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Apogee Consulting Inc

A More Detailed Forecast of A&D Industry’s Near-Term Future

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Commands


We have previously posted articles discussing the near-term future of the aerospace/defense industry.  We have reported on immediate US Department of Defense (DOD) funding shortfalls.  We have discussed a reported downturn in the global A&D marketplace.  And we have noted that A&D corporate leadership may not handle workforce reductions in the same manner as it did in the previous market downturn. To summarize, times are going to be tough, but there is some reason to think that many leadership teams remember mistakes made from the last major workforce restructuring, and will do better this time around. But the A&D marketplace is dynamic and we are constantly searching tea leaves for new insight and information regarding how businesses will be affected by changes to the overall environment.

 

On December 9, 2009 Aerospace & Defense News (ASDNews) published a story entitled, “A New Era for the US Defense Market” that forecasts a near-term spending plateau, followed by a “steady decline” in the forecasted future.  Further, while the Pentagon has asked for a 2 percent increase real growth to its “regular” budget, the Obama Administration has indicated that its initial plans call for spending to remain “essentially flat.” The ASDNews story is based on a new report from Forecast International that gives a more detailed projection of the industry’s near-term future.

 

And while current plans call for the current Iraq force drawdown to result in a complete withdrawal of US forces by December 31, 2011, President Obama announced on December 1, 2009 that he is sending an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan.  With troops (and presumably support contractors) withdrawing from Iraq but ramping up in Afghanistan, one might think the two efforts would wash, but that assumption in not correct, according to the Forecast International report, as well as this article by the Spokane Examiner, which compares and contrasts the two “surge” strategies.

 

According to the Forecast International report, “"Redeploying U.S. assets in Iraq will be a complex and costly process, and the need to repair or replace equipment damaged or lost in theater will only add to the near-term investment. … as combat operations wind down and troops leave Iraq by the thousands, the overall financial burden on the U.S. will slowly begin to ease.” Given the current U.S. economic situation, however, as well as the continued economic pressure of Medicare and other entitlement programs on the budget, the easing is not expected to result in more funds available for non-combat defense activities.

 

Meanwhile, the DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is almost complete and will be given to Congress in early 2010.  The QDR is a legislatively mandated review of DOD’s overall strategy and threat prioritization.  As such, its results will drive DOD’s needs assessments, budget requests, and program funding.  According to the DOD’s QDR fact sheet, “Key security challenges include violent extremist movements, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons, failed or failing states, and increasing encroachment across the global commons (air, sea, space, cyberspace).” Thus, even with a flat or declining budget, programs may be deferred, restructured, or even terminated based on the results of the QDR.

 

According to the Forecast International report, "Complicating the entire matter is an acquisition system that is often plagued by severe cost growth and schedule delays."  The ASDNews article concludes that, “while the acquisition system as a whole is not broken, the fact that many of the Pentagon's most important - and costly - programs continue to face the same challenges year after year only strengthens the impetus for change.” This, of course, may be our most recurring theme in our postings:  programs that fail to execute well will be put on the chopping block, while those that do meet cost, schedule and performance/quality objectives will be spared.

 

To summarize, a consensus is emerging that the U.S. A&D industry is entering another of its cyclical downturns.  The growth of the past eight years—fueled by the response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the resulting “global war on terror”—is abating.  Funding will be in short supply, and will be given to the programs that are the best fit with the QDR strategic needs assessment.  Moreover, programs that struggle with cost growth or schedule will become fodder for those that succeed in that area.


 

 

FAC 2005-38 Brings Changes to Cost Allowability Rules

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Air Fare Secrets


 

 

Issued on December 10, 2009 Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 2005-038 implemented several revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  Included among the revisions were two changes to FAR Part 31 cost allowability rules—the Cost Principles.  One change impacted relatively few contractors, while the other change will impact all contractors subject to the Cost Principles.

 

 

Changes to PRB Rules

 

The first change (FAR Case 2006-021) impacts contractors that maintain postretirement benefit plans other than pensions (PRBs).  According to the FAC—

 

Currently FAR 31.205-6(o) allows contractors to choose among three different accounting methods for PRB costs; pay-as-you-go (cash basis), terminal funding, and accrual basis using generally accepted accounting principles by applying Statement 106 of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS 106). The FAR also requires that any accrued PRB costs be paid to an insurer or trustee. This final rule amends the FAR to permit the use of Internal Revenue Code sections 419 and 419A contribution rules as an alternative method of determining the amount of accrued PRB costs on Government cost-based contracts.

