Los Alamos Testers Blow the Doors Off—Literally

From the gadfly activist group, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), comes word
of a December 16, 2009 test of a Large Bore Powder Gun (LBPG) at
Technical Area 15 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The
test went awry and the Shock & Detonation Physics Group “heard a
loud unusual noise” and observed the doors being “propelled off the
facility.” Initial reports estimated the damage to be on the order of
$3 million. Parts of the LBPG cannon were “found outside the
building.”
As POGO notes, LANL has a long history of technical problems and management issues. POGO’s comment on the latest incident? “… our past investigations have been concerned about security threats to the nuclear labs coming from outsiders.”
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) issued a statement
(reported on Wired.com) that flatly refuted the POGO report, saying,
“Despite claims to the contrary, the only thing ‘demolished’ in this
case was POGO’s credibility … and [this] is the sort of irresponsible
hyperbole we’ve come to expect from this group.” The NNSA stated that
the LBPG test was part of a “standard proof test for a catch tank in
the target chamber … [and] these types of experiments are routine and
responsible.” According to the NNSA statement, the LBPG tests are
“used to conduct measurements of material properties at pressures
needed for understanding nuclear weapons performance.”
Despite
the denial, the POGO reporter stood by his original story, noting, “The
explosion blew the doors off the building, separated the shielding of
two walls, and caused significant facility structural damage.” The POGO site contains a link to the LANL Occurrence Report (found here).
The Occurrence Report does not discuss why the LBPG was being utilized
nor does it discuss any root cause analysis regarding why such a
“routine” test could have failed so catastrophically.
We accept that there is a bona fide need to use LBPG “cannons” in the testing of material properties. We look forward, however, to learning how one could fail in such a way as to blow the doors off a presumably robust facility.
More
interesting, at least to us, is the role played by the NNSA in linking
the Department of Energy with the Department of Defense. As the NNSA
website (link above) tells us—
One
of the primary missions of NNSA is to maintain and enhance the safety,
security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
NNSA, through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures that the U.S.
nuclear arsenal meets the country’s national security requirements and
continues to serve its essential deterrence role. In partnership with the Department of Defense, NNSA’s Defense Programs provides the research, development, secure transportation, and production activities necessary to support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile….
Today, NNSA uses and oversees a wide-range of breakthrough science
experiments, engineering audits and high-tech computer simulations,
including extensive laboratory and flight tests of warhead components
and subsystems, to keep the existing warheads reliable, secure and safe.
Every year, the Secretary of Energy is able to certify the reliability
of the stockpile without conducting an underground nuclear test.
The
NNSA manages eight sites in the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The eight
sites include the Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories. In addition, there are sites in Kansas City, and Amarillo (Texas). There is a test site outside of Las Vegas, and a production site near Augusta, Georgia dedicated to extracting Tritium (3H)
Gas for use in nuclear weapons. Finally, the Y-12 “National Security
Complex” in Oakridge, Tennessee is the nation’s “only source of
enriched uranium” for use in weapons and by the U.S. Navy.

We
find it interesting that the ostensibly civilian Department of Energy
has such an important role in maintaining the nation’s strategic defense.
Perhaps the linkage (or confusion?) between civilian and military uses
of nuclear energy traces its roots back to 1946, when President Truman
transferred control of “atomic energy” from military to civilian
hands. Truman established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
to essentially control all facets of nuclear production, including
managing the National Laboratories. Critics have written, “the AEC had
become an oligarchy controlling all facets of the military and civilian
sides of nuclear energy, promoting them and at the same time attempting
to regulate them, and it had fallen down on the regulatory side ... a
growing legion of critics saw too many inbuilt conflicts of interest."
In 1974 the AEC was disestablished and replaced with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).
According to the NRC website, its only interest is in the commercial
uses of nuclear power; military production and sustainment is handled
by the NNSA within the Department of Energy. Use of nuclear weapons is (of course) under the control of the Department of Defense and the National Command Authority.
So
we’ve meandered from Large Bore Powder Guns to nuclear weapons. We’ve
learned that, even in a secured bunker inside a weapon testing site,
explosive mishaps can occur. We’re very happy that such mishaps occur
with LBPGs and not with nuclear weapons.
Year-End Updates – Volume 3
Third and last in a series of year-end updates to previously reported stories, this time covering two previous topics—
Leaky UAV Video Feeds
We first wrote
about unencrypted video feeds allowing Iraqi insurgents to steal the
video signals by use of commercially available software (that costs
less than $30.00) just a few weeks ago. Prior to that article, we noted ever-increasing reliance on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. We also posted on the impact of cyber-warfare on 21st
century military operations. We included a Pentagon statement that
alluded to the difficulties inherent in adding encryption to a network
that is more than a decade old.
