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Apogee Consulting Inc

More Reorgs in Process

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Our goal here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. is to post one article per working day, roughly five a week, of a length between 500 and 1,000 words, discussing one aspect of the Federal contracting business.  Sometimes we get asked where we find the time, other times we get asked where we find the news items.  With so much happening all the time in this crazy business, and so much to keep on top of, it’s not hard to find stuff to write about—trust us on that.  Our news sources are as diverse as the industry itself, and include specialized sites devoted to Government contracting or to general auditing/accounting, as well as “mainstream media” sites.  We are working right now on a “Links” page that will give our readers opportunities to search out updates on their own.

But it’s not all stories lend themselves to one post.  This article catches up on several items we’ve mentioned before.  We’re discussing, once again, the recurring theme of aerospace/defense companies restructuring and reorganizing in response to the current—and near-term—forecast, of flattening defense budgets.

We’re not the only ones looking at all the changes in aerospace/defense company executive ranks and organization structures.  Aviation Week & Space Technology had a piece on it a few weeks ago.  But we’re looking at the changes, and reporting them here and here (for example).  In this article, we asked which companies were pursuing the better strategy, those that thinned executive ranks to cut costs or those that augmented executive ranks to drive quality and customer satisfaction.  More recently, we discussed changes that a number of companies were making.  After we sent that article to the presses, Boeing announced “organization and leadership changes” to its Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) segment.

First, Boeing announced a name change.  Effective immediately, IDS will now be known as “Boeing Defense, Space & Security (DSS).  DSS will also eliminate two operating units.  The new DSS structure will include four units, including:

· Boeing Military Aircraft (BMA)

· Global Services & Support (GSS)

· Network & Space Systems (N&SS)

· Within the N&SS unit, Boeing DSS will create the Network & Tactical Systems (N&TS) division, which will include the former Combat Systems unit and the Command, Control & Communications Networks unit

In addition, the company announced multiple reassignments within its executive ranks. 

Why is Boeing making the organizational changes?  According to the Boeing press release—

In announcing the changes, Boeing Defense, Space & Security President and CEO Dennis Muilenburg said the realignment is part of a continuing effort to successfully compete in a rapidly evolving global defense and security marketplace. Muilenburg said that reshaping the unit positions Boeing for further growth in new and adjacent markets while continuing to serve existing defense and space customers.

‘Boeing anticipated flattening defense budgets and shifting customer priorities for the past few years and has been taking aggressive steps to position the company for profitable growth in a challenging economy,’ Muilenburg said. ‘In the past 18 months alone, we have acquired seven companies to enhance existing capabilities, expanded Boeing's services business, and created new divisions -- like Unmanned Airborne Systems -- to directly and rapidly respond to our customers' emerging priorities.

‘With these latest strategic moves, we can extend our core programs even as we enhance Boeing-wide capabilities designed to capture business in promising markets in the United States and around the world, including cyber-security, energy, intelligence, C4ISR and logistics,’ Muilenburg said.

Almost at the same time, Lockheed Martin issued a press release announcing that it was reorganizing its Electronic Systems business area, by consolidating the Maritime Systems & Sensors and the Systems Integration-Oswego business units into the new Mission Systems & Sensors unit.  According to the press release, “As a result of the anticipated synergies and efficiencies the combination will bring, the company expects to eliminate approximately 1,200 U.S. positions from the MS2 business. Affected employees will be notified by early April.”

The press release continued, “’The new MS2 reflects our goal to drive performance excellence with a keen focus on affordability in everything we do,’ said Orlando P. Carvalho, president of MS2. ‘We recognize the challenges our customers face and are making every effort to improve efficiencies that enable unparalleled service at the right price.’"

More news from other aerospace/defense companies to follow in the near future, we’re sure.



 

Fraud is Everywhere

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We’ve discussed the potentially misplaced emphasis on contractor fraud and corruption before, and asserted that the majority of contractor fraud also involves corruption on the part of Government officials.  On January 7, 2010, the Department of Justice reported that a former Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) official “was sentenced to three years in prison “for his role in a bribery conspiracy involving a multi-million dollar telecommunications contract” and for income tax evasion.  “In addition to the prison term … Henry Lee Holloway [was ordered] to pay a $5,000 fine and to forfeit $70,000 as the proceeds of [his] involvement in the conspiracy.”

