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Apogee Consulting Inc

EADS Reaches Agreement on A400M Program—But at a Price

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The EADS Airbus A400M military transport aircraft was supposed to be Europe’s answer to Boeing’s C-17 Globemaster and Lockheed Martin’s C-130.  According to this article, “the A400M was supposed to be a low-risk concept”—so low-risk, in fact, that the company and its customers agreed on a fixed-price for the planes even before development had started.  (Readers of this site should know how a fixed-price development story will end—i.e., not well.)  As the article summarizes—

The program took longer and cost a great deal more than planned due to problems with the engines and software. The first flight took place in December 2009, two years behind schedule, and the first deliveries won’t be until 2012, three years late. EADS has for the last two years been burning through about $100 million of its own each month and taken total charges for the program of $3.6 billion.

As we have written about before, Airbus has been trying to convince its international customers (some of whom are also shareholders in EADS) to pay for the program’s cost growth.  The negotiations have dragged on for more than a year.  As we noted, EADS needed a resolution by February 1, 2010 so that it could book its final share of the program’s loss on its 2009 financial statements. 

The final negotiated agreement has been hammered-out. A Seattle P-I article reports that the agreement includes the following provisions—

  • Increase the contract price by 2 billion euros;
  • Waive monetary damages related to current delays;
  • Provide an additional 1.5 billion euros in exchange for a participation in future export sales;
  • Accelerate pre-delivery payments in the 2010-2014 period, with a new schedule to be finalized in the amended contract.

The first article (linked to above) reports that—

EADS will receive $2.04 billion in direct aid to offset losses that would have been reported for the 2009 earnings year. The company will also get a ten percent increase in the price of the aircraft to about $194 million each. If all of the planned sales go through this will generate another $2.7 billion in revenue to help make up for the money EADS spent on the program.

The deal did not solve all of the company’s financial problems.  Reportedly, EADS booked a €1.8 billion loss “provision” on the program, which led the company to report a FY 2009 loss of €763 million compared to a 2008 profit of €1.57 billion.  Meanwhile, this Reuters article reports that “South Africa is still waiting for a 2.9 billion rand repayment from European plane maker Airbus, which has not acknowledged a cancelled deal.”  (We wrote about the cancellation of South Africa’s A400M order here.)

The Reuters article contains this quote from the South African Defence Ministry—

’We await the response of Airbus on the cancellation of this contract so that we can facilitate the return of the money that has already been paid out in line with the agreement we have with them,’ Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu told journalists. ‘The recovery of the money obviously is important because it allows us to bid further for any other capacity that is available,’ she said.

Airbus refuses to acknowledge that South Africa cancelled its A400M order and has been holding on to roughly $400 million of its customer’s money for four months?  Awkward….

To conclude, the first article (linked to above) notes—

The A400M has demonstrated, once again, that defense development and acquisition is not easy. Agreeing to a fixed-price contract for a program that ended up being more difficult and complex then planned hamstrung EADS and its buyers. They were faced with a stark choice of writing off seven years of effort and billions of dollars or working out a way to keep the program alive despite stretched budgets. In the end it looked like keeping the aircraft and the 10,000 jobs related to it trumped other considerations.

Seems like a good summary of the situation to us.


 

Use (and Misuse) of Consultants

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We were recently reminded of the myriad contract compliance issues associated with the use of outside consultants by Government contractors.  (Disclaimer:  Apogee Consulting, Inc. is one.)  First, most companies have difficulty identifying who is (and who is not) a consultant.  The DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) defines consulting services as “services rendered by persons who are members of a particular profession or possess a special skill and who are not officers or employees of the contractor. Such costs include those of outside accountants, lawyers, actuaries, and marketing consultants.”  The applicable FAR cost principle (discussed below) adds, “Professional and consultant services are generally acquired to obtain information, advice, opinions, alternatives, conclusions, recommendations, training, or direct assistance, such as studies, analyses, evaluations, liaison with Government officials, or other forms of representation.”  Those definitions may or may not work for you; but it’s critical that some “command media” somewhere in your company define the term, else you may run afoul of one of the aforementioned contract compliance issues.

