Proposed Inflation Adjustments to Acquisition Thresholds
administrator
On February 4, 2010 the FAR Councils published
a proposed rule that will lead to changes in key acquisition
thresholds. This year’s notice of proposed changes is the second of a
series of notices that is mandated by the 2005 National Defense
Authorization Act, which linked the thresholds to inflation experienced
over a 5-year period. In other words, the FAR Councils are required to
revise/update the thresholds every five years (in years evenly
divisible by five).
The
proposed changes are linked to changes in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) including a projection through April 2010. If the final CPI
change is different from the projected change, then the final
thresholds might be different. That said, the rule proposed to revise
key thresholds as follows—
·Increase the simplified acquisition threshold from $100,000 to $150,000.
·Increase the commercial item test program ceiling from $5,500,000 to $6,500,000.
·Increase the threshold for obtaining cost and pricing data from $650,000 to $700,000.
·Increase the threshold for requiring a (non-construction) prime contractor’s subcontracting plan from $550,000 to $650,000.
·Increase the threshold for requiring a construction prime contractor’s subcontracting plan from $1,000,000 to $1,500,000.
The changes listed above create ripple effects throughout the FAR. However,
readers should note that there are no changes to other statutory
requirements. For example, there are no changes to Cost Accounting
Standards (CAS) thresholds. Nor are there any changes to thresholds
applicable to the Davis-Bacon Act, the Service Contract Act, or to any
trade agreements.
Many
contractors tie their internal policies and procedures to the Federal
acquisition thresholds. Consequently, when thresholds are revised in
the FAR, they may want to evaluate the impacts on their internal
command media. We encourage a thorough review of the proposed
threshold changes, to assess how internal guidance might be impacted.
Fraud is Expensive—But is it Expensive Enough?
administrator
In October, 2009 we wrote
about the serious fraud charges facing BAE Systems PLC. We noted
allegations of “bribery and corruption in arms deals in South Africa,
Romania, and the Czech Republic dating back to the 1990’s.” Britain’s
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was seeking an admission of guilt as well as
payment of fines ranging from £500 to £1billion (US$1.6 billion to $3.2 billion at the currency conversion rates in effect at the time). At
the same time, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) was conducting an
investigation into allegations that the US-subsidiary of BAE Systems
“used a U.S. bank to funnel bribes to Saudi Arabian officials.” We
predicted that, “given the current U.S. government stance on contractor
integrity and ethical conduct, a sustained finding in this area could
prove problematic for the company,” since it derived slightly more than half of its £18.5 billion pounds annual revenue from U.S. operations.
Reports
have emerged that on February 5, 2010, BAE Systems settled its case,
agreeing to pay the U.S. $400 million to settle charges of making a
False Statement and agreeing to pay the SFO £30 million (US$47 million)
for improper accounting (“breach of its duty to keep [accurate] accounting records”) in connection with a payment to a former consultant in Tanzania. The settlement
permits BAE Systems to avoid suspension or debarment, and thus to
continue to bid on U.S. government contracts. As such, it is seen as a
victory for the company; its stock price rose 1.6% on the day of the
announcement.
According to the WSJ article linked above—
[BAE’s
CEO] on Friday stressed that the transactions in relation to which the
company pleaded guilty all occurred nearly a decade ago and outside the
U.S. U.S.
court documents detailed what prosecutors allege was BAE's use of
secretive offshore entities and shell companies, and its efforts to
conceal where payments were going, in 1999 deals to lease fighter jets
to Hungary and the Czech Republic. According to prosecutors, BAE
avoided communicating with so-called ‘marketing advisers’ in writing and maintained scant information about its payments. After 2001, prosecutors allege, BAE made payments totalling
more than £135 million and an additional $14 million-plus to marketing
advisers through one offshore entity, according to the court documents.The
U.S. filing also alleges that BAE paid tens of millions of dollars to a
Saudi government official and other associates, as well as to
intermediaries, as recently as 2002. The payments were made as part of
its management of a long-term agreement begun in the 1980s between the
U.K. and Saudi Arabia to supply military hardware to the Saudis, U.S.
prosecutors say.
