Fraud is Everywhere
We’ve discussed the potentially misplaced emphasis on contractor fraud and corruption before,
and asserted that the majority of contractor fraud also involves
corruption on the part of Government officials. On January 7, 2010,
the Department of Justice reported
that a former Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) official “was
sentenced to three years in prison “for his role in a bribery
conspiracy involving a multi-million dollar telecommunications
contract” and for income tax evasion. “In
addition to the prison term … Henry Lee Holloway [was ordered] to pay a
$5,000 fine and to forfeit $70,000 as the proceeds of [his] involvement
in the conspiracy.”
The
DOJ press release notes that the AAFES provides billions of dollars of
goods and services each year to service men and women by operating base
and post exchanges. Holloway was a general store manager at the Central Exchange in the Republic of Korea (RoK)
from 2003 through 2007. During his tenure, he accepted “at least
$70,000 worth of stock, entertainment, travel expenses, cash and other
things of value” from the CEO of Samsung Rental Company (SSRT) in
return for maintaining “SSRT’s $206 million contract with AAFES to
provide telecommunications services to U.S. Armed Forces installations”
in the RoK,
“despite Holloway’s knowledge and belief that SSRT was underperforming
and violating the terms of its contract with AAFES.” (The SSRT CEO was
sentenced to five years in prison and a $50,000 fine.)
But
fraud and corruption are not confined to the aerospace/defense
industry. On December 24, 2009 reports emerged that Koss Corporation
fired its long-time VP of Finance and Corporate Secretary, for
allegedly embezzling millions from the company. The individual in question (Ms. Sujata “Sue” Sachdeva), was “suspended” on December 21st, “for financial improprieties,” and was fired on December 24th for embezzling as much as $31 million over the past 18 years. Two members of the Koss accounting staff who reported to Ms. Sachdeva were also put on unpaid administrative leave. According to the Wall Street Journal,
“The government alleges she embezzled company funds to pay off her
personal American Express credit-card charges for the purchases of
furs, jewelry, apparel and home decor.”
Importantly, Ms. Sachdeva,
as VP of Finance, was responsible for many “management representations”
provided to its external auditors, Grant Thornton. Because those
representations can no longer be relied upon, Koss’ financial statements must be reaudited, and will likely need to be restated. Koss is a publicly traded company, so the SEC and PCAOB
will also be involved in the resolution. But Grant Thornton won’t be
involved in that resolution, because that audit entity was dismissed after the fraud was uncovered.
It’s
not clear why Grant Thornton was dismissed (and replaced by a smaller
audit firm). News reports indicate that the dismissal was based on a
“recommendation” from Koss’ audit committee. One
might think that Grant Thornton was being blamed for failing to uncover
the multi-million dollar embezzlement scheme during its audits. (One article notes that it was American Express who brought the fraud to the company’s attention--and not the external auditors, nor the internal auditors.) However,
Grant Thornton states that “The fraud was apparently conducted by a
longtime, trusted senior financial executive who was hired and
supervised by senior management. The company (Koss) did not engage
Grant Thornton LLP to conduct an audit or evaluation of internal
controls over financial reporting. Establishing and maintaining
effective internal control is management’s and the board’s
responsibility.”
Those
in Government contracting hear a lot about internal control systems and
contractor “business systems”. As far as we can tell, current DCAA
audit guidance tells auditors to expect perfection from DOD
contractors, with the slightest mistake potentially imperiling the
adequacy determination of an entire internal
control system. Based on DCAA testimony before the Commission on
Wartime Contracting, more than two-thirds of the largest contractors
have at least one inadequate control system. But as this story shows,
very few systems of internal controls can prevent 100% of fraud and
corruption, especially when it is a trusted member of the senior
leadership team who is engaging in it.
Contractors Jockey for Position in New Budget Environment
Lots of news to catch up on regarding defense contractors, including organization restructurings, divestitures, and relocation's.
