Claiming the Government Acted in “Bad Faith”
Recently somebody posted this cry for help on the LinkedIn Question & Answer Board—
We have a COTR that is causing problems with our contract and need a recommendation for an attorney … Can anyone help us? We have a service contract … and the COTR has lied, is now causing our Supervisor to quit because he feels he is being harassed by him… and more. Does this constitute a delay and/or Government Interference? Any help is appreciated.
Let’s
look at this from two perspectives. First, let’s talk about delay and
disruption. This is really two issues. In a delay claim, the
contractor is claiming compensation for not being able to work. In
some situations, that claim can include the costs of “unabsorbed
overhead”—i.e., indirect costs that would have been absorbed on the
instant contract, had the labor hours or dollars been incurred as
scheduled, but which now will be absorbed by other contracts, causing
them to incur more costs than they had planned. In a disruption claim,
the contractor is asking for additional compensation because the work
is more complex, and more expensive, than the parties originally
agreed.
As this article makes clear—
The
contractor must prove for either claim the elements of liability,
causation, and resultant injury. When the contractor is asserting a
delay claim, the contractor has the burden of showing the extent of the
delay, that the delay was proximately caused by government action, and
that the delay caused damage to the contractor. While the law requires ‘reasonable certainty’ to support a damages award, damages do not need to proven with mathematical exactness. Rather, ‘[i]t
is sufficient if a claimant furnishes the court with a reasonable basis
for computation, even though the result is only approximate.’ The preferred method for proving costs is through the submission of actual cost data. However, where actual cost data is not available, estimates of the costs may be used. Estimates of costs ‘should be prepared by competent individuals with adequate knowledge of the facts and circumstances,’ and should be “supported with detailed substantiating data.” [All legal citations omitted.]
What
the LinkedIn interlocutor is also hinting about is whether, by engaging
in lying and harassment and unreasonable delays, the Government has
breached its implied duty of “good faith and fair dealing”. As an aspect of these duties, “[e]very contract . . . imposes an implied obligation ‘that neither party will do anything that will hinder or delay the other party in performance of the contract.’” Such covenants require each party “not to interfere with the other party's performance and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the fruits of the contract.” This “duty not to hinder is breached when the Government commits ‘actions that unreasonably cause delay or hindrance to contract performance.’” [Legal citations omitted.]
The case law is well-settled that the Government enjoys a presumption that it acts in good faith. To
overcome that presumption, “the proof must be almost irrefragable” –
which has also been described as “clear and convincing evidence” of
“some specific intent to injure” the contractor. “Courts
have found bad faith when confronted by a course of government conduct
that was ‘designedly oppressive,’ or that ‘initiated a conspiracy’ to
‘get rid’ of a contractor. As these cases illustrate, the ‘irrefragable
proof’ standard, though daunting, is not intended to be impenetrable, that is, it does not ‘insulate government action from any review by courts.’” [Emphasis in original; legal citations omitted.]
Recently
the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, affirmed a decision by the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims in which the contractor successfully
proved bad faith on the part of its Government customer, the U.S. Army
Corp. of Engineers. The tale is a sad one, where certain government
individuals exercised their authority (and more!) to the detriment of the contractor, North Star Housing. As the Court
found, “the record provides a virtual rancid cornucopia of electronic
messages and other communications evidencing a specific intent by key
government officials to injure North Star.” See the entire CoFC decision here.
As the Court observed, “Among the most troubling aspects of the case … is
clear proof that Mr. Peterson, Ms. Kiser and others eventually co-opted
the contracting officer who was responsible for ruling on North Star’s
claims.” Although
the FAR requires the contracting officers to ensure that contractors
“receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment,” the Court found the
contracting officer did not do so in this case. The Court declared—
Abdication
of those responsibilities in the face of pressure from government
officials who plainly are driven by animus against a given contractor
constitutes perhaps the most pernicious form of bad faith on the part
of the government, as it threatens the integrity of a dispute
resolution process that is central to the government contracting system
itself.
Despite
the Court being “thoroughly convinced” of the Government’s breach of
its duty of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff (North Star) was
not awarded as much money as it had hoped for. First, some of its
claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because they had not
been first presented to the contracting officer with a “sum certain” as
the FAR and Contract Disputes Act (CDA) require. Second, North Star’s analysis of its damages was found to be lacking by the Court. As the Court stated, “such [Government] liability, no matter how egregious, does not obviate the necessity for plaintiff to prove its damages.”
