New DFARS Rule Focuses on Role of Contractors in Crisis Situations

Last September we told you about an August 2009 DOD Class Deviation
that addressed continuity of mission critical services that will
“enable agencies to continue their essential functions across a broad
spectrum of emergencies.” The Class Deviation provided DOD Contracting
Officers with clauses that contained language directed at certain
contractors, such as “expected to use their best efforts to continue
providing such services, in accordance with the terms and conditions of
their contracts even during periods of crisis." We noted that the new
clauses might create some ambiguity between them and the “excusable
delays” and “termination for default” clauses, which specify rights and
remedies for the contracting parties when the contractor cannot perform
the work. Finally, we opined that “it is nice to require ‘full
cooperation’ during times of emergency, but it is doubtful how much
contractors can actually do to compel employees to come to work, if
they choose not to.”
So it should not come as any great surprise that on March
5, 2010, DOD published in the Federal Register notification of intent
to promulgate an interim rule codifying its 2009 Class Deviation into
an official DFARS regulation. See the Federal Register notice here.
The
interim rule established a new DFARS Subpart—237.76 “Continuation of
Essential Contractor Services”—that provides definitions of the terms
relevant to the issue, a policy statement, and a new contract clause
for DOD contracts. The new clause (252.237-7023) performs much the
same function as the clause(s) contained in the Class Deviation. It
puts the contractor on notice that some or all of its services provided
under the contract are considered to be “essential contractor services”
as that term is defined in the regulations, it requires preparation of
a written plan “for continuing the performance of essential contractor
services … during a crisis,” and requires notification and cooperation
in the event of non-performance. For cost accountants, note that the
clause requires segregation of all costs incurred in “continuing
performance of essential services in a crisis situation,” as well as
notification of any associated contract cost impact within 90 days
after commencement of those continued services. Finally,
this language in the new clause caught our attention: “As directed by
the Contracting Officer, the Contractor shall participate in training
events, exercises, and drills associated with Government efforts to
test the effectiveness of continuity of operations procedures and
practices.”
On
a related note, the DFARS revision is being promulgated as an “interim
rule” because “This action is necessary to ensure that essential
contractor services are not interrupted by crises such as those caused
by hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, blizzards, floods, or pandemic
influenza.” Curiously, we were unable to locate any mention of the
existing Class Deviation, which would seem to reduce the urgency of the
matter.
As always, the public may submit comments on new promulgations at www.regulations.gov. Mention DFARS Case 2009-D017 in your submission, should you choose to make one.
Cyber Protection May Become a Contract Compliance Issue

We have written about cyber threats and cyber security before. (For example, see this post.) To our disappointment, such articles receive few hits. The threat is real and requires thoughtful
preparation in order to successfully defend against it. Now, perhaps,
our readers will consider the issue from a different angle, as DOD
seems poised to make cyber security a matter of contract compliance.
On
March 3, 2010 the DOD published an “Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) and notice of public meeting” in connection with
DFARS Case 2008-D028, Safeguarding Unclassified Information. See the
Federal Register notice here.
The summary of the rule is as follows—
DoD
is seeking comments from Government and industry on potential changes
to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to
address requirements for the safeguarding of unclassified information.
The changes would add a new subpart and associated contract clauses for
the safeguarding, proper handling, and cyber intrusion reporting of
unclassified DoD information within industry. … This ANPR does not address procedures for Government sharing of cyber security threat information with industry; this issue will be addressed separately through follow-on rulemaking procedures as appropriate.
Among the potential changes being considered is the addition of two new DFARS contract clauses. “DFARS 252.204–7XXX would require contractors to protect DoD information from unauthorized disclosure, loss, or exfiltration
by employing basic information technology security measures, while
DFARS 252.204–7YYY would require enhanced information technology
security measures applicable to encryption of data for storage and
transmission, network protection and intrusion detection, and cyber
intrusion reporting.” In addition, “A cyber intrusion reporting
requirement is contemplated for enhanced protection to assess the
impact of loss and to improve protection by better understanding the
methods of loss.”
