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Apogee Consulting Inc

Space-Based Threats: Detection and Reaction

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The final 2009 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology carried a story about “space situational awareness” (SSA), which the authors asserted may be “one of the few military space arenas where governments believe they can create real cross-border cooperation.”  The article cites recent events that highlight the shared threats facing space assets, such as the February 2009 collision between an Iridium telecom satellite and a defunct Russian satellite—and posits that the omnipresent threat posed by orbiting space debris may spur international cooperation, such as the exchange of radar data and the development of shared access to other data.

The AW&ST article noted that “European nations are emerging as standard bearers” for the shared approach to SSA.  The December 1, 2009 adoption of the Lisbon Treaty will spur the pooling and sharing of resources—including SSA data—within the European Union, according to the article.  The article notes, however, that the EU’s focus has been primarily civil rather than military.  For example, the EU has “initiated a draft code of conduct … that, among other things, would prohibit the militarization of space.”  More recently, the European Defense Agency (EDA) has become more involved, “helping to coordinate different requirements.”  In addition, “military planners are making some headway in increasing the involvement of commercial satellite operators in space traffic control, and the space insurance industry is becoming involved, too.”

The AW&ST article reports that France has started work on an improved version of its Graves radar, which “was specifically designed for space surveillance,” and is already in operational use.  Germany is developing an SSA center at Kalklar Air Base (also home to the EU Rapid Response Air Initiative (RRAI), which (according to the article) should be operational by early 2010.

But it’s not just the Europeans who are interested in a joint approach to SSA.  In mid-November 2009 (according to the article), “U.S. and French experts met to begin discussing how potential conflicts [in data access policy] might be remedied … the talks are later to be broadened to include Germany and other European nations.”

Meanwhile, as readers of this site know, “the U.S. is increasing oversight of space traffic and is ready to begin deploying a[n] … orbit[al] tracking-and-detection capability.”  Among other initiatives, the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite system “will detect and track space objects, such as satellites and orbital debris generating data the Department of Defense will use in support of military operations. NASA may also use the information to calculate orbital debris collision avoidance measures….”

But the foregoing efforts are focused solely on detection of space-based threats.  What about reaction?  Apparently, Russia is thinking about how to defend the Earth from the space-based threats posed by asteroids that stray too close to our orbit.  On December 31, 2009, reports emerged that Russian scientists are planning to meet “in secret” to develop a plan to prevent a potential collision with the asteroid Apophis in 2036.  According to ASDNews.com, although the Russians initially are planning the response “in a closed meeting of our collegium, the science-technical council,” they admit that “a serious plan to prevent such a catastrophe would probably be an international project involving Russian, European, U.S., and Chinese space experts.”

While Russian scientists are focused on taking action to prevent a collision that might result in the loss of “hundreds of thousands” of lives, NASA is more optimistic about the situation.  Although the agency announced that Apophis would pass within 18,000 miles of Earth’s orbit in 2029, “NASA later said that it has ‘all but ruled out’ the chance of the asteroid hitting the Earth in 2036,” according to an article on DigitalTrends.com.  The ASDNews.com article quotes NASA as stating that “"Updated computational techniques and newly available data indicate the probability of an Earth encounter on April 13, 2036, for Apophis has dropped from one-in-45,000 to about four-in-a-million.”

The Russians aren’t taking any chances, though.  The DigitalTrends.com article reports that “The Russian researchers are considering a plan to send a spacecraft to bump the large asteroid to a safer orbit.”  Russian Scientist Anatoly Perminov is quoted as saying, “Calculations show that it’s possible to create a special-purpose spacecraft within the time we have, which would help avoid the collision. The threat of collision can be averted.”  The article notes that alternate methods to change the trajectory of an asteroid include mirrors, light, or paint to change the way the asteroid absorbs heat enough to shift its direction. These methods would take about 20 years to change the path of the asteroid.

Twenty years is barely enough time to get ready for 2036, and it’s already too late to get ready for the 2029 encounter with Apophis.  As John Wayne once said, “Slap some bacon on a biscuit and let’s go--we’re burning daylight.”


collision
 

Los Alamos Testers Blow the Doors Off—Literally

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danger explosive material

From the gadfly activist group, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), comes word of a December 16, 2009 test of a Large Bore Powder Gun (LBPG) at Technical Area 15 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).  The test went awry and the Shock & Detonation Physics Group “heard a loud unusual noise” and observed the doors being “propelled off the facility.”  Initial reports estimated the damage to be on the order of $3 million.  Parts of the LBPG cannon were “found outside the building.” 

