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GAO Points Out Potpourri of Problems with Pentagon Procurement Process

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On January 20, 2010, GAO offered testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense (John Murtha, D-PA, Chair).  The testimony, which can be found here, had the rather misleading title of “Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes.”   The testimony was not really about risk management; instead, it was more of a recap of various DOD acquisition issues that the GAO has been criticizing for years—most of which are rather obvious.

Highlights of the GAO testimony—

  • The first opportunity to reduce acquisition risk is in the early planning phases.
  • Risk can be reduced through selecting the appropriate contract type.
  • Risks that are not effectively managed in the pre-execution phase of a contract may become costly problems during execution.
  • Acquisition risk management is dependent on a “capable” acquisition workforce; yet “DOD lacks key information about the current number and skill sets of its acquisition workforce and what it needs.”
  • Because DOD relies so heavily on contractors to support its acquisition process, and lacks insight into the roles its contractors are fulfilling, the Department cannot make effective decisions regarding its acquisition workforce staffing—thus “increasing the risk of transferring government responsibilities to contractors.”

The testimony reiterated familiar themes, such as—

Risk is inherent in any major acquisition, whether a weapon system or complex service acquisition. But it is only through the thoughtful management of risks throughout all phases of the acquisition process that successful outcomes can be achieved. Clearly, however, DOD has not adequately managed such risks. For example, its major weapon systems continue to take longer to develop, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned. … Despite decades of reform efforts, these outcomes and their underlying causes have proven resistant to change and, in fact, both DOD weapon system acquisition and DOD contract management have been on our high-risk list for nearly 20 years.

Much more interesting than the reiteration of simplistic observations is the summary of GAO bid protest statistics.  Although released separately, the testimony included an overview of the recent history of GAO’s “quasi-judicial” function as arbiter of bid protests.  (Readers will note that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims also performs in a similar capacity.)  We previously have wondered out loud whether the Department of Defense has “lost its ability to evaluate proposals fairly and in accordance with the written evaluation criteria.”  The GAO testified that—

There has been a substantial increase in spending on acquisition programs and services, while the number of civilian and military personnel in DOD’s acquisition workforce has remained relatively constant. Program offices have reported that workforce shortfalls have resulted in degradation in oversight, delays in certain management and contracting activities, and increased workloads for existing staff. To supplement its in-house acquisition workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel. For example, we have found that in some program offices contractor personnel outnumber DOD personnel.

Have DOD’s acquisition workforce problems contributed to degradation in the ability to conduct fair and equitable evaluations of bidders for major defense acquisition programs?  One way to assess the situation would be to look at GAO’s bid protest decisions, to see whether the sustention rate is elevated when compared to historical norms.

According to the GAO 2009 bid protests are up 20% over the prior year—1,764 vs. 1,458.  Comparing 2009 to 2005, bid protests are up nearly 40%--1,764 vs. 1,262.  (Readers should take GAO’s numbers with a grain of salt, however.  GAO counts every “docket number” as an individual protest; a single protest can have multiple docket numbers.  Moreover, the quantity of protests filed really tells us nothing.  Government spending also increased during that period, so one might logically expect an increase in bid protest activity.  In addition, GAO recently received expanded bid protest jurisdiction over task orders, which accounting for 49 of its 2009 bid protests) 

Sustention of bid protests is measured against “merit decision” (not the number of cases filed) and the numbers show that the sustention rate actually dropped during that period—from 71/306 (23%) to 57/315 (18%).  So rather than a degradation, the evidence points to an improvement in the Government’s ability to carry out its acquisition function!

Looking just at the Defense Department, the number of protests filed was up nearly 50 percent—from 706 to 1,050.  But as before, the percentage of sustained protests actually decreased from 18% to 12%.

GAO also reports an “effectiveness rate”—which is defined as a situation when a protester receives some form of relief from the Government agency conducting the procurement, even if it did not have its protest sustained.  Looking at the reported effectiveness rates, there has actually been some increase, from 27 percent (2005) to 45 percent (2009).  It’s difficult to determine what this means without further details.

