DFARS, WSARA, MDAPs, and Competition
We’ve discussed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) (P.L. 111-23) before, notably here and here. You can find a nice summary of the recent law over here.
Section 202 of WSARA requires the Secretary of Defense to (among other actions) “ensure
fair and objective `make-buy' decisions by prime contractors on major
defense acquisition programs.” According to Senator Levin’s analysis,
this requirement was driven by a July 2008 Defense Science Board report
that “consolidation in the defense industry has
substantially reduced innovation in the defense industry and created
incentives for major contractors to maximize profitability on
established programs rather than seeking to improve performance.”
The requirement assumes that prime contractors would rather vertically integrate that subcontract work to outside entities. It also assumes that competition—or the threat of competition—will spur defense contractors at all tiers in the program supply chain to better performance. Of particular note, this Section of the law assumes that “government oversight of [contractor] make-or-buy decisions” will “maximize competition throughout the life of a program,” including maximizing competition a lower tiers in the supply chain.
While
you cogitate on those dubious assumptions, we’ll let you know that on
February 24, 2010, the Defense Department published DFARS Case
2009-D014 implementing Section 202 of WSARA as an “interim rule with
request for comments.” Here is a link to the entire Federal Register Notice.
The
interim rule notes that it is simply a change to “internal Government
operating procedures,” and thus should not significantly impact
contractors. You may not agree with that assessment—but remember it
applies only to acquisitions of “major defense acquisition programs”
(MDAPs) as that phrase is defined at 10 U.S.C. 2430.
Here are some highlights of the interim rule:
· Acquisition
plans for MDAPs must include measures that “ensure competition at both
the prime contract level and subcontract level (at such tier or tiers
as are appropriate….”
· “Require
prime contractors to give full and fair consideration to qualified
sources other than the prime contractor for the development or
construction of major subsystems and components of major weapon systems.”
· “Provide
for Government surveillance of the process by which prime contractors
consider such sources and determine whether to conduct such development
or construction in-house or through a subcontract.”
· “Provide
for the assessment of the extent to which the prime contractor has
given full and fair consideration to qualified sources in sourcing
decisions as a part of past performance evaluations.”
A couple of quick comments on the foregoing.
First, there is little or no basis to think that prime contractors
aren’t subbing-out work. The plain fact is that most MDAP prime
contractors only self-perform about 10 to 20 percent of the program;
the rest is subbed-out. (Granted, some of that “subcontracted effort”
is going to other divisions of the prime.) Second, make-buy decisions
are already reviewed during DCMA
Contractor Purchasing System Reviews (CPSRs). In reality, then, these
efforts aren’t going to make much a difference. So who cares, right?
Well,
what worries us is the language that seems to suggest that the
government oversight can go beyond the prime contractor’s efforts, and
evaluate make-or-buy decisions at lower tiers in the program supply
chain. It is possible that a second-tier, third-tier, or even lower
tier’s make/buy analysis could be subject to DCMA scrutiny. Why is
that a problem?
First,
the government has no privity of contract with those lower-tier
contractors. In other words, the contracts are between the performing
entity and its next higher-tier, and the government is not a party to
that agreement and has precious few enforcement rights. For example, if a second-tier entity commits defective pricing, the government’s
remedy is at the prime contractor level, not at the tier where the
actual violation occurred. If the prime wants to be made whole, then
it has to take its subcontractor to court. So how does the Government get rights to the lower tier subcontractors with respect to implementing its oversight of the make/buy decisions, and what does it do if it doesn’t like what it finds?
To be litigated, we assume.
Second, where does DCMA get the resources to implement the requirements of this public law? The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (about whom we’ve posted more than a few articles) had this to say about the subject in its Special Report No. 1 (“Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse”):
There
have been too few experts to conduct reviews and too few personnel to
validate that contractor corrective action was properly implemented. …
Another indication of personnel shortages is the small number of DCMA
personnel devoted to contractor purchasing system reviews (CPSR). The
number of personnel assigned to perform CPSR reviews has decreased from
102 in 1994 to 70 in 2002, to 14 in 2009. Contract transactions, on the
other hand, have increased by 328 percent since fiscal year 2000. This
steep decline in personnel, combined with the exponential increase in
contracting activity, demonstrates a diminishing level of DCMA critical
analysis of contractor purchasing systems.
So,
with only 14 heads to perform CPSR reviews, DCMA is going to take on
the added challenge of reviewing not only prime contractor make-or-buy
decisions, but also the make/buy analyses of the lower tier
subcontractors as well? Sure. No problem.
