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UPDATE: Personal Conflicts of Interest (PCIs) Back in the News

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In prior articles, we noted that, as contractors have filled more and more of the Federal government’s acquisition workforce needs, the government has become more concerned about organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) that may arise and taint competitions for new contract awards.  More recently, we reported on a proposed rule to revise the FAR to address “personal” conflicts of interest (PCIs).

 

As we discussed, the proposed FAR rule would address the situation where a contractor has “employees performing acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions” and would require those contractors to prohibit such employees with access to non-public governmental information from using it for personal gain.  The proposed rule would define a “personal conflict of interest” as “a situation in which a covered employee has a financial interest, personal activity, or relationship that could impair the employee's ability to act impartially and in the best interest of the Government when performing under the contract.”

 

The proposed rule lists several sources of PCIs, including (but not limited to)—(i) financial interests of the covered employee, of close family members, or of other members of the household; (ii) other employment or financial relationships (including seeking or negotiating for prospective employment or business); and (iii) gifts, including travel. The proposed rule provides more details regarding what financial interest issues may give rise to a PCI, which include—

 

  • Compensation, including wages, salaries, commissions, professional fees, or fees for business referrals
  • Consulting relationships (including commercial and professional consulting and service arrangements, scientific and technical advisory board memberships, or serving as an expert witness in litigation)
  • Services provided in exchange for honorariums or travel expense reimbursements
  • Research funding or other forms of research support
  • Investment in the form of stock or bond ownership or partnership interest (excluding diversified mutual fund investments)
  • Real estate investments;
  • Patents, copyrights, and other intellectual property interests;
  • Business ownership and investment interests

 

We remind you of the foregoing because PCIs are back in the news again.

 

First, we note a November 24, 2009 memorandum from Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) to various senior Pentagon executives, discussing contractor PCIs.  The memo noted that “The Government's increased reliance on contracted technical, business and procurement expertise has increased the potential for PCls. Unlike Government employees, contractor employees are not required to disclose financial or other personal interests to the Government that may conflict with the responsibilities they are performing on behalf of the Government.”

 

The memo contains two attachments designed to sensitize DOD employees to the risks of contractor PCIs. The first attachment “depicts levels of risk created as a function of the relationship between potential impacts of PCIs and the likelihood that contractors will influence Government decisions.”  The memo notes that contract type and the items being acquired affect the risk that a contractor PCI will affect the acquisition, with fixed-price supply acquisitions denoted as being low risk. The second attachment provides six scenarios and discusses the associated risks, and sensitizes Pentagon employees as to the issues involved.

 

For example, one scenario discussed in the memo runs as follows—

 

Shirley is an employee of government contractor Company X. Company X has assigned Shirley to work supporting a Government office. That office has contract responsibility to ensure the swift and effective performance of specific aspects of a contract. The contract to which Shirley is assigned was awarded to Company X. The award is a cost-plus-award-fee contract. Shirley’s yearly bonus will be based on the award-fee Company X receives on the contract. Shirley finds that the performance of the contract is impeded by an operational conflict over which she has influence.


Risk: High. Shirley has two personal conflicts of interest. First she has a conflict because she has oversight responsibilities on a contract between the government and her employer. Second, she has another conflict because her bonus is not based on how well she carries out her contract oversight responsibilities in support of the Government Office, but rather on the overall quality of the performance of her employer’s contract--the same contract on which she has oversight responsibilities. There is an actual or perceived risk that her decisions, rather than being based only on the best interests of the Government, might be influenced on what is best for Company X and her own financial interest.

 

Another scenario in the attachment is as follows—

 

Mr. Jones is an employee of government contractor Company G. After full and open competition, Company G has been awarded a firm fixed-price contract to manage a Defense Agency’s depot. Company G has appointed Mr. Jones as their project manager for this contract. Mr. Jones’ wife owns a moving franchise. In his role as project manager for Company G, Mr. Jones orders boxes, pallets, tape, and other like items from his wife’s moving company.


Risk: Low to None. Although Mr. Jones’ behavior may not appear ethical, this personal conflict of interest has no inappropriate financial effect on the Government. Company G’s award was based on a firm fix price that was determined fair and reasonable as the result of full and open competition. Any loss to Company G due to Mr. Jones’ actions has no effect on the Government.

 

See the entire memo here.

