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Apogee Consulting Inc

Payments Under Undefinitized Contract Actions

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Recently we discussed use of payment withholds to spur contractor action to correct alleged deficiencies in its various internal control systems (now called “business systems” for an unknown reason).  We noted (and linked to) a recent controversy about whether DOD showed favoritism or exercised improper influence with respect to its largest Logistics Capability (LOGCAP) contractor, KBR.  The story is that two commanding generals in the Southwest Theater of Operations directed the cognizant Contracting Officer not to impose a 15 percent payment withhold on KBR’s invoices, even though it was operating under a Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) and the FAR seemingly required such a withhold.  Eventually an official waiver was granted, but in the meantime the situation was … murky. We noted that applicable statute and regulation requires definitization of UCA generally within 6 months, but KBR had been performing without a definitized Task Order for more than three years.  Our position on this issue is pretty straightforward.  If the DOD can’t get its act together and negotiate a firm price within the required timeframe, then it is unfair to penalize the contractor, who must continue to perform regardless.  DOD’s failure to comply with law and regulation gives it “unclean hands” and it should not profit, to the other contracting party’s detriment, in such circumstances.

In what is perhaps a related move, on March 5, 2010 the DOD published in the Federal Register a revision to DFARS, implementing an interim rule, to make “the limitations on payment of costs prior to definitization of unpriced change orders applicable to all categories of undefinitized contractual actions.”  The interim rule purports to implement § 812 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act.  What it does is revise one sentence and adding a new sentence.  According to the rule (found here)—

Section 217.7401 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2) and adding

paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:

217.7401  Definitions.

* * * * *

    (a) * * *

    (2) It includes task orders and delivery orders.

    (3) It does not include change orders, administrative changes, funding modifications, or any other contract modifications that are within the scope and under the terms of the contract, e.g., engineering change proposals, value engineering change proposals, and over and above work requests as described in Subpart 217.77. For policy relating to definitization of change orders, see 243.204-70.

As always, the public may submit comments to www.regulations.gov, citing DFAR Case 2009-D035.


 

New DFARS Rule Focuses on Role of Contractors in Crisis Situations

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Last September we told you about an August 2009 DOD Class Deviation that addressed continuity of mission critical services that will “enable agencies to continue their essential functions across a broad spectrum of emergencies.”  The Class Deviation provided DOD Contracting Officers with clauses that contained language directed at certain contractors, such as “expected to use their best efforts to continue providing such services, in accordance with the terms and conditions of their contracts even during periods of crisis."  We noted that the new clauses might create some ambiguity between them and the “excusable delays” and “termination for default” clauses, which specify rights and remedies for the contracting parties when the contractor cannot perform the work.  Finally, we opined that “it is nice to require ‘full cooperation’ during times of emergency, but it is doubtful how much contractors can actually do to compel employees to come to work, if they choose not to.”

So it should not come as any great surprise that on March 5, 2010, DOD published in the Federal Register notification of intent to promulgate an interim rule codifying its 2009 Class Deviation into an official DFARS regulation.  See the Federal Register notice here.

The interim rule established a new DFARS Subpart—237.76 “Continuation of Essential Contractor Services”—that provides definitions of the terms relevant to the issue, a policy statement, and a new contract clause for DOD contracts.  The new clause (252.237-7023) performs much the same function as the clause(s) contained in the Class Deviation.  It puts the contractor on notice that some or all of its services provided under the contract are considered to be “essential contractor services” as that term is defined in the regulations, it requires preparation of a written plan “for continuing the performance of essential contractor services … during a crisis,” and requires notification and cooperation in the event of non-performance.  For cost accountants, note that the clause requires segregation of all costs incurred in “continuing performance of essential services in a crisis situation,” as well as notification of any associated contract cost impact within 90 days after commencement of those continued services. Finally, this language in the new clause caught our attention:  “As directed by the Contracting Officer, the Contractor shall participate in training events, exercises, and drills associated with Government efforts to test the effectiveness of continuity of operations procedures and practices.”

On a related note, the DFARS revision is being promulgated as an “interim rule” because “This action is necessary to ensure that essential contractor services are not interrupted by crises such as those caused by hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, blizzards, floods, or pandemic influenza.”  Curiously, we were unable to locate any mention of the existing Class Deviation, which would seem to reduce the urgency of the matter.

