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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA Audit Guidance on Sampling

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Those of us deep into DCAA audits of final billing rate proposals (also known as “incurred cost audits”) have learned that the audit agency recently updated its required transaction sample sizes, based on input from statisticians. Unsurprisingly, the sample sizes didn’t go down; they almost doubled in size. That means more work for both auditors and auditees.

Note: DCAA still has 12 months to complete its audit, regardless of sample size used. In other words, the auditors must now cram in nearly twice the transaction review effort into the same audit duration. One might almost feel sorry for them.

Almost.

Transaction samples primarily are used on audits of indirect costs. The auditors pull as sample that is statistically significant and then they use the findings from that sample to project to the sample universe. For example, assume a universe of $1,000,000 and a statistical sample of $10,000. In that sample, auditors find $1,000 (10%) in questioned costs. They then write the report to show total questioned costs of $100,000 (10% of the universe). That’s basically how it works. Therefore, it’s important that the sample be statistically valid, because the audit agency doesn’t want contractors arguing that the projected results were wrong on statistical grounds.

In December, 2019, DCAA issued revised audit guidance on when sampling may be used by auditors. The guidance (MRD 19-PIC-005), was published on DCAA’s website only recently. We have read it several times and, frankly, it’s not the clearest piece of writing that DCAA has ever issued. Fortunately, it references a Contract Audit Manual (CAM) section (6-104). The CAM has several revised sections, effective February, 2020—and this is one of those sections. We went to the revised section 6-104 in order to understand what the MRD was trying to say.

Here’s what we learned:

Effective with final billing rate proposals (which DCAA calls “incurred cost proposals” or “ICPs”) received after January 1, 2020, ICPs eligible to participate in the risk-based sampling process will be assessed for sampling eligibility. If the ICP is determined eligible for sampling it will be placed in the sampling universe subject to random selection for audit based on established sampling parameters. If the ICP is not randomly selected for audit, a risk-based sampling memorandum will be issued to the contracting officer indicating the ICP was eligible for sampling and not selected for audit.

(Remember, DCAA is using a “risk-based” stratification of contractor proposals, such that only the largest proposals (measured by Auditable Dollar Value or ADV) get audited every year. The smaller proposals get audited less often. Contractor proposals with an ADV of $5 million or less don’t get audited. Ever. We’ve written about the DCAA audit approach before—see (for example) this article. We have not been fans of DCAA’s “new approach” (we call it “new” even though its seven years old at this point) because it simply seems like another way of not fulfilling DCAA’s contract audit mission. Whatever.)

(Also, there are two type of ADV calculations. The first ADV addresses the overall contractor ICP risk, which is total flexibly priced contract dollars plus T&M billed dollars less subcontractor dollars. The second ADV (called “sampling ADV”) is defined as “total cost proposed on flexibly priced Government contracts, plus total cost billed on Government T&M contracts, less direct costs on non-DoD contracts in which the reimbursable agency does not participate.” The more you know ….)

Back to the CAM:

Well, it looks like we were wrong, because sometime between 2016 and 2020, DCAA changed its policy such that proposals with small ADVs can be audited. They can even be audited via statistical sampling methodology! The revised CAM now states that such ICPs may be audited via sampling when (1) there were no significant questioned costs in the last completed incurred cost audit, and (2) there are no Department (ACO, PCO, COR, DCAA, etc.) concerns with a significant impact on the ICP. So there.

For proposals with sampling ADVs between $5 million and $100 million, transaction sampling may be used when conditions (1) and (2) (as above) apply, plus a condition (3): “The contractor does not have a pre-award accounting system survey that resulted in an unacceptable opinion, or a disapproved accounting system based on a postaward accounting system audit.”

For contractor proposals with sampling ADVs between $100 million and $250 million, first thing is that they must be audited every 5th year. Beyond that, transaction sampling may be used when conditions (1), (2), and (3) apply, plus the following additional conditions: (4) the contractor does not have any business system deficiencies relevant to the incurred cost year subject to audit, (5) the contractor does not have any significant accounting practice changes in the year subject to audit; and (6) the contractor has not experienced any significant organizational changes in the year subject to audit.

For contractor proposals with sampling ADVs between $250 million and $500 million, first thing is that they must be audited every 4th year. Beyond that, conditions (1) through (6) (as above) apply.

For contractor proposals with sampling ADVs between $500 million and $1 billion, first thing is that they must be audited every other year. Beyond that, conditions (1) through (6) apply.