First,
let’s look at Northrop Grumman. On December 15, 2009 NOC completed the
sale of its TASC advisory unit to General Atlantic LLC and KKR for
$1.65 billion in an all-cash deal. As we previously noted, tighter organizational conflict of interest (COI) rules make it more difficult for defense contractors to both advise government officials and to sell goods/services to them. As one story notes, “Since
the TASC acquisition announcement in early November, company officials
have been working to separate ties to Northrop Grumman and demonstrate
it is in full compliance with U.S. government organizational conflict
of interest policies.” Analysts
have speculated that other defense contractors may have to divest
themselves of similar advisory entities in order to comply with the
tighter rules.
Just
a couple of weeks later, on January 4, 2010, NOC announced that it was
moving its corporate headquarters from Century City (Los Angeles) to
“the Washington area” in order to be closer to its government
customers. The Washington Post reported:
“We are a global security company, and all of the federal processes,
whether the executive branch or Congress, are in the Washington area,"
said Wes Bush, Northrop's chief executive and president. "We think
we'll be able to do a better job for our customers and our company by
having our corporate office there."
The Baltimore Sun reported:
"We're
trying to both protect the jobs we have and build more jobs for the
company, and we think the best way to do that is be very engaged with
our customers," McClain said. "It's something our company leadership
has discussed over probably several years, but it's a disruptive thing
to do to the people involved. So we thought with the change to the
leadership we have had, that this is a good time to bite the bullet and
make the move."
The
move, involving some 300 corporate leaders and staff, is expected to
take place by the end of 2011. Jack Northrop founding the company in
1939 and it was the last aerospace/defense contractor to remain in Southern
California. Once the national center for aerospace development,
Southern California watched as its companies were acquired (e.g.,
McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell) or left the region (e.g., Lockheed, CSC). Other large non-defense engineering companies, including Fluor, also have moved out of the area in recent years.
Second, SAIC announced on
September 24, 2009 that it had relocated its corporate headquarters
from San Diego to MacLean, VA. The SAIC press release announced:
"This
move will formally relocate the corporate executive leadership team
closer to our federal government customers enabling us to better
respond quickly and efficiently to their critical needs, while
maintaining a significant presence in San Diego," said SAIC Chief
Executive Officer Walt Havenstein.
"Although our headquarters location has changed, our commitment to
customer satisfaction and high ethical standards remains constant."
Third, ITT Corp. announced on January 5, 2010 that it was restructuring its defense segment, reducing the number of business units from seven to three, and will be cutting jobs in 2010. The defense segment is ITT’s largest business, at $6.3 billion in annual sales is represents more than 50 percent of the New York-based conglomerate’s revenue. DefenseSystems.com reported:
The
new defense segment will be called ITT Defense and Information
Solutions. David Melcher, who joined ITT about 16 months ago, will lead
the new division as president. The restructuring was driven in part by
shifts in defense priorities and budgets and the customer's demands for
more integrated and network-centric solutions, he said. “We
are positioning ITT to be in a better position than ever to support our
customers’ emerging technology needs, while also greatly enhancing our
ability to stake out new markets,” Steve Loranger,
ITT’s chairman, president and chief executive officer, said in a
statement. “This move will also allow ITT to achieve greater operating
efficiencies and optimize our cost structure, which will help drive
successful business strategies for continued top line growth.”
“This reorganization is a strategic action to better address the
evolving needs of our customers, the cyclical nature of defense
spending and the need to continue to deliver value to our shareholders,
while maintaining ITT’s most critical investments and competencies,”
Melcher said. The reorganization marks ITT's recognition that it needs
to approach the market less as a product company and more as a systems
and solutions provider, he said.
Reports indicate that ITT Defense plans to cut two to three percent of its workforce.
Astute
readers may see a common thread in the seemingly disconnected corporate
actions. As this site has reported several times (e.g., here and here) most
forecasts indicate a flattening of the defense budget followed by a
steady decline, as it enters another of its cyclical downturns.