 

In an interesting coincidence, the Department of Justice announced on December 1, 2009 that a former NASA scientist had been sentenced to a fine, probation, and community service for a “felony conflict of interest charge” in connection with his participation in the award of NASA contracts to his wife’s company.  According to the announcement, Mark Schoeberl—

 

admitted that: between July and September 2004, after encountering resistance to his proposal to appropriate $20,000 directly to Animated Earth, he asked a colleague to approve the appropriation, knowing that the funds would eventually reach Animated Earth[his wife’s company]; between January and March 2009, Schoeberl asked GSFC personnel that Animated Earth be paid incrementally for work completed in one of its NASA contracts and after receiving advice from NASA personnel, Schoeberl instructed his wife as to how to invoice NASA for work performed by her company; in May 2009, Schoeberl prepared a ‘sole source justification’ document to justify Animated Earth being the only company eligible for a new contract for maintenance on kiosks that Animated Earth had previously installed on NASA grounds; in June 2009, Schoeberl directed financial personnel to initiate a $60,000 procurement of software to be purchased from Animated Earth and provided a ‘sole source justification’ document for that procurement; and in June 2009, Schoeberl asked a NASA colleague to speak with another colleague about awarding federal stimulus package funds to Animated Earth.

 

The DOJ release stated that—

 

As a senior NASA manager, Schoeberl was required to disclose in annual ethics reports any income he and his wife earned from outside activities. Schoeberl’s 2007 financial disclosure form omitted any mention of his interest in Animated Earth, even though the company had generated over $50,000 in income from NASA that year and Animated Earth had been included in Schoeberl’s 2006 financial disclosure form.

 

As GovExec.com reports, “Prosecutors agreed Schoeberl did not deserve to go to jail, noting in court documents that he quickly accepted responsibility for his conduct, had no criminal history and had a lengthy record of service at NASA.”  Even though records show that Animated Earth received “more than $190,000 in NASA contracts” over a three-year period—all of which were awarded without competition—“prosecutors said the government does not seem to have suffered a financial loss because ‘Animated Earth appears to have completed the work that it contracted with the federal government,’ according to the article.

 

To conclude, government employees have long been subject to PCI controls which—as can be seen from the story of Mr. Schoeberl—are not always completely effective.  As the line between contractor and government employee blurs, the government is moving to have similar controls imposed on contractor employees who are deeply involved in governmental activities.  Contractors with employees embedded in governmental support activities should consider getting in front of this issue, and not waiting for the final FAR rule to be issued, as this would seem to be an issue that will only become more sensitive over time.

 

 

GAO Discusses RATB and ARRA Funds

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ARRA Logo


On November 30, 2009 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued report GAO-10-216R with the catchy title, “Recovery Act: Contract Oversight Activities of the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board and Observations on Contract Spending in Selected States.”  In related news, there is an entity called the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (RATB) with oversight responsibilities covering the use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds.  But that’s not the only set of eyes scrutinizing the use of ARRA funds.  In addition to the RATB, various Federal agency Inspectors General (IGs) “are expected to audit the programs, grants, and projects funded under the Recovery Act, both within their particular agency or department and collectively.” Moreover, “the Recovery Act requires GAO to perform bimonthly reviews of the use of funds by selected states and localities and to comment on estimates of jobs created or retained in the quarterly reports of Recovery Act fund recipients.” In its report, GAO discusses the RATB’s oversight of Federal agency spending of ARRA funds, as well as how 16 states (and the District of Columbia) are awarding ARRA contracts, after six months of activity.

 

The RATB consists of a chair, 12 Federal agency IGs, and 39 staff (20 of whom are seconded from other Federal agencies). The RATB includes three committees:  (1) Recovery.gov Committee, (2) Accountability Committee, and (3) Recovery Funds Working Group Committee.  According to the GAO report, the RATB monitors various Federal data sources, operates the Recovery Board Fraud Hotline, and operates the Recovery Operations Center (ROC).  The RATB ROC “provides two core functions—predictive analytics and in-depth risk analysis. The [ROC] uses software that allows for in-depth analyses of a large volume of publicly available data on entities receiving Recovery Act funds. … The results provide oversight authorities with information to focus limited resources on cities, regions, and high-risk government programs where historical data and current trends suggest the likelihood of future risk.”  GAO noted that “… about two weeks after the center became operational, Board staff told us they had two active investigations under way based on the in-depth analysis tool.”