As POGO notes, LANL has a long history of technical problems and management issues.  POGO’s comment on the latest incident?  “… our past investigations have been concerned about security threats to the nuclear labs coming from outsiders.”

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) issued a statement (reported on Wired.com) that flatly refuted the POGO report, saying, “Despite claims to the contrary, the only thing ‘demolished’ in this case was POGO’s credibility … and [this] is the sort of irresponsible hyperbole we’ve come to expect from this group.”  The NNSA stated that the LBPG test was part of a “standard proof test for a catch tank in the target chamber … [and] these types of experiments are routine and responsible.”  According to the NNSA statement, the LBPG tests are “used to conduct measurements of material properties at pressures needed for understanding nuclear weapons performance.” 

Despite the denial, the POGO reporter stood by his original story, noting, “The explosion blew the doors off the building, separated the shielding of two walls, and caused significant facility structural damage.”  The POGO site contains a link to the LANL Occurrence Report (found here).  The Occurrence Report does not discuss why the LBPG was being utilized nor does it discuss any root cause analysis regarding why such a “routine” test could have failed so catastrophically.

We accept that there is a bona fide need to use LBPG “cannons” in the testing of material properties.  We look forward, however, to learning how one could fail in such a way as to blow the doors off a presumably robust facility.

More interesting, at least to us, is the role played by the NNSA in linking the Department of Energy with the Department of Defense.  As the NNSA website (link above) tells us—

One of the primary missions of NNSA is to maintain and enhance the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA, through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures that the U.S. nuclear arsenal meets the country’s national security requirements and continues to serve its essential deterrence role. In partnership with the Department of Defense, NNSA’s Defense Programs provides the research, development, secure transportation, and production activities necessary to support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile…. Today, NNSA uses and oversees a wide-range of breakthrough science experiments, engineering audits and high-tech computer simulations, including extensive laboratory and flight tests of warhead components and subsystems, to keep the existing warheads reliable, secure and safe. Every year, the Secretary of Energy is able to certify the reliability of the stockpile without conducting an underground nuclear test.

The NNSA manages eight sites in the Nuclear Weapons Complex.  The eight sites include the Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories.  In addition, there are sites in Kansas City, and Amarillo (Texas). There is a test site outside of Las Vegas, and a production site near Augusta, Georgia dedicated to extracting Tritium (3H) Gas for use in nuclear weapons.  Finally, the Y-12 “National Security Complex” in Oakridge, Tennessee is the nation’s “only source of enriched uranium” for use in weapons and by the U.S. Navy.

NNSA Map

We find it interesting that the ostensibly civilian Department of Energy has such an important role in maintaining the nation’s strategic defense.  Perhaps the linkage (or confusion?) between civilian and military uses of nuclear energy traces its roots back to 1946, when President Truman transferred control of “atomic energy” from military to civilian hands.  Truman established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to essentially control all facets of nuclear production, including managing the National Laboratories.  Critics have written, “the AEC had become an oligarchy controlling all facets of the military and civilian sides of nuclear energy, promoting them and at the same time attempting to regulate them, and it had fallen down on the regulatory side ... a growing legion of critics saw too many inbuilt conflicts of interest."  In 1974 the AEC was disestablished and replaced with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  According to the NRC website, its only interest is in the commercial uses of nuclear power; military production and sustainment is handled by the NNSA within the Department of Energy.  Use of nuclear weapons is (of course) under the control of the Department of Defense and the National Command Authority.

So we’ve meandered from Large Bore Powder Guns to nuclear weapons.  We’ve learned that, even in a secured bunker inside a weapon testing site, explosive mishaps can occur.  We’re very happy that such mishaps occur with LBPGs and not with nuclear weapons.


 

Year-End Updates – Volume 3

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Third and last in a series of year-end updates to previously reported stories, this time covering two previous topics—

Leaky UAV Video Feeds

We first wrote about unencrypted video feeds allowing Iraqi insurgents to steal the video signals by use of commercially available software (that costs less than $30.00) just a few weeks ago.  Prior to that article, we noted ever-increasing reliance on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the Southwest Asia theater of operations.  We also posted on the impact of cyber-warfare on 21st century military operations.  We included a Pentagon statement that alluded to the difficulties inherent in adding encryption to a network that is more than a decade old.