Just
a few days after our article was posted (on 12/18/2009),
DefenseNews.com reported that “the U.S. Air Force has known for more
than a decade that the live video feeds from its unmanned aerial
vehicles can be intercepted by the enemy but opted not to do anything
about it until this year.” Sources cite “various reasons” for the delay in encrypting the signals. The article quotes one military source as saying
– “It's not just monetary, but technology readiness. We've taken
certain risks and mitigated those risks with our tactics, techniques
and procedures." The article reports that the Air Force now has established 2014 as the date by which video feeds will be encrypted.
According to the DefenseNews.com article—
The
Air Force isn't relying solely on encryption to protect the video
[signal]. An immediate solution is to narrow the area from which the
video feeds can be received, making it more likely that an insurgent
would be spotted trying to intercept them, a defense official said.
Typically, militants would need to be within 100 yards of the airman or
soldier receiving the signal.
However,
the Iraqi insurgents aren’t relying solely on COTS software to track
the UAVs. The DefenseNews.com article reports that—
‘We
noticed a trend when going after these guys; that sometimes they seemed
to have better early warning’ of U.S. actions, said [an] officer
briefed on the raid. ‘We went and did a raid on one of their safe
houses and found all of this equipment that was highly technical,
highly sophisticated. It was more sophisticated than any other
equipment we'd seen Iraqi insurgents use.’ … The [militia] group had a
‘very long and well-documented history’ of getting their training and
equipment from Iran, the officer said. ‘It was the technological
know-how to make the antennas,
computers and software go together and pick up the appropriate bands
that was impressive. It is something that would take some very smart
electrical engineers to put together. Iran had to choose the most loyal
and capable surrogates that they could trust with equipment like that.
They knew that we were flying Predators over their heads 24/7, so it's
easy to say 'yeah, I know that I'm going to do a signals analysis
search for [the drone]' and take advantage of it,’ the officer said.
Finally,
the DefenseNews.com confirms our suspicion that the lack of encryption
was at least partially caused by the “spiral development” of the
Predator UAV. The article quotes former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne, who stated, “"I
would say that the enemy can find a flaw in a 70 percent solution and
they are going to exploit it. On the other hand, before they did
exploit it, you did get utility from it … in the case of the Predator,
we've extracted tremendous utility out of them."
EADS Insider Trading Charges
In November we wrote
about several EADS/Airbus executives facing insider trading charges
with respect to the reporting of A380 program problems and delays. The
executives’ defense was, essentially, that they were unaware of the
program’s problems when they exercised stock options in March 2006,
opting to purchase shares (for resale) at the current stock
price—despite the company’s March 8 announcement of record 2005
profits. Such an announcement should logically lead to delays in the
exercise of the options (i.e., the options logically should be worth
more in the future, based on an expectation of continued earnings
growth).
We
questioned the executives’ defense. If true, why was it true? Why
were the executives unaware of the program’s problems—problems that
only three months later led to a 26% drop in the stock price? As we
opined in our article—
In
a risk-aware management culture, EADS and Airbus executives wouldn’t
need an email to tell them that turbulent times were ahead for the
program; they would already know it because they would be aware of
current program status. They would be actively monitoring program risks
and would clearly see inflection points in risk probabilities. Their management ‘radar screens’ would clearly show trouble ahead.
On
December 21, 2009 AviationWeek.com reported that “French stock market
regulators cleared 17 individuals and two main shareholders” and
dismissed the insider trading charges implicating the executives. AviationWeek.com reported that—
EADS
applauded the decision, noting it was ‘satisfied that the Sanctions
Commission has recognized that EADS has complied with all applicable
market information duties, in particular in respect of risks affecting
the A380 program and its development, and that there has been no breach
of insider trading rules. EADS is confident that this point of view
will also prevail in all other pending proceedings based on the same
facts.’
The Wall Street Journal reported that “The
AMF ruling doesn't mark the end of the protracted EADS case, because a
parallel judicial investigation into alleged insider trading at the
aerospace company is still under way. But EADS said it was confident
that similar facts would lead to similar rulings.”
We
see no reason to doubt the veracity of the EADS/Airbus executives, and
we believe they were unaware of the A380’s problems prior to exercising
their stock options. But we also continue to ask why were these executives so oblivious to the program’s problems? This was the largest aircraft
development effort in the company’s history. It was a bet-the-company
program. How could the executives be so blissfully unaware of the
significant development and production problems, especially since one program delay had already been reported? Did the program
manager(s) successfully hide the new problems from management scrutiny, or were the executives merely incompetent?