So the statistics may be meaningful, or not.  We’ll leave any conclusion(s) to our readers’ judgment.  But we maintain that anecdotal evidence is mounting that DOD is having trouble evaluating bidders for major defense acquisition programs without opening the door to a successful bid protest.  As GAO notes in its report, such recent programs as CSAR/X, Aerial Refueling Tanker, FMTV, and TRICARE were interrupted by successful protests by the losing bidders.  And as we have noted with respect to two of those programs listed by GAO, the errors cited by GAO were of the “blocking and tackling” variety, and not of the “difficult and complex” variety.  We hope DOD gets its act together, soon.



 

Claiming the Government Acted in “Bad Faith”

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Recently somebody posted this cry for help on the LinkedIn Question & Answer Board—

We have a COTR that is causing problems with our contract and need a recommendation for an attorney … Can anyone help us? We have a service contract … and the COTR has lied, is now causing our Supervisor to quit because he feels he is being harassed by him… and more. Does this constitute a delay and/or Government Interference? Any help is appreciated.

Let’s look at this from two perspectives.  First, let’s talk about delay and disruption.  This is really two issues.  In a delay claim, the contractor is claiming compensation for not being able to work.  In some situations, that claim can include the costs of “unabsorbed overhead”—i.e., indirect costs that would have been absorbed on the instant contract, had the labor hours or dollars been incurred as scheduled, but which now will be absorbed by other contracts, causing them to incur more costs than they had planned.  In a disruption claim, the contractor is asking for additional compensation because the work is more complex, and more expensive, than the parties originally agreed. 

As this article makes clear—

The contractor must prove for either claim the elements of liability, causation, and resultant injury. When the contractor is asserting a delay claim, the contractor has the burden of showing the extent of the delay, that the delay was proximately caused by government action, and that the delay caused damage to the contractor. While the law requires ‘reasonable certainty’ to support a damages award, damages do not need to proven with mathematical exactness. Rather, ‘[i]t is sufficient if a claimant furnishes the court with a reasonable basis for computation, even though the result is only approximate.’ The preferred method for proving costs is through the submission of actual cost data. However, where actual cost data is not available, estimates of the costs may be used. Estimates of costs ‘should be prepared by competent individuals with adequate knowledge of the facts and circumstances,’ and should be “supported with detailed substantiating data.”  [All legal citations omitted.]

What the LinkedIn interlocutor is also hinting about is whether, by engaging in lying and harassment and unreasonable delays, the Government has breached its implied duty of “good faith and fair dealing”. As an aspect of these duties, “[e]very contract . . . imposes an implied obligation ‘that neither party will do anything that will hinder or delay the other party in performance of the contract.’” Such covenants require each party “not to interfere with the other party's performance and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the fruits of the contract.” This “duty not to hinder is breached when the Government commits ‘actions that unreasonably cause delay or hindrance to contract performance.’” [Legal citations omitted.]

The case law is well-settled that the Government enjoys a presumption that it acts in good faith.  To overcome that presumption, “the proof must be almost irrefragable” – which has also been described as “clear and convincing evidence” of “some specific intent to injure” the contractor. “Courts have found bad faith when confronted by a course of government conduct that was ‘designedly oppressive,’ or that ‘initiated a conspiracy’ to ‘get rid’ of a contractor. As these cases illustrate, the ‘irrefragable proof’ standard, though daunting, is not intended to be impenetrable, that is, it does not ‘insulate government action from any review by courts.’”  [Emphasis in original; legal citations omitted.]

Recently the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, affirmed a decision by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in which the contractor successfully proved bad faith on the part of its Government customer, the U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers.  The tale is a sad one, where certain government individuals exercised their authority (and more!) to the detriment of the contractor, North Star Housing.  As the Court found, “the record provides a virtual rancid cornucopia of electronic messages and other communications evidencing a specific intent by key government officials to injure North Star.”  See the entire CoFC decision here.

As the Court observed, “Among the most troubling aspects of the case … is clear proof that Mr. Peterson, Ms. Kiser and others eventually co-opted the contracting officer who was responsible for ruling on North Star’s claims.”  Although the FAR requires the contracting officers to ensure that contractors “receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment,” the Court found the contracting officer did not do so in this case. The Court declared—

Abdication of those responsibilities in the face of pressure from government officials who plainly are driven by animus against a given contractor constitutes perhaps the most pernicious form of bad faith on the part of the government, as it threatens the integrity of a dispute resolution process that is central to the government contracting system itself.