The
ANPR states that a public meeting will be held on April 22, 2010 at
NASA’s James W. Webb Memorial Auditorium in SE Washington, D.C.
(Details are in the Federal Register notice, link above.) In lieu of
speaking at the all-day meeting, you can submit written comments and
answers to questions posed by the DAR Council. At the meeting, “DoD
is interested in receiving input regarding ‘‘best practices’’ for
protecting networks and data, experience with any of the proposed
safeguards, and an evaluation of its value.” The rule drafters have provided 13 questions that they hope industry will answer, so help them craft the proposed rule.
Our
take on this is that DOD and its contractors are in this together. It
was less than a year ago, in April of 2009, when the Wall Street
Journal (among others) reported that “Computer spies have broken into
the Pentagon's $300 billion Joint Strike Fighter project ….” According
to the story (found here)—
Computer
systems involved with the program appear to have been infiltrated at
least as far back as 2007, according to people familiar with the
matter. Evidence of penetrations continued to be discovered at least
into 2008. The intruders appear to have been interested in data about
the design of the plane, its performance statistics and its electronic
systems, former officials said.
The
intruders compromised the system responsible for diagnosing a plane's
maintenance problems during flight, according to officials familiar
with the matter.
So
it seems entirely appropriate for the DOD to consider issuing basic
standards of minimum cyber protection to its industrial base, and to
require reporting (including root cause analyses) when network breaches
occur and data is compromised. And we applaud the opportunity offered
industry to help shape the rule and its implementation. We hope
knowledgeable companies will help DOD craft a good rule that is easily
implementable.
After that, companies
will need to comply with the requirements of the new contract clauses,
or else risk accusations of breach of contract (or worse). Remember,
when BAE Systems recently paid the U.S.
Government $400 million, the fine was imposed for False Statements
associated with certain representations and certifications made to the
Government, and not necessarily for any other alleged wrongdoing.
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Changes to Socioeconomic Program Rules
The
various constituencies that comprise the U.S. Government’s
socioeconomic program are difficult to track and report. Just off the
top of our heads, contractors subject to socioeconomic program
reporting requirements need to track awards made to general Small
Businesses, Small Disadvantaged Businesses, Woman-Owned Small
Businesses, Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, and Service-Disabled
Veteran-Owned Small Businesses. Not to mention HUBZone area businesses, Labor Surplus area businesses, 8(a) businesses, and ANCs.
Naturally, socioeconomic reports generally contain numerous
inaccuracies, mostly made inadvertently. But sometimes there is a
knowing failure to report accurately, which leads to legal and
financial problems.
Even
more difficult is navigating the procurement rules that apply to each
“flavor” of socioeconomic program. For example, contracts can be set
aside for only 8(a) firms to bid on, but only if the contracting
officer’s market research indicates that two or more responsible
entities are available to compete for the work—unless, of course, one
of the prospective bidders is an Alaska Native Corporation (ANC) in
which case the contract need not be competed and can be awarded on a
“sole-source” basis to the ANC.