The DOJ press release notes that the AAFES provides billions of dollars of goods and services each year to service men and women by operating base and post exchanges.  Holloway was a general store manager at the Central Exchange in the Republic of Korea (RoK) from 2003 through 2007.  During his tenure, he accepted “at least $70,000 worth of stock, entertainment, travel expenses, cash and other things of value” from the CEO of Samsung Rental Company (SSRT) in return for maintaining “SSRT’s $206 million contract with AAFES to provide telecommunications services to U.S. Armed Forces installations” in the RoK, “despite Holloway’s knowledge and belief that SSRT was underperforming and violating the terms of its contract with AAFES.”  (The SSRT CEO was sentenced to five years in prison and a $50,000 fine.)

But fraud and corruption are not confined to the aerospace/defense industry.  On December 24, 2009 reports emerged that Koss Corporation fired its long-time VP of Finance and Corporate Secretary, for allegedly embezzling millions from the company.  The individual in question (Ms. Sujata “Sue” Sachdeva), was “suspended” on December 21st, “for financial improprieties,” and was fired on December 24th for embezzling as much as $31 million over the past 18 years.  Two members of the Koss accounting staff who reported to Ms. Sachdeva were also put on unpaid administrative leave.  According to the Wall Street Journal, “The government alleges she embezzled company funds to pay off her personal American Express credit-card charges for the purchases of furs, jewelry, apparel and home decor.”

Importantly, Ms. Sachdeva, as VP of Finance, was responsible for many “management representations” provided to its external auditors, Grant Thornton.  Because those representations can no longer be relied upon, Koss’ financial statements must be reaudited, and will likely need to be restated.  Koss is a publicly traded company, so the SEC and PCAOB will also be involved in the resolution.  But Grant Thornton won’t be involved in that resolution, because that audit entity was dismissed after the fraud was uncovered.

It’s not clear why Grant Thornton was dismissed (and replaced by a smaller audit firm).  News reports indicate that the dismissal was based on a “recommendation” from Koss’ audit committee.  One might think that Grant Thornton was being blamed for failing to uncover the multi-million dollar embezzlement scheme during its audits.  (One article notes that it was American Express who brought the fraud to the company’s attention--and not the external auditors, nor the internal auditors.)  However, Grant Thornton states that “The fraud was apparently conducted by a longtime, trusted senior financial executive who was hired and supervised by senior management.  The company (Koss) did not engage Grant Thornton LLP to conduct an audit or evaluation of internal controls over financial reporting. Establishing and maintaining effective internal control is management’s and the board’s responsibility.”

Those in Government contracting hear a lot about internal control systems and contractor “business systems”.  As far as we can tell, current DCAA audit guidance tells auditors to expect perfection from DOD contractors, with the slightest mistake potentially imperiling the adequacy determination of an entire internal control system.  Based on DCAA testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, more than two-thirds of the largest contractors have at least one inadequate control system.  But as this story shows, very few systems of internal controls can prevent 100% of fraud and corruption, especially when it is a trusted member of the senior leadership team who is engaging in it.


 

Contractors Jockey for Position in New Budget Environment

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Lots of news to catch up on regarding defense contractors, including organization restructurings, divestitures, and relocation's.

First, let’s look at Northrop Grumman.  On December 15, 2009 NOC completed the sale of its TASC advisory unit to General Atlantic LLC and KKR for $1.65 billion in an all-cash deal.  As we previously noted, tighter organizational conflict of interest (COI) rules make it more difficult for defense contractors to both advise government officials and to sell goods/services to them.  As one story notes, “Since the TASC acquisition announcement in early November, company officials have been working to separate ties to Northrop Grumman and demonstrate it is in full compliance with U.S. government organizational conflict of interest policies.”  Analysts have speculated that other defense contractors may have to divest themselves of similar advisory entities in order to comply with the tighter rules.

Just a couple of weeks later, on January 4, 2010, NOC announced that it was moving its corporate headquarters from Century City (Los Angeles) to “the Washington area” in order to be closer to its government customers.  The Washington Post reported:

“We are a global security company, and all of the federal processes, whether the executive branch or Congress, are in the Washington area," said Wes Bush, Northrop's chief executive and president. "We think we'll be able to do a better job for our customers and our company by having our corporate office there."

The Baltimore Sun reported:

"We're trying to both protect the jobs we have and build more jobs for the company, and we think the best way to do that is be very engaged with our customers," McClain said. "It's something our company leadership has discussed over probably several years, but it's a disruptive thing to do to the people involved. So we thought with the change to the leadership we have had, that this is a good time to bite the bullet and make the move."

