U.S. Cyber Challenge Looking for 10,000 Good Hackers

From the White House—
Tan Dailin was a graduate student at Sichuan University when he was noticed (for attacking a Japanese site) by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the summer of 2005. He was invited to participate in a PLA-sponsored hacking contest and won. He subsequently participated in a one-month, 16-hour-per-day training program where he and the other students simulated various cyber invasion methods, built dozens of hacking exploits, and developed various hacking tactics and strategies. He was chosen for the Sichuan regional team to compete against teams from Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet, and Chongqing Military Districts. His team again ranked number one and he won a cash prize of 20,000 RMB.
Then, under the pseudonym Wicked Rose, he formed a group called Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) and recruited other talented hackers from his school. He found a funding source (an unknown benefactor) and started attacking US sites. After an initial round of successful attacks, his funding was tripled. All through 2006, NCPH built sophisticated rootkits and launched a barrage of attacks against multiple US government agencies. By the end of July, 2006, NCPH had created some 35 different attack variants for one MS Office vulnerability. During the testing phase, NCPH used Word document vulnerabilities. They switched to Excel and later to PowerPoint vulnerabilities. The result of all of this activity is that the NCPH group siphoned thousands, if not millions, of unclassified US government documents back to China.
Sponsored by the White House, the US Cyber Challenge is a national talent search and skills development program. Its official purpose is to find 10,000 young Americans with the interests and skills to fill the ranks of cyber security practitioners, researchers, and warriors. Some will become the top guns in cyber security.
The program promises to nurture and develop the participants’ skills, and enable them to get access to advanced education and exercises. Moreover, the program will enable them to be recognized by employers where their skills can be of the greatest value to the nation.
The Cyber Challenge includes several different programs, including:
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“CyberPatriot” (an introductory program designed for high school students), in which participants compete in computer system network defense by defending their networks from attacks by a hostile “Red Team”.
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The “DC3 Digital Forensics Challenge” (conducted by the DOD’s Cyber Crime Center), in which “contestants attempt to uncover evidence on digital media.”
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The Network Attack Competition (conducted by the SANS Institute), which is a “competition in network vulnerability discovery and exploitation”—also described as “ NetWars” or a “capture the flag competition” in which players attempt to exploit the computer networks of the other players while defending their own.
The Network Attack Competition is the sexy, newsworthy competition. It is described as follows—
You can play the game as an analyst, a penetration tester, a defender, or any combination. You earn points by finding keys, moving to higher levels, capturing services such as a website, overcoming obstacles (attack techniques) and protecting resources (defensive techniques). You can see the other players' scores and your own points scored, live, or on an overall scoreboard.
The NetWars game is a collection of computer and network security challenges. It is designed to represent real-world security issues: their flaws and their resolutions. Each player can follow an independent path based on individual problem solving skills, technical skills, aptitude, and creativity. The game is played in a fun but safe environment using the technology that drives our lives every day.
The game starts when a player downloads and starts a CD-ROM image on a PC or in a virtual environment such as VMware Player. The image contains a brief tutorial and the game's full instructions.
The player must find a hidden key within the image that is downloaded and then uses that key to enter an online environment where knowledge of security vulnerabilities and their exploits can be turned into points.
This year’s NetWars winner was determined in December, 2009, when 21 year-old Chris Benedict of Nauvoo, Illinois was declared the “king of the hacker hill.” CNN reported on the competition here. Two of the other three winners were Michael Coppola (a 17 year-old high school senior) and Matt Bergin (age not reported), who beat out twelve other finalists.
What do the winners get? According to the White House—
Promising candidates will be immediately recognized and will be invited to attend regional “camps” at local colleges, run jointly by college faculty and cyber security experts from the community, where they will develop their skills more fully and participate in additional competitions. The students who rise to the top in these regional programs will be invited to live national challenges like those conducted by schools coordinated by the University of Texas at San Antonio and NYU Polytechnic. Greatly promising candidates from these programs will be given either Federal Service grants or SANS Institute scholarships to study advanced cyber security programs and may earn scholarships to colleges and graduate programs at participating schools. Finally, the best of the candidates will be brought into federal agencies like the National Security Agency, the FBI, DoD DC3, US-CERT, and US Department of Energy Laboratories, all of which are helping to make this program effective.