And the results of those analyses will be reported in the year 2220, if ever.
As
readers know, we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. are very much in favor
of improved contract performance. We are also in favor of improved
subcontractor management. And we believe that the defense industry can
do a lot better than it currently does in both of those domains. Yet
we are forced to question whether this aspect of WSARA will
significantly address any shortfalls. We believe the odds are that
this will simply become another bureaucratic report-writing exercise, diverting resources from where they are really needed.
If
you agree with our assessment, perhaps you will let the Ms. Meredith
Murphy of the DAR Council know by submitting your comments in
accordance with the directions specified in the interim rule (link
above).
It’s Been 24 Hours, Time for Another Procurement Fraud Story
We’re
aware that the Apogee Consulting, Inc. is in danger of becoming the
“all-fraud, all-the-time” website. A couple of days ago, we vented a bit
about the sad state of the public procurement process, where we noted
“Not a week goes by without a story of corruption, bribery, and/or
fraud hitting the internet.” A day later, we reported allegations
that defense employees were stealing military firearms (potentially
including .50 caliber machine gun parts) and selling them after hours.
Well, we skipped a day or two, but now we’re back with yet another
story of corruption in the Federal contracting arena. Forget that bit
about “not a week goes by”—it’s now hard to go 24 hours without hearing
about some type of wrongdoing.
Either
the number of incidents of corruption has skyrocketed recently, or the
investigators and prosecutors are getting better at ferreting it out.
Maybe it’s a little of both …
Today’s story is brought to you by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), as are most of these stories. The DOJ oversees the National Procurement Fraud Task Force (NPFTF). The NPFTF is “committed to detecting, investigating, and prosecuting procurement, grant, and Recovery Act fraud.” A
visit to the NPFTF website (link above) reveals sordid tales of
corruption, from the relatively quotidian (“Former Pittston Area School
Board Member Sentenced to 12 Months for “corrupt receipt of a reward”)
to the more ominous (“Former Junction City Mayor Sentenced to 24 months
for taking bribes from builder”). Naturally, there are also many
stories of procurement fraud and corruption related to military
contracts.
Back to today’s story which can be found here.
The headline is simple: “Former Representative of Backfill
Subcontractor Sentenced to 33 Months in Jail for Kickback and Fraud
Scheme”. The press release reveals that “James E. Haas Jr., a former
representative of a New Jersey subcontractor that provides common
backfill, a type of soil material used to refill an excavation”
was sentenced on February 23, 2010 to 33 months in jail, a $30,000
fine, and ordered to pay the EPA $53,000 in restitution. What was the
crime? According to the press release—
[Haas]
engaged in a kickback and fraud conspiracy at the Federal Creosote
Superfund site, located in Manville, N.J. Haas admitted to paying
kickbacks to former employees of a prime contractor at Federal Creosote
in exchange for the award of a subcontract to the company he
represented. He also admitted to inflating bid prices for the
subcontract to include the amount of the kickbacks paid to his
co-conspirators. Haas also pleaded guilty to committing fraud against
the United States.
Haas
wasn’t the only malefactor. The DOJ announced that “To date, a total
of three companies and eight individuals have pleaded guilty as part of
the investigation.” The investigation has been conducted by the DOJ,
the EPA’s Inspector General, and the IRS Criminal Investigation team. (We guess the fraudsters forgot to report the income from their illegal activities. Tsk, tsk.)
Really, what else can be said? If there’s any lessons
to be learned, it’s that that companies need to be vigilant in
implementing—and testing—appropriate internal controls. Fraudsters
need to be detected. That “prime contractor” whose employee accepted
kickbacks should have been caught by the contractor. Moreover, having strong internal controls acts to prevent potential fraudsters from committing wrongdoing.
In
our experience, companies are reluctant to invest in their internal
controls, and reluctant to test those controls through internal audits
and other means. They prefer to trust their employees to do the right
thing. As these stories show, there are too many employees who take
advantage of that trust (naïveté?) to engage
in fraud and corruption. It’s time to get serious about detecting and
preventing wrongdoing, so that the number of these stories declines.
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Should Contractor Payment Withholds Be Mandatory?
Readers with excellent memories may recall that we posted
back in January that the Defense Department had issued a proposed DFARS
revision that would impact oversight activities related to contractor
“business systems” (which is the new description for what used to be
called internal control systems). The first thing we want to do is to
remind you that comments on the proposed rule are due March 16, 2010.
