Use (and Misuse) of Consultants

We
were recently reminded of the myriad contract compliance issues
associated with the use of outside consultants by Government
contractors. (Disclaimer: Apogee Consulting, Inc. is one.) First, most companies have
difficulty identifying who is (and who is not) a consultant. The DCAA
Contract Audit Manual (CAM) defines
consulting services as “services rendered by
persons who are members of a particular profession or possess a special
skill and who are not officers or employees of the contractor. Such
costs include those of outside accountants, lawyers, actuaries, and
marketing consultants.” The applicable FAR
cost principle (discussed below) adds, “Professional
and consultant services are generally acquired to obtain information,
advice, opinions, alternatives, conclusions, recommendations, training,
or direct assistance, such as studies, analyses, evaluations, liaison
with Government officials, or other forms of representation.” Those definitions may or may not work for you; but it’s critical that
some “command media” somewhere in your
company define the term, else you may run
afoul of one of the aforementioned contract compliance issues.
Next,
the form of the consulting agreement will create some problems for many
contractors (and for the consultants too). For example, some consultants
are hired to address specific program-related technical issues and the
resulting costs will be treated as direct costs of the benefitting
contract. Does that make the consultants “subcontractors” as that term
is used in FAR Part 44, and thus require advance contracting officer consent as well as
inclusion of company-standard terms and prime contract flow-down clauses
into the executed consulting
agreement? Maybe—depending on how the contractor worded its purchasing
system policies and procedures. If not, does the company then issue a Purchase Order to the consultant? Can the consultant
insist that its “standard” contract be used? Who
decides?
More likely, consulting costs will be indirect costs—but that
doesn’t really address the questions we raised
above. As you read this article, consider how
your company contracts with its consultants, what terms and conditions
it incorporates into its agreements, and how it assures that its
consultants are performing in a compliant manner. As importantly,
consider what detail you expect the consultants to provide in their
billings, in order to maximize the amount of allowable costs you incur.
For example, how will your consultants support billings for
out-of-pocket costs such as travel-related and/or miscellaneous
expenses? Will you require copies of detailed receipts, copies of
credit card statements, or other supporting documentation? Why or why
not? Who decides?
Use
of consultants is subject to special cost allowability rules found at
the cost principle 31.205-33. Generally, costs of
consultants are allowable where costs are “reasonable in relation to
the services rendered and when not contingent upon recovery of the costs
from the Government.” But the cost principle also defines several
circumstances where consultant costs are unallowable.
For
example, the following consulting services are unallowable.
(1) Services to improperly obtain, distribute, or use
information or data protected by law or regulation (e.g., 52.215-1(e), Restriction on Disclosure and Use of Data).
(2) Services that are intended to improperly influence the
contents of solicitations, the evaluation of proposals or quotations, or
the selection of sources for contract award, whether award is by the
Government, or by a prime contractor or subcontractor.
(3) Any other services obtained, performed, or otherwise
resulting in violation of any statute or regulation prohibiting improper
business practices or conflicts of interest.
(4) Services performed which are not consistent with the
purpose and scope of the services contracted for or otherwise agreed to.
In addition to the foregoing, the DCAA CAM also notes that
consultant costs may be made unallowable under the provisions of other
cost principles, and lists seven specific situations (e.g., costs
related to legal or other proceedings) and two generic situations (e.g.,
reasonableness or allocability). Contractors should be sensitive to
those areas in addition to the four situations listed above.
The
cost principle also requires that, in order to be allowable, “Fees for
services rendered [must be] supported by evidence of the nature and
scope of the service furnished.” Contractors must
provide “evidence necessary to determine that
work performed is proper and does not violate law or regulation,” including—
(1) Details of all agreements (e.g., work requirements, rate of compensation, and nature and amount
of other expenses, if any) with the individuals or organizations
providing the services and details of actual services performed;
(2) Invoices or billings submitted by consultants, including
sufficient detail as to the time expended and nature of the actual
services provided; and
(3) Consultants’ work
products and related documents, such as trip reports indicating persons
visited and subjects discussed, minutes of meetings, and collateral
memoranda and reports.
The DCAA CAM
provides additional details regarding the third evidentiary prong above
(i.e., the need to provide evidence of work performed). The CAM says
that the third prong “is intended to provide support for the work
actually performed by the consultant (in contrast to the first category
of evidence regarding the work planned to be performed). Although a work
product usually satisfies this requirement, other evidence may also
suffice. If the contractor provides sufficient evidence demonstrating
the nature and scope of the actual work performed, the … requirements
are met even if the actual work product (for example, an attorney’s
written advice to the contractor) is not provided. The auditor should
not insist on a work product if other evidence provided is sufficient to
determine the nature and scope of the actual work performed.”