To wrap up, many
contractors are afraid to submit claims because they are worried about
angering their customer(s) and losing future work. (We note that
contractor evaluations and past performance ratings cannot be affected
by assertion of contractual rights.) Contractors
seeking to assert claims against their Government customers need to
understand what their cause of action is. Are they asserting
Government-caused delay or disruption? And are the Government’s
actions tied
to any provable breaches of its duty to act in good faith? Finally,
what damages can be proven, and have all the steps of the FAR and CDA
strictly been followed when asserting the claim?
DOD Responds to Commission on Wartime Contracting’s Concerns
Readers
of this site are likely familiar with the issues raised by the
independent Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
(CWC). Over
and over, CWC has expressed its concerns with how DOD exercises
oversight on the contractors supporting the warfighters in Southwest
Asia. For example, in this article, we told you that the CWC had issued its interim report, entitled, “"At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan." In this article,
we told you about testimony before the Commission, in which then-DCAA
Director April Stephenson blamed "faulty accounting, cost-estimating,
purchasing and other business systems" for "millions of dollars" of
contractor overbillings to the Department of Defense (DOD). We told
you about a Federal Times article that quoted Director Stephenon's
testimony: "When a contractor’s business system and related internal
controls are inadequate, the data generated by the contractor’s system
is unreliable, which in turn, results in the risk of noncompliances with government laws and regulations, mischarging, fraudulent acts and contract overpayments."
Later
on, we reported the fascinating war between bureaucracies that was
playing out before us all. While the attacks took place in many
forums, some of the nastiest took place at the CWC. For instance, based on some of the CWC testimony and comments, we asked if DCAA and DCMA would be merging in order to end their “dysfunctional” contractor oversight.
Nearly four months after the CWC told DOD to go back and rethink its approach to contractor oversight, the
Pentagon submitted its official response to the CWC’s “eight issues of
immediate concern.” The report, issued to the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) by the “Task Force on
Wartime Contracting” (TFWC) on December 17, 2009, was made public on
January 26, 2010. As we mentioned, the TFWC report, which can be found
here, addressed eight issues –
1. Risk associated with drawdown of troops in Iraq
2. Shortage of contract management personnel in theater and training
3. Acceleration of transition to the new LOGCAP IV contract
4. Adequacy of contractor business systems
5. Greater accountability in the use of subcontractors
6. Proper transition of lessons learned from Iraq to Afghanistan
7. Establishment of a contracting command in Afghanistan
8. Proper training and equipping of security contractors.
The
TFWC was chaired by Mr. Shay Assad, Director, Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy (DPAP), and had the following objectives: mapping
CWC observations to the eight issues of immediate concern, identifying
current DOD initiatives, and tracking whether DOD’s initiatives would
address the CWC areas of concern.
The report, which can be found here, concluded that every CWC concern
was being addressed by a current DOD initiative. Almost all of DOD’s
initiatives had been started prior to CWC expressing its concerns. The
report’s conclusions were summarized as follows—
The Task Force [TFWC] reported that it believes the DoD
initiatives are the right solution set and therefore does not recommend
pursuing alternatives. The progress on these initiatives is largely
moving forward as planned, but some key initiatives, primarily in the
area of resourcing contingency contracting officer’s representatives
and subject matter experts, are experiencing major challenges. The
Task Force is focusing on improving progress in these areas and will
continue to work with senior leaders to remove the barriers.
Savvy
readers will recognize the diplomatic tone of the summary, which might
also be translated (by a less bureaucratic translator) as telling the
CWC that the DOD recognized the issues before they were brought to its
attention, has initiated effective counter-measures, and has things
well in hand. So thank you very much, CWC, but no thanks.
We
want to examine, in some detail, how the report addresses two CWC
concerns: (1) adequacy of contractor business systems, and (2) greater
accountability in the use of subcontractors. Our examination will
focus on whether the details in the report support the conclusions as summarized by DPAP.