Contractor proposals with sampling ADVs greater than $1 billion must be audited every year.

What does it mean if a contractor’s proposal is subject to audit but, for whatever reason, sampling and projection cannot be used? As we understand it, a prohibition on using statistical sampling methodology simply means that the results cannot be projected to the universe. However, we may be wrong about that. Perhaps in those higher-risk situations, a super-high sample size is used because there is no ability to project. Neither the MRD nor the CAM is particularly clear on the issue.

Clearly, the auditors’ judgment must be used to develop appropriate audit techniques. Maybe some smart auditor who’s taken AUD 113 Risk-Based Sampling of Incurred Cost Submissions at DCAI can write us and let us know the official answer.

In the meantime, we trust we’ve decoded the latest MRD. At least, we did our best to do so.

 

Is There Such a Thing as Too Transparent?

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On January 22, 2020, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed a revision to its Guidance for Grants and Agreements (found at Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations). If you are an entity subject to the OMG Guidance, you probably know about the proposed revision. You may even be working on your comments to be submitted for consideration.

For those who may not be as attuned to what’s happening (or what is proposed to be happening), the OMB stated that the “proposed revisions are intended to reduce recipient burden, provide guidance on implementing new statutory requirements, and improve Federal financial assistance management, transparency, and oversight.”

Well, that’s nice, isn’t it? Who could disagree with those objectives?

Further, in the Background section of the Federal Register notice, the OMB stated—

Based on feedback and ongoing engagement with the grants management community, the current Administration established the Results-Oriented Accountability for Grants Cross Agency Priority Goal (Grants CAP Goal) in the President's Management Agenda on March 20, 2018 (available at: https://www.performance.gov/CAP/grants/). The Grants CAP Goal recognizes that grants managers report spending a disproportionate amount of time using antiquated processes to monitor compliance. Efficiencies could be gained from modernization and grants managers could instead shift their time to analyze data to improve results. To address this challenge, the Grants CAP Goal Executive Steering Committee (ESC), which reports to the Chief Financial Officer's Council (CFOC), identified four strategies to work toward maximizing the value of grant funding by developing a risk-based, data-driven framework that balances compliance requirements with demonstrating successful results for the American taxpayer.

1. Strategy 1: Standardize the Grants Management Business Process and Data

2. Strategy 2: Build Shared IT Infrastructure

3. Strategy 3: Manage Risk

4. Strategy 4: Achieve Program Goals and Objectives

The proposed revisions support those four strategic goals, or so OMB asserted.

Readers, in many years of reviewing proposed Federal rule-making, we have learned to watch for certain words, such as “consistency,” “transparency,” and “standardization”. When we see those words, we put our hands in our pocket to hold on to our wallet. This may be one of those times.

We are not going to recap all the proposed revisions to the Guidance, of which there are many. The link is in the first sentence and you can go read the Federal Register notice yourself. If you do take the time to review the proposed rule, perhaps you will ask yourself whether this is yet another example of sneaky stuff being implemented in the name of transparency and standardization.

We would like to point out one interesting aspect of the proposed rule. We can’t take credit for noticing it; this particular aspect was brought to our attention by an industry group.

What do you think of this?

Lastly, for transparency purposes, a proposed revision adds a new subsection to 200.414(h) to require that all grantees' negotiated agreements for indirect cost rates are collected and displayed on public website. The agency responsible for this task and the public website will be designated by OMB.

As we understand the proposal, should your entity agree to receive a Federal grant or other agreement, and should you have to negotiate indirect cost rates as part of receiving that grant or agreement, then you also agree that your indirect cost rates will be publicly posted for all to see.

For transparency purposes.

Now, if this were about for-profit entities that compete for Federal funds, that right there would be a deal-breaker. The company would say “How about no?” and walk away quickly. There are not many more proprietary things than a commercial company’s indirect cost rates.

But this is not that. This is for other entities, such as educational and heath institutions. Generally speaking, those entities are not-for-profit and we suspect they do not compete among themselves based on estimated costs. So maybe—just maybe—this is not the same deal-breaker for them that it would be for the commercial entities.

So we’re not sure what to think about this proposal.

Is it an overreach, or maybe not such a big deal after all? We really do not know.

But the question is: for the entities affected by the proposed rule—those that must comply with the OMB Guidance found in Title 2 of the CFR—what do they think about it?