‘Beginning in 1993, BAE [Systems] knowingly and willfully failed to
identify commissions paid to third parties for assistance in the
solicitation or promotion or otherwise to secure the conclusion of the
sale of defense articles, in violation of its legal obligations,’ the
court documents filed by Justice Department prosecutors said.
Interestingly,
the false statement stemmed not from the payments themselves, but from
management’s assertions and certifications regarding its commitment to
ethical business conduct. As the WSJ article reports, “In the court
documents, prosecutors allege that BAE promised to institute antibribery programs and filed false documents to the U.S. Defense Department stating it had implemented such programs when none existed.”
According to the Financial Times, “BAE ‘undertook no adequate review’ of any of the services it gave the official, the DoJ said, even when the BAE employee who was handling the matter submitted $5m in invoices. The DoJ
said that until early 2002, the company transferred millions more to an
account in Switzerland controlled by an intermediary, though the
company ‘was aware that there was a high probability’ that the payments
would be transferred to the Saudi official.”
We have discussed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) before. We have also discussed,
in passing, the False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. 1001). This is an
interesting blending of the two statutes. The U.S. DOJ certainly
earned its $400 million settlement.
In the U.K. though, watchdog groups are not as sanguine about the paltry settlement negotiated by the SFO. This report from the BBC states that the “Campaign Against the Arms Trade” (CAAT) was “shocked and angered” by the settlement, as well as “outraged and angry,” and ‘dismissed the UK fine as a “tiny price”
for the lucrative deals the company struck. The CAAT spokesperson
asserted that “Ultimately the charges that we see admitted are
administrative charges, not charges of corruption."
This Financial Times article
quotes a former African National Congress MP as calling the settlement
a “travesty of justice.” Certainly, US$400 million is no small
fine—but does the UK settlement of $47 million represent a mere slap on
the wrist? What do you think? Members are encouraged to leave their
comments below.
Why Can’t NASA Manage its Programs?
administrator
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been a topic of interest since President Obama took office more than a year ago and almost immediately ordered an independent review of NASA’s manned space program. That review, carried out by the Augustine Commission, had nothing but bad news for the Administration, reporting “The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory.”
More recently—and perhaps in response to the Augustine Commission’s pessimistic assessment—the Obama
Administration announced a budgetary shift for NASA, giving the agency
more funds for R&D, while taking away funds from the planned return
to the moon—“killing the Constellation program” in the words of this article by the Washington Post. The article explains—
The
old NASA strategy set a destination first, and developed technology --
rockets and a crew capsule -- to get there. The new strategy calls for
pouring billions into space technologies without defining the
destination. The
idea is to create technological flexibility so that astronauts could
potentially visit a variety of locations in the inner solar system,
including the moon, near-Earth asteroids and possibly Mars or the moons
of Mars. The ‘Flexible Path’ strategy was favored by the advisory panel appointed last year by President Obama to review NASA's options.
This article at SpaceNews.com is rather moreoptimistic; it
quotes a NASA executive as saying, “This is a great budget. It’s a
major increase to the science budget. It’s an especially major
increase to the Earth science budget.”
While NASA wrestled with its future vision and mapping a path to manned space missions, back on Earth the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was busy criticizing its unmanned satellite missions, telling Congress that “NASA
frequently exceeded its own acquisition cost and schedule estimates,
even when those estimates were relatively new. In fact, 9 out of 10
projects that have been in implementation for several years significantly exceeded their cost or schedule baseline estimates—all in the last 3 years.”
In
a report released on February 1, 2010, GAO assessed 19 “large-scale”
unmanned NASA projects, of which 15 had entered the “implementation”
phase. Of those 15, GAO concluded that nine of them “experienced
significant cost and/or schedule growth from their project baselines.”