Next, the form of the consulting agreement will create some problems for many contractors (and for the consultants too).  For example, some consultants are hired to address specific program-related technical issues and the resulting costs will be treated as direct costs of the benefitting contract.  Does that make the consultants “subcontractors” as that term is used in FAR Part 44, and thus require advance contracting officer consent as well as inclusion of company-standard terms and prime contract flow-down clauses into the executed consulting agreement?  Maybe—depending on how the contractor worded its purchasing system policies and procedures.  If not, does the company then issue a Purchase Order to the consultant?  Can the consultant insist that its “standard” contract be used?  Who decides?

More likely, consulting costs will be indirect costs—but that doesn’t really address the questions we raised above.  As you read this article, consider how your company contracts with its consultants, what terms and conditions it incorporates into its agreements, and how it assures that its consultants are performing in a compliant manner.  As importantly, consider what detail you expect the consultants to provide in their billings, in order to maximize the amount of allowable costs you incur.  For example, how will your consultants support billings for out-of-pocket costs such as travel-related and/or miscellaneous expenses?  Will you require copies of detailed receipts, copies of credit card statements, or other supporting documentation?  Why or why not?  Who decides?

Use of consultants is subject to special cost allowability rules found at the cost principle 31.205-33.  Generally, costs of consultants are allowable where costs are “reasonable in relation to the services rendered and when not contingent upon recovery of the costs from the Government.”  But the cost principle also defines several circumstances where consultant costs are unallowable. 

For example, the following consulting services are unallowable.

(1) Services to improperly obtain, distribute, or use information or data protected by law or regulation (e.g., 52.215-1(e), Restriction on Disclosure and Use of Data).

(2) Services that are intended to improperly influence the contents of solicitations, the evaluation of proposals or quotations, or the selection of sources for contract award, whether award is by the Government, or by a prime contractor or subcontractor.

(3) Any other services obtained, performed, or otherwise resulting in violation of any statute or regulation prohibiting improper business practices or conflicts of interest.

(4) Services performed which are not consistent with the purpose and scope of the services contracted for or otherwise agreed to.

In addition to the foregoing, the DCAA CAM also notes that consultant costs may be made unallowable under the provisions of other cost principles, and lists seven specific situations (e.g., costs related to legal or other proceedings) and two generic situations (e.g., reasonableness or allocability).  Contractors should be sensitive to those areas in addition to the four situations listed above.

The cost principle also requires that, in order to be allowable, “Fees for services rendered [must be] supported by evidence of the nature and scope of the service furnished.”  Contractors must provide “evidence necessary to determine that work performed is proper and does not violate law or regulation,” including—

(1) Details of all agreements (e.g., work requirements, rate of compensation, and nature and amount of other expenses, if any) with the individuals or organizations providing the services and details of actual services performed;

(2) Invoices or billings submitted by consultants, including sufficient detail as to the time expended and nature of the actual services provided; and

(3) Consultants’ work products and related documents, such as trip reports indicating persons visited and subjects discussed, minutes of meetings, and collateral memoranda and reports.

The DCAA CAM provides additional details regarding the third evidentiary prong above (i.e., the need to provide evidence of work performed).  The CAM says that the third prong “is intended to provide support for the work actually performed by the consultant (in contrast to the first category of evidence regarding the work planned to be performed). Although a work product usually satisfies this requirement, other evidence may also suffice. If the contractor provides sufficient evidence demonstrating the nature and scope of the actual work performed, the … requirements are met even if the actual work product (for example, an attorney’s written advice to the contractor) is not provided. The auditor should not insist on a work product if other evidence provided is sufficient to determine the nature and scope of the actual work performed.”

The CAM also notes that “The contractor is responsible for producing adequate evidential matter to support the claimed costs.”  Accordingly it is important to come to an agreement with the consultant—before the first invoice is submitted—regarding what support will need to be provided, whether work product or other evidentiary matter will be included with each invoice, who at the company will review and approve the invoices, and how such documentation will be retained to support future DCAA audits.

Also, don’t forget to establish the consultant in your vendor master file to speed payment processing.  Trust us—your consultant will thank you for that….