So we can expect Messrs. Benedict, Coppola, and Bergin to be offered pretty much whatever they want, if only they will agree to join the United States’ nascent cybersecurity infrastructure and help defend against the likes of Tan Dailin and his ilk.
We have previously written about the challenges of 21st century warfare, asserting that it was “not your father’s war” and noting that “our adversaries are making advances … in areas in which we are vulnerable to exploitation.” New challenges require innovative approaches, and we applaud our government for implementing this unique approach to identifying and developing individuals with the aptitude to excel in the cyberspace wars of the 21st century.
More Insight into CAS 413 Requirements from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
When Westinghouse (subsequently known as Viacom, and now known as CBS) closed down its Machinery Technology Division (MTD) segment and nearly simultaneously sold its Electronic Systems Group (ESG) segment to Northrop Grumman in 1996, little did it know it was setting in motion a chain of events that would culminate, nearly fourteen years later, in a series of rulings from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CoFC) that would help CAS practitioners understand the complex operations of the segment closing adjustment required by CAS 413-50(c)(13).
We have written about this matter before—see links here and here. Suffice to say that CAS 413 is hard to fathom, difficult to comply with, and almost always leads to protracted litigation. Fortunately, Judge Firestone of the CoFC does a good job in unraveling the knots and explaining how to comply, and her decisions are generally upheld on appeal. This article will discuss two very recent decisions by Judge Firestone as they pertain to the disposition of the two CBS segments—ESG and MTD.
The ESG Sale
The ESG sale to Northrop Grumman was a complex transaction. Westinghouse transferred both pension plan assets and liabilities to Northrop Grumman—but not all of them. It retained certain pension assets and liabilities. That same year, Westinghouse submitted a segment closing adjustment claim to the Government. Meanwhile, Northrop Grumman merged the pension plan assets and liabilities it had received from Westinghouse into its own pension plan.
Westinghouse/Viacom/CBS’s analysis showed a pension deficit—i.e., pension plan liabilities outweighed assets. Accordingly, it asked the Government to fund the deficit. A battle ensued and the matter has been the subject of at least two other CoFC cases. See this ESG decision here.
As part of the ongoing battle, CBS recalculated its numbers and its new analysis “includes the portion of the pension plan deficit that CBS transferred to Northrop Grumman.” In other words, CBS was asking the Government to fund the entire pension plan funding shortfall that existed prior to the sale of the ESG segment.
Judge Firestone decided that there were clearly two separate processes in action. The first process was the segment closing calculation mandated by CAS 413, and the second process was the determination of how much of the calculated surplus/deficit would be attributed to the parties. She also addressed the requirements of the original CAS 413 language versus the requirements of the revised CAS 413 language. (CAS 413 was revised in 1995.)
Her decision is consistent with other CAS 413 cases she’s decided: the segment-close calculation is controlled by the CAS language, while the amount of pension surplus/deficit each party bears is based on contract language. With respect to the first issue, Judge Firestone adjudged that—
… a segment closing calculation under original CAS 413 must be made on all of the segment’s pension assets and liabilities, including the portion of the segment’s pension assets and liabilities that the segment seller transfers to the segment buyer. The court noted that unlike revised CAS 413, which limits the calculation to the portion of the pension assets and liabilities retained by the segment seller, original CAS 413 did not distinguish between the portion of the pension assets and liabilities retained by the segment seller and the portion of the pension assets and liabilities transferred to a segment buyer. … [T]herefore, segment closing calculations under original CAS 413 must be performed on the pension assets and liabilities of the entire segment without regard to the fact that some of these pension assets and liabilities were transferred to the segment buyer. (Internal citations omitted.)
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The court therefore holds that the segment closing calculation for the sale of the ESG segment to Northrop Grumman with respect to contracts covered by original CAS 413 must include all of the segment’s pension assets and liabilities attributable to those contracts, without adjustment for the pension assets and liabilities transferred to Northrop Grumman.