The move, involving some 300 corporate leaders and staff, is expected to take place by the end of 2011.  Jack Northrop founding the company in 1939 and it was the last aerospace/defense contractor to remain in Southern California.  Once the national center for aerospace development, Southern California watched as its companies were acquired (e.g., McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell) or left the region (e.g., Lockheed, CSC).  Other large non-defense engineering companies, including Fluor, also have moved out of the area in recent years.

Second, SAIC announced on September 24, 2009 that it had relocated its corporate headquarters from San Diego to MacLean, VA.  The SAIC press release announced:

"This move will formally relocate the corporate executive leadership team closer to our federal government customers enabling us to better respond quickly and efficiently to their critical needs, while maintaining a significant presence in San Diego," said SAIC Chief Executive Officer Walt Havenstein. "Although our headquarters location has changed, our commitment to customer satisfaction and high ethical standards remains constant."

Third, ITT Corp. announced on January 5, 2010 that it was restructuring its defense segment, reducing the number of business units from seven to three, and will be cutting jobs in 2010.  The defense segment is ITT’s largest business, at $6.3 billion in annual sales is represents more than 50 percent of the New York-based conglomerate’s revenue. DefenseSystems.com reported:

The new defense segment will be called ITT Defense and Information Solutions. David Melcher, who joined ITT about 16 months ago, will lead the new division as president. The restructuring was driven in part by shifts in defense priorities and budgets and the customer's demands for more integrated and network-centric solutions, he said.   “We are positioning ITT to be in a better position than ever to support our customers’ emerging technology needs, while also greatly enhancing our ability to stake out new markets,” Steve Loranger, ITT’s chairman, president and chief executive officer, said in a statement. “This move will also allow ITT to achieve greater operating efficiencies and optimize our cost structure, which will help drive successful business strategies for continued top line growth.”  “This reorganization is a strategic action to better address the evolving needs of our customers, the cyclical nature of defense spending and the need to continue to deliver value to our shareholders, while maintaining ITT’s most critical investments and competencies,” Melcher said.  The reorganization marks ITT's recognition that it needs to approach the market less as a product company and more as a systems and solutions provider, he said.

Reports indicate that ITT Defense plans to cut two to three percent of its workforce.

Astute readers may see a common thread in the seemingly disconnected corporate actions.  As this site has reported several times (e.g., here and here) most forecasts indicate a flattening of the defense budget followed by a steady decline, as it enters another of its cyclical downturns.  Accordingly, A&D companies are jockeying for position, trying to maximize their share of the shrinking pie.  We predicted a renewed emphasis on cost cutting, as well on program execution.  We also noted two companies – Lockheed Martin and EADS – who were actually adding to their executive ranks in order to enhance customer relationships and ensure program execution.

What we are seeing looks like more than the routine reshuffling of executives within a corporation.  We seem to be witnessing companies executing strategies designed to position themselves to survive—or even thrive—in the upcoming storm that the budgetary warning clouds portend.  Look for more of the same in the coming months.


 

DCAA Audit Guidance Discusses Limits on Indirect Costs Allocated to Basic Research Contracts

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On December 10, 2009 the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) issued guidance to its auditors, reminding them that Congress had implemented statutory limits on the percentage of indirect costs that could be allowably allocated to DOD-issued contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements for purposes of pursuing “basic research.” 

As the audit guidance stated, the FY2008 and FY 2009 DOD Appropriations Act stated—

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available in this Act may be used to pay negotiated indirect cost rates on a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement (or similar arrangement) entered into by the Department of Defense and an entity in excess of 35 percent of the total cost of the contract, grant, or agreement (or similar arrangement): Provided, That this limitation shall apply only to contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements entered into after the date of the enactment of this Act using funds made available in this Act for basic research.

Existing DOD guidance defines the phrase “indirect costs of a prime awardee” as follows—

· Universities. All Facilities and Administration (F&A) costs as provided in the cost principles for educational institutions (see OMB Circular A-21/2 CFR Part 220).

· Non-profit Organizations. Indirect costs are those as defined in disclosed and/or established accounting practices and as provided in the cost principles for non-profit organizations (see OMB Circular A-122/ 2 CFR Part 230) or FAR Part 31.2 for those Non-profit Organizations not subject to OMB Circular A-122 (see CFR Part 230.2(c)).

· For-profit Organizations. Indirect costs are those as defined in disclosed and/or established accounting practices and as provided in the cost principles at FAR Part 31.2.