(Four projects were considered to be in the “formulation” phase, and
NASA did not provide GAO with formal cost and schedule information on
them.) GAO reported—
Based
on our analysis, development costs for projects in our review increased
by an average of over 13 percent from their baseline cost
estimates—including one project that increased by over 68 percent—and
an average delay of almost 11 months to their launch dates. These
averages were significantly higher when the four projects that just
entered implementation are excluded. Specifically, there are 10
projects of analytical interest because (1) they are in the
implementation phase, and (2) their baselines are old enough to begin
to track variances. Most of these 10 projects have experienced
significant cost and/or schedule growth, often both. These projects had
an average development cost growth of 18.7 percent—or almost $121.1
million—and schedule growth of over 15 months, and a total increase in
development cost of over $1.2 billion. Over half of this total increase
in development cost—or $706.6 million—occurred in the last year. These
cost growth and schedule delays have all occurred within the last 3
years, and a number of these projects had experienced considerable cost
growth before baselines were established in response to the 2005
statutory reporting requirement.
See GAO’s entire report here.
The GAO report also noted that roughly $1 billion in ARRA funds was
given to NASA, much of which was used to offset some of the cost growth
it reported.
In its report, GAO reviewed six factors that it believed contributed to cost and schedule growth. Those six factors were:
Technology maturity (including maturity of critical technology as well as maturity of heritage technology)
Design stability
Contractor performance
Development partner performance
Funding issues
Launch manifest issues
The
report discussed each of the above factors as they apply to NASA’s
projects. More interestingly, the report devotes two pages of detail
to each individual project. Following are some “highlights” from the
detailed project reports.
Aquarius
Project – Only 16 percent of engineering drawings released at Critical
Design Review (CDR) milestone. No engineering test models because of
funding constraints. Ten month schedule slip and $10.7 million cost
growth.
Ares
I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) – “The Constellation program’s poorly
phased funding plan has diminished the Ares I project’s ability to deal
with technical challenges.”
Glory Project – Only 69 percent of drawing released at CDR. 14 percent cost increase and 10 month schedule slip since rebaselining in FY 2009. Currently, recent launch failure of Taurus XL rocket threatening current scheduled launch date.
James
Webb Space Telescope (JWST) – “The JWST project was re-planned in
fiscal year 2006 after a $1 billion cost increase and a 2-year schedule
delay on the project. In fiscal year 2009, the project established its
baseline with a life cycle cost of $4.96 billion and a June 2014 launch
date. This represents about a $500 million increase over NASA’s 2006 replan figures and has resulted in another 1-year delay of the launch readiness date.”
Kepler – “Since being baselined in fiscal year 2007, Kepler’s
development costs have increased by about 25 percent and its schedule
has increased by 9 months. Project officials attribute the cost and
schedule growth to many things, including a $35 million budget
reduction in fiscal year 2005. This funding instability contributed to
an overall 20-month delay in the project’s schedule and about $169
million in cost growth.”
Mars
Science Laboratory (MSL) – “MSL’s cost has grown over $660 million
because of technological and engineering problems. This includes more
than a 68 percent increase in development costs. The project is using a
25-month schedule delay to work on overcoming technical challenges with
the actuators and avionics that were the primary drivers for the slip.”
Solar
Dynamics Observatory (SDO – “SDO’s design was not stable at the
critical design review (CDR). Following this review, the project
experienced nearly a 1,200 percent overall increase in the number of
releasable drawings expected. Project officials said only drawings for
in-house structures, such as propulsion systems, electronics,
instrument ports, the high-gain antenna system,
and the spacecraft, were considered at CDR. Drawings for the
instruments were not included and flight drawings were only in draft
form at CDR. The project estimated it released less than 63 percent of
engineering drawings at each of their instrument-level CDRs.”
From
one point of view, the GAO report is a litany of project management
failures. But from another point of view, the report tells various
stories of individual project teams doing the best they could in
difficult circumstances, trying to create state-of-the-art scientific
instruments and manage complex systems, while being held to unrealistic
budgets and almost impossible launch schedules.