 

The RATB has been busy providing oversight for a lot of activity.  According to the GAO report, there have been (to date) 27,774 ARRA-related contract actions.  The General Services Administration (GSA) has issued 16,878 of the total and the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued 6,357 of the total number of contract actions.  Of the total number, 25,666 (or 92 percent) were competitively awarded.  Interestingly, while DOD contract actions comprise only 23 percent of the total, DOD’s number of contract actions awarded without competition accounted for 59 percent of the total number of single or sole-source awards.

 

The other ARRA oversight team, consisting of the Federal agency IGs, has been busy as well.  GAO reported—

 

As of September 30, 2009, the [IGs] reported they had 77 investigations and 391 audits, inspections, evaluations, or reviews in process. They also reported they have issued 163 reports on Recovery Act-related issues since the act was passed—70 reports were issued but not published because they contain proprietary information that cannot be made available to the public, and 93 reports have been published on Recovery.gov. For example, the Department of Energy [IG] had issued 8 reports as of September 30, 2009, that addressed aspects of Recovery Act issues…. These reports identified the relevance of their issues to Recovery Act implementation. As another example, the General Services Administration [IG] has issued two reports since the Recovery Act was passed. The most recent report, issued in September 2009, provided observations on the Public Building Service’s major construction and modernization projects being funded under the Recovery Act.

 

GAO also looked at how states were awarding contract actions that used ARRA funds.  According to the GAO report, 122 such contracts were reviewed, of which 87 percent were awarded competitively.  Of the 122 contracts reviewed, 73 percent were awarded on a fixed-priced basis.

 

(Note these metrics are important because of the Obama Administration’s expressed commitment to using competition and fixed-price contract types to manage contract cost-growth.  See the Administration’s memo here.)

 

We visited http://www.recovery.gov and looked at how the states were spending ARRA funds.  According to the Government’s site, California has awarded $18.5 billion in awards, Texas has awarded $10.7 billion, and New York has awarded $10.6 billion in Recovery-related awards.  In contrast, Arkansas has awarded $1.36 billion in such awards, while Delaware has awarded only $514 million in awards.

 

To conclude, after six months of activity, billions in ARRA funds are being spent by many states and Federal agencies, and the RATB is trying to stay on top of it all.  That GAO had little to offer in the way of criticism says quite a bit about how well the RATB is doing so far … or perhaps maybe it is simply too early for any conclusions to be drawn.

 

See the GAO’s entire report here.


 

 

What’s New in the A&D World (Volume 2)

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Little news tidbits for your consideration.

 

  • Initial reports say that the Ball Aerospace 95-megapixel camera carried on the Kepler spacecraft is so sensitive, that it can “see a star’s reflected light on an orbiting planet”.  (Source: AW&ST, Aug. 17, 2009)
  • NASA has slipped pad abort (PA-1) tests of the Orion crew module into from September 2008, to April 2009, and now into early 2010, because of “development problems with the avionics … [and] issues with the control electronics in part of the launch abort system (LAS).”  (Source: AW&ST, Aug. 17, 2009)
  • The U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has eliminated Northrop Grumman and MMIST from the competitive range for an unmanned cargo lift/resupply vehicle – leaving the Lockheed Martin/Kaman K-MAX and the Boeing Hummingbird as the final bidders.  (Source: AW&ST, Aug. 17, 2009)
  • Boeing’s and NASA’s X-48C hybrid wing body began flight tests at the Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards AFB – as part of NASA’s plans to develop low-noise and low-emissions “N+2” subsonic fixed-wing development program.  (Source: AW&ST, Aug. 17, 2009)
  • Launch of the $800 million Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite via Orbital Science’s Minotaur IV rocket has been delayed “indefinitely” because of problems with the launch vehicle that affect the entire fleet.  Reportedly, there is a problem with government-furnished equipment (GFE) that supports the launch vehicle’s third stage.  (Source: AW&ST, Oct. 12, 2009)
  • Congress has approved a legislative waiver that will allow a temporary reduction in the number of the U.S. Navy’s active aircraft carriers.  For a 33-month period (between 2012 and 2015), the Navy will sail 10 carriers instead of 11.  The reduction permits the Navy to avoid spending more than $1 billion to extend the life of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) until the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is ready to enter service.  (Source: AW&ST Oct. 12, 2009)
  • The U.S. Navy is changing the way it evaluates bids.  Future evaluations will include the lifetime energy cost of building and powering a system, as will each bidder’s commitment to energy efficiency.  Navy Secretary Mabus reportedly has proposed a “Great Green Fleet” composed of environmentally friendly warships utilizing nuclear power, hybrid electric systems that utilize biofuels, and biofuel-powered aircraft.  (Source: AW&ST Oct. 19, 2009)
  • The U.S. Air Force reported that its Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) is experiencing schedule delays.  The $1.2 billion development program, which has previously encountered technical setbacks (radar calibration issues), is running a year late in integration testing into the Global Hawk Block 40 UAV, according to the Air Force.  The program has not reported any significant cost growth.  (Source: AW&ST, Nov. 16, 2009)
  • The U.S. Navy hopes to install upgrades on Increment 4 of its P-8 Poseidon multimission maritime aircraft that would permit the crew to directly control the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV and is seeking a common graphical user interface for both programs.  (Source:  InsideDefense.com, Nov. 16, 2009).