What will they agree to as a condition of receiving Federal funds?

How far are they willing to go in the name of transparency?

Is this business as usual, or is there really such a thing as too much transparency?

You can email us and let us know your thoughts.

But better yet, you can submit your thoughts, in the form of a public comment on the proposed rule, to the OMB directly. There’s a link to do so on the Federal Register page. As we type this, 12 comments have been received so far.

You have until 23 March 2020 to submit your thoughts and comments to the rule-makers, should you be so inclined.

 

Year-to-Date Update

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You may want to skip this one, as it focuses on internal stuff.

For those who have chosen to remain, I wanted to discuss how the year is going so far, and what plans have been laid for 2020.

In early January I teamed with Don Acquisition to teach a class on the FAR and DFARS for people in the UK who had no idea about what the FAR and DFARS was. All they knew was that they had received subcontracts from US defense prime contractors that included lots and lots of clauses—and apparently, they were supposed to comply with requirements found in those clauses. They thought it might be nice to understand exactly what those requirements were. Thus: a four-day class in northern England. You might think January in northern England would be pretty miserable, but you’d be wrong about that. It was great. Would return in a heartbeat.

I had never experienced Don’s approach to teaching before and I was impressed with it. Don also teaches the FAR Bootcamp®. As with most of the instructors who teach those classes, Don doesn’t like PowerPoint slides; instead, Don likes a “hands-on” approach where every student brings a laptop and connects to the internet, and researches the clauses (and their prescriptions) individually. It worked well. We quickly realized that the client was positioned to assert commerciality, so we blocked-off most of a day to discuss the what and the how of that process. As part of the training, Don had the students look up the commercial item clauses and understand just how much of the other requirements suddenly disappeared when a commercial item determination was received.

If you are looking for similar training, I cannot over recommend Don Acquisition LLC. You will not be disappointed.

Before I left for the UK I turned in a proposed article to Karen Manos, editor of the Government Contracts Cost, Accounting and Pricing Report. My article was accepted and should be published in the next 60 days. The catchy title? “Explaining the DFARS Ground and Flight Risk Clause.” As I said, catchy. It’s not for everyone. Either you are a provider of aviation-related products and services, and you have to deal with that pesky clause, or you are not a provider and have no interest in it. For those of us who have to deal with it, the amount of ignorance on the clause’s requirements (from both government contracting officer and contractor) is a bit startling. I thought I’d try my bit to rectify the situation. (For one example, did you know that clause contains its own cost allowability provisions? Yep.)

When I came back from the UK I was reminded that I have two textbooks to update for 2019. Most readers know I am the editor for two LexisNexis Accounting for Government Contracts books (The Cost Accounting Standards and The Federal Acquisition Regulation). I am just about done editing the first book, and the second one is due at the end of April.

In early April I will be speaking at the annual joint AGA/NCMA meeting in San Diego, discussing lesser-known aspects of cost reimbursement contracting. I was prompted to speak on the topic after listening to another presenter make some—how should I say?—technical errors on the topic. Yeah, technical errors. That’s it. The kind of technical errors that forced me to walk out of the room, lest I say something impolite. (I do not like to criticize other people who are making public presentations. It’s a hard thing to do and everyone who tries deserves respect. My strategy is to ask softball questions from the audience to try to get the speaker to think about what they said. Failing that, I quietly get up and exit the room. Then I walk a bit before I let out a primal scream of frustration.)

My “Financial Management of Government Contracts” class starts again in early May. That is a six-week class. I will not be there for the last week’s class, because I accepted a speaking opportunity at the next ACI Advance Forum on DCAA & DCMA Cost, Pricing, Compliance, & Audits. The conference will be held in DC in mid-June. I responded too late to get on the fun Business Systems panel; so instead I’ll be (1) leading a half-day workshop on CPSR preparation, and (2) participating on a panel discussing commercial items. I turned in my agenda for the workshop this weekend.

The year is less than three months old, but it feels like the year is a lot older than that. Reading over this blog post, I think I understand why.

 

Planning for CAS Compliance

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Recently a potential client lost out on a large opportunity—did not make the shortlist—because it could not certify that its cost accounting practices were compliant with CAS. It could not certify that it had submitted, or would submit, a CASB Disclosure Statement. It could not accept the CAS contract clauses that require consistency in cost accounting practices.

It couldn’t accept the CAS requirements because it had not done any of the required planning.