That addresses cost allowability, but there are other matters to consider as well.  In the March 2010 issue of National Defense magazine, two attorneys from The Boeing Company address some of the ethical issues associated use of consultants.  As they note, “consultant missteps may be grounds for civil and criminal liability, organizational conflicts of interest, and reputational damage.”  Following are some of the thorny scenarios listed in the article—

  • A company’s consultant also advises the DOD and has access to source selection information for a contract your company wants to bid on.
  • A consultant who is not a registered lobbyist meets with a lawmaker regarding your company’s program.  Does this meeting need to be reported under the Lobbying Disclosure Act?
  • Your consultant also has a consulting contract with your biggest competitor, and has access to your proprietary information.
  • A consultant meets a foreign government official on behalf of your company and gifts are exchanged.  Did you just violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?
  • Your consultant just hired a former DOD official who resigned a couple of months ago and will be providing advice to you on an upcoming bid.  Are there any post-employment restrictions on that consultant?  How do you know?

The fact of the matter is that your company will very likely be held responsible for the actions of your consultants.  Doing sufficient due diligence before executing the agreement is of paramount importance, as is staying aware of all activities the consultant is performing on your behalf.  The article’s authors recommend “use of express contractual provisions spelling out the consultant’s responsibilities for legal and ethical compliance” to address some of the risks listed above.

The article ends with a nice axiom:  “The bottom line is to recognize the compliance risks that accompany [use of] consultants.”  We couldn’t agree more.




 

Aerial Tanker Update: NOC Walks Away

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Competition is a deeply ingrained aspect of our public procurement process.  As Marshall J. Doke, Jr. recently testified before the Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight)—

Competition requirements in government contracts in this country go back over 200 years and now exist in all 50 states. Competition is required not only to obtain lower prices but also to prevent unjust favoritism, collusion, or fraud. I emphasize this last purpose because of what one federal judge called a growing culture of corruption in Washington. … I believe the deficiencies in our competition process have given such enormous discretion to contracting officials that, together with a lack of transparency, they have created an environment and circumstances that have contributed significantly to [an] increase in fraud. … The fact that you ‘call’ something competition does not make it real competition. Who thinks professional wrestling is real competition? What if, in football, the players are not told how many points they will get for kicking a field goal? … The significance of this ‘competition’ process is that agencies can, pretty much, award a contract to whichever competitor it wants. Not just ‘agencies,’ but also contracting officers or other source selection officials, can make such decisions. It is this broad discretion, lack of transparency, and bullet proof award decisions that, I submit, create circumstances and an environment that can result in fraudulent activity. There is, I believe, a direct correlation between discretion and fraud. That is the reason the Government has competition requirements in government contracts in the first place. That is why sealed bidding actually is the favored method of contracting if the Government can describe its requirements adequately. [Emphasis in original.]

The House Armed Services Committee’s Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform recently wrote in its interim report—

The effects of the current approach to weapon systems acquisition on the defense industry also are significant. The length and scope of weapon system programs has accelerated defense industry’s consolidation around a handful of aerospace firms that now control large amounts of production capacity across the entire span of the defense acquisition system. Only the largest firms have access to the resources and expertise to bid on the most complex programs, and it is difficult for firms of all but the largest size to survive losing them. As a result, competition is reduced at the front end of programs, and all but eliminated in the sustainment phase (often as a result of poor planning for sustainment). Small businesses are largely locked out of the process or accorded contracts only on the goodwill of one of the larger firms. Mid-tier companies are either absorbed or decide to abandon defense acquisition for the more competitive commercial sphere, especially after a large weapon system competition loss. Winning or losing individual contracts becomes such a critical matter that the incentives to protest contract awards are overwhelming. The Panel is concerned that the end result of this process is the gradual erosion of competition and innovation in the defense industrial base.

Keep the foregoing in mind as we discuss the recent news that the EADS/Northrop Grumman team has decided not to submit a proposal for the KC-X Aerial Tanker, leaving Boeing’s “NexGen” Tanker as the only remaining option for the U.S. Air Force.  We’ve discussed this “poster child” for inept major defense acquisition program before, notably here.  Click the link for some background, some opinions, and some predictions.