Adequacy of Contractor Business Systems
The
report maps five CWC observations to this issue. Two observations
relate to DCMA and three to DCAA. The report notes that subcommittee
11 of the Department’s Panel on Contracting Integrity “will focus on
establishing consistent processes and procedures to address contractor
business system deficiencies.” However, the subcommittee’s
“comprehensive review and analysis of
the Department’s audits and evaluations of contractor business systems
will take time.” Moreover, both DCMA and DCAA have inadequate
resources to address oversight requirements.
The
“good news” is that DCAA has already issued “more than 100 cost
suspensions totaling more than $500 million” in its testing of
contingency operations support contractors in Southwest Asia. In
addition, DCAA has issued audit guidance that has “clarified what
constitutes a significant deficiency and eliminated the ‘inadequate in
part’ opinion in an attempt to reduce the apparent confusion regarding
the expectation of the contractor and CO regarding the reported
deficiencies.”
Of the five observations, two are rated as Yellow (experiencing challenges) and two are rated Green (on track). The fifth observation (lack of resources within DCAA is a significant factor contributing to ineffective audit coverage) does not seem to have
been addressed in any detail within this section of the report, even
though it is one of the CWC observations that is mapped to this issue.
Our assessment: This
area was evaluated with some measure of optimism. Lack of DCAA
resources was not addressed (though it was noted that DCAA has given
in-theater audits its highest priority). Importantly, the report was
misleading because the DCAA audit guidance it asserts “clarified” and
“attempt[ed]
to reduce … confusion” did nothing of the sort—and was actually
criticized by nearly all stakeholders for increasing confusion and
reducing the value of DCAA’s audit reports in this area. We do not
believe the details support the overall conclusion(s) in this area.
Greater Accountability in the Use of Subcontractors
There was only a single CWC concern mapped to this issue. In the words of the report—
Contractors
are incentivized to control costs, because costs are reviewed twice a
month by the government. Cost analyses, regression analyses, and spend
plan analyses identify trends and potential cost savings or
unanticipated increases that will result in budget variances. DCMA
works aggressively with contractors to address such variances. Cost
control is included in the award-fee criteria.
In addition, as the report notes—
In
addition, DCMA monitors the use of subcontracts by verifying the
requirement in theater, after which the ACO in the DCMA corporate
office reviews and provides a formal consent to subcontract. LOGCAP IV
is in the process of instituting cost variance analysis reporting.
This area was rated Yellow (experience challenges) because it is a relatively new area of emphasis. In the words of the report—
The
Department is monitoring LOGCAP and taking steps to protect the
government and the soldier. However, the increased focus on
subcontractors is relatively new—driven by a March 2009 OSD Peer Review
of the LOGCAP IV contracts. The TFWC is rating this yellow until a
complete award-fee cycle demonstrates the effectiveness of this
approach.
Our
assessment: The initiatives discussed in the report are good, insofar
as they go. We would be more impressed if innovative approaches were
mentioned, such as mapping the supply chains of the various tiers of
subcontractors and developing more real-time cost and schedule statusing.
The report notes that 70 percent of the work is performed by
subcontractors; and this seems to us to be a proper area of emphasis.
Although there appears to be a good use of statistical and EVM tools,
we would have hoped for more in this area.
Based
on our analysis of two of the eight areas of CWC concern, we are not
overly impressed with the TFWC report. If it serves to get the CWC off
DOD’s back, perhaps that’s good enough. But despite our cynicism, many
of these areas are real problems that affect the oversight of LOGCAP
and other DOD contractors; they need to be addressed. DPAP, the
Business Integrity Panel, and the various subcommittees should be
encouraged to tackle these tough problems with more than bureaucratic
platitudes.
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SAIC Tests FCS Equipment: A Clear Conflict of Interest, Says DOD IG
On January 27, 2009, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) released a redacted version of its report on
“contracted advisory and assistance services for the U.S. Army Future
Combat Systems.” The report concluded that the DOD’s Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) had engaged SAIC as its
“primary commercial contractor” supporting its testing needs, even
though SAIC (along with Boeing) serves as the Future Combat Systems
(FCS) Lead System Integrator for system design and development, and
even though SAIC’s contract with DOT&E “explicitly stated ‘…
providers are excluded from this contract who have significant
involvement in the development of DoD systems that are under, or will be under DOT&E oversight’.” Despite
SAIC’s argument that its role on the FCS contract was one of system
integrator, not system developer, the DOD IG found that the FCS
contract had received billions of dollars out of the Army’s Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation—thus, SAIC
was de facto a system developer. The DOD IG Report,
blasted the entities involved for this situation, stating that
“DOT&E and the Army did not exercise the good judgment and sound
discretion needed to prevent the existence of conflicting roles that
might bias a contractor’s judgment or provide it an unfair competitive
advantage.” Ouch.