It lost out on a large potential opportunity because it had not committed to CAS compliance. Instead, the company was waiting to see if the contract award would be forthcoming before making the required investments of time and effort and money. The contract didn’t arrive and thus the CAS compliance project was put on hold.

Bummer for them.

Bummer for us.

But the thing is, if you are waiting for an incipient contract award to start your CAS compliance efforts, you’ve really waited far too long. Planning for CAS compliance requires at least a year’s worth of runway; sometimes as many as two or three years’ worth of runway.

Fundamentally, the problem is CAS 401. CAS 401 requires that the cost accounting practices use to prepare cost estimates must be consistent with those to be used for accounting for the contract after award, and for reporting contract costs after award. So the bottom-line is: if you haven’t figured out your cost accounting practices before the cost estimate is generated, you are very likely going to start out contract performance with a CAS 401 noncompliance.

But it’s more than that. Of course it is.

That Disclosure Statement isn’t going to write itself. And it’s not the actual typing of the words, the completion of the fields in the Word table, that is the bugaboo. Nope. The bugaboo is deciding on what the company’s cost accounting practices are, or will be. Companies that don’t have Disclosure Statements also tend not to have well-documented accounting, policies, procedures, and/or practices. Thus, it takes teams (plural) of people coming together to develop a consensus on exactly what the company’s practices are.

Think that’s easy? Nope. Just coming up with an organization structure on which to hang indirect cost pools and allocation bases can take a matter of months. I remember coming up with more than 20 different iterations at one company before we could get something that most people could agree upon. (Some stakeholders never did like the final version.) The accountants and engineers wanted something very precise, while the sales and marketing folks wanted something very flexible. And the program managers just wanted something they could manage to.

And that was just the pools and bases.

If you’ve ever thumbed-through a Disclosure Statement, you’ve realized that it takes more than the accounting folks to fill it out. It can take actuaries, and insurance folks, and manufacturing folks—just to name a few. Most parts of the company need to come together in order to get an accurate Disclosure Statement for submission; and then they need to support that submission through government reviews.

That’s a lot of work. And you really don’t want to be doing all that work at the very same time the company is preparing a large proposal for a CAS-covered opportunity. Nobody is going to have the time—or the focus—to deal with CAS matters when there is a multi-million-dollar proposal in process.

For the above reasons, plus others, a company that wants to pursue CAS-covered contract work needs to commit to the effort early, at least a year but perhaps two or three years in advance of submitting a proposal for that work.

“But what if we don’t win? Won’t all that effort and money just have been wasted?”

For that opportunity, perhaps. But not for the next opportunity or the ones after that.

Committing to CAS compliance is a step that prepares a contractor to compete on a new level, and potentially receive larger contracts. But the key word is “compete.” The company is still going to have to go after the work and then perform well should it receive an award.

But if the company doesn’t invest in CAS compliance, then it has little if any chance of winning those new contracts.

As one company recently learned.

 

The New Normal: Mergers and Acquisitions

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It was dubbed “the Last Supper.”

In 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and his Deputy William Perry hosted the CEOs of the top defense firms and issued the ultimatum that shrinking defense budgets would require consolidation among them. That mean set off “feeding frenzy” (according to one source) in which companies competed to acquire each other, knowing that only a few companies would be left to survive the looming defense budget cuts of the Clinton administration. Within seven years “107 firms had become five,” according to another source.

That was 25+ years ago, but the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions seems very reminiscent of those times.

  • In 2015, Lockheed Martin acquired Sikorsky Aircraft from United Technologies Corporation (UTC) for $9 billion.

  • In 2015, Harris Corporation merged with Exelis, Inc., in a $4.75 billion deal. Exelis itself had been a 2011 spin-off from ITT Corporation. In 2017, the combined company spun-off its government IT business, which is now called Peraton.

  • In 2017, UTC acquired Rockwell Collins in a $30 billion deal, which created Collins Aerospace.

  • In 2018, Northrop Grumman acquired Orbital ATK for $9.2 billion. (Orbital ATK was the successor company from a 2015 merger between Orbital Sciences and Alliant Techsystems.)

  • In 2018, Harris and L3 Corporation merged to create L3 Harris Technologies. Just before the merger, L3 had sold its Vertex Aerospace business to a private equity firm for $540 million. The combined L3 Harris corporation “… will have approximately 48,000 employees and customers in over 100 countries, with an expected net revenue of $16 billion in calendar year 2018,” according to the accompanying press release.