Despite the Court being “thoroughly convinced” of the Government’s breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff (North Star) was not awarded as much money as it had hoped for.  First, some of its claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because they had not been first presented to the contracting officer with a “sum certain” as the FAR and Contract Disputes Act (CDA) require.  Second, North Star’s analysis of its damages was found to be lacking by the Court.  As the Court stated, “such [Government] liability, no matter how egregious, does not obviate the necessity for plaintiff to prove its damages.”

To wrap up, many contractors are afraid to submit claims because they are worried about angering their customer(s) and losing future work.  (We note that contractor evaluations and past performance ratings cannot be affected by assertion of contractual rights.)  Contractors seeking to assert claims against their Government customers need to understand what their cause of action is.  Are they asserting Government-caused delay or disruption?  And are the Government’s actions tied to any provable breaches of its duty to act in good faith?  Finally, what damages can be proven, and have all the steps of the FAR and CDA strictly been followed when asserting the claim?



 

DOD Responds to Commission on Wartime Contracting’s Concerns

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Readers of this site are likely familiar with the issues raised by the independent Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC).  Over and over, CWC has expressed its concerns with how DOD exercises oversight on the contractors supporting the warfighters in Southwest Asia.  For example, in this article, we told you that the CWC had issued its interim report, entitled, “"At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan."  In this article, we told you about testimony before the Commission, in which then-DCAA Director April Stephenson blamed "faulty accounting, cost-estimating, purchasing and other business systems" for "millions of dollars" of contractor overbillings to the Department of Defense (DOD).  We told you about a Federal Times article that quoted Director Stephenon's testimony:  "When a contractor’s business system and related internal controls are inadequate, the data generated by the contractor’s system is unreliable, which in turn, results in the risk of noncompliances with government laws and regulations, mischarging, fraudulent acts and contract overpayments." 

Later on, we reported the fascinating war between bureaucracies that was playing out before us all.  While the attacks took place in many forums, some of the nastiest took place at the CWC.  For instance, based on some of the CWC testimony and comments, we asked if DCAA and DCMA would be merging in order to end their “dysfunctional” contractor oversight.

Nearly four months after the CWC told DOD to go back and rethink its approach to contractor oversight, the Pentagon submitted its official response to the CWC’s “eight issues of immediate concern.”  The report, issued to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) by the “Task Force on Wartime Contracting” (TFWC) on December 17, 2009, was made public on January 26, 2010.  As we mentioned, the TFWC report, which can be found here, addressed eight issues –

1. Risk associated with drawdown of troops in Iraq

2. Shortage of contract management personnel in theater and training

3. Acceleration of transition to the new LOGCAP IV contract

4. Adequacy of contractor business systems

5. Greater accountability in the use of subcontractors

6. Proper transition of lessons learned from Iraq to Afghanistan

7. Establishment of a contracting command in Afghanistan

8. Proper training and equipping of security contractors.

The TFWC was chaired by Mr. Shay Assad, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), and had the following objectives:  mapping CWC observations to the eight issues of immediate concern, identifying current DOD initiatives, and tracking whether DOD’s initiatives would address the CWC areas of concern. 

The report, which can be found here, concluded that every CWC concern was being addressed by a current DOD initiative.  Almost all of DOD’s initiatives had been started prior to CWC expressing its concerns.  The report’s conclusions were summarized as follows—

The Task Force [TFWC] reported that it believes the DoD initiatives are the right solution set and therefore does not recommend pursuing alternatives. The progress on these initiatives is largely moving forward as planned, but some key initiatives, primarily in the area of resourcing contingency contracting officer’s representatives and subject matter experts, are experiencing major challenges. The Task Force is focusing on improving progress in these areas and will continue to work with senior leaders to remove the barriers.

Savvy readers will recognize the diplomatic tone of the summary, which might also be translated (by a less bureaucratic translator) as telling the CWC that the DOD recognized the issues before they were brought to its attention, has initiated effective counter-measures, and has things well in hand.  So thank you very much, CWC, but no thanks.