On March 8, 2010, Northrop Grumman issued a press release in which it announced it would not be submitting a bid.  The press release quoted NOC CEO Wes Bush as saying, “We reached this conclusion based on the structure of the source selection methodology defined in the RFP, which clearly favors Boeing's smaller refueling tanker and does not provide adequate value recognition of the added capability of a larger tanker, precluding us from any competitive opportunity.”  Moreover, the public statement includes a promise not to submit a protest on the allegedly biased evaluation methodology.  The EADS press release included similar wording. 

The situation leaves Boeing as the sole remaining bidder and apparent winner-by-default.  The question now is whether this situation will give Boeing control of the tanker’s pricing.  Without competition, there is little incentive for Boeing to slash its costs.  And as this New York Times article notes, every single change made by the Air Force after contract award will tend to drive up the price.  (We note that there is nothing wrong with that; it’s a normal part of fixed-price contracting.)

Predictably, European leaders were less than restrained in calling-out the political implications of the evaluation methodology.  Even U.S. leaders noted that the EADS/NOC team had little to be optimistic about in the new RFP.  The New York Times article linked to above reports that Congressman Norm Dicks (D-WA, Chair, House Appropriations Committee’s Defense Appropriations Subcommittee) said “that he insisted the Pentagon consider how much the smaller Boeing plane would save in fuel and other costs over 40 years, rather than just over 25 years, as in the earlier competition. Referring to Northrop and EADS, he added, ‘I think those factors alone made it almost impossible for them to win.’”

Let’s ignore the politics and focus on the government contracting.  Vern Edwards, doyen of government acquisition, was kind enough to post the actual Section M evaluation criteria from the Tanker RFP on the internet.  Following is a cut-n-paste of his post—

In accordance with FAR 15.304(e), all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, are approximately equal to cost or price.

* * *

1.1.1 The Government will evaluate the Mission Capabilities Factor (Factor 1) to determine technical acceptability. The Mission Capability subfactors (Key Systems Requirements, Systems Engineering, Product Support, Program Management, Technology Maturity, and Past Performance) will not be weighted and each subfactor will be evaluated as acceptable or unacceptable. Any subfactor that is evaluated as unacceptable will render the entire proposal unacceptable and ineligible for award.



1.1.2 The Government will evaluate the 93 non-mandatory technical requirements (Factor 3). Each of these requirements will be evaluated as having been met or not met. For those non-mandatory requirements proposed by the offeror which are deemed to have been met, a point value for that requirement will be awarded as described in paragraph 2.4.2 below. The Government will calculate a total point score for Factor 2 by adding together all points awarded for each non-mandatory requirement that the offeror fully meets, except as otherwise indicated.



1.1.3 The Government will evaluate each offeror's Total Proposed Price (TPP) in accordance with Section M, paragraphs 2.3.1, 2.3.1.1, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.2.3. The Government will evaluate Total Proposed Price in discounted present value dollars, defined as TPP (PV), Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA), Fuel Usage Rate Assessment (FURA), and Military Construction (MILCON) in accordance with Section M, paragraphs 2.3.2, 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.2.3. The Government will calculate a present value total evaluated price (TEP) [Factor 3] for each acceptable offeror by applying their IFARA, FURA, and MILCON adjustments to their respective TPP (PV).



1.1.4 The Government will then compare the resulting TEPs for all acceptable proposals to determine the lowest TEP. If there are no acceptable proposals with a TEP [total evaluated price] that is less than or equal to 101% of the lowest acceptable proposal TEP, the Government will award a contract to that acceptable offeror with the lowest TEP without consideration of the Factor 3 score.



1.1.5 If one or more acceptable proposals have a TEP that is less than or equal to 101% of the lowest acceptable proposal TEP, the Government will then compare the scores obtained in the Factor 3 evaluation for only these proposals, according to the criteria in paragraph 2.4.4.

What can we conclude from our evaluation of the RFP’s evaluation methodology?  We can conclude that the EADS/NOC assessment was correct.  The evaluation methodology clearly favored Boeing’s smaller plane and there was almost zero chance that the larger EADS/NOC aircraft would be evaluated as the better choice. 