With respect to the second issue (how much of the calculated surplus/deficit should be attributed to each party), Judge Firestone noted that the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause (52.216-7) of CBS’ flexibly priced contracts required that costs must be allowable pursuant to the requirements of FAR Part 31 which included, inter alia, that the costs must comply with CAS, or else Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) if CAS did not apply.
Looking at the language of CAS 412, Judge Firestone noted that “a contractor may only claim payment from the government for pension costs if the contractor has a ‘valid liability’.” Judge Firestone looked at Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 6 to define the term “liability,” and determined that –
SFAC No. 6 defines 'liability' to mean the ‘legal, equitable, or constructive duty or responsibility’ to pay an obligation. Under SFAC No. 6, liabilities are defined as ‘probable future sacrifices of economic benefits arising from present obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets or provide services to other entities in the future as a result of past transactions or events.’ Later in SFAC No. 6, paragraph 42 explains that if liabilities are transferred or eliminated, those liabilities can no longer be claimed by the transferring entity. In this paragraph, which falls under the heading, ‘Transactions and Events that Change Liabilities,’ GAAP recognizes that a liability may be eliminated if it is transferred to another. Specifically, it provides that ‘[o]nce incurred, a liability continues as a liability of the entity until the entity settles it, or another event or circumstance discharges it or removes the entity’s responsibility to settle it.’
(Emphasis added by Judge Firestone, internal citations omitted.)
Judge Firestone concluded—
Because CBS does not have any ‘liability’ for the pension obligations it transferred to Northrop Grumman, paying CBS for the transferred pension deficit would violate the CAS and GAAP. Thus, payment is not authorized under FAR 31.201-2 and is not permissible under the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause. Therefore, CBS’s claim for pension costs attributable to the pension liabilities it transferred to Northrop Grumman must be denied.
Accordingly, Judge Firestone determined that, while the CAS 413 segment closing calculation must be performed on the entirety of the segment’s pension plan assets and liabilities as they existed before the transfer, the Government was liable to CBS only for the amount of the pension deficit attributable to the assets and liabilities that CBS retained after the transfer to Northrop Grumman.
The MTD Closure
But Judge Firestone wasn’t done yet. In a second CBS case decided the same day, she addressed the date on which the segment was actually closed—and therefore subject to the segment-closing pension adjustment of CAS 413. See the MTD decision here.
Those gentlefolk following these series of admittedly arcane cases will realize how important that date is. As we have previously noted, Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) has held that the segment-closing pension adjustment is a current period adjustment—meaning that a contractor is in noncompliance with CAS 413 if it fails to make the required adjustment prior to the end of the current fiscal year in which the segment closing takes place. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has also held that when a when a noncompliance with the requirements of 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(12) is alleged, then the government is entitled to interest compounded daily beginning on the date that the segment was closed. So determining the exact date of segment closure is critical.
One might think that determining the segment-closing date would be relatively straightforward—and normally it is. But Westinghouse/Viacom/CBS and its government customer created a set of circumstances that tested Judge Firestone’s wisdom.
According to the Courts recital of undisputed facts, Westinghouse established the MTD segment in 1983 to provide technical and engineering support to the U.S. Navy’s Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). The segment’s 190 employees performed on two contracts (one was a follow-on contract to the initial award). In November 1995, NAVSEA informed Westinghouse that it would not be awarded a third follow-on contract and, within a month, Westinghouse told NAVSEA that it would therefore close the MTD segment effective February 1, 1996. In particular, Westinghouse notified NAVSEA (pursuant to its contract’s Limitation of Funds clause) that remaining funds would be insufficient to cover the segment’s closing costs, and that funding the segment’s pension deficit “could be significant.”
In executing its decision to shut down the MTD segment, Westinghouse gave its employees a 60-day notice of termination, sent its subcontractors notifications of terminations for convenience, and requested that its employees' secret facility clearance be terminated as of February 1, 1996. It notified NAVSEA that it would discontinue work on the contract (even though there was work remaining to be done) because of the funding constraints. NAVSEA was not pleased.