We want to examine, in some detail, how the report addresses two CWC concerns:  (1) adequacy of contractor business systems, and (2) greater accountability in the use of subcontractors.  Our examination will focus on whether the details in the report support the conclusions as summarized by DPAP.

Adequacy of Contractor Business Systems

The report maps five CWC observations to this issue.  Two observations relate to DCMA and three to DCAA.  The report notes that subcommittee 11 of the Department’s Panel on Contracting Integrity “will focus on establishing consistent processes and procedures to address contractor business system deficiencies.”  However, the subcommittee’s “comprehensive review and analysis of the Department’s audits and evaluations of contractor business systems will take time.”  Moreover, both DCMA and DCAA have inadequate resources to address oversight requirements.

The “good news” is that DCAA has already issued “more than 100 cost suspensions totaling more than $500 million” in its testing of contingency operations support contractors in Southwest Asia.  In addition, DCAA has issued audit guidance that has “clarified what constitutes a significant deficiency and eliminated the ‘inadequate in part’ opinion in an attempt to reduce the apparent confusion regarding the expectation of the contractor and CO regarding the reported deficiencies.” 

Of the five observations, two are rated as Yellow (experiencing challenges) and two are rated Green (on track).  The fifth observation (lack of resources within DCAA is a significant factor contributing to ineffective audit coverage) does not seem to have been addressed in any detail within this section of the report, even though it is one of the CWC observations that is mapped to this issue.

Our assessment:  This area was evaluated with some measure of optimism.  Lack of DCAA resources was not addressed (though it was noted that DCAA has given in-theater audits its highest priority).  Importantly, the report was misleading because the DCAA audit guidance it asserts “clarified” and “attempt[ed] to reduce … confusion” did nothing of the sort—and was actually criticized by nearly all stakeholders for increasing confusion and reducing the value of DCAA’s audit reports in this area.  We do not believe the details support the overall conclusion(s) in this area.

Greater Accountability in the Use of Subcontractors

There was only a single CWC concern mapped to this issue.  In the words of the report—

Contractors are incentivized to control costs, because costs are reviewed twice a month by the government. Cost analyses, regression analyses, and spend plan analyses identify trends and potential cost savings or unanticipated increases that will result in budget variances. DCMA works aggressively with contractors to address such variances. Cost control is included in the award-fee criteria.

In addition, as the report notes—

In addition, DCMA monitors the use of subcontracts by verifying the requirement in theater, after which the ACO in the DCMA corporate office reviews and provides a formal consent to subcontract. LOGCAP IV is in the process of instituting cost variance analysis reporting.

This area was rated Yellow (experience challenges) because it is a relatively new area of emphasis.  In the words of the report—

The Department is monitoring LOGCAP and taking steps to protect the government and the soldier. However, the increased focus on subcontractors is relatively new—driven by a March 2009 OSD Peer Review of the LOGCAP IV contracts. The TFWC is rating this yellow until a complete award-fee cycle demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach.

Our assessment:  The initiatives discussed in the report are good, insofar as they go.  We would be more impressed if innovative approaches were mentioned, such as mapping the supply chains of the various tiers of subcontractors and developing more real-time cost and schedule statusing.  The report notes that 70 percent of the work is performed by subcontractors; and this seems to us to be a proper area of emphasis.  Although there appears to be a good use of statistical and EVM tools, we would have hoped for more in this area.

Based on our analysis of two of the eight areas of CWC concern, we are not overly impressed with the TFWC report.  If it serves to get the CWC off DOD’s back, perhaps that’s good enough.  But despite our cynicism, many of these areas are real problems that affect the oversight of LOGCAP and other DOD contractors; they need to be addressed.  DPAP, the Business Integrity Panel, and the various subcommittees should be encouraged to tackle these tough problems with more than bureaucratic platitudes.



