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Apogee Consulting Inc

Pentagon Examines “Points of Failure” in Defense Industrial Base

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The January 2010 edition of National Defense magazine carried an interesting article discussing the Pentagon’s Industrial Policy Directorate, and its new emphasis on anticipating financial failures by critical suppliers in its supply base.  According to the article, which related an interview with Director of Industrial Policy (IP) Brett Lambert, the IP team “does not plan to be an advocate for industry but rather to engage in a closer dialogue with the private sector so the Pentagon is better informed about the financial health of critical suppliers.”  The article reported that Lambert said the new emphasis “will help the Defense Department anticipate ‘points of failure’ in the supplier base and save taxpayer dollars by avoiding costly rescues of failing companies.”

The article reports that, unlike the prior focus on the health of the largest prime contractors, today the Pentagon is concerned about the financial standing of “smaller companies in the lower echelon of the supply chain.”  According to Lambert, “What we are seeing increasingly is that all primes rely on a single source, or point of failure, that is down in the second, third or fourth tier … I believe we don’t have adequate insight into those critical subcomponents.”  The article notes that “The Pentagon’s own contracting databases only capture information about the top-tier industrial base….”

Welcome to the club Mr. Lambert.  At Apogee Consulting, Inc., we have been preaching this philosophy for quite some time.  Let’s restate the issue and our point of view for clarity:

1. In today’s aerospace/defense environment, where up to 80 or 90 percent of program execution has been outsourced to external suppliers, program execution risk is found in the supply chain and managing that risk is inextricably tied to managing supplier performance.  In other words, 21st century program management is not significantly different from supply chain management.

2. Most primes delegate supply chain management, and supply chain risk management, to a separate silo—the same silo that sources, evaluates, and awards subcontracts.  That’s a recipe for failure.  The skill set in acquisition management is not the same as that necessary for program management.  At a minimum, the priorities are different and the technical emphasis is different.

3. Most primes hold their 1st tier subcontractors responsible for lower tier supplier execution.  Most 1st tier contractors hold their 2nd tier suppliers responsible for lower tier supplier execution.  And so on ad infinitum.  This is again a recipe for failure, because execution risk cannot be transferred and always resides, ultimately, with the prime contractor—who is responsible for program execution regardless of what some lawyer thinks.

4. Despite the foregoing, most companies engaged in program management fail to devote sufficient resources and budgets and management attention towards supply chain management.  Most companies don’t know their program supply chain and, if challenged, cannot produce any written or graphic description of a single program supply chain—let alone map multiple program supply chains to identify where a common supplier exists between programs.  Those common suppliers are both opportunities (in terms of establishing long-term alliances) and risks (in terms of single points of failure for multiple programs), yet companies almost invariably have made no effort to identify them.

5. Those critical few suppliers that support multiple programs must be identified, because they represent risk to multiple (and now interdependent) programs.  Once identified, they must be evaluated for financial health, and contingency plans must be created so that, if one of those suppliers ends defense production or enters bankruptcy, impacts on the multiple programs will be minimized or mitigated completely.  We know of no single company that is making this effort in a rigorous manner that befits the true risk to program execution.

The National Defense article also notes that the Defense IP Directorate is concerned about loss of critical skills during the upcoming defense spending downturn.  (About which we’ve also written about many times.)  Lambert is quoted as saying, “we are focused on preserving skills necessary to support our war fighters in the near term and long term.”  However, he cautions that skills are not jobs, and (according to the article) suggests that “debates about critical skills are biased toward white-collar positions.” 

As if in evidence of the Defense Department’s awareness of the need to preserve critical skills, we noted that on January 15, 2010 a $93.4 million contract was awarded by the Defense Logistics Agency to AM General LLC.  The contract was a fixed-price, sole-source award made without competition, and it was awarded to AM General “in support of HMMWV industrial base requirements.”  In other words, the award was made so that AM General’s suppliers would be able to keep their Humvee production lines open and to delay layoffs associated with the declining need for new vehicles. 

As the National Defense article reports, “When military orders go down and it becomes unprofitable to make defense-unique components … firms may decide to end production of those items.  Other subcontractors may go out of business altogether because of declining orders.”  Lambert is quoted as saying, “When we terminate programs, the cascading effects on the lower tiers can be catastrophic.”  And, we would add, because certain lower-tier suppliers supply multiple programs, ending one program may create unintended consequences for many others. 

The DOD finally appears to be recognizing some of the risks embedded in its industrial base, and the article reports that “Lambert’s office will be reaching out to CFOs of prime contractors to gain access to their subcontractor data.”  Little does he know that the primes will have little, if any, data to provide his office.

And that fact should frighten many people in the Defense Industrial Policy Directorate.



 

DOD Proposes Changes to Contractor “Business Systems” Administration and Oversight

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On January 15, 2010 the DOD published a proposed rule in the Federal Register that announced several significant changes to the way it intends to exercise oversight over contractor “business systems.”  Readers of this site will likely experience some feelings of déjà vu as they scan the proposed DFARS rule changes.