What leads us to that conclusion.  Consider the following:

1.      Price is the most important factor; equal to the aggregation of all other factors.

2.      The Mission Capabilities Factor (Factor 1) is simply pass or fail.  There is no weighting for more capability.

3.      Factor 3 includes 93 “non-mandatory technical requirements” that could tilt the evaluation in favor of the more capably aircraft—but only if the proposed prices are within one percent of each other.  In all other circumstances, Factor 3 will not be evaluated.

4.      Once an offeror passes Factor 1, then the lowest “Total Evaluated Price” (TEP) wins.

Fact:  smaller planes are always cheaper than larger planes.  In fact, Boeing estimators can provide a rough order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost estimate if you tell them the weight of a plane and how many engines it has.  Once the Air Force decided to move the evaluation methodology from a “best value” trade-off (price vs. capability) to a “lowest-price-technically acceptable” (LPTA) methodology, the larger plane had almost zero chance of winning the competition.

A while ago, we posted an article inquiring whether the evaluation methodology might be found to be illegal, because it failed to comply with the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA).  We thought there was a fairly decent argument that the RFP needed to conform to the statutory requirements, though (as noted) Northrop has declined to pursue a course of action that would test this argument.  Regardless, the fact that this huge MDAP is being awarded without effective competition is—or should be—embarrassing to the Obama Administration, which has publicly committed to reduce “the combined share of dollars obligated through new contracts in FY 2010 that are: … awarded non-competitively and/or receive only one bid in response to a solicitation or a request for quote ….”




 

Defense Acquisition Reform Panel Submits Recommended Fixes

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On March 4, 2010, after a year of “holding 12 hearings and numerous briefings covering a broad range of issues in defense acquisition,” the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform (PDAR, DAR, or DARP) issued its interim report.  The interim report covered many topics, and is summarized below—

The Panel found that while the nature of defense acquisition has substantially changed, the defense acquisition system has not kept pace. The system remains structured primarily for the acquisition of weapon systems at a time when services represent a much larger share of the Department’s acquisitions. As a result, the Department’s formal acquisition policy has limited application to the majority of the Department’s acquisitions. Furthermore, while the Department is currently working to modernize in the ‘information age,’ the acquisition system is particularly poorly designed for the acquisition of information technology. Even in the acquisition of weapon systems, the Department’s historical strength, the system continues to generate development timeframes for major systems measured in decades, an approach which has resulted in unacceptable cost growth, negative effects on industry, and in too many cases, a failure to meet warfighter needs.

The DARP interim report looked at the entire defense acquisition/program management system and also focused on a few select areas.  Following are some selected quotes from the report.