 

SAIC Tests FCS Equipment: A Clear Conflict of Interest, Says DOD IG

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On January 27, 2009, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) released a redacted version of its report on “contracted advisory and assistance services for the U.S. Army Future Combat Systems.”  The report concluded that the DOD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) had engaged SAIC as its “primary commercial contractor” supporting its testing needs, even though SAIC (along with Boeing) serves as the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Lead System Integrator for system design and development, and even though SAIC’s contract with DOT&E “explicitly stated ‘… providers are excluded from this contract who have significant involvement in the development of DoD systems that are under, or will be under DOT&E oversight’.”  Despite SAIC’s argument that its role on the FCS contract was one of system integrator, not system developer, the DOD IG found that the FCS contract had received billions of dollars out of the Army’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation—thus, SAIC was de facto a system developer.  The DOD IG Report, blasted the entities involved for this situation, stating that “DOT&E and the Army did not exercise the good judgment and sound discretion needed to prevent the existence of conflicting roles that might bias a contractor’s judgment or provide it an unfair competitive advantage.”  Ouch.

According to the DOD IG, after the situation was brought to the parties’ attention, SAIC’s advisory/assistance support contract to DOT&E was quickly modified to “delete the FCS-related tasks” after officially “concluding that SAIC had statutory OCIs regarding those tasks.”

But what is an Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI)?  We’ve touched on this topic before, notably in connection with Northrop Grumman’s sale of its TASC unit.  Essentially, the FAR states that an OCI exists when one of three situations exists—

1. An individual is actually (or potentially) unable to provide the government with “impartial assistance or advice”

2. A person’s objectivity in performing contract work is or might be impaired

3. A person or entity has an unfair competitive advantage

An OCI can be created with respect to an existing contract or with respect to future work.  The FAR (at 9.5) discusses “Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest,” and (according to the DOD IG audit report) “places restrictions on contractors being placed in a position to make decisions that favor their own products or capabilities.”  The DOD IG also noted that 10 U.S.C. § 2399 “places further restrictions on system developers supporting operational test and evaluation.” 

The DOD IG report also noted that Army Contracting Officers had a responsibility to identify and, if possible, mitigate actual or potential OCIs.  (See FAR 9.504.)  Moreover, the FAR directs “The contracting officer shall award the contract to the apparent successful offeror unless a conflict of interest is determined to exist that cannot be avoided or mitigated.”  Despite the FAR requirements regarding OCIs, the DOD IG concluded—

We were unable to determine if the contracting officer performed any evaluation beyond accepting statements made in SAIC’s proposal to determine if potential issues existed that would hinder SAIC’s ability to provide unbiased advisory and assistance services related to the overall contract or the specific scope of work SAIC performed under [the Delivery Order]. There was no documentation in the contracting file to show how the issue was addressed.

…

We found no evidence that anyone evaluated whether SAIC was significantly involved in the development of a DoD system that DOT&E was or would be overseeing prior to contract award. According to the contracting officer, DOT&E did not see a conflict with awarding the contract to SAIC because it had previously been fulfilling the requirements under a bridge contract that was entered into after the previous prime contractor was dropped after being acquired by Northrop Grumman, another FCS systems developer. Only after an inquiry was made was the issue of how the Government reached its conclusion that SAIC’s participation in the development of the FCS did not violate the OCI clause contained in the solicitation examined.

In addition, the DOD IG found similar concerns with Northrop Grumman, CSC, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin.  It reported—

We were unable to determine how the contracting officer concluded that the business isolation procedures that Northrop Grumman described in the proposal it submitted for the overall contract was consistent with the OCI provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2399 or the OCI clause contained in their overall contract. However, based on documentation contained in the contract files, it appears the contracting officer concluded that Northrop Grumman possessed no OCIs related to the requirements of either delivery order.

…

In their proposal, the Test and Experimentation Services Company [a JV that included CSC] informed the contracting officer that it possessed OCIs with respect to the work to be performed under the work authorization orders. However, the company proposed that CSC’s partner perform all the work under the contract. Thus, the Director of Contracts stated that based on that fact, the command concluded that awarding the scope of work to the Test and Experimentation Services Company did not violate Title 10’s OCI restrictions because CSC would not share in any of the profit derived from the contract.