 

 

AERIAL TANKER UPDATE: NOC Threatens to Walk

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December 1, 2009—reports have surfaced that Northrop Grumman Corporation (NOC) has threatened to drop out of the competition for the KC-X aerial tanker unless the Pentagon makes significant changes to the evaluation scheme in the draft RFP.  While some reports indicate that NOC has already dropped out of the competition, causing share prices for NOC stock to fall and share prices for Boeing stock to rise, other reports indicate a more complex situation.  Many reports clarify that NOC has not actually dropped out of the competition, opting instead to ratchet up the pressure on the Pentagon by sending a letter to Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Dr. Ashton Carter, containing the ultimatum.

 

See the letter here.

 

The letter, while respectful, is firm.  It states that NOC has learned that the Pentagon will not be issuing a second (revised) Request for Proposals (RFP), nor will it be making significant changes to the evaluation criteria in the draft RFP—an evaluation scheme that has been described as a “lowest price, technically acceptable” approach rather than the “best value” trade-off that had been expected.

 

NOC CEO Bush wrote, “Absent a responsive set of changes in the final RFP, Northrop Grumman has determined that it cannot submit a bid to the Department for the KC-X program.”

 

Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Alabama) was quoted as saying, “It was obvious that the draft RFP totally abandoned the Air Force's stated goal of a transformational aircraft and was doctored so that the advanced capabilities of the Northrop Grumman/EADS plane would not be given credit.” Similarly, Alabama’s Governor (Bob Riley) accused the Obama Administration of “corrupting” the selection process.  “"All along, we’ve said the process should be fair and the needs of our warfighters must come first. That definitely isn’t happening. The question is why is this RFP so radically different than the one Northrop Grumman won last year?”

 

(The NOC/EADS team had planned to make Mobile, Alabama its US manufacturing base.)

 

According to a report on Forbes.com, the Defense Department said it “regretted” NOC’s decision, but would not revise the evaluation criteria to give either Boeing or the NOC/EADS team an advantage. "The department cannot and will not change the warfighting requirements for the tanker to give advantage to either competitor. The department wants competition but cannot compel the two airplane makers to compete."

 

We’ve written about this possibility before.  Should NOC actually drop out of the bidding, it will leave Boeing as the sole bidder, creating a multi-billion dollar “sole-source” contract opportunity for Boeing. This situation would contradict the Obama Administration’s expressed goal of using competition to drive down contract prices. And regardless of the Pentagon’s official nonchalance, having Boeing remain the sole bidder would seem to be a serious setback, and would put the Defense Department in the forefront of significant Congressional criticism.

 

Will NOC walk?  Or is this latest ultimatum simply bravado and grandstanding?  And if Boeing is the sole bidder, will it use its leverage to move the contract from fixed-price to cost-plus? For answers to these and other questions, stay tuned to this Defense acquisition soap opera.


 

 

How Fair is the Subcontractor Fairness Act?

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Clueless


Introduced in the House of Representatives on November 19, 2009 as the “Subcontractor Fairness Act of 2009,” H.R. 4134 should be a litmus test for certain members of Congress.  Hold that thought for a minute.

 

The Federal Government’s procurement system is marked by bureaucratic complexity and defined by a set of overlapping and interlocking statutes and regulations.  Reform effort after reform effort has attempted to address the inefficient and expensive system, with limited success.  Congress, the Government Accountability Office, and the military services of the Pentagon have each tried various fixes, but nothing has seemed to work.  More recently, the Obama Administration has made several attempts to get tough with Federal contractors; but so far there has been little progress to show for the efforts.