The indirect cost limitation applies only to prime contractors; it does not flow down to subcontractors.  Moreover (as the guidance stated), the limitation is not a cap on the contractor’s indirect cost rates; instead, “the limitation restricts the amount of reimbursement for indirect costs … to 35% of the total cost of the award.” The “total cost” of a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement is defined in the applicable cost principles called out for the affected entity (as noted above).  For entities subject to the FAR Part 31 cost principles, the phrase “total cost” is defined (at 31.201-1) as follows—

(a) The total cost, including standard costs properly adjusted for applicable variances, of a contract is the sum of the direct and indirect costs allocable to the contract, incurred or to be incurred, plus any allocable cost of money pursuant to 31.205-10, less any allocable credits. In ascertaining what constitutes a cost, any generally accepted method of determining or estimating costs that is equitable and is consistently applied may be used.

(b) While the total cost of a contract includes all costs properly allocable to the contract, the allowable costs to the Government are limited to those allocable costs which are allowable pursuant to Part 31 and applicable agency supplements.

To use the example provided in the audit guidance, the limitation is calculated as follows—

On a $100,000 award, $35,000 in indirect costs is the maximum allowed per the limitation ($100,000 x 35%).

Contract vehicles that are subject to the limitation will contain a clause or other language that clearly notify the prime contractors of the applicable limit.  For those wondering, “basic research” is defined in the FAR (at 2.101) as “research directed toward increasing knowledge in science. The primary aim of basic research is a fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under study, rather than any practical application of that knowledge.” 

Importantly, the limitation will not apply to contractors’ independent research and development (IR&D) activities, even though FAR 31.205-18 clearly states that the definition of IR&D includes basic research efforts.  Since IR&D efforts expressly exclude activities that are “sponsored by a grant or required in the performance of a contract,” activities covered by the indirect cost limitation can never be IR&D.  Instead—and as the audit guidance clearly states—the limitation on indirect costs only applies to awards given by the DOD to a prime contractor.  Period.

The DCAA audit guidance tells auditors –

Auditors should request recipients of “basic research” awards to demonstrate that award briefs (e.g., contract briefs) identify the subject indirect cost limitation as applicable. Also, auditors should verify that award recipients have a system in place that provides procedures to monitor charges on an award-by-award basis to ensure the 35 percent limitation is not exceeded.

Field Audit Offices should obtain from recipients … performing research, a listing of awards … subject to the limitation. During the normal course of audits, such as forward pricing proposals, annual incurred cost proposals, and interim and final billings submitted to the Government, auditors should review award briefings to identify the term or condition containing the limitation and test for compliance.

Accordingly, those entities receiving contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements from the DOD for basic research should be prepared for the audit procedures discussed above.

See the DCAA audit guidance here.


 

Boeing Poised to Lose $271 Million in EELV Contract Payments

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A December 29, 2009 story by Business Week reported that Boeing was preparing to be told by DCAA in mid-January that it is going to take a $271 million hit to its EELV program launch payments.  According to the article, DCAA was currently finishing a review that was expected to assert that not only does Boeing owe the Government a refund on $82 million in payments already received by the company, it also owed interest on that amount.  In addition, future payments of $189 million that the company “claims it is owed” may be forfeit.  The article quoted Pentagon spokesman Navy Commander Darryn James as saying via e-mail—

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is reviewing whether Boeing ‘improperly billed’ the Air Force in a 2006-2008 contract for labor, management, quality control and support costs that were incurred between 1998 and 2006 in the Delta IV rocket program. Federal accounting standards require the billings take place in the year the costs were incurred. ‘These costing issues encompass very complex and highly technical accounting matters. The agency is aggressively pursuing this issue.’

To add fuel to the fire, the article also reported that the DOD Inspector General testified before Congress that the DCAA “regional manager” “overturned a draft audit conclusion that Boeing shouldn’t be paid anything because the company was in ‘potential violation of accounting standards’.”  Moreover, the article reported that the DOD IG had begun a criminal investigation against the regional manager, who has hired a lawyer.

The article also reported that, for its part, Boeing noted that “neither the GAO nor the inspector general found that Boeing acted improperly in its dealing with the government.”  Further, Dennis Muilenburg, President of Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems unit, was reported to have said in an interview that the company is entitled to the $271 million.  According to Muilenberg, in 2006 the Air Force agreed to pay the costs associated with the Delta IV booster rocket launch services, he said. “We have a previous agreement that we believe is proper and should be honored,” Muilenburg said.