Very
few people care about the difficulties and the challenges of the NASA
missions; they prefer to criticize the easy targets of cost growth and
schedule slip. Even though we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. firmly
maintain that projects can be managed to successful cost, schedule,
quality and performance objectives, we also understand the difficulties
faced by these project teams. We are reminded of this saying by Theodore Roosevelt, spoken before the Sorbonne in 1910—
It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out howthe strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better.
The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face
is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs
and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without
error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great
devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best,
knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the
worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his
place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither
victory nor defeat.
Too Big to Fail? Airbus and the A400M Transport
administrator
We
reported before on Airbus’ problems with its new A400M military
transport plane. It’s the typical development scenario, over budget
and behind schedule. Only
this time, Airbus entered into fixed price contracts for its planes,
meaning that any cost growth would become a loss unless contracts were
renegotiated to provide additional funding. Adding complexity is the fact that the program has at least seven international participants (such as South Africa) while Airbus, as a subsidiary of EADS, is owned by “core shareholders” the State of France, French conglomerateLagardère,the Spanish Government, and the German company Daimler.In other words, some of the A440M customers are also the company’s owners! Another interesting aspect is the various stories about a recent report prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) that said “management had consistently underestimated the costs of the programme”
and that the €20 billion ($28 billion) program would be overrun by at
least €11 billion, or more than 50 percent of the original budget.
Ouch!
At the heart of the issue is who should pay for the overrun.
Airbus naturally wants to push additional funding needs back to its
customers; but those same customers (some of whom are also owners)
think that Airbus needs to pay for its own mistakes. The Financial
Times article (link above) reported that “Hervé Morin, French defence minister, said EADS would have to bear a ‘very significant share’ of the cost overruns on a programme.”
The PwC report allegedly said that Airbus could absorb up to €7.6
billion in overruns “without problem” – but that conclusion was
rejected by Airbus, as was the entire PwC report, which was
characterized as a negotiating ploy.
Meanwhile, the Airbus CEO threatened to cancel the entire program if its European customers didn’t provide more funding. According to the BBC article in the link,
Ditching the A400M would cost EADS some 5.7bn euros in advance payments - more than double the 2.4bn euros it has already set aside to cover losses it expects to incur from the project. Some analysts believe, therefore, that there is too much at stake for Airbus to cancel the project. ‘Airbus's
posturing over the A400M is a tactic to extract more governmental aid
to secure funding to ensure that contracts can be met,’ said Saj Ahmad, an independent aerospace analyst. ‘If
the A400M is terminated, Airbus faces the prospect of a
several-billion-euro compensation bill that would obliterate its cash
reserve and decimate its stock value.’ But others believe that the company could axe the plane to avoid further losses. ‘There will come a point where it is better for EADS to simply walk away,’ said Nomura aerospace analyst Jason Adams. Doing
so would severely damage Airbus' reputation and boost arch rival
Boeing, which has seen the order book for its A400M rival, the C-17,
swell.
European
customers are reportedly divided on how best to proceed. The UK and
France want to move ahead briskly toward completion, while Germany
wants to slow the program down in order to spread the overrun over more
years. Talks are underway now. According to this report,
the airplane’s European customers “are ready to contribute” as much as
€3.5 billion towards the program’s cost growth. But the offer has not
(as of this date) accepted the offer, “as it falls short of the €4.4
billion it is asking for.” In late breaking news, this article
reports that the core funding offer is €2.0 billion, with additional
tranches of “reimbursable advances” (i.e., loans) in the range of €1.0
to €1.5 billion being offered to Airbus to help close the funding gap.
There is one additional driver that is rarely mentioned. As this New York Times article notes—
European
Aeronautic Defense & Space, the parent company of Airbus, has said
it wants to clarify what its share of the more than €7 billion in A400M
cost overruns will be so it can book them in its 2009 financial
results, rather than carry them over into the first quarter of 2010.