According
to the DOD IG, after the situation was brought to the parties’
attention, SAIC’s advisory/assistance support contract to DOT&E was
quickly modified to “delete the FCS-related tasks” after officially
“concluding that SAIC had statutory OCIs regarding those tasks.”
But what is an Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI)? We’ve touched on this topic before, notably in connection with Northrop Grumman’s sale of its TASC unit. Essentially, the FAR states that an OCI exists when one of three situations exists—
1. An individual is actually (or potentially) unable to provide the government with “impartial assistance or advice”
2. A person’s objectivity in performing contract work is or might be impaired
3. A person or entity has an unfair competitive advantage
An
OCI can be created with respect to an existing contract or with respect
to future work. The FAR (at 9.5) discusses “Organizational and
Consultant Conflicts of Interest,” and (according to the DOD IG audit
report) “places restrictions on contractors being placed in a position
to make decisions that favor their own products or capabilities.” The
DOD IG also noted that 10 U.S.C. § 2399 “places further restrictions on
system developers supporting operational test and evaluation.”
The
DOD IG report also noted that Army Contracting Officers had a
responsibility to identify and, if possible, mitigate actual or
potential OCIs.
(See FAR 9.504.) Moreover, the FAR directs “The contracting officer
shall award the contract to the apparent successful offeror unless a
conflict of interest is determined to exist that cannot be avoided or
mitigated.” Despite the FAR requirements regarding OCIs, the DOD IG concluded—
We
were unable to determine if the contracting officer performed any
evaluation beyond accepting statements made in SAIC’s proposal to
determine if potential issues existed that would hinder SAIC’s ability
to provide unbiased advisory and assistance services related to the
overall contract or the specific scope of work SAIC performed under [the Delivery Order]. There was no documentation in the contracting file to show how the issue was addressed.
…
We found no evidence that anyone evaluated whether SAIC was significantly involved in the development of a DoD
system that DOT&E was or would be overseeing prior to contract
award. According to the contracting officer, DOT&E did not see a
conflict with awarding the contract to SAIC because it had previously
been fulfilling the requirements under a bridge contract that was
entered into after the previous prime contractor was dropped after
being acquired by Northrop Grumman, another FCS systems developer. Only
after an inquiry was made was the issue of how the Government reached
its conclusion that SAIC’s participation in the development of the FCS
did not violate the OCI clause contained in the solicitation examined.
In addition, the DOD IG found similar concerns with Northrop Grumman, CSC, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin. It reported—
We
were unable to determine how the contracting officer concluded that the
business isolation procedures that Northrop Grumman described in the
proposal it submitted for the overall contract was consistent with the
OCI provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2399 or the OCI clause contained in their
overall contract. However, based on documentation contained in the
contract files, it appears the contracting officer concluded that
Northrop Grumman possessed no OCIs related to the requirements of
either delivery order.
…
In
their proposal, the Test and Experimentation Services Company [a JV
that included CSC] informed the contracting officer that it possessed
OCIs with respect to the work to be performed under the work
authorization orders. However, the company proposed that CSC’s partner
perform all the work under the contract. Thus, the Director of
Contracts stated that based on that fact, the command concluded that
awarding the scope of work to the Test and Experimentation Services
Company did not violate Title 10’s OCI restrictions because CSC would
not share in any of the profit derived from the contract.
…
The
OCI provisions prohibited FC Business Systems from satisfying
requirements resulting from its work under the contract, and the task
order issued to support the OTC Air Defense Artillery Test
Directorate’s mission requirements included additional restrictions to
prevent FC Business Systems from operationally testing equipment it
helped manufacture. However, the provisions did not require FC Business
Systems to inform the Government of its acquisition by General
Dynamics. As a result, the OTC and General Services Administration did
not detect that General Dynamics, one of Boeing’s major FCS development
subcontractors (after acquiring the FC Business Systems) was helping
the command plan, coordinate, collect, and reduce data used to evaluate
the effectiveness and suitability of the FCS, a clear violation of the
OCI provisions in 10 U.S.C. 2399.