Just a few days after our article was posted (on 12/18/2009), DefenseNews.com reported that “the U.S. Air Force has known for more than a decade that the live video feeds from its unmanned aerial vehicles can be intercepted by the enemy but opted not to do anything about it until this year.”  Sources cite “various reasons” for the delay in encrypting the signals.  The article quotes one military source as saying – “It's not just monetary, but technology readiness.  We've taken certain risks and mitigated those risks with our tactics, techniques and procedures."  The article reports that the Air Force now has established 2014 as the date by which video feeds will be encrypted.

According to the DefenseNews.com article—

The Air Force isn't relying solely on encryption to protect the video [signal].  An immediate solution is to narrow the area from which the video feeds can be received, making it more likely that an insurgent would be spotted trying to intercept them, a defense official said. Typically, militants would need to be within 100 yards of the airman or soldier receiving the signal.

However, the Iraqi insurgents aren’t relying solely on COTS software to track the UAVs.  The DefenseNews.com article reports that—

‘We noticed a trend when going after these guys; that sometimes they seemed to have better early warning’ of U.S. actions, said [an] officer briefed on the raid. ‘We went and did a raid on one of their safe houses and found all of this equipment that was highly technical, highly sophisticated. It was more sophisticated than any other equipment we'd seen Iraqi insurgents use.’ … The [militia] group had a ‘very long and well-documented history’ of getting their training and equipment from Iran, the officer said.  ‘It was the technological know-how to make the antennas, computers and software go together and pick up the appropriate bands that was impressive. It is something that would take some very smart electrical engineers to put together. Iran had to choose the most loyal and capable surrogates that they could trust with equipment like that.  They knew that we were flying Predators over their heads 24/7, so it's easy to say 'yeah, I know that I'm going to do a signals analysis search for [the drone]' and take advantage of it,’ the officer said.

Finally, the DefenseNews.com confirms our suspicion that the lack of encryption was at least partially caused by the “spiral development” of the Predator UAV.  The article quotes former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne, who stated, “"I would say that the enemy can find a flaw in a 70 percent solution and they are going to exploit it.  On the other hand, before they did exploit it, you did get utility from it … in the case of the Predator, we've extracted tremendous utility out of them."

A380 First ClassEADS Insider Trading Charges

In November we wrote about several EADS/Airbus executives facing insider trading charges with respect to the reporting of A380 program problems and delays.  The executives’ defense was, essentially, that they were unaware of the program’s problems when they exercised stock options in March 2006, opting to purchase shares (for resale) at the current stock price—despite the company’s March 8 announcement of record 2005 profits.  Such an announcement should logically lead to delays in the exercise of the options (i.e., the options logically should be worth more in the future, based on an expectation of continued earnings growth).

We questioned the executives’ defense.  If true, why was it true?  Why were the executives unaware of the program’s problems—problems that only three months later led to a 26% drop in the stock price?  As we opined in our article—

In a risk-aware management culture, EADS and Airbus executives wouldn’t need an email to tell them that turbulent times were ahead for the program; they would already know it because they would be aware of current program status. They would be actively monitoring program risks and would clearly see inflection points in risk probabilities. Their management ‘radar screens’ would clearly show trouble ahead.

On December 21, 2009 AviationWeek.com reported that “French stock market regulators cleared 17 individuals and two main shareholders” and dismissed the insider trading charges implicating the executives.  AviationWeek.com reported that—

EADS applauded the decision, noting it was ‘satisfied that the Sanctions Commission has recognized that EADS has complied with all applicable market information duties, in particular in respect of risks affecting the A380 program and its development, and that there has been no breach of insider trading rules. EADS is confident that this point of view will also prevail in all other pending proceedings based on the same facts.’

The Wall Street Journal reported that “The AMF ruling doesn't mark the end of the protracted EADS case, because a parallel judicial investigation into alleged insider trading at the aerospace company is still under way. But EADS said it was confident that similar facts would lead to similar rulings.”

We see no reason to doubt the veracity of the EADS/Airbus executives, and we believe they were unaware of the A380’s problems prior to exercising their stock options.  But we also continue to ask why were these executives so oblivious to the program’s problems?  This was the largest aircraft development effort in the company’s history.  It was a bet-the-company program.  How could the executives be so blissfully unaware of the significant development and production problems, especially since one program delay had already been reported?  Did the program manager(s) successfully hide the new problems from management scrutiny, or were the executives merely incompetent?