Readers of this site not only should fail to be surprised by this “news,” they should also be able to point out several errors in the Business Week story.  We first reported the DOD IG finding in late September, a full three months before Business Week got around to it.  At that time, we told our readers—

The DOD IG confirmed prior GAO findings with respect to “Contractor A, Case 2” that the audit findings were impaired because of auditor independence issues related to the Western Region Audit Manager (RAM), and that the audit working papers were insufficient to support the audit opinions. (“Contractor A” is responsible for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle as well as the Delta IV rocket.) Moreover, the DOD IG confirmed that original audit opinion was changed without sufficient documentation. As a result (according to the DOD IG), the U.S. Air Force may have agreed to pay up to $271 million in unallowable costs either related to losses on other contracts or to costs incurred in prior cost accounting periods. The USAF Space and Missiles Center (SMC) agreed to suspend further payments to “Contractor A” pending resolution of the matter.

In that September article, we provided a link to the full DOD IG report.  Readers who cared to make the effort could have learned more of the details, which were provided in the report.  The report detailed issues with Boeing’s unabsorbed “Program Management and Hardware Support” (PM&HS) indirect cost pool allocated to its Delta IV EELV program, as well as deferred production costs at the Boeing/Lockheed Martin EELV joint venture known as “United Launch Alliance.”  The IG report noted that DCMA had entered into two Advance Agreements with the contractor, one of which agreed that the government found Boeing’s “Lot Accounting a compliant practice under the CAS.”  The second Advance Agreement provided that “$271,152,672 in unabsorbed PM&HS costs that were incurred prior to June 1, 2006, but were neither allocable nor payable under prior [launch] contracts, may be reimbursed by the Air Force under future contracts as a fixed-price line item.”  The second Advance Agreement called for the Air Force to make eight annual payments to Boeing of $33.9 million each.

Despite the Advance Agreements, DCAA audit reports issued in 2005 and 2006 asserted that the proposed amortization of the unabsorbed PM&HS costs represented a noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standard 406, because the costs had been incurred in prior cost accounting periods.  Alternatively, DCAA asserted that the PM&HS costs represented losses incurred on other contracts, and thus were unallowable pursuant to the cost principle at FAR 31.205-23.  Boeing refused to negotiate the Delta IV Buy III Launch Capability contract so long as the Air Force agreed with DCAA.  National security was at stake.  Having little choice in the matter, the Air Force considered giving Boeing a waiver from CAS; instead, they convened a meeting with DCMA and DCAA to identify “roadblocks” impeding successful negotiation of the contract.  (The Air Force denied that term was used.)

One of the methods suggested to break the impasse was to “walk-through” Boeing’s Lot Accounting processes.  After that meeting, the DCAA Regional Audit Manager (RAM) directed the auditor to drop allegations of noncompliance with CAS 406.  As the IG reported—

According to the supervisor, lead auditor, and FAO manager, the DCAA RAM directed the auditor to omit CAS 406 compliance testing and discussion of CAS compliance from the audit of the contractor’s … proposed unabsorbed PM&HS costs. … The DCAA RAM reported to her supervisor, the Regional Director for DCAA’s Western [Region]… that CAS 406 was no longer an issue.  However, she failed to report that this determination was not supported by the results of audit procedures and that her field audit staff disagreed.

Based on the foregoing, the DOD IG concluded that the RAM had violated the independence requirements of (generally accepted) Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), and that the DCAA audit reports could not be relied on by the Air Force for purposes of negotiating contract pricing.  Moreover, because the Air Force had entered into the Advance Agreements based on the tainted audit reports, they may be invalid.

There were more details, of course.  Among other things, there were indications that Boeing extended its definition of one “Lot” from two to 15 years.  (Though we note that the Air Force asserted in its comments that the IG report was incorrect, and that Boeing had consistently used a Lot Accounting period of 42 Common Booster Cores “regardless of time and number of missions.”)  The IG report also notes that the ULA JV had concluded that it would not utilize Boeing’s Lot Accounting practices because they neither complied with GAAP nor with CAS.

So as with many government contract cost accounting matters, the truth is both complex and hard to fathom.  Will Boeing have to concede $271 million in payments to which it believes it is contractually entitled?  We’ll look forward to the final DCAA audit report(s), and hope that they ignore any political pressure and focus solely on the facts, which (apparently) even the DOD IG seems to have gotten wrong.

This is a great example of how the facts matter, and how easy it is to allege a problem, and how hard it is to refute an allegation.  Clearly, Boeing’s entitlement to the $271 million depends on its “Lot Accounting” practices, why the PM&HS costs were not fully absorbed by prior launch contracts, and how Boeing intended to amortize its production costs under future programs (and whether it would be permitted to do so under FAR and CAS parameters).  As DCAA focuses on generating high-quality audits that DCMA contracting officers and buying commands can effectively utilize to make business decisions, we hope they will keep this example in mind.

Delta IV Launch
 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.