If
you are a Contracting Officer in the employ of the Federal government,
figuring out which program has priority over the others is a
non-trivial challenge. Recently, there has been significant
controversy in the socioeconomic program prioritization, with GAO
determining that the SBA’s interpretation of socioeconomic program
statutory language was flawed, and the OMB directing Contracting
Officers to ignore the GAO’s interpretation in favor of the SBA’s
interpretation. Over at the WIFCON Blogsite, “Don Acquisition” had this to say on the subject, back in November 2009—
There has been a considerable amount of controversy over the last year or so in the area of small business programs. In International Program Group, Inc., (B—400278, B—400308, 19 September 2008) the Government Accountability Office (GAO) held that HUBZone
set-asides took priority over service-disabled veteran-owned small
business (SDVOSB) set-asides and SDVOSB sole source acquisitions. This
was unsurprising given the clear language in the FAR. In Mission Critical Solutions (B—401057, 4 May 2009) (also see reconsideration), the GAO held that the HUBZone
set-asides took precedence over the 8(a) program. This was surprising
given the clear language of the FAR. Of note in both cases was that the
GAO solicited and rejected the Small Business Administration's (SBA's)
interpretation of the applicable statutes, which was that there was
parity among the 8(a), HUBZone, and SDVOSB programs. It was after the latter case that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) stepped in with a memorandum advising agencies to disregard the two GAO decisions and providing the following guidance:
Pending the completion of the legal review of the GAO's decisions by the Executive Branch, the SBA's ‘parity’
regulations should not be disregarded by contracting officers, and
Federal agencies should not, as a result of the GAO's decisions, be
compelled to prioritize HUBZone small businesses over
8(a) BD or SDVOSBs. Instead, until the legal review is completed,
Federal agencies should continue to give active consideration to each
small business program pursuant to their pre-existing contracting
practices and ‘parity’ policies.
Remarkably, this guidance 1) assumes that contracting officers had been following
the parity policies implemented in SBA's regulations and 2) implies
that, henceforth, contracting officers are free to treat HUBZone,
SDVOSB, and 8(a) contractors as equals. There is no acknowledgement of
the fact that there were no pre-existing "parity" policies in the FAR.
Prior to the GAO decisions, the FAR Council issued a proposed rule that
would have implemented parity among the three programs—something that
clearly did not exist in the FAR. See 73 FR 12699. As of today, the FAR
Case dealing with Socioeconomic Program Parity (2006-034) has been
tabled. As such, any contracting officer subject to the FAR that thinks
that they have been given the green light to disregard the FAR and
treat all three programs the same should think again.
Whew. If you got
all that, then you are indeed impressive. In any case, “Don
Acquisition’s” advice proved prescient, because the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims just ruled on the matter over here. The plaintiff, once again, was Mission Critical Solutions, taking “another bite at the apple.”
We’ll skip over the detailed legalese and discussion of statutory
interpretation, deference to agency interpretation, the true meaning of
the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” and all that.
We’ll cut directly to the chase. Here’s what Chief Judge Hewitt said
on March 2, 2010—
Plaintiff
has succeeded on the merits of this case. The court has examined the
statutory language of the Small Business Act and concluded that the
mandatory language of the HUBZone statute requires that
a contracting officer first determine whether the specified criteria
are met before awarding a contract under another small business program
or on a sole-source basis. … The Army’s award of the contract to Copper
River on a sole-source basis without first determining whether there
was ‘a reasonable expectation that not less than [two] qualified HUBZone
small business concerns will submit offers and that the award can be
made at a fair market price’ was not in accordance with law--in
particular, the contract award did not comply with the plain meaning of
the HUBZone statute.
It’s
likely that the decision will be appealed but, in the meantime, “Don
Acquisition” should be congratulated for his discernment.
In
other news, the Small Business Administration announced proposed rule
changes to the “Woman-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program.”
As far as we can tell, the rule retains some of a prior final rule’s
language, withdraws language associated with a previous proposed rule,
and proposes new language for comment. See the announcement here.
We could discuss some of the proposed changes but—quite frankly—if you
thought the foregoing was dense and headache-inducing, you should see
the content of the 30-page Federal Register notice. We’ll pass on
that, thank you very much.
Watchdog Group Says DCAA Not Implementing Meaningful Reforms

When
Patrick Fitzgerald took over as Director of the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) in November 2009, he had a clear mandate for change.