As always, the public may submit comments on new promulgations at www.regulations.gov.  Mention DFARS Case 2009-D017 in your submission, should you choose to make one.




 

Cyber Protection May Become a Contract Compliance Issue

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We have written about cyber threats and cyber security before.  (For example, see this post.)  To our disappointment, such articles receive few hits.  The threat is real and requires thoughtful preparation in order to successfully defend against it.  Now, perhaps, our readers will consider the issue from a different angle, as DOD seems poised to make cyber security a matter of contract compliance.

On March 3, 2010 the DOD published an “Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) and notice of public meeting” in connection with DFARS Case 2008-D028, Safeguarding Unclassified Information.  See the Federal Register notice here.

The summary of the rule is as follows—

DoD is seeking comments from Government and industry on potential changes to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to address requirements for the safeguarding of unclassified information. The changes would add a new subpart and associated contract clauses for the safeguarding, proper handling, and cyber intrusion reporting of unclassified DoD information within industry. … This ANPR does not address procedures for Government sharing of cyber security threat information with industry; this issue will be addressed separately through follow-on rulemaking procedures as appropriate.

Among the potential changes being considered is the addition of two new DFARS contract clauses.  “DFARS 252.204–7XXX would require contractors to protect DoD information from unauthorized disclosure, loss, or exfiltration by employing basic information technology security measures, while DFARS 252.204–7YYY would require enhanced information technology security measures applicable to encryption of data for storage and transmission, network protection and intrusion detection, and cyber intrusion reporting.”  In addition, “A cyber intrusion reporting requirement is contemplated for enhanced protection to assess the impact of loss and to improve protection by better understanding the methods of loss.”

The ANPR states that a public meeting will be held on April 22, 2010 at NASA’s James W. Webb Memorial Auditorium in SE Washington, D.C.  (Details are in the Federal Register notice, link above.)  In lieu of speaking at the all-day meeting, you can submit written comments and answers to questions posed by the DAR Council.  At the meeting, “DoD is interested in receiving input regarding ‘‘best practices’’ for protecting networks and data, experience with any of the proposed safeguards, and an evaluation of its value.”  The rule drafters have provided 13 questions that they hope industry will answer, so help them craft the proposed rule.

Our take on this is that DOD and its contractors are in this together.  It was less than a year ago, in April of 2009, when the Wall Street Journal (among others) reported that “Computer spies have broken into the Pentagon's $300 billion Joint Strike Fighter project ….”  According to the story (found here)—

Computer systems involved with the program appear to have been infiltrated at least as far back as 2007, according to people familiar with the matter. Evidence of penetrations continued to be discovered at least into 2008. The intruders appear to have been interested in data about the design of the plane, its performance statistics and its electronic systems, former officials said.

The intruders compromised the system responsible for diagnosing a plane's maintenance problems during flight, according to officials familiar with the matter.

So it seems entirely appropriate for the DOD to consider issuing basic standards of minimum cyber protection to its industrial base, and to require reporting (including root cause analyses) when network breaches occur and data is compromised.  And we applaud the opportunity offered industry to help shape the rule and its implementation.  We hope knowledgeable companies will help DOD craft a good rule that is easily implementable.

After that, companies will need to comply with the requirements of the new contract clauses, or else risk accusations of breach of contract (or worse).  Remember, when BAE Systems recently paid the U.S. Government $400 million, the fine was imposed for False Statements associated with certain representations and certifications made to the Government, and not necessarily for any other alleged wrongdoing.




 

Changes to Socioeconomic Program Rules

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The various constituencies that comprise the U.S. Government’s socioeconomic program are difficult to track and report.  Just off the top of our heads, contractors subject to socioeconomic program reporting requirements need to track awards made to general Small Businesses, Small Disadvantaged Businesses, Woman-Owned Small Businesses, Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses.  Not to mention HUBZone area businesses, Labor Surplus area businesses, 8(a) businesses, and ANCs.  Naturally, socioeconomic reports generally contain numerous inaccuracies, mostly made inadvertently.  But sometimes there is a knowing failure to report accurately, which leads to legal and financial problems.