Sometime in January 1996, NAVSEA determined that it could fund the MTD segment-closing costs from “funds unrelated to the appropriated funds under the … contract and that [contract] funds … had not been fully expended.” The NAVSEA contracting officer “asked Westinghouse to continue work on the [contract] for national defense reasons.” As a result, MTD “agreed to reinstate its subcontracts and transfer” the remaining contract work to another segment (the Science and Technology Center, or STC segment). However, the MTD segment would continue to generate the contract billings, even though all work was performed by STC employees and other subcontractors. As Judge Firestone related, “By May 1, 1996, there were only two MTD employees remaining. These employees were not performing work under the contract, but were involved solely in the winding-down of the segment and in performing the billing functions requested by the government.”
Moreover, “The Defense Contract Audit Agency (‘DCAA’) audited MTD’s plant closings after the MTD facility closed. When the DCAA presented questions to MTD in April 1996, MTD advised the DCAA that it could not respond because MTD no longer had any employees.”
Nonetheless, when it came time to determine the segment-closing pension adjustment to be made pursuant to the requirements of CAS 413, the government argued that (under the language of the original CAS 413) a segment does not close until its contractual relationship(s) with the government are finally terminated and it would no longer be possible to adjust pension costs charged to the contract. The government contended that “even though MTD was no longer incurring pension costs through direct labor, MTD’s pension costs ‘could have been’ adjusted through 1996 and 1997 if MTD had changed its CAS disclosure statement and allocated pension costs on some other basis.” Using that logic, the government argued that the MTD segment closed on July 1, 1997—which was when work under the final contract was finally completed. CBS argued that the segment closing took place when the MTD segment stopped performing CAS-covered contracts that would allow for the amortization of pension costs. Accordingly, CBS argued that the MTD segment closed on February 1, 1996—which is when it stopped incurred direct and indirect costs.
Judge Firestone cleanly cut through the parties’ arguments, quickly getting to the heart of the matter. She wrote, “…this court has held, and the Federal Circuit has affirmed, that the critical test for determining whether a segment closing has occurred is whether there are future cost accounting periods in which to adjust previously determined pension costs.”
She continued—
It is also not disputed that while MTD subcontracted performance under the contract to STC, MTD remained the prime contractor on Contract No. 4030 after NAVSEA prevailed upon MTD to assume that role for funding and national security reasons. The record demonstrates that if NAVSEA had not prevailed upon MTD to retain its prime contractor status, the timing of the segment closing in this case would not be in dispute. Once MTD had ceased work ... following termination of its security clearance and after it transferred the contract work to STC, it would have been ‘closed.’
Judge Firestone concluded—
While it is no doubt true that MTD remained the prime contractor … after February 1, 1996 for billing purposes only in order to help the government, it is also true that under CAS 413, MTD was not able to charge pension costs to the government based on direct labor rates … after it had ceased operations on February 1, 1996. Accordingly, the MTD segment closed as of that date.
We continue to be both amazed and amused at the “firestorm of litigation” (to quote former OFPP Administrator Angela Styles) sparked by the Cost Accounting Standards dealing with defined-benefit pension plans. The litigation is understandable: the amounts of money at stake in each case almost prevent any type of negotiated settlement. But when it takes fourteen years (or more) for each of these cases to be decided, we have to wonder if this is the situation envisioned by the CAS Board(s)? Is there no simpler way to have government customers pay their fair share of pension costs, and no more than their fair share?
The good news is that most companies are moving away from defined-benefit pension plans, so the litigation window has a finite life. But is the price we taxpayers are paying in the meantime—in terms of litigation expense, use of judicial resources, and corporate and government funds—worth it? We wonder ….
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Merry Christmas from the U.S. Government: Three New Compliance Issues for 2010
Government contract compliance is a multi-faceted business objective, encompassing numerous diverse yet often interconnected processes and business controls. Sellers to the Federal government have to contend with a multitude of potential issues, from those involving financial management (e.g., cost allowability, contract financing, and contract billings) to acquisition (e.g., Buy America Act, socioeconomic reporting, price reasonableness, and government property management) to post-award execution issues (e.g., change control, limitations of cost and funds, Earned Value Management, and quality assurance)—to name just a few.