 

An Open Letter to Mr. Patrick Fitzgerald, Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

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DCAA logo

Dear Mr. Fitzgerald,

Happy New Year!  It’s coming up on 60 days since you took over your new position, replacing Ms. April Stephenson.  You’re the first “outside” leader of the Defense Contract Audit Agency since … well, since forever.  You came into the job with a clear mandate for change, and apparently with the support of all the right stakeholders.  Your challenge is to reform the agency while maintaining (or increasing) morale, and to add (and train) desperately needed new auditors while retaining the seasoned auditors you’ve got.  And by the way, you need to restore the agency’s reputation and return it to its preeminent status as the Federal government’s premier audit agency, while keeping the defense acquisition system stakeholders happy.  It’s no small challenge you’ve taken on.

Everybody wants fundamental changes in the way DCAA conducts its audits.  Congress wants to see GAO issue a report that shows DCAA can comply with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS).  The DOD Inspector General wants to see a drop-off in the number of allegations of a hostile work environment and retribution for whistleblower allegations.  The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) wants reports issued quickly, with information its Contracting Officers can use to make decisions about contractors’ internal control systems, as well as proposed and billed costs.  The Defense Industrial Base wants accurate audit reports that fairly reflect the facts, and they want the Defense auditors to listen to the facts being presented.

Forgive me my impertinence, but I thought I’d offer you some suggestions for your consideration, in order to help you successfully tackle the challenge in front of you.

First, you need to introduce more flexibility into the audit process.  The agency was criticized for auditing a billing system that didn’t exist (it was found to be adequate); you don’t want that to happen on your watch.  The Defense Department contracts with a diverse set of performing entities, from Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to manufacturers, and from service providers to not-for-profit entities.  There is no sense trying to apply a “one-size-fits-all” standard approach to each one.  Instead, start by mapping the control systems endemic to each contractor, and establishing an audit approach tailored to each.  As part of that initial mapping process, examine (and document) the type of work performed, the number and type of contracts received, expected average proposal volume, and the key customers.  From there, develop a risk profile unique to that contractor, and use that risk profile to develop both a short-term (current year) and long-term (next five year) audit plan. Then execute the plan.

Second, consider revamping the audit process.  I’m glad you and DCMA seem to be equitably dividing the workload associated with reviews of contractor internal control systems.  That’s a good first step, as is ending the issuance of an overall system adequacy opinion in favor of simply reporting the system deficiencies found by the auditors.  But more work is needed in this area.  Currently, a draft audit report is provided to the contractor only after the audit work has been completed and the results reviewed by management.  This locks the agency into its position(s) and creates a bit of “pride of authorship” – creating an environment in which revisions are treated as admissions that the audit work (or management review) was substandard.  So if the contractor questions the draft statement of condition or underlying findings, the agency is almost always unwilling to change its initial position.  That is no way to generate high quality audit findings.  Instead, hold off on the management review until the contractor has had a chance to review and discuss the draft SOCAR with the auditor(s), and (if necessary) to provide a written response.  That puts the DCAA management team in a position to review both sides of the story without having already taken sides, and to steer the auditor toward the correct position without having to “backstep” from anything.

Third, consider whether all DCAA audits need to be subject to GAGAS.  Reasonable people will disagree with GAO’s stringent definition of “independence” under GAGAS, but you can avoid the issue altogether if you make certain audits subject to GAGAS while others are not.  There is precedent for this change:  the AICPA has Consulting Standards that differ from Auditing Standards.  Since DCAA performs both financial advisory services and audits, it would seem to make sense to apportion each type of audit into GAGAS-compliant and non-GAGAS-compliant groupings.  And, by the way, DCMA really wants DCAA to participate in the process as an advisor; it wants your audits to offer value-added advice and to support the acquisition process.  Contractors want to hear from auditors as well; they want to know where they need to improve and what should be done to fix system deficiencies.  Your auditors can’t do this if GAO will allege they’ve compromised “independence” whenever this happens—so change the rules of the game to eliminate the issue altogether.

Fourth, bring back the concept of materiality into the audit process.  I heard from a senior member of the DCAA executive team that “all deficiencies at major contractors are significant deficiencies”—which leads to minor issues being blown out of proportion.  Under the current (December 2008) audit guidance, any significant deficiency leads almost inexorably to recommended system disapproval.  Again, one size should not fit all, and not all issues should be treated the same.  Give your auditors discretion to determine which issues are significant and which are minor, and that sense of proportionality will drive proper agency resource allocation.