…

The OCI provisions prohibited FC Business Systems from satisfying requirements resulting from its work under the contract, and the task order issued to support the OTC Air Defense Artillery Test Directorate’s mission requirements included additional restrictions to prevent FC Business Systems from operationally testing equipment it helped manufacture. However, the provisions did not require FC Business Systems to inform the Government of its acquisition by General Dynamics. As a result, the OTC and General Services Administration did not detect that General Dynamics, one of Boeing’s major FCS development subcontractors (after acquiring the FC Business Systems) was helping the command plan, coordinate, collect, and reduce data used to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the FCS, a clear violation of the OCI provisions in 10 U.S.C. 2399.

The DOD IG made several recommendations designed to prevent similar situations from arising in the future.  Among them, it recommended that the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Mr. Shay Assad, develop a new DFARS clause that would preclude “contractors that are involved in the development, production, or testing of a system … from providing technical advice to the program office for that system or from participating activities impacting the operational test and evaluation of that system unless appropriate waivers are obtained.”   Importantly, the new clause would “make it incumbent on the proposing contractor to identify in their proposal any work that that they are or have performed either under prime contract or subcontract related to the development or supply of a DoD system.”

The report noted that Mr. Assad agreed with the recommendation.  “The Director also stated that he would issue a memorandum emphasizing the importance of complying with FAR OCI provisions after the FAR Acquisition Law Team issues its final rule for a related FAR case to ensure that he does not issue conflicting guidance.”

We recommend that contractors supporting government test and evaluation functions take note.


 

Government Contract Accounting Issues Associated with Joint Ventures

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It’s been ten years since I first tackled government contract accounting issues associated with joint ventures.  (See “Accounting, Cost and Pricing Issues in Strategic Alliances and Teaming Agreements,” Strategic Alliances and Teaming on Government Contracts: Winning Combinations for the Next Century, American Bar Association, 2000.)  At that time, my co-authors (Jim Check and Jason Aiken) and I asserted that “The structural form and, more importantly, the substance of an alliance arrangement will bear significantly on determining whether costs are allowable and how they are allocated.”

We discussed three primary scenarios—

1. Each alliance member will incur all costs individually and no costs will be incurred by the alliance (the “unpopulated alliance” scenario).

2. The alliance will incur all costs and no alliance member will incur any costs (the “populated alliance” scenario).

3. Each alliance member will incur some costs as an individual entity, while some costs will be incurred by the alliance (the “hybrid alliance” scenario).

In the first scenario above, all costs (including costs of the alliance’s infrastructure such as program management, billing, audit support, etc.) are incurred by an alliance memberand included on that member’s billings to the alliance entity.  The alliance entity is simply a shell without any of its own costs, employees, or control systems.  In the second scenario, the alliance is brought to life by infusing it with working capital, employees, and control systems.  The alliance implements all necessary business systems, including payroll processing, purchasing, property control, etc.  The alliance will develop its own indirect rate structure and calculates is own indirect cost rates, based on the direct and indirect costs it incurs.  In such circumstances, the alliance may require its own Disclosure Statement.  Finally, in the third scenario there are at least two structures involved—that of the alliance entity and those of the alliance members.  Alliance members may operate as both owners and subcontractors, depending on how the work is allocated.

Although there are several different forms of “alliance” (including teaming agreement or Special Business Unit), the most prevalent type is the joint venture.  Joint ventures (JVs) offer the opportunity to present a single, unified face to a customer, to create a separate cost structure and benefit packages, and to utilize the alliance members’ past performance information for purposes of winning a proposal.

The DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) discusses audit issues associated with JVs at 7-1800.  According to the CAM—

A joint venture, proposed and established as a separate business entity, should have its own set of books and supporting documentation sufficient for an audit trail. Transactions should be recorded consistent with the joint venture agreement, and care must be taken to ensure that the joint venture bears its equitable share of the costs.  A joint venture, proposed and established as a separate business entity, should have its own set of books and supporting documentation sufficient for an audit trail. Transactions should be recorded consistent with the joint venture agreement, and care must be taken to ensure that the joint venture bears its equitable share of the costs.

More recently, in its role as adjudicator of bid protests, the GAO has addressed the need for a JV to have an adequate accounting system suitable for cost reimbursement contracts, as well as whether a JV needs to file a CASB Disclosure Statement. 