Three Christmas-time promulgations from the Federal government illustrate the diverse set of issues that must be addressed to be a “compliant” government contractor.
First, some good news relating to the thorny issue of “excessive pass-through costs.” For some time now, the DOD has imposed a statutorily mandated prohibition on reimbursement of excessive pass-through costs. When the value of the orders a contractor (or lower-tier subcontractor) places with vendors/suppliers/subcontractors exceeds 70% of its total costs—and the Contracting Officer determines that the higher-tier contractor “adds no or negligible value”—then indirect costs and profit/fee applicable to the subcontracted work are unallowable for that contract. This assessment is made during the proposal phase, based on the estimated value of work to be subcontracted. Moreover, if (after contract award) the higher-tier contractor’s amount of subcontracting unexpectedly exceeds 70% of its total cost, then it must notify its Contracting Officer and justify why it adds value—or risk having applicable indirect costs and profit/fee disallowed. (Fixed-price contracts are subject to a potential retroactive unilateral downward price adjustment.)
On December 23, 2009 DOD Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Shay Assad issued a Class Deviation directing DOD Contracting Officers to utilize the recently published direction, solicitation provision, and contract clause found in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in lieu of the now-obsolete direction, solicitation provision, and contract clause found in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). In addition, the Deviation exempts fixed-price incentive contracts awarded on the basis of adequate price competition from the FAR requirements relating to this issue.
Next, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industrial Security (BIS) issued a final rule to 15 C.F.R. § 701 to implement requirements for the reporting of “offset agreements” in the sales of “weapon systems or defense-related items” to foreign entities. The existing reporting rule was revised to address criticisms in a GAO report (GAO-08-854). According to the rule, an “offset transaction” is –
Any activity for which the U.S. firm claims credit for full or partial fulfillment of the offset agreement. Activities to implement offset agreements are categorized as coproduction, technology transfer, subcontracting, credit assistance, training, licensed production, investment, purchases and other.
The rule defines both “direct” and “indirect” offsets. U.S. firms are required to file annual reports when offset agreements exceed $5 million in value, or when a firm has claimed an offset credit with its foreign customer of at least $250,000. The reports are required to include certain information, including (but not limited to) the NAICS code associated with the military export sale. If more than one NAICS code is applicable, then the contractor must apportion the sale into the appropriate NAICS code(s). The revised reporting requirements will be effective with firms’ June 2010 reporting period.
Comments received in response to the draft rule included several criticisms. Among the criticisms was that the reporting requirements were burdensome and would result in additional costs to contractors. Commenters requested an 18-month implementation period. The BIS rule-makers were not impressed with the argument(s) submitted, noting “the 33 percent increase amounts to the addition of three hours to the existing nine hour burden.” In a similar vein, the BIS drafters rejected the call for a long implementation period, making the rule effective in 30 days.
Finally, the DFARS supplemental cost principles (applicable to DOD contracts) were revised by issuance of a final rule on December 24, 2009 to address the allowability of the costs of leasing government equipment for display or demonstration purposes. One change was made to the DFARS language at 225-7303-2 (“Cost of doing business with a foreign government or international organization”) to clarify that the limitations on cost allowability found at the 231.205-1 cost principle do not apply to FMS contracts, even though the general rule that “costs not allowable under FAR Part 31 are not allowable in pricing FMS contracts” is still valid. The final rule also revised that DFARS cost principle (231.205-1, Public Relations and Advertising Costs) to make unallowable “monies paid to Government associated with the leasing of Government equipment, including lease payments and reimbursement for support services ….” In other words, a contractor cannot normally price into its proposals the cost of leasing equipment from the U.S. Government for display or demonstration purposes—unless it is pricing a Foreign Military Sale contract, in which case such costs may be included. (We have discussed the FMS program, generally, in this article.)