Accordingly, A&D companies are jockeying for position, trying to
maximize their share of the shrinking pie. We predicted a renewed emphasis on cost cutting, as well on program execution. We also noted two companies – Lockheed Martin and EADS – who were actually adding to their executive ranks in order to enhance customer relationships and ensure program execution.
What
we are seeing looks like more than the routine reshuffling of
executives within a corporation. We seem to be witnessing companies
executing strategies designed to position themselves to survive—or even
thrive—in the upcoming storm that the budgetary warning clouds
portend. Look for more of the same in the coming months.
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DCAA Audit Guidance Discusses Limits on Indirect Costs Allocated to Basic Research Contracts
On
December 10, 2009 the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) issued
guidance to its auditors, reminding them that Congress had implemented
statutory limits on the percentage of indirect costs that could be
allowably allocated to DOD-issued contracts, grants, or cooperative
agreements for purposes of pursuing “basic research.”
As the audit guidance stated, the FY2008 and FY 2009 DOD Appropriations Act stated—
Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, none of the funds made available in this
Act may be used to pay negotiated indirect cost rates on a contract,
grant, or cooperative agreement (or similar arrangement) entered into
by the Department of Defense and an entity in excess of 35 percent of
the total cost of the contract, grant, or agreement (or similar
arrangement): Provided, That this limitation shall apply only to
contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements entered into after the
date of the enactment of this Act using funds made available in this
Act for basic research.
Existing DOD guidance defines the phrase “indirect costs of a prime awardee” as follows—
· Universities.
All Facilities and Administration (F&A) costs as provided in the
cost principles for educational institutions (see OMB Circular A-21/2
CFR Part 220).
· Non-profit Organizations.
Indirect costs are those as defined in disclosed and/or established
accounting practices and as provided in the cost principles for
non-profit organizations (see OMB Circular A-122/ 2 CFR Part 230) or
FAR Part 31.2 for those Non-profit Organizations not subject to OMB
Circular A-122 (see CFR Part 230.2(c)).
· For-profit Organizations. Indirect
costs are those as defined in disclosed and/or established accounting
practices and as provided in the cost principles at FAR Part 31.2.
The
indirect cost limitation applies only to prime contractors; it does not
flow down to subcontractors. Moreover (as the guidance stated), the
limitation is not
a cap on the contractor’s indirect cost rates; instead, “the limitation
restricts the amount of reimbursement for indirect costs … to 35% of
the total cost of the award.” The
“total cost” of a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement is defined
in the applicable cost principles called out for the affected entity
(as noted above). For entities subject to the FAR Part 31 cost
principles, the phrase “total cost” is defined (at 31.201-1) as follows—
(a)
The total cost, including standard costs properly adjusted for
applicable variances, of a contract is the sum of the direct and
indirect costs allocable to the contract, incurred or to be incurred,
plus any allocable cost of money pursuant to 31.205-10,
less any allocable credits. In ascertaining what constitutes a cost,
any generally accepted method of determining or estimating costs that
is equitable and is consistently applied may be used.
(b)
While the total cost of a contract includes all costs properly
allocable to the contract, the allowable costs to the Government are
limited to those allocable costs which are allowable pursuant to Part 31 and applicable agency supplements.
To use the example provided in the audit guidance, the limitation is calculated as follows—
On a $100,000 award, $35,000 in indirect costs is the maximum allowed per the limitation ($100,000 x 35%).
Contract
vehicles that are subject to the limitation will contain a clause or
other language that clearly notify the prime contractors of the
applicable limit. For those wondering, “basic
research” is defined in the FAR (at 2.101) as “research directed toward
increasing knowledge in science. The primary aim of basic research is a
fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under study, rather
than any practical application of that knowledge.”
Importantly, the
limitation will not apply to contractors’ independent research and
development (IR&D) activities, even though FAR 31.205-18 clearly
states that the definition of IR&D includes basic research
efforts. Since IR&D efforts expressly exclude activities that are “sponsored
by a grant or required in the performance of a contract,” activities
covered by the indirect cost limitation can never be IR&D.