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An Open Letter to Mr. Patrick Fitzgerald, Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

Dear Mr. Fitzgerald,
Happy New Year! It’s
coming up on 60 days since you took over your new position, replacing
Ms. April Stephenson. You’re the first “outside” leader of the Defense
Contract Audit Agency since … well, since forever. You came into the
job with a clear mandate for change, and apparently with the support of
all the right stakeholders. Your
challenge is to reform the agency while maintaining (or increasing)
morale, and to add (and train) desperately needed new auditors while
retaining the seasoned auditors you’ve got. And by the way, you need
to restore the agency’s reputation and return it to its preeminent
status as the Federal government’s premier audit agency, while keeping
the defense acquisition system stakeholders happy. It’s no small challenge you’ve taken on.
Everybody
wants fundamental changes in the way DCAA conducts its audits.
Congress wants to see GAO issue a report that shows DCAA can comply
with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). The
DOD Inspector General wants to see a drop-off in the number of
allegations of a hostile work environment and retribution for
whistleblower allegations. The
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) wants reports issued quickly,
with information its Contracting Officers can use to make decisions
about contractors’ internal control systems, as well as proposed and
billed costs.
The Defense Industrial Base wants accurate audit reports that fairly
reflect the facts, and they want the Defense auditors to listen to the
facts being presented.
Forgive me my impertinence, but I thought I’d offer you some suggestions for your consideration, in order to help you successfully tackle the challenge in front of you.
First,
you need to introduce more flexibility into the audit process. The
agency was criticized for auditing a billing system that didn’t exist
(it was found to be adequate); you don’t want that to happen on your
watch. The Defense Department contracts with a diverse set of
performing entities, from Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (FFRDCs) to manufacturers, and from service providers to
not-for-profit entities. There is no sense trying to apply a
“one-size-fits-all” standard approach to each one. Instead, start by
mapping the control systems endemic to each contractor, and
establishing an audit approach tailored to each. As part of that
initial mapping process, examine (and document) the type of work
performed, the number and type of contracts received, expected average
proposal volume, and the key customers. From there, develop a risk
profile unique to that contractor, and use that risk profile to develop
both a short-term (current year) and long-term (next five year) audit
plan. Then execute the plan.
Second,
consider revamping the audit process. I’m glad you and DCMA seem to be
equitably dividing the workload associated with reviews of contractor
internal control systems. That’s a good first step, as is ending the
issuance of an overall system adequacy opinion in favor of simply
reporting the system deficiencies found by the auditors. But more work
is needed in this area. Currently, a
draft audit report is provided to the contractor only after the audit
work has been completed and the results reviewed by management. This
locks the agency into its position(s) and creates a bit of “pride of
authorship” – creating an environment in which revisions are treated as
admissions that the audit work (or management review) was substandard. So if
the contractor questions the draft statement of condition or underlying
findings, the agency is almost always unwilling to change its initial
position. That is no way to generate high quality audit findings.
Instead, hold off on the management review until the contractor has had
a chance to review and discuss the draft SOCAR with the auditor(s), and
(if necessary) to provide a written response. That puts the DCAA
management team in a position to review both sides of the story without
having already taken sides, and to steer the auditor toward the correct position without having to “backstep” from anything.
Third,
consider whether all DCAA audits need to be subject to GAGAS.
Reasonable people will disagree with GAO’s stringent definition of
“independence” under GAGAS, but you can avoid the issue altogether if
you make certain audits subject to GAGAS while others are not. There
is precedent for this change: the AICPA has Consulting Standards that
differ from Auditing Standards. Since DCAA performs both financial
advisory services and audits, it would seem to make sense to apportion
each type of audit into GAGAS-compliant and non-GAGAS-compliant
groupings. And, by the way, DCMA really wants DCAA to participate in
the process as an advisor; it wants your audits to offer value-added
advice and to support the acquisition process. Contractors want to
hear from auditors as well; they want to know where they need to
improve and what should be done to fix system deficiencies. Your
auditors can’t do this if GAO will allege they’ve compromised
“independence” whenever this happens—so change the rules of the game to eliminate the issue altogether.
Fourth,
bring back the concept of materiality into the audit process. I heard
from a senior member of the DCAA executive team that “all deficiencies
at major contractors are significant deficiencies”—which leads to minor
issues being blown out of proportion. Under the current (December
2008) audit guidance, any significant deficiency leads almost
inexorably to recommended system disapproval. Again, one size should
not fit all, and not all issues should be treated the same. Give your
auditors discretion to determine which issues are significant and which
are minor, and that sense of proportionality will drive proper agency resource allocation.