Senators called for fundamental reforms in the way DCAA executed its audits; Senator Joe Lieberman said, "I hope that the DoD
comptroller as well as the incoming DCAA director will continue to
bring outside auditing expertise into the agency, strengthen quality
control, improve training at all levels of DCAA, and prioritize audits
based on the risk of contractor over-billings as well as waste, fraud
and abuse." The Commission on Wartime Contracting called for substantive reforms in the way DCAA audited defense contractors’ “business systems;” it reported that—
As
a result of personnel shortfalls, DCAA system reviews and follow-ups
are not always timely; therefore, the real-time status of contractor
business systems cannot always be determined. As noted in our Interim
Report to Congress, DCAA has not performed timely reviews of many
contractor business systems.
And even the Pentagon Spokesperson said Mr. Fitzgerald was being brought in to replace Ms. April Stephenson “because DoD leaders feel he is the best-qualified person to continue making improvements at DCAA.” So the only impediments to substantive reform were the inertia of the audit agency and Mr. Fitzgerald’s will to change it.
We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc even got into the spirit of reform, penning an open letter to Mr. Fitzgerald, making several suggestions for his consideration.
It’s
been four months, and from our outsider perspective there have been
zero substantive reforms executed by the new management regime. The
status remains quo; the course seems unchanged; and it’s business as
usual. But that’s just the perspective of one consulting firm. Surely
insiders must have insight into the changes underway at the Federal
government’s premier audit agency? Senior auditors within the agency
must be seeing the course changes, the personnel changes, and the
changes to audit metrics and guidance that will herald the reemergence
of DCAA from the ashes of its failed audits, right?
Wrong.
The
Project on Government Oversight (POGO), an inside-the-Beltway “public
watchdog” group focused on (among other things) DOD oversight of its
contractors, sent a letter to influential Senators on March 2, 2010, expressing
its concern that “some of the reforms being implemented at DCAA as a
result of your investigations are only superficial fixes in order to
alleviate political pressure on the agency.” POGO asserted that “the
‘reforms’ implemented to date have not been meaningful, particularly
when it comes to human capital management.” In the words of POGO—
We
worry that these problems are indicative of a systemic strategy for
reform that seeks to decrease congressional pressure rather than to
institute meaningful reform. More importantly, we think that it would
be naïve to assume that removing April Stephenson from DCAA solves the
systemic problems at DCAA.
POGO cited three areas where it believes reform efforts have fallen short of expectations. The areas were:
1. The
dismantling of an ad hoc “grassroots” group of “high-level DCAA
auditors tasked with evaluating DCAA’s promotion process.” The POGO
letter states, “when the group asked for information
that would allow them to conduct compliance testing to see if DCAA was
following its own policies, DCAA headquarters denied them the
information and the group was disbanded. “
2. Implementation
of a DCAA “hotline” that “was intended to be used as a tool to ensure
audit quality by giving auditors the ability to report management
misconduct, but in practice it may be a tool for retaliation against
the kind of independence in auditing that DCAA should be fostering.”
POGO asserted that “it is frequently up to the manager responsible for
the alleged wrongdoing to act upon hotline findings, presenting an
obvious conflict of interest.”
3. The
lack of action taken by DCAA leadership to discipline managers found to
have provided lax oversight (or worse) leading to defective audits.
The POGO letter states, “There should be accountability for managers
who consistently exercise bad judgment by wrongfully changing audit
opinions, facilitating ‘cozy’ relations with contractors, or creating
an abusive work environment. The fact that some of these abusive managers remain at DCAA continues to demoralize the agency's work force.”
The POGO letter is “based on concerns several DCAA auditors brought to POGO” and concludes that “The
Pentagon thinks they got Congress off their back by removing the
Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency, but the problems at DCAA
are far from solved.”
We
understand that several fundamental changes are actually underway at
the audit agency, focused on changing the way in which contractor
internal control systems are audited and the way in which DCAA provides
the results of its audits to its customers. Practitioners should start
to see those changes being implemented in the near future, perhaps in
the next few months. That being said, we are forced to agree with
POGO’s concerns that agency reforms, if any, have been hidden—and it is
past time that DCAA signals its willingness to transform, by making fundamental, substantive reforms to its culture visible to outside observers.
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