The DOD IG made several
recommendations designed to prevent similar situations from arising in
the future. Among them, it recommended that the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Mr. Shay Assad, develop a new DFARS
clause that would preclude “contractors that are involved in the
development, production, or testing of a system … from providing
technical advice to the program office for that system or from
participating activities impacting the operational test and evaluation
of that system unless appropriate waivers are obtained.” Importantly,
the new clause would “make
it incumbent on the proposing contractor to identify in their proposal
any work that that they are or have performed either under prime
contract or subcontract related to the development or supply of a DoD system.”
The report noted that Mr. Assad agreed with the recommendation. “The Director also stated that he would issue a memorandum emphasizing the importance of complying with FAR OCI provisions after the FAR Acquisition Law Team issues its final rule for a related FAR case to ensure that he does not issue conflicting guidance.”
We recommend that contractors supporting government test and evaluation functions take note.
Government Contract Accounting Issues Associated with Joint Ventures
It’s been ten years
since I first tackled government contract accounting issues associated
with joint ventures. (See “Accounting, Cost and
Pricing Issues in Strategic Alliances and Teaming
Agreements,” Strategic Alliances and Teaming
on Government Contracts: Winning Combinations for the Next
Century, American Bar Association, 2000.) At that time, my co-authors
(Jim Check and Jason Aiken) and I asserted that “The structural form
and, more importantly, the substance of an alliance arrangement will
bear significantly on determining whether costs are allowable and how
they are allocated.”
We discussed three
primary scenarios—
1. Each alliance member
will incur all costs individually and no costs will be incurred by the
alliance (the “unpopulated alliance” scenario).
2. The alliance will
incur all costs and no alliance member will incur any
costs (the “populated alliance” scenario).
3. Each alliance member
will incur some costs as an individual entity, while some costs will be
incurred by the alliance (the “hybrid alliance”
scenario).
In the first scenario
above, all costs (including costs of the alliance’s infrastructure such
as program management, billing, audit support, etc.) are incurred by an
alliance memberand included on that member’s
billings to the alliance entity. The alliance entity is simply a shell
without any of its own costs, employees, or control systems. In the
second scenario, the alliance is brought to life by infusing it with
working capital, employees, and control systems. The alliance
implements all necessary business systems, including payroll
processing, purchasing, property control, etc. The alliance will
develop its own indirect rate structure and calculates is own indirect
cost rates, based on the direct and indirect costs it incurs. In such
circumstances, the alliance may require its own Disclosure Statement.
Finally, in the third scenario there are at least two structures
involved—that of the alliance entity and those of the alliance
members. Alliance members may operate as both owners and
subcontractors, depending on how the work is allocated.
Although there are
several different forms of “alliance” (including teaming agreement or
Special Business Unit), the most prevalent type is the
joint venture. Joint ventures (JVs) offer the
opportunity to present a single, unified face to a customer, to create
a separate cost structure and benefit packages, and to utilize the
alliance members’ past performance information for purposes of winning
a proposal.
The
DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) discusses audit issues associated with
JVs at 7-1800. According to the CAM—
A
joint venture, proposed and established as a separate business entity,
should have its own set of books and supporting documentation
sufficient for an audit trail. Transactions should be recorded
consistent with the joint venture agreement, and care must be taken to
ensure that the joint venture bears its equitable share of the costs.
A joint venture, proposed and established as a separate business
entity, should have its own set of books and supporting documentation
sufficient for an audit trail. Transactions should be recorded
consistent with the joint venture agreement, and care must be taken to
ensure that the joint venture bears its equitable share of the
costs.
More
recently, in its role as adjudicator of bid protests, the GAO has addressed
the need
for a JV to have an adequate accounting system suitable for cost
reimbursement contracts, as well as whether a JV needs to file a CASB
Disclosure Statement.