 

The full rule can be found here.  As the FAR Councils note, “the total measured PRB costs over the life of the PRB plan would be the same whether the contractor chose to apply the criteria in FAS 106 or IRC sections 419 and 419A [and] the Government will not pay higher PRB costs, since the resulting difference from contractors previously funding the lower IRC amount rather than the full FAS amount will continue to be an unallowable cost. This final rule does permit contractors to electively switch to the IRC 419 accrual basis and avoid any current or future disallowances.”

 

 

Changes to Air Fare Allowability Rules

 

The second change (FAR Case 2006-024) changes the cost allowability rules applied to air fare.  The current rule based the allowable cost of air fare on “the lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours” but the FAR Councils assert that this language was ambiguous and led to “inconsistent interpretations” and “confusion regarding what costs are allowable.”  Consequently, the language was amended to set the allowability standard as “the lowest priced airfare available to the contractor.” (The revised rule eliminates any reference to airfare class, such as economy or coach.)

 

This change is going to affect all contractors subject to the Cost Principles—and is going to be problematic. In fact, we’ll go so far as to say that the new rule introduces more ambiguity than the prior rule and raises a host of new questions.  It’s a cure that is worse than the disease.  Moreover, from personal experience it’s clear that there never was any disease in the first place; any ambiguity was in the minds of the rule-makers and there was no need for this revision in the first place.

 

Let’s look at the rule.  Effective January 11, 2010, the travel Cost Principle at FAR 31.205-46(b) will read as follows:

 

(b) Airfare costs in excess of the lowest priced airfare available to the contractor during normal business hours are unallowable except when such accommodations require circuitous routing, require travel during unreasonable hours, excessively prolong travel, result in increased cost that would offset transportation savings, are not reasonably adequate for the physical or medical needs of the traveler, or are not reasonably available to meet mission requirements. However, in order for airfare costs in excess of the above airfare to be allowable, the applicable condition(s) set forth above must be documented and justified.

 

In addition to the foregoing, paragraph (c)(2) will be amended to replace the term “standard” with the word “allowable” wherever it appears.

 

The FAR Councils explain in the promulgating comments that “lowest-price airfare” includes the cost of non-refundable tickets.  Moreover, the Councils assert that “the requirement for supporting documentation and justification for airfare costs in excess of the ‘lowest coach airfare available’ should include documentation justifying purchase of a higher-cost refundable ticket in those instances when a non-refundable ticket is available.” The Councils also clarified that the costs of cancelling or changing restricted air fares is allowable.

 

The Councils explained the need for this rule as follows—

 

This amendment is intended to prohibit the contractor's practice where it has negotiated airfare agreements with travel providers and uses those agreements to purchase first class or business class seats but does not use the lowest priced airfare available under the agreements to determine the allowable cost baseline for the first class or business class seats, but instead determines the allowable cost based on the lowest airfare available to the general public instead of the lowest airfare available to the contractor under the agreements. This amendment will require the contractor to use the lowest airfare available to the contractor.

 

The revised air fare rule can be found in its entirety here.

 

Problems

 

The key problem with the new rule is that there are many more types of less expensive air fare available to contractors than the ones they have negotiated.  For instance, use of discount airlines such as Southwest or Air Trans or Jet Blue may result in cheaper fares, but also may require use of alternate airports.  Of course, where use of a discount airline results in “increased cost that would offset the transportation savings” the contractor need not use it—but that conclusion will need to be documented and justified for each trip.  Moreover, the rule doesn’t address use of Expedia, Travelocity or other internet-based discounter.  Are contractors now supposed to jettison their traditional travel agents in favor of such internet entities in the search for the “lowest priced airfare available to the contractor”?  One would tend to assume the FAR Councils did not mean to require that, yet the words say what they say.

 

In addition, the rule seems to create a new class of unallowable air fare, which is fares paid in excess of that elusive “lowest priced airfare” that was available at the time of booking.  If the FAR Councils did not mean to create this new unallowable air fare, then the rule was crafted poorly.  As written, each air fare incurred for each trip must be compared to the platonic ideal of a “lowest priced airfare”—as that ambiguous term is interpreted by the contractor and its auditors.

 

One could take the position—supported by the words of the promulgating comments quoted above—that any airfare incurred pursuant to a negotiated corporate agreement is fully allowable unless it is for a first class or business class seat.  If a premium seat is purchased, the unallowable amount is calculated by comparing the actual fare paid to what would have been paid had a non-premium seat been purchased pursuant to that same agreement.  That would be a reasonable interpretation that would certainly minimize confusion and implementation costs.