The linkage of the proposed rule to the activities of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan is obvious.  We’ve posted several articles on the CWC, notably here and here.  It was the CWC that used the phrase “contractor business system” instead of the term of art “contractor internal control system.”  Apparently, the DAR Council has decided to adopt that phrase.

Moreover, the first sentences of the background of the proposed rule come directly, word for word, from the CWC’s first Special Report, which can be found here.  (“Contractor business systems and internal controls are the first line of defense against waste, fraud, and abuse.  Weak control systems increase the risk of unallowable and unreasonable costs on Government contracts.”)  Obviously, the proposed rule needs to be understood in the context of the past months’ drama that has played out in that forum.

There are some positive aspects of the proposed rule.

· Reduces the number of “business systems” subject to oversight by the DOD, from ten to six.  The six business systems are: (1) Accounting, (2) Earned Value Management, (3) Estimating, (4) Material Management and Accounting (MMAS), (5) Property Control, and (6) Purchasing.

· Establishes in the regulatory framework system adequacy standards, thus moving control of system adequacy determinations from DCAA to DCMA contracting officers.

· Requires DCAA to issue audit reports to the DCMA contracting officers “in sufficient detail to allow the contracting officer to understand what the contractor would need to correct to comply with the applicable standard or system requirement, and the potential magnitude of the risk to the Government posed by the deficiency.”

There are some less-than-positive aspects of the proposed rule.

· The rule notes the cooperation necessary between DCAA auditor and DCMA contracting officer, yet it provides essentially no details regarding how that cooperation is to work.  For example, the proposed rule says “The ACO, in consultation with the auditor, shall (1) approve the [estimating] system …” but does not describe how that consultation is to work in actual practice.

· The rule provides for payment withholds for system deficiencies, up to 50 percent of the contract value—which we would consider to be punitive in nature.  Moreover, if the ACO determines “that there are one or more system deficiencies that are highly likely to lead to improper contract payments being made,” then “the ACO will withhold up to one-hundred percent of payments….”

· Payment withholds can be made against performance-based payments.  PBPs are, by Congressional intent and DOD implementation, not supposed to be tied to business system adequacy.

The proposed rule affects numerous parts of the DFARS and implements several new contract clauses.  Readers are encouraged to review the proposed rule in detail.  It can be found here.

DOD is seeking comments on this proposed rule.  In addition, DOD is seeking comments on the information collection requirements associated with it.  The promulgating comments state—

DoD invites comments on the following aspects of the proposed rule: (a) Whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of DoD, including whether the information will have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the estimate of the burden of the information collection; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Comments must be submitted before March 16, 2010.  Comments may be submitted via email or USPS; details are found in the proposed rule.

This rule, if implemented as written, will likely have a significant impact on how contractors approach compliance and how they implement governance and control systems.  Because of this potential impact, we encourage all Federal contractors to submit comments to the DAR Council.



 

DOD Issues New Guidance on Government Property

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On January 11, 2010 the Defense Department issued two pieces of internal guidance focused on enhancing practices used to account for property in the possession of the DOD and its contractors.  This issue is important to the DOD because the Pentagon has, historically, been unable to fully account for its property—which has led to a continuing inability to obtain “clean” audit opinions on its financial statements.  Thus, anything the DOD can do to enhance controls and accountability for property is a significant step forward for the Department.

The first guidance document, simply entitled “Government Furnished Property (GFP),” discussed the management of DOD property used on in contract performance—i.e., furnished to contractors.  The guidance document opines that “Although contract property policy and oversight has been the target of significant reform over the past ten years, there is still room for improvement.”  The document reminds DOD personnel that the primary means for identification and tracking of GFP is the Unique Item Identifiers (UII) “in transaction-derived data from electronic business transactions.”  To execute the policy, “electronic transactions” will be used to transfer GFP, both in the transfer of property to contractors and in the return of that property back to the DOD.  All transactions will “cite a contract number under which the property is or was accountable for stewardship.”  For non-UII’d property, the Pentagon will be establishing a “GFP Hub” that will be used to better track the items, until guidance is finalized in the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS).

The document notified DOD recipients that an overall CONOPS (CONcept of OPerationS) is being developed for “a DoD GFP Business Environment.”  The document stated that “In the target environment – 2011 and beyond – the DoD GFP Business Environment must have strong internal controls and oversight practices, which are governed by an interoperable, open architecture that enables a single-face to industry, and with the DoD IUID Registry  and GFP Hub forming the cornerstone of GFP reporting.

The second guidance document discussed Contractor Acquired Property (CAP), which was defined as “property acquired, fabricated, or otherwise provided by the contractor for performing a contract and to which the Government has title.”  The document reiterated a 2007 business rule that stated “that although title passes to DoD when the property is obtained by the contractor, the property will not be recorded on DoD financial statements (as other than construction in process) or in accountability systems until the property is delivered to DoD.”  The guidance discourages the establishment of separate accountability records by DoD, stating that doing so is “an inefficient practice” that results in duplicate property records.  Problems can be avoided if the contractor property records are used until the CAP is delivered to the DOD, at which time the appropriate accounting entries will be made on DOD’s general ledger.