Three compliance issues to think about, addressing diverse issues possibly of interest to only a few practitioners. Yet companies that sell to the U.S. government need to be aware of such issues and must comply with them. It is little wonder, therefore, that sellers in the Federal marketplace invest in people and systems and controls—and then constantly update them in response to the changing regulatory environment—and pass the cost of doing so to its government customers in the form of higher prices.
DARPA Downselects to Orbital Sciences for System F6 Phase 2

We always love a good technology story—especially one where the underdog beats out the big dog. Here’s a story that has it all: cryptic acronyms, advanced technology, spaceflight, and a win by the little guy against three of the largest dogs in the neighborhood.
Defense Industry Daily recently reported that a team led by Orbital Sciences was awarded (on December 4, 2009) the Phase 2 System F6 contract—a $75 million award in which Orbital beat Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman. In February 2008, the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA) awarded the four teams a Phase 1 contract to develop key technologies, develop a system design, develop “an innovative analytical approach using econometric tools,” and develop an “evolved hardware-in-the-loop test-bed … using a cluster of networked computers.” Orbital Sciences’ approach was selected to proceed onto Phase 2.
What is the System F6 concept? The six ‘F’s” are Future Fast, Flexible, Fractionated, Free-Flying Spacecraft. According to DARPA, the program—
… intends to demonstrate that a traditional, large, monolithic satellite can be replaced by a group of smaller, individually launched, wirelessly networked and cluster-flown spacecraft modules. Each ‘fractionated’ module can contribute a unique capability to the rest of the network, such as computing, ground communications, or payload functionality. The ultimate goal of the program is to launch a fractionated spacecraft system and demonstrate it in orbit in approximately four years.
A 2008 DARPA press release announces—
We see many benefits to fractionation. Fractionation provides the flexibility to launch individual payloads when they are ready so that an otherwise complex, multi-payload program isn’t delayed. It diversifies risk during launch by not putting all of our eggs into one basket, greatly improves robustness to attack, and provides the capability to rapidly replace a failed component without needing complex in-orbit servicing. And we have the potential to take advantage of Moore’s law by frequently upgrading on-orbit computing resources using relatively small modules, as opposed to waiting decades until we replace the entire spacecraft. The F6 architecture will demonstrate an approach that will enable us to do these types of crucial space activities in the future, and maybe even some incredible things we haven’t even begun to consider.
As the DID article explains, “In the next phase of the System F6 program, Orbital will be responsible for the detailed design and ground testing of the new technologies, architectures and programmatic concepts required for the System F6. These include wireless data communications, cluster flight operations, distributed spacecraft computing systems, rapidly relocatable ground systems, and value-centric design methodologies. DARPA is hoping for a planned flight demonstration in 2013.”
The December 2009 DARPA press release likens the development of fractionated spacecraft to the evolution of “monolithic mainframe computers … to ever-smaller ubiquitously networked systems … changing how computing is used.” The System F6 is intended to demonstrate the benefits of the new approach, including “rapid defensive cluster scatter and re-gather maneuvers.”
One key feature of the Phase 2 efforts is the creation of an “F6 Developer’s Kit,” which will be “distributed under an open-source license, which will include definitions and reference implementation of all interfaces necessary to develop a new module for an F6 cluster, with source code, binaries, and documentation for the resource-sharing middleware and cluster flight algorithms.”
As the DARPA press release concludes, “We are looking at dramatically decreasing the space industry’s barrier to entry and also radically simplifying the way large space systems are integrated and tested.”
The winning Orbital Sciences team included: IBM, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Georgia Institute of Technology, SpaceDev, and Aurora Flight Sciences. We have written about SpaceDev (a subsidiary of Sierra Nevada Corporation or SNC) before, noting that SpaceDev was a leader in “innovative space technology” with “proven space products in its portfolio.” SNC acquired SpaceDev for $38 million in December, 2008 and—roughly a year later—and has seen its bet pay-off nicely in this DARPA award.
We also note that Aurora Flight Sciences was a team member of three of the four competing teams. This smallish (300 person) privately owned corporation reported roughly $50 million in annual sales. We’ll be keeping an eye on this rapidly emerging player.
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