  • The bulk of the system is largely outside the day to day purview of USD AT&L and many of the most well known acquisition statutes (e.g. Nunn-McCurdy) don’t apply to the entire acquisition system. A much greater share of the defense acquisition system is run entirely by the military departments and is not centrally managed.
  • Put simply, the Panel believes that there is a mismatch between the culture of weapon systems acquisition and the demands that current operational requirements put on the acquisition system. Even in the Department’s ninth year of active warfare during which large quantities of equipment have been consumed and numerous new mission needs have been generated, weapon systems acquisition remains typified by programs with development timelines lasting more than a decade.
  • The Panel notes with concern that in contrast to the formal, even rigid, requirements process for weapons systems acquisition the requirements process for services contracting is almost entirely ad hoc. In many cases the user community on a services contract is a military base commander or operational commander. However, these users are not accustomed to thinking of themselves, or operating, as requirements generators. They are not staffed or trained to perform these responsibilities, and for this reason, requirements for services contracts are often poorly written. As a result, the Department is either unable to obtain what it needs, is unable to hold contractors accountable for poor performance, or both.
  • Only 16% of IT projects are completed on time and on budget.   31% are cancelled before completion.  The remaining 53% are late and over budget, with the typical cost growth exceeding the original budget more than 89%.  Of the IT projects that are completed, the final product contains only 61% of the originally specified features.
  • The Panel reviewed a recent study by the National Research Council which indicated a number of findings that reflect the reality that DOD’s weapon systems acquisition focused process is insufficient to deal with IT acquisition.  As was pointed out in testimony before the Panel, the traditional defense acquisition process is ‘ill-suited for information technology systems. Phase A is intended to mature technology; yet information technologies are now largely matured in the commercial sector. Phase B is intended to ready a program for production; yet information technologies are not produced in quantity. Phase C is a production phase, which again is generally not relevant to information technology that is not produced in quantity.’  Weapon system acquisition processes are often applied to IT systems acquisition, without addressing unique aspects of IT. As one witness before the Defense Acquisition Reform panel put it, ‘the weapon systems acquisition process is optimized to manage production risk and does not really fit information technology acquisition that does not lead to significant production quantities.’  … As a result, the Department is unable to keep pace with the rate of IT innovation in the commercial market place, cannot fully capitalize on IT-based opportunities, and seldom delivers IT-based capabilities rapidly. By way of example, the private sector is able to deliver capabilities and incrementally improve on those initial deliveries on a 12 to 18 month cycle; defense IT systems typically take 48-60 months to deliver. In an environment where technology is obsolete after 18 months, defense IT systems are typically two to three generations out of date by the time they are delivered. [Emphasis in original.]
  • Requirements in the weapon system acquisition context are governed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The problems with the JCIDS process that the Panel heard about include:  (1) An inability to meaningfully prioritize, (2) An inability to understand the costs and trade-offs inherent in establishing requirements, (3) Excessive paperwork and bureaucratic delay in the process of considering new requirements, (4) A lack of clear communication between those setting requirements and those in the acquisition process turning requirements into evaluation criteria and contract specifications, (5) A lack of sufficient communication on requirements with defense industry necessary to allow industry planning for appropriate R&D and capacity investments, (6) The achievement of “jointness” by accommodating inputs from all commenters, including inputs from those with no resources at stake, (7) A lack of capacity on the joint staff devoted to requirements, (8) A consistent pattern of “requirements creep” that happens after a JROC-approved requirement is established but before and during the period of contract specification and execution, (9) A lack of ability to monitor “requirements creep” in between program milestones, (10) An inability to properly incorporate requirements relating to system sustainability.

The Panel made a number of recommendations to address the problems reported above (as well as others in the interim report).  Among the recommendations that our readers are likely to find to be of interest are the following—

  1. Congress should expand the role of the Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) to operate as an auditable performance management function for the entire defense acquisition system.
  2. PARCA and all Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and buying activities should negotiate specific measurable goals for each PEO/buying activity relating, at a minimum, to cost, quality, delivery, acquisition workforce quality (including program manager tenure where relevant), quality of market research, small business utilization, and utilization of acquisition best practices. In cases where they are unable to negotiate a set of goals by consensus, PARCA’s recommendation would take precedence with the possibility of review by the USD AT&L.
  3. The Department and Congress should review and clarify the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s separation between acquisition and the military service chiefs to allow detailed coordination and interaction between the requirements and acquisition processes and to encourage for enhanced military service chief participation in contract quality assurance.
  4. The Department should work the Department of Commerce, Small Business Administration, General Services Administration, and the private sector to proactively notify relevant firms, especially small businesses, of contract solicitations rather than only relying on firms to find those notifications on FedBizOpps.
  5. Congress should repeal the 3% contract payment withholding requirement.
  6. The Department should identify potential contractors and grantees with serious tax delinquencies and include that information in databases relating to past performance and contractor integrity.
  7. The Department should consider shifting the responsibility for certification of contractor business systems to independent teams within or outside of DCAA and DCAA should allocate its audit resources on the basis of risk.

The entire interim report can be found here.

We are pleased by some of the recommendations, notably numbers 5 and 7 above.  We hope the rest of Congress is listening and decides to take appropriate action.  Our optimism is tempered, however, by the knowledge that literally hundreds of panels and commissions have made literally thousands of similar recommendations over the past four decades, without noticeably improving the Defense acquisition system and/or its program management framework.



 

Using Contractors to Support Warfighters—Cost Savings or Wasteful Spending?

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Recently the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a letter to Congress (GAO-10-266R, Warfighter Support) comparing the cost of using contractors versus the cost of using Government employees in military support operations.  As everybody (including GAO and Congress) knows, at this point the DOD is almost entirely reliant on contractors to support its in-theater operations.  Regardless of whether you think that’s a good or bad thing, it’s an uncontroverted fact.  More recently, DOD has announced its intention of “in-sourcing” some functions currently performed by contractors, gearing up to hire as many as 20,000 new employees. 