 

But that’s not what the words say.  And based on our experience with Government auditors, that is not how the rule will be interpreted in audits of such costs.  Accordingly, if the Government desires truly to implement the rule in accordance with the FAR Councils’ comments, as opposed to the actual words, then they will need to implement clear audit guidance to that effect.

 

We are not optimistic.

 

We believe this rule is unnecessary, ambiguous and poorly crafted.  It will not accomplish the stated intent of the FAR Councils and might very well lead to additional unallowable costs.  At a minimum, it imposes an additional documentation and justification requirement that add to contractors’ travel accounting efforts, which are already too high.

 

 

A Simple Solution?

 

A final thought.  If the rule is interpreted by auditor based on the words rather than the promulgating comments, one quick solution is to stop negotiating corporate agreements with airlines.  Simply pay the same price the public pays, which eliminates the issue raised by the FAR Councils as the impetus for the rule change.  Such a step will not fix the other ambiguities and problems we’ve noted, but should immediately reduce the auditors’ interest in this area.

 

Of course, if contractors take that simple step, the Government will pay more—perhaps far more—than it currently does for contractor air fares.  It would be a great example of the operation of the Law of Unintended Consequences.  But it would reduce unallowable air fare costs and thus increase the corporate bottom-line.  And it would serve the bureaucratic rule-makers right, in our view.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Night Time Flight

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An AH-64D Apache attack helicopter departs the flightline under a full moon to conduct operations from Camp Taji, Iraq, Dec. 2, 2009. The helicopter is assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division's 1st Air Cavalry Brigade. /U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Travis Zelinski/

 

DOD Implements Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act

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On December 4, 2009 Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Dr. Ashton Carter issued a Directive-Type Memo (DTM) implementing the recently enacted Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (P.L. 111-23).  The original statute can be found here.  (We’ve written about this law with respect to the KC-X aerial tanker competition.)

 

The DTM makes some significant changes to the Defense acquisition process.  Among the changes –

 

 

  • Requires the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to include “full consideration of possible trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives for each alternative considered.”
  • The AOA Study Guidance is now led and approved by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE).
  • Program acquisition strategies for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) “shall describe the measures taken to ensure competition, or the option of competition, at both the prime and subcontract level throughout the program life cycle.”
  • Program acquisition strategies for MDAPs and ACAT II programs must address the program’s maintenance and sustainment strategy.
  • Unless waived, competitive prototyping is now a statutory requirement for MDAPs.
  • The DCAPE will conduct Independent Cost Estimates in advance of decisions to enter Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) or full rate production (FRP).
  • Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) will be performed periodically or as requested—and will “evaluate the cost, schedule, and performance of the program, relative to current metrics, performance requirements, and baseline parameters. … Root cause analysis shall consider the underlying cause or causes for shortcomings in cost, schedule, and performance.”

 

The DTM contains an extensive discussion of the reporting of program cost growth. Reporting is required when either the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) or Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) of a MDAP is expected to exceed 25 percent of the current Approved Program Baseline or 50 percent of the original Approved Program Baseline.  The report will be submitted to various DOD stakeholders as well as to Congress.  After performing various required assessments, the program must be terminated unless the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) submits a certification to Congress regarding the program’s impact on national security.  If the program is not terminated, then it must be restructured and reviewed every six months.  Other reports are required if the program slips initial operating capability milestone by 25 percent when compared to its Milestone A certification schedule.

 

There’s much more to the DTM, of course.  The DOD acquisition system is a complex beast, filled with acronyms and onerous requirements.  For example, the uninitiated may find the following discussion of Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs) a bit daunting:

 

PDRs before MS B for other than MDAPs will be approved by the MDA when consistent with the TDS or Acquisition Strategy objectives.  When the PDR is conducted before MS B, a post-PDR assessment will be conducted in association with the MS B review and formally considered by the MDA at the MS B review.  If the PDR is conducted after MS B, the MDA will conduct a post-PDR assessment at a time reflected in the approved acquisition strategy.

 

The key takeaway here is that, as we have reported several times, programs are being scrutinized for cost, schedule and performance issues at each critical milestone in the DOD acquisition process.  Those programs that experience significant cost and/or schedule problems will be in for tough times.  As this DTM makes clear, patience with cost growth or schedule slips is nonexistent and program terminations are going to be a more common result.

 

Program managers beware.