EADS’s 2009 accounts are scheduled to be published March 9, and
financial market regulations require that they be audited by an outside
accounting firm — a process that normally takes about four weeks.
Last
week, the international ratings agency Fitch warned that failure to
reach an accord, or an agreement to EADS’s disadvantage, could lead it
to downgrade the company’s BBB-plus credit rating. Any rating cut would
increase the rate of interest EADS would have to pay on future
borrowings in the capital markets. Failure
to reach a solution in time for the close of EADS’s 2009 accounts
‘makes a downgrade more likely,’ said the person with knowledge of the
talks.
While
Airbus’ A380 commercial aircraft program is routinely discussed for its
past program and supply chain management “challenges,” the A400M
military program is emerging as the current “financial albatross”
weighing down the company. While it is easy to see (with hindsight)
that early commitment to a fixed-price per aircraft was a huge misstep,
we wonder what other “lessons learned” will emerge from this
problem-plagued program.
Rough Ride for the F-35
administrator
We’ve been holding off discussion of the F-35 “Lightning II” Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) until things settled down a bit. Well, things haven’t really settled down, but there’s enough news that it seems a good time to take stock of the program.
Readers will recall our previous article,
in which we inquired how much the JSF will really cost its
customers—both in the US and abroad—and noted that “time will tell who
has the best at-completion estimate, the Pentagon JET evaluators or the
program team.” Since then, the Obama Administration has moved to eliminate the alternate engine competition, purchases of production aircraft have been delayed, the Pentagon has fired its Program Manager, and SecDef Gates announced that Lockheed Martin will lose $614 million in budgeted award fees based on the program’s problematic performance. Oh, and a leaked Navy briefing reported that—
… over
the lifetime of the fleet - the carrier-based and STOVL JSF versions
will cost the Navy 40 per cent more, in total operating costs, than the
F/A-18C/Ds and AV-8Bs that they replace. (The older aircraft costs are
taken from FY2008 and include a lot of aging-aircraft issues.) This is
despite a smaller fleet and fewer flight hours: the new aircraft are expected to cost more than 60 per cent more to fly per hour than their predecessors.
The
Navy report suggests that the total cost of the Pentagon's JSF program
will be $705 billion in FY2002 dollars, just over twice the figure
predicted at the program's inception.
But that’s not all. In response to our previous question, DefenseNews.com reported that the
Pentagon is accepting the Joint Estimating Team (JET) budget
projection, and consequently is adding $314 billion to the program’s
official budget (over a five-year period). But not content to stop
there, the article reported that USD (AT&L) Dr. Ash Carter “is set
to order [yet another] bottom-up review of the program and its costs.”
In the words of SecDef
Gates, “Progress and performance of the F-35 over the past two years
has not been what it should, as a number of key goals and benchmarks
were not met.”
It
should not be forgotten that the F-35 is truly an international fighter
development and production program, with eight other nations
participating in its funding. Those other nations are getting nervous
that delays and cut-backs in the number of aircraft being purchased
will raise the per-craft price—and as the per-craft price has risen,
those countries have begun to consider cutting-back their production
orders even more.
This article discusses the increase in price to the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and states that the aircraft’s price “has risen from £37m each four years ago to £62m now.”
As a result, “a consensus has emerged … that they cannot afford the 140
American Joint Strike Fighters … they had been seeking. … One
compromise would be for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to halve its order from 140 planes to 70.”
Officially,
the program calls for delivery of 5,500 aircraft—2,400 to the US and
3,100 to the international partners. Lockheed Martin asserts that it
can manage the program and catch-up schedule, while controlling cost
growth. If it cannot, it may find itself the builder of a white
elephant fighter whose lack of economies of scale make the plane
unaffordable for its international partners. The stakes are high, not
only for Lockheed Martin (whose stock has been downgraded based at
least in part on its F-35 problems), but also for the US Air Force.
Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.