Even more difficult is navigating the procurement rules that apply to each “flavor” of socioeconomic program.  For example, contracts can be set aside for only 8(a) firms to bid on, but only if the contracting officer’s market research indicates that two or more responsible entities are available to compete for the work—unless, of course, one of the prospective bidders is an Alaska Native Corporation (ANC) in which case the contract need not be competed and can be awarded on a “sole-source” basis to the ANC. 

If you are a Contracting Officer in the employ of the Federal government, figuring out which program has priority over the others is a non-trivial challenge.  Recently, there has been significant controversy in the socioeconomic program prioritization, with GAO determining that the SBA’s interpretation of socioeconomic program statutory language was flawed, and the OMB directing Contracting Officers to ignore the GAO’s interpretation in favor of the SBA’s interpretation.  Over at the WIFCON Blogsite, “Don Acquisition” had this to say on the subject, back in November 2009—

There has been a considerable amount of controversy over the last year or so in the area of small business programs. In International Program Group, Inc., (B—400278, B—400308, 19 September 2008) the Government Accountability Office (GAO) held that HUBZone set-asides took priority over service-disabled veteran-owned small business (SDVOSB) set-asides and SDVOSB sole source acquisitions. This was unsurprising given the clear language in the FAR. In Mission Critical Solutions (B—401057, 4 May 2009) (also see reconsideration), the GAO held that the HUBZone set-asides took precedence over the 8(a) program. This was surprising given the clear language of the FAR. Of note in both cases was that the GAO solicited and rejected the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) interpretation of the applicable statutes, which was that there was parity among the 8(a), HUBZone, and SDVOSB programs. It was after the latter case that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) stepped in with a memorandum advising agencies to disregard the two GAO decisions and providing the following guidance:


Pending the completion of the legal review of the GAO's decisions by the Executive Branch, the SBA's ‘parity’ regulations should not be disregarded by contracting officers, and Federal agencies should not, as a result of the GAO's decisions, be compelled to prioritize HUBZone small businesses over 8(a) BD or SDVOSBs. Instead, until the legal review is completed, Federal agencies should continue to give active consideration to each small business program pursuant to their pre-existing contracting practices and ‘parity’ policies.


Remarkably, this guidance 1) assumes that contracting officers had been following the parity policies implemented in SBA's regulations and 2) implies that, henceforth, contracting officers are free to treat HUBZone, SDVOSB, and 8(a) contractors as equals. There is no acknowledgement of the fact that there were no pre-existing "parity" policies in the FAR. Prior to the GAO decisions, the FAR Council issued a proposed rule that would have implemented parity among the three programs—something that clearly did not exist in the FAR. See 73 FR 12699. As of today, the FAR Case dealing with Socioeconomic Program Parity (2006-034) has been tabled. As such, any contracting officer subject to the FAR that thinks that they have been given the green light to disregard the FAR and treat all three programs the same should think again.

Whew.  If you got all that, then you are indeed impressive.  In any case, “Don Acquisition’s” advice proved prescient, because the U.S. Court of Federal Claims just ruled on the matter over here.  The plaintiff, once again, was Mission Critical Solutions, taking “another bite at the apple.”  We’ll skip over the detailed legalese and discussion of statutory interpretation, deference to agency interpretation, the true meaning of the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” and all that.  We’ll cut directly to the chase.  Here’s what Chief Judge Hewitt said on March 2, 2010—

Plaintiff has succeeded on the merits of this case. The court has examined the statutory language of the Small Business Act and concluded that the mandatory language of the HUBZone statute requires that a contracting officer first determine whether the specified criteria are met before awarding a contract under another small business program or on a sole-source basis. … The Army’s award of the contract to Copper River on a sole-source basis without first determining whether there was ‘a reasonable expectation that not less than [two] qualified HUBZone small business concerns will submit offers and that the award can be made at a fair market price’ was not in accordance with law--in particular, the contract award did not comply with the plain meaning of the HUBZone statute.

It’s likely that the decision will be appealed but, in the meantime, “Don Acquisition” should be congratulated for his discernment.

In other news, the Small Business Administration announced proposed rule changes to the “Woman-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program.”  As far as we can tell, the rule retains some of a prior final rule’s language, withdraws language associated with a previous proposed rule, and proposes new language for comment.  See the announcement here.  We could discuss some of the proposed changes but—quite frankly—if you thought the foregoing was dense and headache-inducing, you should see the content of the 30-page Federal Register notice.  We’ll pass on that, thank you very much.