Fifth, I
suggest you empower your auditors to exercise discretion (within broad
guidelines) to determine how best to perform their audits and which
results should be supported. But before you do so, you’ll need to
train them so that they have the right guidance to permit discretion to
be exercised in a manner that will lead to high-quality results.
You’ll have literally hundreds of new auditors joining the agency in
the next few years; they’ll need mentoring and training. You have a
cadre of recently retired auditors; consider bringing them back, both
as trainers and mentors.
Once you have the auditors trained and have given them robust guidance,
then turn them loose to exercise discretion. I bet you’ll be surprised
at the audit quality that will result.
So
I’ve given you five suggestions, Mr. Fitzgerald. I hope you’ll
consider them in the sprit they’re intended. We all want the same
thing, sir, which is high quality audits issued timely in a manner that
adds value to the acquisition process.
Year-End Updates – Volume 2
Second in a series of year-end updates to previously reported stories-
The JSF Program
We first wrote about the F-35 "Lightning II" Joint Strike Fighter in August 2009, asking whether Lockheed Martin was ready to ramp up production to the record-setting pace of 20 aircraft per month. It turned out to be our single most popular article.
(For the record, we expressed some doubt, stating, "the JSF program team has set for itself an incredibly ambitious goal of producing a finished aircraft every single working day. It's set the goal despite early design and supply chain problems, and despite almost universal history among other aircraft programs that says it can't be done.")
Two months later, in November 2009, we asked how much the JSF was going to cost, reporting rumors that the Pentagon's Joint Estimate Team (JET) was telling Defense Department leaders that the program would need anywhere from $7 to $15 billion more funding than originally baselined, and would require anywhere from 6 months to 2 years of additional schedule. At least one source predicted a dire breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act thresholds.
In that article, we also noted a very pessimistic report from the Center for Defense Information, in which the authors asserted that the JET report addressed only known problems, and predicted that new problems (as well as new cost and schedule impacts) were "sure to emerge."
On December 16, 2009, InsideDefense.com reported that "Key lawmakers today expressed strong reservations about the state of the Joint Strike Fighter program following a closed-door briefing on the findings of a recent independent assessment of the effort that suggested billions of additional dollars and more time is required to develop the aircraft."
According to the InsideDefense.com article, "A draft fiscal year 2011 budget directive issued last week by the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the military services to fund the JSF program to the JET estimate, a move that Pentagon sources say will result in the fighter program's immediate breach of 'critical' Nunn-McCurdy cost thresholds."
InsideDefense.com reports that "the draft resource management decision … would extend JSF development by at least a year, reduce production by approximately 100 aircraft between FY-11 and FY-15 and require the addition of billions of dollars to the effort through 2015."
Meanwhile, the Fort-Worth Star Telegram published an article on the same date (12/19/2009) wonders if the F-35 program is entering the same "death spiral" that beset the F-111 and F-22 programs, noting-
First, unrealistic technical requirements, cost estimates and schedules lead to delays and rising costs. Then, far fewer planes are bought than originally planned. That means the cost of each one rises, resulting in even fewer planes being bought, which produces even higher costs per copy, etc. … One internal study, by the Joint Estimate Team, has predicted it will take an additional 30 months, until 2016, and an additional $16.5 billion to complete development work, test and bring the Lockheed production line up to speed, goals that were to be met in 2013-14. If that were to occur, the F-35 would trigger congressionally imposed budget reviews that would lead to ever more scrutiny.
Lockheed Martin had this to say about the doomsayers' predictions-
The F-35 is meeting or exceeding every single one of its performance requirements. That performance is being reinforced in both flight testing and laboratory testing. There are no technical showstoppers on the F-35 program.
Costs across the program are declining at significant rates. All F-35 production aircraft under contract to date cost less than Defense Department forecasts. Production efficiency continues to improve dramatically.
The government's procurement-cost forecast for the life of the F-35 program has remained constant for the last two years.
While we acknowledge schedule and cost pressures in the development phase of the program and are working directly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to resolve them, program trends are very positive overall, and have us on path to meet each of the services' F-35 Initial Operational Capability Requirements beginning in 2012.
We are on track to field the F-35's tremendous capabilities to our war fighters and recapitalize our nation's aging fighter fleet. The program enjoys solid funding support from the Office of Secretary of Defense and Congress. The president's budget recommendations reflect DoD's commitment to international partnerships and common defense solutions.
The aircraft designs are largely complete. All three F-35 variants have been built and two types flown. Early test results are very encouraging and we are preparing to ramp up flight test and production.
Just for the record, we note that the Lockheed Martin response focuses on technical issues while glossing over at-completion estimates. We wonder what the program internal EACs look like, and whether they have been rigorously evaluated by independent reviewers such as Lockheed Martin's Internal Audit staff?
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