As we’ve noted before, “Some people lead happy, productive lives, have successful careers, and never have to deal with Government property issues.”  It’s not a fun topic.  But in the world of Defense contracting, compliance with Government Property rules is mandatory.  As the two guidance document show, it’s also an important compliance area for the Department of Defense.



 

Nick Sanders, Principal Consultant, to Speak at NCMA Orange County Chapter Meeting

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Apogee Consulting, Inc. announces that its Principal Consultant, Nick Sanders, will speak at an upcoming meeting of NCMA’s Orange County, CA chapter.

 Mr. Sanders will speak on“DOD Oversight Wars” at the meeting to be held in the evening of January 20th at the Orange County Offices of Crowell & Moring.  Details can be found at the Chapter website


 

Supply Chain Risk Management – What Not to Do

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crashing plane

The January 4, 2010 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology carried an interesting story called “Tactical Retreat,” that discussed the Boeing 787 supply chain.  We’ve discussed this issue before—notably here—and linked to an article that described Boeing’s supply chain as a “nightmare” in which “individual suppliers [ ] maximize their own self interest at the expense of the program’s objectives. In the 787 supply chain, ‘a complicated array of companies share the risk and the profits of the new airliner. That means financial burdens will inevitably shift up and down the line as each company protects its own interest.’”  In other words, rather than forge true partnerships with its suppliers, Boeing created an environment where risks were pushed downwards in the supply chain, and each supplier was on its own with respect to performance. 

It was a Darwinian environment.  Instead of reinforcing its supply chain to ensure performance, Boeing created a situation where each individual link in the chain was stressed.  Inevitably, some of the links were bound to fail.  We noted in this article that companies connected to Boeing supply chains underperformed their peers.  Finally, the 787 supply chain snapped.  Vought was the first to go—as we reported here—but perhaps not the last.  Boeing reportedly paid out somewhere between $400 million and $1 billion in order to buy out Vought’s South Carolina manufacturing plant, and then paid an undisclosed sum for the Alenia North America portion of Global Aeronautica’s subassembly facility at the same plant.  (In 2008 Boeing bought out Vought’s share of Global Aeronautica in a separate transaction.) 

Although there is likely strategic value in the purchase, the bottom line is that Boeing has paid out hundreds of millions of dollars in order to internalize its external supply chain.  As the AW&ST article states, “Boeing’s [South Carolina] acquisition … gives the company control of a crucial link in the troubled 787 supply chain as it moves to ramp up production….”  The article recounts that Global Aeronautica was “a cornerstone in Boeing’s strategy to outsource major pieces of the 787,” but was “ultimately an example of how that strategy was too far of a reach.”

If there is one axiom of modern aerospace & defense supply chain management, it is this:  execution risk cannot be transferred from one part of the supply chain to another.  Regardless of which entity performed the work, Boeing ultimately was responsible for its aircraft.

The AW&ST article quotes one union member as saying that Boeing’s “attempt to spread the 787’s development risks and costs across the supply chain actually made the company more vulnerable” to performance problems.  We agree with that assessment.  By treating each supplier as an individual entity without properly acknowledging the interdependence of the supply chain—and its ultimate dependence on each supplier at whatever tier—Boeing put its program at risk.  In the final accounting, the 27-month delay in the 787’s first flight is not the fault of any individual supplier; instead, it is the result of Boeing’s mismanagement of its program and its program supply chain.

As the article notes, Boeing paid the price for its mismanagement.  The union member is quoted as saying, “Rather than saving money, Boeing has become the reinsurer of its supply chain and has in fact had to buy outright or loan money to different suppliers to keep its outsourcing model from failing.”  The article reports that part of the Alenia deal “addresses Alenia’s demand to be compensated for costs related to the 787’s schedule slips,” among other things.  Alenia is not alone.  The article states (without providing specifics) that other 787 suppliers have submitted financial claims for the repeated program delays.  An industry analyst is quoted as describing the situation as a “logjam” of supplier claims.

Such claims take time away from program execution, of course, exacerbating an already delicate balance of cost, schedule, and execution.  Time spent reviewing and negotiating claims is time that is not being spent managing program performance.

We’ve heard time and again that implementing long-term fixed-price supplier agreements, even before design finalization, reduces the risk of cost overruns.  This is a nonsensical statement that ignores the fact that supplier change orders and claims are the inevitable result of design changes, schedule slips, and other normal changes to the pricing assumptions initially used.  The Boeing 787 program is evidence that fixed-price supplier agreements mean nothing, if program performance is imperiled.

Although things have reportedly improved—and, really, how could they not?—Boeing’s initial approach to program supply chain management should stand as the poster child of how not to do it.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.