 

Watchdog Group Says DCAA Not Implementing Meaningful Reforms

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When Patrick Fitzgerald took over as Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) in November 2009, he had a clear mandate for change.  Senators called for fundamental reforms in the way DCAA executed its audits; Senator Joe Lieberman said, "I hope that the DoD comptroller as well as the incoming DCAA director will continue to bring outside auditing expertise into the agency, strengthen quality control, improve training at all levels of DCAA, and prioritize audits based on the risk of contractor over-billings as well as waste, fraud and abuse."  The Commission on Wartime Contracting called for substantive reforms in the way DCAA audited defense contractors’ “business systems;” it reported that—

As a result of personnel shortfalls, DCAA system reviews and follow-ups are not always timely; therefore, the real-time status of contractor business systems cannot always be determined. As noted in our Interim Report to Congress, DCAA has not performed timely reviews of many contractor business systems.

And even the Pentagon Spokesperson said Mr. Fitzgerald was being brought in to replace Ms. April Stephenson “because DoD leaders feel he is the best-qualified person to continue making improvements at DCAA.”  So the only impediments to substantive reform were the inertia of the audit agency and Mr. Fitzgerald’s will to change it.

We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc even got into the spirit of reform, penning an open letter to Mr. Fitzgerald, making several suggestions for his consideration.

It’s been four months, and from our outsider perspective there have been zero substantive reforms executed by the new management regime.  The status remains quo; the course seems unchanged; and it’s business as usual.  But that’s just the perspective of one consulting firm.  Surely insiders must have insight into the changes underway at the Federal government’s premier audit agency?  Senior auditors within the agency must be seeing the course changes, the personnel changes, and the changes to audit metrics and guidance that will herald the reemergence of DCAA from the ashes of its failed audits, right?

Wrong.

The Project on Government Oversight (POGO), an inside-the-Beltway “public watchdog” group focused on (among other things) DOD oversight of its contractors, sent a letter to influential Senators on March 2, 2010, expressing its concern that “some of the reforms being implemented at DCAA as a result of your investigations are only superficial fixes in order to alleviate political pressure on the agency.”  POGO asserted that “the ‘reforms’ implemented to date have not been meaningful, particularly when it comes to human capital management.”  In the words of POGO—

We worry that these problems are indicative of a systemic strategy for reform that seeks to decrease congressional pressure rather than to institute meaningful reform. More importantly, we think that it would be naïve to assume that removing April Stephenson from DCAA solves the systemic problems at DCAA.

POGO cited three areas where it believes reform efforts have fallen short of expectations.  The areas were:

1.      The dismantling of an ad hoc “grassroots” group of “high-level DCAA auditors tasked with evaluating DCAA’s promotion process.”  The POGO letter states, “when the group asked for information that would allow them to conduct compliance testing to see if DCAA was following its own policies, DCAA headquarters denied them the information and the group was disbanded. “

2.      Implementation of a DCAA “hotline” that “was intended to be used as a tool to ensure audit quality by giving auditors the ability to report management misconduct, but in practice it may be a tool for retaliation against the kind of independence in auditing that DCAA should be fostering.”  POGO asserted that “it is frequently up to the manager responsible for the alleged wrongdoing to act upon hotline findings, presenting an obvious conflict of interest.”

3.      The lack of action taken by DCAA leadership to discipline managers found to have provided lax oversight (or worse) leading to defective audits.  The POGO letter states, “There should be accountability for managers who consistently exercise bad judgment by wrongfully changing audit opinions, facilitating ‘cozy’ relations with contractors, or creating an abusive work environment. The fact that some of these abusive managers remain at DCAA continues to demoralize the agency's work force.”

The POGO letter is “based on concerns several DCAA auditors brought to POGO” and concludes that “The Pentagon thinks they got Congress off their back by removing the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency, but the problems at DCAA are far from solved.”

We understand that several fundamental changes are actually underway at the audit agency, focused on changing the way in which contractor internal control systems are audited and the way in which DCAA provides the results of its audits to its customers.  Practitioners should start to see those changes being implemented in the near future, perhaps in the next few months.  That being said, we are forced to agree with POGO’s concerns that agency reforms, if any, have been hidden—and it is past time that DCAA signals its willingness to transform, by making fundamental, substantive reforms to its culture visible to outside observers.



 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.