Instead—and as the audit guidance clearly states—the limitation on
indirect costs only applies to awards given by the DOD to a prime
contractor. Period.
The DCAA audit guidance tells auditors –
Auditors
should request recipients of “basic research” awards to demonstrate
that award briefs (e.g., contract briefs) identify the subject indirect
cost limitation as applicable. Also, auditors should verify that award
recipients have a system in place that provides procedures to monitor
charges on an award-by-award basis to ensure the 35 percent limitation
is not exceeded.
Field Audit Offices should obtain from recipients … performing research, a listing of awards …
subject to the limitation. During the normal course of audits, such as
forward pricing proposals, annual incurred cost proposals, and interim
and final billings submitted to the Government, auditors should review
award briefings to identify the term or condition containing the
limitation and test for compliance.
Accordingly,
those entities receiving contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements
from the DOD for basic research should be prepared for the audit
procedures discussed above.
See the DCAA audit guidance here.
Boeing Poised to Lose $271 Million in EELV Contract Payments
A December 29, 2009 story by Business Week reported that Boeing was
preparing to be told by DCAA in mid-January that it is going to take a
$271 million hit to its EELV program launch payments. According to the article, DCAA was currently finishing a review that was expected to assert that not only does Boeing owe the Government a refund on $82 million in payments already received by the company, it also owed
interest on that amount. In addition, future payments of $189 million
that the company “claims it is owed” may be forfeit. The article quoted Pentagon spokesman Navy Commander Darryn James as saying via e-mail—
The Defense Contract Audit Agency is reviewing whether Boeing ‘improperly billed’
the Air Force in a 2006-2008 contract for labor, management, quality
control and support costs that were incurred between 1998 and 2006 in
the Delta IV rocket program. Federal accounting standards require the billings take place in the year the costs were incurred. ‘These costing issues encompass very complex and highly technical accounting matters. The agency is aggressively pursuing this issue.’
To
add fuel to the fire, the article also reported that the DOD Inspector
General testified before Congress that the DCAA “regional manager”
“overturned a draft audit conclusion that Boeing shouldn’t be paid
anything because the company was in ‘potential violation of accounting
standards’.” Moreover, the article reported that the DOD IG had begun
a criminal investigation against the regional manager, who has hired a
lawyer.
The article also reported that, for its part, Boeing noted that “neither
the GAO nor the inspector general found that Boeing acted improperly in
its dealing with the government.” Further, Dennis Muilenburg, President of Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems unit, was reported to have said in an interview that the company is entitled to the $271 million. According to Muilenberg, in 2006 the
Air Force agreed to pay the costs associated with the Delta IV booster
rocket launch services, he said. “We have a previous agreement that we
believe is proper and should be honored,” Muilenburg said.
Readers
of this site not only should fail to be surprised by this “news,” they
should also be able to point out several errors in the Business Week
story. We first reported
the DOD IG finding in late September, a full three months before
Business Week got around to it. At that time, we told our readers—
The
DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “Contractor A, Case
2” that the audit findings were impaired because of auditor
independence issues related to the Western Region Audit Manager (RAM),
and that the audit working papers were insufficient to support the
audit opinions. (“Contractor A” is responsible for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle as well as the Delta IV rocket.) Moreover, the DOD IG confirmed that original audit opinion was changed without sufficient documentation.
As a result (according to the DOD IG), the U.S. Air Force may have
agreed to pay up to $271 million in unallowable costs either related to
losses on other contracts or to costs incurred in prior cost accounting
periods. The USAF Space and Missiles Center (SMC) agreed to suspend further payments to “Contractor A” pending resolution of the matter.
In that September article, we provided a link
to the full DOD IG report. Readers who cared to make the effort could
have learned more of the details, which were provided in the report.
