting to build. Thus, they understood that losing money on this particular program (as they almost certainly did) was not as important as it would be on another program, because of its strategic importance.
When we work with program management teams, one of the most important questions we ask is, “What is the definition of success?” As Aaron Shenhar writes in the November 16, 2009 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology, “not all programs are equal.” In Alenia’s case, it was important to its customer that the program finish on time and on budget; however, it was important to the company that its customers were satisfied, even if that meant losing money in the process. (Obviously that logic would not hold true in all instances; otherwise the company would go out of business.)
Did the company succeed in meeting customer expectations? According to the article, Col Tim Freeman, commander of the USAF's 330th aircraft sustainment wing, said “I am very impressed. They did exactly what they said they were going to do." Clearly, that is the kind of customer feedback Alenia and Finmeccanica were looking for.
More prosaically, with hindsight we can see how AleniaAeronautica might have better positioned its program to succeed with its U.S. Government customer. First of all, it is surprising that DCAA would refuse to “accept [Alenia’s] financial statements [because] Alenia’s accounting system was based on European standards.” While IFRS and U.S. GAAP differ, the differences are not so pervasive or overwhelming that adjustments couldn’t have been made. (See this brochure by Ernst & Young, or this brochure by PricewaterhouseCoopers, explaining key differences between the two. Importantly, most commenters believe the two sets of financial reporting standards are converging.) One suspects that DCAA may have had other issues with the AleniaAeronautica accounting system, such as the company’s timekeeping and labor reporting practices. Additional investments by the company in this (and other) areas may avoid the future need to forego interim contract payments, thus boosting cash flow. It is possible that the time-value of the money saved may have paid for the efforts.
Second, had Alenia negotiated Performance-Based Payments, it could have received interim contract payments without the need for DCAA to agree that its accounting system was adequate. Performance-Based Payments (PBPs) are a relatively new form of DOD contract financing, not even entirely well-understood by experienced US-based defense contractors. Those companies that have taken advantage of them, however, generally have reported being quite pleased. (See our articles on PBPs here and here.)
Consequently, we conclude that international companies who want to do business with the U.S. DOD should consider investing in preparing their management internal control “business systems” to meet DCAA standards, and in understanding what options may be available to them if they run into difficulties with their Government oversight officials. Thus, the story of AleniaAeronautica’s success with its first U.S. Air Force prime contract has several good lessons within it.
DOD Issues Latest Iraq Status Report Citing Positive Trends and Continued Challenges

DOD recently issued to the public its latest quarterly status report on conditions in Iraq. The report, mandated by Public Law, provides an in-depth look into the present and future of the war-torn region. The latest report (current through 30 August 2009) discusses implementation of the Security Agreement (SA) and Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), and notes that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are now responsible for providing urban security, with the US forces acting in an advisory role. Multi-national forces (e.g., UK, Australia, Romania) have largely departed the theater and the drawdown of US forces has begun; the report envisions a complete withdrawal of US forces by 31 December 2011. (We reported on allegations that support contractors are not reducing their staffs in a commensurate manner to the troop drawdowns here.)
The report states that the upcoming January 2010 elections will be “a pivotal event” for the Government of Iraq (GoI); the election includes a national referendum on the SA that, if voted down, could “force an earlier than anticipated redeployment of U.S. forces.”
Territorial issues between Kurds and Arabs continue to breed internal tensions. In addition, the report states “targeted operations against insurgent and extremist groups continue to disrupt their activities, but gains in the security environment are not yet enduring.” Shi’a and Sunni nationalist groups are slowly integrating into the Government, but much work remains to be done. The report includes the statement that—
Malign Iranian influence continues to pose a significant challenge to Iraq’s long-term stability and political independence. The GoI, through reciprocal visits with Iran at the Head-of-State and Foreign Minister levels, has sent strong messages warning Iran against its continued support to Shi’a militants, while still encouraging improved bilateral relations, economic cooperation, and cultural and religious exchanges.
Significantly, the Iraq military and civilian budgets and overall fiscal situation have been impacted by low oil prices and the diversion of export oil to its own infrastructure.
The report (which can be found here) concludes as follows—
… political, security, economic, diplomatic, and rule of law trends in Iraq remain generally positive, but significant challenges remain. … In spite of the continued progress, these gains remain uneven throughout the country and marred by infrequent but high-profile attacks. Additional progress is required to produce sustainable stability. Iraq remains fragile, primarily because many underlying sources of instability have yet to be resolved, putting security gains at risk. To ensure long-term stability, the GoI must continue to build its legitimacy through the provision of basic services and improved security for the Iraqi people, as well as the continued resolution of lingering political, ethnic, and sectarian disputes.
PICTURE CREDIT: An Iraqi soldier exits a Marine helicopter during joint air assault training between Iraqi commandos and scouts, and U.S. Army paratroopers on Camp Ramadi, Iraq, Nov. 15, 2009. The goal of the training was to learn the standard procedures of each side for future joint missions. The U.S. soldiers are assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which is serving as an Advise and Assist Brigade. /U.S. Army photo by Spc. Michael J. MacLeod
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