 

 

DOD Outlines DCMA/DCAA Dispute Resolution Process

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mediate


 

 

We frequently have written about issues—both real and imagined—concerning the jurisdiction and authority of DCAA and DCMA with respect to oversight of Government contractors.  For example, we reported on hearings held by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan in which DCMA was lambasted for “caving to the contractors and not acting properly on the Defense Department’s behalf.” Another article reported that “a lack of cooperation" between DCMA and DCAA "is hindering the oversight of contractors' business systems." We’ve even gone so far as to ask whether DCAA and DCMA would merge to form one agency dedicated to oversight of DOD contractors.

 

In the midst of finger-pointing within the Defense Department, attacks from without continued.  GAO reported abysmal DCAA audit report quality for the second year in a row (corroborated by an independent audit by the DOD Inspector General).  We reported on hearing s in both the Senate and House that rose to levels of near-hysteria.  More relevantly, the audit quality findings subsequently were utilized in another GAO report to criticize DCMA (and DOD in general) for relying on DCAA audit reports to perform surveillance over contractors, saying “The effectiveness of DOD’s cost surveillance process depends, to a large extent, on the adequacy of [ ] DCAA procedures. Our recent work has raised concerns in this regard.”

 

Well, the storm waves are starting to settle as the calendar year draws to an end.  DCAA Director April Stephenson has been “reassigned” to another SES-level position in the DOD and Shay Assad (Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy) has emerged as the mediator between DCMA and DCAA—thus positioning DOD to report back to the Commission on Wartime Contracting that significant progress has been made in resolving differences between the two Defense oversight agencies.  On December 4, 2009 Assad issued a memo entitled “Resolving Contract Audit Recommendations” that established a framework for how the resolution process will work.

 

The memo, which can be found here, discusses how the two agencies will resolve “significant disagreements”—defined as when a contracting officer’s pre-negotiation memorandum indicates that “less than 75 percent of the total recommended questioned costs in a DCAA audit report on a contractor proposal valued at $10 million or more.” It’s interesting that the resolution process memo seems to be aimed at contractor proposals—including “price proposals” for new work as well as cost impact proposals, and forward and final indirect cost rate proposals.  The memo seems to omit any discussion of how DCMA and DCAA would resolve differences of opinion regarding the adequacy of contractor internal control “business systems” or noncompliances with Cost Accounting Standards or allegations of “defective pricing”.  Thus, it focuses on a subset of oversight interactions but not the entire universe of activity.  And the omitted areas are the areas the critics have pointed at, such as the adequacy of contractor control systems.  As we say, interesting ….

 

The first step of the resolution process is to discuss the differences of opinion.  DCMA contracting officers are required to “discuss the basis of the disagreement with the auditor prior to negotiations”.  The DCMA contracting officers must then “document that discussion, and the basis for disagreement, in the pre-negotiation objective (or pre-business clearance) and in a written communication to the auditor prior to negotiations ….”  The memo notes that an email to the auditor is considered to be an adequate written communication.  Once the negotiation objective is approved, “the contracting officer may proceed with negotiations.”

 

The next step of the resolution process takes place with the auditor continues to disagree with the contracting officer’s position.  In such circumstances, “DCAA management” may request that the DOD “Component management” review the contracting officer’s decision.  The DCAA request for review must be submitted within three business days after receiving the written communication from the contracting officer.

 

The next step of the resolution process takes place if DCAA management and the DOD “Component’s highest management level” cannot resolve the difference of opinion. In such circumstances, the DCAA Director will bring the matter to the attention of Mr. Assad.  If that doesn’t work to resolve the differences, the DCAA Director may bring the matter to the attention to the Under Secretary for Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) and/or the Under Secretary for Defense (Comptroller).

 

In addition to the foregoing, the memo notes that the DCAA Director can bring any matter to Mr. Assad’s attention that “he believes requires my attention (e.g., precedent setting or of high interest to the Department).”

 

The memo concludes as follows—

 

It is neither expected nor necessary that the contracting officer and contract auditor agree on every issue.  They have different, yet complementary, roles in the process.  It is expected that the auditor and contracting officer will work together, recognizing that it is the contracting officer’s ultimate responsibility to determine fair and reasonable contract values.

 

As noted above, this memo positions DOD to report back to the various stakeholders (e.g., Commission on Wartime Contracting) that it has made significant progress toward resolving the alleged dysfunctional relationship between DCAA and DCMA.  Even if it curiously omits discussion of the more contentious areas, it is nonetheless progress.  And the memo positions Mr. Assad as the mediator between the two DOD oversight agencies, hopefully to resolve differences of opinion before they become grist for the various Commissions and Committees.  It seems to be a good first step.

 

It will be interesting to see whether the process outlined in the memo actually can be worked by the contracting officers and auditors in the field.


 

 


Page 258 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.