 

Retired Air Force Lt. General Robert Kadish was recently quoted as saying, “"In an effort to improve the system, we have made it almost unintelligibly complex.  And, this complexity is an albatross around our neck."

 

Very few individuals understand the details of the complex acquisition system. Those that do are valuable subject matter experts who help stakeholders find and exploit the system’s loopholes. Former Defense Comptroller Dr. Dov Zakheim recently described the U.S. government’s acquisition system “as one that is based on end-running the system.” That’s right.  To make the system work, one must work around it, not within it—according to one of those few experts who ought to know.

 

There are many on the outside of the system who complain and posture and bloviate on what ought to be done, from gadflies to bloggers to lawmakers.  Even fewer of this group have any understanding about how the system works; they only know that contractors charge too much and deliver too little, too late—without understanding why, let alone what to do about it.

 

Individuals of this latter group self-identify by clearly incorrect pontifications designed to attract attention rather than to fix any serious problems.  Lawmakers of this latter group self-identify by introducing legislation that addresses a problem that doesn’t exist, or addresses the wrong problem, or which will obviously create problems more severe than the “problem” the proposed legislation purports to address.

 

So when we say H.R. 4134 is a litmus test for certain members of Congress, what we mean to say is that those members who have sponsored the bill are self-identifying themselves into that latter group of cluelessness—dubbed PWACs by certain seasoned acquisition professionals.  (PWAC = Persons Without A Clue.)

 

What makes this bill stand out for its cluelessness?

 

Simply put:  each competitive solicitation issued by the Federal government (both civilian and defense) valued at more than $550,000 ($1,000,000 for construction) must require that each offeror submitting a proposal must:

 

(a) Identify all of its subcontractors at the time it submits its proposal for evaluation

(b) Negotiate subcontract agreements including prices with each of its subcontractors

(c) Include with its proposal a list of each of its subcontractors, including the subcontract scope of work and the prices to be paid

(d) Agree that, should the offeror be awarded a contract from the government, each subcontracting agreement will become a valid subcontract “upon award of the prime contract.”

 

See the entire bill here.  You can also see those members of Congress who’ve sponsored the legislation, who have thusly self-identified into the PWAC group.

 

There are so many problems with the proposed bill that we hardly know where to start.

 

1. This bill, if approved and signed into law, wouldn’t ensure prime contractors treat subcontractors fairly.  Instead, primes will enter into long-term agreements with certain subcontractors and the others will be left out in the cold.  This is because the process for preparing a competitive proposal to the Federal government doesn’t have sufficient time to negotiate subcontracts.  (We’ve written about this before.)  So this bill will reduce subcontract awards and hurt small businesses.

2. At the very least, imposition of this requirement would delay the proposals and thus delay contract awards.  Consequently, the delivery of goods and services to those that need them will be delayed as well.

3. Speaking of small businesses, since all subcontracts will be identified and negotiated prior to award and become effective on the date of the prime contract award, you can forget socioeconomic reporting or preparation of “small business subcontracting plans.”  Subcontracting plans and the reporting thereof are about what happens after award of the prime contract; since nothing will be allowed to happen after award, there will be no need for them.

4. By linking this requirement to the proposal preparation effort as opposed to the contract execution effort, the PWACs have just converted direct labor into B&P labor.  I.e., watch contractor’s indirect cost rates climb up and up, making everything more expensive for the buying commands and other Federal stakeholders.

5. No mention as to whether this requirement will flow down from the primes to the lower-tier subcontractors.  The PWACs apparently don’t understand that the first-tier subcontractors also award subcontracts themselves, and so on. That’s why we call it a “supply chain.”  Wouldn’t it be perfect to say that each subcontractor must also identify its subcontracts, and so on, before submitting a competitive proposal?  That would be just about the best way to freeze the entire Federal acquisition system we could conceive of.

6. No mention as to what the contracting officers and source selection teams evaluating the offerors are supposed to do with the subcontracting information provided by the prime contractors.  Do they read it?  If so, what for?  Do they throw the paper away?

 

We could go on.  But we think the point’s been made.  This is bad legislation and, if signed into law as written, will do much more harm than good.  We hope it dies in Committee.  And we hope those PWAC members of Congress stay far away from any further legislation that could similarly affect the Federal acquisition system.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.