In PMO Partnership Joint Venture (B401973.3, 1/14/2010), the Department of Transportation (DOT) rejected PMO’s offer because it considered the JV’s indirect cost structure to be “unacceptable.”  In the words of the hired auditor (BMC)—

Indirect cost rates were not projected for the PMO Partnership and used in the cost proposal in accordance with FAR 31.203. Instead the indirect cost rates for each partner were used separately in the cost proposal. A budget should have been developed for the partnership entity and projected indirect rates should have been calculated from the budget and used in the cost proposal. As a result the indirect costs included in the cost proposal are questioned . . .The cost proposal should be for the PMO Partnership Joint Venture Entity and should not list the costs for each partner separately. The PMO Partnership Joint Venture is a separate entity in and of itself and that is how the costs should be presented in the cost proposal. . . .

Because the JV’s indirect structure was found unacceptable (and by the way noncompliant with CAS 401), the entity’s offer was rejected and PMO protested the contracting officer’s decision.  As a preliminary matter, DOT’s argument that the JV had violated CAS 401 was dismissed because the JV was a qualified small business concern, and thus exempt from the requirements of CAS 401.  In addition, GAO noted that the Government had “not explained why the particular overhead rate structure proposed by PMO-JV would lead to an inconsistency in the application of cost accounting practices or a loss of financial control over costs during contract performance.”  Accordingly, the protest was sustained.

Similarly, in McKissack+Delcan JV II (B401973.2, 1/13/2010) the JV’s offer to DOT was rejected because the JV member maintaining the accounting records (Delcan) would utilize Canadian GAAP instead of US GAAP.  Moreover, “The proposal submitted to the Government does not show that the joint venture is an independent entity. An independent joint venture for Government contracting purposes would have employees committed from each company and the indirect rate structure would be unique to the joint venture. . . . In addition, the indirect rate structure proposed is Delcan's; the proposal should contain an indirect rate structure specific to McKissack & Delcan Joint Venture II.”  However, as the protest evolved the Government abandoned its initial position(s) and ended-up with the same arguments it used with respect to PMO, namely that the JV’s “accounting system is inadequate because MD-JV's failure to submit a unique indirect rate for the joint venture violates CAS 401.”  As with PMO, the protest was sustained.

In both protests above, DCAA failed to appreciate that a JV need not be “populated” and might simply consist of the costs of its members.  On the other hand, companies wishing to enter into a JV or other strategic alliance should be mindful of the blind spot(s) in DCAA’s audit approach, and take care to link proposed indirect costs to the form and substance of the alliance entity they have chosen.

Finally, in Northrop Grumman/Textron (B400837, 2/17/2009) the two companies protested award of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) contract to the GTV Joint Venture (a JV between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General) because (among other things) GTV failed to submit a CASB Disclosure Statement for the JV.  GAO noted that “GTV’s proposal indicated that 100 percent of the contract costs would be accounted for by subcontracts with the two joint venture members, apportioned between them equally.  GTV indicated in its proposal that a CAS disclosure statement had previously been submitted, and specifically cited in this regard disclosure statements submitted by AM General and GDLS.” 

GAO relied on the DCAA audit guidance that states—

The need for a joint venture CAS Disclosure Statement depends upon the characteristics of the venture itself. The determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Where the joint venture is the entity actually performing the contract, has the responsibility for profit and/or producing a product or service, and has certain characteristics of ownership or control, a Disclosure Statement should be required. Where the venture merely unites the efforts of two contractors performing separate and distinct portions of the contract with little or no technical interface, separate joint venture disclosure may not be required.

Because “GTV’s proposal in fact incorporated CAS disclosure statements applicable to the contemplated contract effort” the protest was denied.

To sum up, there are undeniable attractions to forming a joint venture or similar alliance to pursue government business.  But doing so presents difficulties—not the least of which is ensuring alignment between the form/structure of the alliance and its cost structure, and navigating the submission of CASB Disclosure Statements.  Based on recent GAO decisions, auditors will not be sensitized to the possible forms of the alliance, and may misevaluate what is presented, unless pains are taken to clearly show how proposed costs are consistent with how costs will be accumulated and billed after contract award.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.