The report detailed issues with Boeing’s unabsorbed “Program Management
and Hardware Support” (PM&HS) indirect cost pool
allocated to its Delta IV EELV program, as well as deferred production
costs at the Boeing/Lockheed Martin EELV joint venture known as “United Launch Alliance.”
The IG report noted that DCMA had entered into two Advance Agreements
with the contractor, one of which agreed that the government found
Boeing’s “Lot Accounting
a compliant practice under the CAS.” The second Advance Agreement
provided that “$271,152,672 in unabsorbed PM&HS costs that were
incurred prior to June 1, 2006, but were neither allocable nor payable
under prior [launch] contracts, may be reimbursed by the Air Force
under future contracts as a fixed-price line item.” The second Advance
Agreement called for the Air Force to make eight annual payments to Boeing of $33.9 million each.
Despite the Advance Agreements, DCAA audit reports issued in 2005
and 2006 asserted that the proposed amortization of the unabsorbed
PM&HS costs represented a noncompliance with Cost Accounting
Standard 406, because the costs had been incurred in prior cost
accounting periods. Alternatively, DCAA asserted that the PM&HS
costs represented losses incurred on other contracts, and thus were
unallowable pursuant to the cost principle at FAR 31.205-23. Boeing
refused to negotiate the Delta IV Buy III Launch Capability contract so
long as the Air Force agreed with DCAA. National security was at
stake. Having little choice in the matter, the Air Force considered
giving Boeing a waiver from CAS; instead, they convened a meeting with
DCMA and DCAA to identify “roadblocks” impeding successful negotiation
of the contract. (The Air Force denied that term was used.)
One
of the methods suggested to break the impasse was to “walk-through”
Boeing’s Lot Accounting processes. After that meeting, the DCAA
Regional Audit Manager (RAM) directed the auditor to drop allegations
of noncompliance with CAS 406. As the IG reported—
According
to the supervisor, lead auditor, and FAO manager, the DCAA RAM directed
the auditor to omit CAS 406 compliance testing and discussion of CAS
compliance from the audit of the contractor’s … proposed unabsorbed
PM&HS costs.
… The DCAA RAM reported to her supervisor, the Regional Director for
DCAA’s Western [Region]… that CAS 406 was no longer an issue. However,
she failed to report that this determination was not supported by the
results of audit procedures and that her field audit staff disagreed.
Based
on the foregoing, the DOD IG concluded that the RAM had violated the
independence requirements of (generally accepted) Government Auditing
Standards (GAGAS), and that the DCAA audit reports could not be relied
on by the Air Force for purposes of negotiating contract pricing.
Moreover, because the Air Force had entered into the Advance Agreements
based on the tainted audit reports, they may be invalid.
There were more details, of course. Among other things, there were indications that Boeing extended its definition of one “Lot” from two to 15 years.
(Though we note that the Air Force asserted in its comments that the IG
report was incorrect, and that Boeing had consistently used a Lot
Accounting period of 42 Common Booster Cores “regardless of time and
number of missions.”) The IG report also notes that the ULA JV had
concluded that it would not utilize Boeing’s Lot Accounting practices
because they neither complied with GAAP nor with CAS.
So
as with many government contract cost accounting matters, the truth is
both complex and hard to fathom. Will Boeing have to concede $271
million in payments to which it believes it is contractually entitled?
We’ll look forward to the final DCAA audit report(s), and hope that
they ignore any political pressure and focus solely on the facts, which
(apparently) even the DOD IG seems to have gotten wrong.
This
is a great example of how the facts matter, and how easy it is to
allege a problem, and how hard it is to refute an allegation. Clearly,
Boeing’s entitlement to the $271 million depends on its “Lot
Accounting” practices, why the PM&HS costs were not fully absorbed
by prior launch contracts, and how Boeing intended to amortize its
production costs under future programs (and whether it would be
permitted to do so under FAR and CAS parameters). As DCAA focuses on
generating high-quality audits that DCMA contracting officers and
buying commands can effectively utilize to make business decisions, we
hope they will keep this example in mind.

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