If you want to submit comments—and, believe us, you really do want to submit comments—follow the link above and you’ll see how and where to submit comments.
One
of the more controversial aspects of the proposed rule is that, for
contractors who have their business systems determined to be
“unapproved” or “inadequate” or to “contain significant deficiencies”,
the Government will impose payment withholds on the payments it would
otherwise be making. (By the way, the proposed rule seems to use those
three terms interchangeably, which is
a good indication of the amount of thought and effort that went into
the proposed language.) How much can the Government withhold? Glad
you asked. The proposed language seems to say that the first step is a
10% withhold, meaning that if you billed the Government $1,000, the
Government would pay you $900 and keep $100 until you corrected your
business system deficiencies to its (read: DCAA’s) satisfaction. If
you needed that $100 to make payroll or pay vendors, that’s too bad.
But
the proposed rule permits the DOD Administrative Contracting Officer
(ACO) to withhold even larger percentages—as much as 50 percent. In
some situations, where the ACO determines “that there are one or more
system deficiencies that are highly likely to lead to improper contract
payments being made,” then “the ACO will withhold up to one-hundred
percent of payments….” Ouch!
And note the language, the use of the imperative “will withhold”. Many would argue, and will be arguing on March 16th,
that the FAR already gives the ACO discretion to withhold or otherwise
reduce payments to protect the Government’s interests. They ask why
the DOD needs a new rule, when the existing rule works just fine, thank
you very much. We’ll tell you why: the new rule takes away the ACO’s
discretion and makes the payment withholds mandatory.
Why is that such a big deal, we hear you asking. Well, take a look at this story over at GovExec.com.
Mr. Robert Brodsky (who regularly reports on oversight and audit
matters, and does a good job at it) reports that two “commanding
generals” directed a Contracting Officer to ignore DCAA’s
recommendation to implement payment withholds on invoices submitted by
KBR, Inc. under its LOGCAP III contract. According
to the story, the generals were swayed by KBR’s warnings that such
impacts to its cash flow would hurt its ability to continue to support
the troops in Iraq. KBR also promised to pass on the payment withholds
to its subcontractors, which would negatively impact them as well.
According to the DOD IG report on which the article is based, the Army
accepted without verification KBR’s warnings and deferred the payment
withholds.
There’s more to the story, of course. In this case, the issue was not with KBR’s business systems (which the DCAA was in the process of shredding anyway). The issue was that KBR’s LOGCAP Task Order(s) were “undefinitized
contract actions” (UCAs)—meaning that KBR was told to start work even
though it had not yet negotiated a final price with the Army. The FAR
directs that, in such circumstances, payments cannot exceed 85 percent
of costs incurred. Normally this should not be an undue hardship,
since the FAR requires definitization within six months. But in this
case the period in which KBR was performing under the UCA extended for more than three years. The IG report does not say what the hold-up was, but we bet DCAA’s preoccupation with KBR’s alleged estimating system deficiencies had something to do with it.
So the DOD IG (and most of the mainstream media reporting the story) thinks the Army improperly showed favoritism to KBR and “illegally” waived mandatory payment withholds. Maybe.
But maybe the independent discretion vested in a warranted Contracting
Officer should mean something, as well. Maybe we need flexibility in
our procurement rules that permits field personnel to do what’s
necessary—especially in times of war.
We
might also point out another lesson that comes from this story. This
was an instance of mandatory payment withholds that weren’t
implemented. What makes anybody think other Contracting Officers won’t
ignore the new DFARS mandatory withhold rule as well? Think about it.
If the potential impact(s) of a 15 percent withhold could be used to
persuade commanding generals that imposition would adversely affect
their mission, how will the potential impact(s) of a 50% or even
100% payment withholds be perceived? Our guess is that DOD’s military
and civilian leadership will be even more reluctant to impose those
withholds—and we bet that the Courts will be reluctant to enforce such
punitive measures that lack any relationship to the Government’s risk
of overpayment.
Real Acquisition Reform
With all the hoopla surrounding program cost growth and schedule slips, and the resulting calls for “acquisition reform”—and even some statutory steps in that direction—one might think there have been put forward some innovative suggestions. Nope. As we posted recently, most of the “conventional wisdom” in this area is wrong, and most “reformers” are more aptly described as PWACs—Persons Without A Clue.
So it is with a great deal of satisfaction that we can finally point to one recommended acquisition reform step that, if implemented, would save the taxpayers a great deal of money—as well as increasing efficiency within program supply chains. What makes this step even more interesting is that it comes from an unlikely source: the Defense Department Inspector General (DOD IG). Talk about adding value!