In PMO Partnership
Joint Venture (B401973.3, 1/14/2010), the Department of
Transportation (DOT) rejected PMO’s offer because it considered the
JV’s indirect cost structure to be “unacceptable.” In the words of the
hired auditor (BMC)—
Indirect cost rates were not projected for the PMO Partnership and
used in the cost proposal in accordance with FAR 31.203. Instead the
indirect cost rates for each partner were used separately in the cost
proposal. A budget should have been developed for the partnership
entity and projected indirect rates should have been calculated from
the budget and used in the cost proposal. As a result the indirect
costs included in the cost proposal are questioned . . .The cost proposal
should be for the PMO Partnership Joint Venture Entity and should not
list the costs for each partner separately. The PMO Partnership Joint
Venture is a separate entity in and of itself and that is how the costs
should be presented in the cost proposal. . . .
Because the JV’s
indirect structure was found unacceptable (and by the way noncompliant
with CAS 401), the entity’s offer was rejected and PMO protested the
contracting officer’s decision. As a preliminary matter, DOT’s
argument that the JV had violated CAS 401 was dismissed because the JV
was a qualified small business concern, and thus exempt from the
requirements of CAS 401. In addition, GAO noted that the Government
had “not explained why the particular overhead rate structure proposed
by PMO-JV would lead to an inconsistency in the application of cost
accounting practices or a loss of financial control over costs during
contract performance.” Accordingly, the protest was
sustained.
Similarly, in McKissack+Delcan JV
II (B401973.2, 1/13/2010) the JV’s
offer to
DOT was rejected
because the JV member maintaining the accounting records
(Delcan) would
utilize Canadian GAAP instead of US GAAP. Moreover,
“The proposal
submitted to the Government does not show that the joint venture is an
independent entity. An independent joint venture for Government
contracting purposes would have employees committed from each company
and the indirect rate structure would be unique to the joint venture. .
. . In addition, the indirect rate structure proposed is Delcan's; the
proposal should contain an indirect rate structure specific
to McKissack & Delcan Joint Venture
II.” However, as
the protest evolved the Government abandoned its
initial position(s) and ended-up with the same arguments it used with
respect to PMO, namely that the JV’s “accounting
system is inadequate because MD-JV's failure to submit a unique
indirect rate for the joint venture violates CAS
401.” As with
PMO, the protest was sustained.
In both protests above, DCAA failed to appreciate that a JV need
not be “populated” and might simply consist of the costs of its
members. On the other hand, companies wishing to enter into a JV or
other strategic alliance should be mindful of the blind spot(s) in
DCAA’s audit approach, and take care to link proposed indirect costs to
the form and substance of the alliance entity they have
chosen.
Finally, in Northrop Grumman/Textron (B400837, 2/17/2009)
the two companies protested award of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
(JLTV) contract to the GTV Joint Venture (a JV between General Dynamics
Land Systems and AM General) because (among other things) GTV failed to submit a CASB Disclosure Statement for the JV. GAO
noted that “GTV’s
proposal indicated that 100 percent of the contract costs would be
accounted for by subcontracts with the two joint venture members,
apportioned between
them equally. GTV indicated
in its proposal that a CAS disclosure statement had previously been
submitted, and specifically cited in this regard disclosure statements
submitted by AM General and GDLS.”
GAO relied on the DCAA audit guidance that states—
The
need for a joint venture CAS Disclosure Statement depends upon the
characteristics of the venture itself. The determination must be made
on a case-by-case basis. Where the joint venture is the entity actually
performing the contract, has the responsibility for profit and/or
producing a product or service, and has certain characteristics of
ownership or control, a Disclosure Statement should be required. Where
the venture merely unites the efforts of two contractors performing
separate and distinct portions of the contract with little or no
technical interface, separate joint venture disclosure may not be
required.
Because “GTV’s proposal in fact incorporated CAS disclosure
statements applicable to the contemplated contract effort” the protest
was denied.
To sum up, there are undeniable attractions to forming a joint
venture or similar alliance to pursue government business. But doing
so presents difficulties—not the least of which is ensuring alignment
between the form/structure of the alliance and its cost structure, and
navigating the submission of CASB Disclosure Statements. Based on
recent GAO decisions, auditors will not be sensitized to the possible
forms of the alliance, and may misevaluate what is presented, unless
pains are taken to clearly show how proposed costs are consistent with
how costs will be accumulated and billed after contract
award.
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