We recently posted an article on “contrarian” views published by the Lexington Institute.  The author, Dr. Loren Thompson, asserted that adding more positions wasn’t the right answer.  In summarizing Dr. Thompson’s thoughts, we wrote—

Adding more acquisition, audit, and program management professionals to DoD’s ranks … will compound the problem. … Dr. Thompson notes that those new heads will take additional funds—not just to cover the costs of salary and benefits, but also to cover the costs of training, equipping, housing and supporting them. As Dr. Thompson notes, ‘When you add up all these costs, the long-term burden of taking on 20,000 new acquisition professionals will be over $80 billion -- which just happens to be the projected cost of buying a replacement for the Trident ballistic-missile sub.’

So when GAO’s analyzes the relative cost of hiring contractors versus hiring Government employees, it is relevant to our interests. 

The GAO “report” (we hesitate to call it a report because it is not in the usual GAO report format) started off by noting a 2005 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report that concluded “over a 20-year period, using Army military units would cost roughly 90 percent more than using the contractor.”  But it also noted a 2008 CBO report that concluded “for the 1-year period beginning June 11, 2004, the costs of the private contractor did not differ greatly from the costs of having a comparable military unit performing similar functions.”  Accordingly, the results of this GAO analysis would be an interesting addition to the history of the topic.

The GAO next notes that DOD was unable to provide it with sufficient information to conduct a meaningful analysis, so it was forced to look only at the State Department’s use of military contractors.  While that’s better than nothing, it is disappointing that GAO couldn’t get the necessary DOD information that would have permitted it to really add to the on-going debate on the subject.

GAO reviewed four task orders from the State Department’s Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPSS) II contracts and one contract for Baghdad embassy security.  As GAO reports—

Our comparison of likely State Department costs versus contractor costs for four task orders and one contract awarded by the State Department for security services in Iraq showed that for three of the task orders and the contract, the cost of using State Department employees would be greater than using contractors, while the State Department’s estimated cost to use federal employees was less for the other task order. For example, using State Department employees to provide static security for the embassy in Baghdad would have cost the department approximately $858 million for 1 year compared to the approximately $78 million charged by the contractor for the same time period. In contrast, our cost comparison of the task order for providing personal security for State Department employees while in the Baghdad region—which required personnel that have security clearances—showed that for this task order, the State Department’s estimated annual cost would have been about $240 million, whereas the contractor charged approximately $380 million for 1 year.

(Emphasis added.)

So in three of four contract scenarios evaluated, using contractors actually saved the State Department money.  And not just a little bit of money—GAO reported that use of Government employees was more than 10 times more expensive than using contractors.  Moreover, where use of Government employees would have been cheaper, GAO noted that “because the State Department does not currently have a sufficient number of trained personnel to provide security in Iraq, the department would need to recruit, hire, and train additional employees at an additional cost of $162 million.”  In other words, when one adds the additional $162 million in government costs to the State Department’s estimated annual estimated cost of $240 million, one gets $402 million versus the contractor’s charges of $380 million—i.e., the contractor is marginally cheaper.  To sum up, GAO found no instance where use of State Department employees to replace contractors would result in any cost savings to the U.S. Government or to the taxpayers.

What drove the Government’s costs?  GAO reported that—

… over one-half of the State Department’s estimated costs for deployed employees were to cover costs required to sustain the employees overseas. The State Department’s estimated cost to provide security included components such as salaries, benefits, cost of living allowances and overtime, overseas costs, and other support costs associated with deploying and sustaining U.S. citizen employees overseas. Overseas costs included things such as furniture, furnishings and equipment for office spaces and residences, maintenance and repair of living quarters, and travel cost for rest and relaxation for deployed personnel.

In addition, GAO noted that “some costs associated with providing Iraq security services using federal employees—such as developing new career fields, providing additional overhead, and building new housing—are difficult to quantify.” 

So to those who think the costs of the “Global War on Terrorism” were driven up by increased use of contractors, this GAO report seems to an effective rebuttal.  It’s too bad the DOD couldn’t or wouldn’t provide sufficient information to put a final nail in the coffin of that point of view.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.