Fifth, I suggest you empower your auditors to exercise discretion (within broad guidelines) to determine how best to perform their audits and which results should be supported.  But before you do so, you’ll need to train them so that they have the right guidance to permit discretion to be exercised in a manner that will lead to high-quality results.  You’ll have literally hundreds of new auditors joining the agency in the next few years; they’ll need mentoring and training.  You have a cadre of recently retired auditors; consider bringing them back, both as trainers and mentors.  Once you have the auditors trained and have given them robust guidance, then turn them loose to exercise discretion.  I bet you’ll be surprised at the audit quality that will result.

So I’ve given you five suggestions, Mr. Fitzgerald.  I hope you’ll consider them in the sprit they’re intended.  We all want the same thing, sir, which is high quality audits issued timely in a manner that adds value to the acquisition process.


 

Year-End Updates – Volume 2

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Second in a series of year-end updates to previously reported stories-

The JSF Program


We first wrote about the F-35 "Lightning II" Joint Strike Fighter in August 2009, asking whether Lockheed Martin was ready to ramp up production to the record-setting pace of 20 aircraft per month. It turned out to be our single most popular article.

(For the record, we expressed some doubt, stating, "the JSF program team has set for itself an incredibly ambitious goal of producing a finished aircraft every single working day. It's set the goal despite early design and supply chain problems, and despite almost universal history among other aircraft programs that says it can't be done.")

Two months later, in November 2009, we asked how much the JSF was going to cost, reporting rumors that the Pentagon's Joint Estimate Team (JET) was telling Defense Department leaders that the program would need anywhere from $7 to $15 billion more funding than originally baselined, and would require anywhere from 6 months to 2 years of additional schedule. At least one source predicted a dire breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act thresholds.

In that article, we also noted a very pessimistic report from the Center for Defense Information, in which the authors asserted that the JET report addressed only known problems, and predicted that new problems (as well as new cost and schedule impacts) were "sure to emerge."

On December 16, 2009, InsideDefense.com reported that "Key lawmakers today expressed strong reservations about the state of the Joint Strike Fighter program following a closed-door briefing on the findings of a recent independent assessment of the effort that suggested billions of additional dollars and more time is required to develop the aircraft."

According to the InsideDefense.com article, "A draft fiscal year 2011 budget directive issued last week by the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the military services to fund the JSF program to the JET estimate, a move that Pentagon sources say will result in the fighter program's immediate breach of 'critical' Nunn-McCurdy cost thresholds."

InsideDefense.com reports that "the draft resource management decision … would extend JSF development by at least a year, reduce production by approximately 100 aircraft between FY-11 and FY-15 and require the addition of billions of dollars to the effort through 2015."

Meanwhile, the Fort-Worth Star Telegram published an article on the same date (12/19/2009) wonders if the F-35 program is entering the same "death spiral" that beset the F-111 and F-22 programs, noting-

First, unrealistic technical requirements, cost estimates and schedules lead to delays and rising costs. Then, far fewer planes are bought than originally planned. That means the cost of each one rises, resulting in even fewer planes being bought, which produces even higher costs per copy, etc. … One internal study, by the Joint Estimate Team, has predicted it will take an additional 30 months, until 2016, and an additional $16.5 billion to complete development work, test and bring the Lockheed production line up to speed, goals that were to be met in 2013-14. If that were to occur, the F-35 would trigger congressionally imposed budget reviews that would lead to ever more scrutiny.

Lockheed Martin had this to say about the doomsayers' predictions-

The F-35 is meeting or exceeding every single one of its performance requirements. That performance is being reinforced in both flight testing and laboratory testing. There are no technical showstoppers on the F-35 program.

Costs across the program are declining at significant rates. All F-35 production aircraft under contract to date cost less than Defense Department forecasts. Production efficiency continues to improve dramatically.

The government's procurement-cost forecast for the life of the F-35 program has remained constant for the last two years.

While we acknowledge schedule and cost pressures in the development phase of the program and are working directly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to resolve them, program trends are very positive overall, and have us on path to meet each of the services' F-35 Initial Operational Capability Requirements beginning in 2012.

We are on track to field the F-35's tremendous capabilities to our war fighters and recapitalize our nation's aging fighter fleet. The program enjoys solid funding support from the Office of Secretary of Defense and Congress. The president's budget recommendations reflect DoD's commitment to international partnerships and common defense solutions.

The aircraft designs are largely complete. All three F-35 variants have been built and two types flown. Early test results are very encouraging and we are preparing to ramp up flight test and production.


Just for the record, we note that the Lockheed Martin response focuses on technical issues while glossing over at-completion estimates. We wonder what the program internal EACs look like, and whether they have been rigorously evaluated by independent reviewers such as Lockheed Martin's Internal Audit staff?


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.