Here’s the DOD IG report that caught our eye and sparked our fascination. It’s a report from October 2009, just released (in redacted form) in mid-February 2010. It discusses the volatility of titanium pricing, and suggests some ways in which the DOD could better control the pricing it receives for this commodity. Why in the world would it take auditors to recommend such a fundamental—nay, basic—strategic acquisition approach? But before we get too wrapped up the obviousness of the recommendation, let’s look at what the DOD IG had to say.
First, the IG noted that certain contracts (notably the multi-year contract for the Navy F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet) contained economic price adjustment contract clauses. These clauses are designed to provide automatic contract price adjustments based “on changes in the economic behavior of the national economy.” Without these contracts, contractors would have to price in the risk that certain commodities would suffer price increases; should those increases not materialize then the contractors would receive a windfall. Essentially, the clauses turn otherwise fixed-price contracts into limited forms of cost-reimbursement contract—but only for the commodity covered and only to the extent that the market price for that commodity moves outside certain bounds, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in its producer price index (PPI) reports.
In this case, the commodity in question is titanium. Titanium is a strong, lightweight metal with an exceptional strength-to-weight ratio, elevated temperature performance, and corrosion resistance. It is used in a variety of applications, most notably in jet engines and airframe components. The IG reported that, in 2007, “an estimated 76 percent of domestic titanium metal was used in aerospace applications.” There are three major domestic titanium suppliers: TIMET, ATI, and RTI.
The IG found that “the BLS producer price index for titanium mill shapes, used in the economic price adjustment clause of the Navy F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet contract, was outdated and subject to extreme market volatility, as it was primarily based on spot market prices. The index was also too narrow to be used in DOD multiyear contracts…” But the DOD IG had more to say on the subject of titanium pricing.
It reported that “DOD had not effectively mitigated its risk for titanium material price increases… As a result, Defense aerospace weapons systems were subject to higher market prices for titanium material based on supply and demand of titanium in the commercial marketplace.” It provided three root causes for this situation:
1. DOD suppliers of titanium components had not always secured titanium material on long-term contracts and material purchased at market prices carried a significantly higher price that got passed through to DOD contracts.
2. DOD multiyear contracts that used the BLS producer price index for titanium mill shapes were not effective because the BLS index was outdated, primarily based on spot market prices, and too narrow an index.
3. DOD does not have a strategic purchasing program for titanium to leverage buying power, take advantage of economies of scale, and secure prices on longterm contracts when acquiring titanium products.
The DOD IG noted that the DOD requires between 20 and 30 million pounds of titanium annually. Importantly, the Pentagon could save “from $100 million to $300 million annually” if it purchased half of its needs via a long-term contract instead of having its contractors purchase it at market prices. As evidence for that assertion, the IG reported on how the titanium price volatility had affected the F/A-18 contract prices, noting that “The material price increase related to titanium costs for the FY 2007 through FY 2009 performance period was $129 million, which accounted for more than 66 percent of the total material cost increases during that period of performance.”
The IG concluded:
DOD was subject to market volatility in titanium material pricing because DOD did not have a strategic purchasing program for titanium to leverage buying power, take advantage of economies of scale, and secure prices on long-term contracts when acquiring titanium products. Also, DOD had limited options when purchasing titanium because of the restriction on the acquisition of specialty metals under title 10, United States Code, section 2533b.
The IG recommended that the DOD adopt a strategic materials management process with respect to titanium, and noted that DOD had requested this step in an April 2008 report to Congress. The IG reported:
The Strategic Materials Protection Board concluded that the National Defense Stockpile should reshape into the Strategic Materials Security Program. They stated that this program could have the programmatic flexibility to efficiently and effectively acquire the right materials and to ensure that essential strategic materials are available to respond to current and future needs and threats, including the ability to more fully project material needs and the ability to leverage the buying power of DOD and other Federal agencies by aggregating materials requirements and negotiating long-term strategic procurement arrangements. In line with the conclusions of the National Defense Stockpile April 2009 Report to Congress, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, in conjunction with the Administrator, Defense National Stockpile Center, Defense Logistics Agency, should develop a strategic purchasing program for titanium with U.S. titanium producers to leverage buying power, take advantage of economies of scale, and secure prices on long-term contracts when acquiring titanium products.
This is real acquisition reform, folks. This is a relatively simple two-step process that could save the DOD from $100 to $300 million each year. That money could go to other needs, or back to the taxpayers. So what is Congress waiting for?
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