  • In 2018, General Dynamics acquired CSRA, an IT services company, in a deal valued at $9.7 billion. CSRA was already the 39th largest defense contractor, prior to the acquisition.

  • In 2019, UTC and Raytheon Corporation announced that they would merge, creating Raytheon Technologies Corporation sometime in 2020 (depending on when regulatory approvals are received). At the time the merger was announced, the combined entity was projecting $74 billion in annual sales, making it second only to The Boeing Company and well ahead of Lockheed Martin’s annual sales of $60 billion. (The merger of Lockheed and Martin Marietta took place in 1994, just after the “last supper.”)

Also in 2019, Leidos agreed to acquire Dynetics for $1.7 billion; Parker Hannifin acquired Exotic Metals for $1.7 billion; and Pacific Architect and Engineers was acquired by a private equity firm for $1.6 billion. And Fluor Engineering announced its intention to divest itself of its Federal Servicers business.

And the activity continues in 2020. In January, Woodward and Hexcel announced “an all-stock merger of equals.” The combined entity, Woodward Hexcel, is expected to generate roughly $5 billion in sales. Not to be outdone, in January BAE Systems agreed to acquire Collin Aerospace’s GPS business for $1.9 billion and Raytheon’s Airborne Tactical Radio business for $275 million. The GPS business sale is notable because the business is headquartered in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. That was the location of the headquarters of the entity formerly known as Rockwell Collins.

With all that activity, you’d think people would be pretty good at integration, wouldn’t you? Our experience tells us you’d be wrong about that.

Everybody is anxious when an acquisition, merger, or divestiture happens. People wonder if they’ll get laid off. People wonder if the sacrifices they’ve made for their careers will be rewarded, or if they’ll have to start again. Politics is king. And thus, in too many instances the business synergies are not achieved. If studies are to be believed, the majority of such activities don’t reach their objectives. In other words, they fail.

A case in point: the recent problems at The Boeing Company have been attributed to the culture of McDonnell Douglas. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas (MDC) merged in 1997. According to this story:

In a clash of corporate cultures, where Boeing’s engineers and McDonnell Douglas’s bean-counters went head-to-head, the smaller company won out. The result was a move away from expensive, ground-breaking engineering and toward what some called a more cut-throat culture, devoted to keeping costs down and favoring upgrading older models at the expense of wholesale innovation. Only now, with the 737 indefinitely grounded, are we beginning to see the scale of its effects.

‘The fatal fault line was the McDonnell Douglas takeover,’ says Clive Irving, author of Jumbo: The Making of the Boeing 747. ‘Although Boeing was supposed to take over McDonnell Douglas, it ended up the other way around.’

In case you want more than one data point, here’s another story with the same theme. That second article asserts:

It was this MDC-dominated leadership and Board that sent Boeing into a downward spiral. MDC starved Douglas Aircraft for R&D money and relied on derivatives. During the period 1998-2003, Boeing’s R&D fell precipitously … Boeing offered derivatives of in the form of the 737-900 (not today’s more successful ER), 757-300 and 767-400, all sales duds. Boeing talked and talked and talked about new airplanes but had no action.

Thus, the lesson to be learned is that politics and self-dealing can create a culture that leads to sub-optimal outcomes. Just ask any Boeing investor.

From a compliance point of view, there are myriad details to be sorted out. Among those details are: pools, bases and indirect rates; cost accounting practices and disclosure statements; policies, procedures and practices. Restructuring cost savings proposals. Novation agreements. Determining home office functions/activities versus shared service functions/activities versus what takes place at the segment/business unit.

And business systems.

Each of the six DFARS business systems will need to be sorted out. Of all the aspects of a merger/acquisition of two large defense contractors, this may be the most important and least appreciated issue to be sorted out. Each of those six business systems has policies, procedures, and practices that determine how the entity complies with the DFARS business system adequacy criteria. Each of those six business systems is subject to audit/review by government oversight officials. Each of those six business systems can be determined to be inadequate—which leads inexorably to payment withholds. Payment withholds do not look good on the new entity’s cash flow reports.

You’d like to think that each of these large aerospace/defense companies would have a repeatable strategy, a secret formula if you will, for executing these large-scale mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures. You’d like to hope that each of these entities has a team of the best and brightest dedicated to sorting-out all the details and issues that come up, and that would assure the planned business objectives were being met.

And maybe they do!

But we wouldn’t bet on it.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.