The
CAM also notes that “The contractor is responsible for producing
adequate evidential matter to support the claimed costs.” Accordingly it is important to come to an agreement with the
consultant—before the first invoice is submitted—regarding what support
will need to be provided, whether work product or other evidentiary
matter will be included with each invoice, who at the company will
review and approve the invoices, and how such documentation will be
retained to support future DCAA audits.
Also, don’t forget to
establish the consultant in your vendor master file to speed payment
processing. Trust us—your consultant will thank you for that….
That
addresses cost allowability, but there are other matters to consider as
well. In the March 2010 issue of National Defense magazine, two attorneys from The Boeing Company address some
of the ethical issues associated use of consultants. As they note,
“consultant missteps may be grounds for civil and criminal liability,
organizational conflicts of interest, and reputational damage.”
Following are some of the thorny scenarios listed in the article—
- A company’s consultant also
advises the DOD and has access to source selection information for a
contract your company wants to bid on.
- A
consultant who is not a registered lobbyist meets with a lawmaker
regarding your company’s program. Does this meeting need to be reported
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act?
- Your consultant also has a consulting contract with your
biggest competitor, and has access to your proprietary information.
- A consultant meets a foreign government official on behalf of
your company and gifts are exchanged. Did you just violate the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act?
- Your consultant just hired a former DOD official who resigned a
couple of months ago and will be providing advice to you on an upcoming
bid. Are there any post-employment restrictions on that consultant?
How do you know?
The fact of the matter is that your
company will very likely be held responsible for the actions of your
consultants. Doing sufficient due diligence before executing the
agreement is of paramount importance, as is staying aware of all
activities the consultant is performing on your behalf. The article’s
authors recommend “use of express contractual provisions spelling out
the consultant’s responsibilities for legal and ethical compliance” to
address some of the risks listed above.
The article ends with a
nice axiom: “The bottom line is to recognize the compliance risks that
accompany [use of] consultants.” We couldn’t agree more.
Aerial Tanker Update: NOC Walks Away

Competition is a deeply ingrained aspect of our public procurement process. As Marshall J. Doke, Jr. recently testified before the Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight)—
Competition
requirements in government contracts in this country go back over 200
years and now exist in all 50 states. Competition is required not only
to obtain lower prices but also to prevent unjust favoritism,
collusion, or fraud. I emphasize this last purpose because of what one
federal judge called a growing culture of corruption in Washington. …
I believe the deficiencies in our competition process have given such
enormous discretion to contracting officials that, together with a lack
of transparency, they have created an environment and circumstances
that have contributed significantly to [an] increase in fraud. … The fact that you ‘call’
something competition does not make it real competition. Who thinks
professional wrestling is real competition? What if, in football, the
players are not told how many points they will get for kicking a field
goal? … The significance of this ‘competition’ process is that agencies can, pretty much, award a contract to whichever competitor it wants. Not just ‘agencies,’ but also contracting officers or other source selection officials, can make such decisions. It is this broad discretion, lack
of transparency, and bullet proof award decisions that, I submit,
create circumstances and an environment that can result in fraudulent
activity. There is, I believe, a direct correlation between discretion
and fraud. That is the reason the Government has competition
requirements in government contracts in the first place. That is why
sealed bidding actually is the favored method of contracting if the
Government can describe its requirements adequately. [Emphasis in original.]
The House Armed Services Committee’s Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform recently wrote in its interim report—
The
effects of the current approach to weapon systems acquisition on the
defense industry also are significant. The length and scope of weapon
system programs has accelerated defense industry’s consolidation around
a handful of aerospace firms that now control large amounts of
production capacity across the entire span of the defense acquisition
system. Only the largest firms have access to the resources and
expertise to bid on the most complex programs,
and it is difficult for firms of all but the largest size to survive
losing them. As a result, competition is reduced at the front end of
programs, and all but eliminated in the sustainment phase (often as a
result of poor planning for sustainment). Small businesses are largely
locked out of the process or accorded contracts only on the goodwill of
one of the larger firms. Mid-tier companies are either absorbed or
decide to abandon defense acquisition for the more competitive
commercial sphere, especially after a large weapon system competition
loss. Winning or losing individual contracts becomes such a critical
matter that the incentives to protest contract awards are overwhelming.
The Panel is concerned that the end result of this process is the
gradual erosion of competition and innovation in the defense industrial
base.
Keep
the foregoing in mind as we discuss the recent news that the
EADS/Northrop Grumman team has decided not to submit a proposal for the
KC-X Aerial Tanker, leaving Boeing’s “NexGen” Tanker as the only remaining option for the U.S. Air Force. We’ve discussed this “poster child” for inept major defense acquisition program before, notably here. Click the link for some background, some opinions, and some predictions.
On March 8, 2010, Northrop Grumman issued a press release
in which it announced it would not be submitting a bid. The press
release quoted NOC CEO Wes Bush as saying, “We reached this conclusion
based on the structure of the source selection methodology defined in
the RFP, which clearly favors Boeing's smaller refueling tanker and
does not provide adequate value recognition of the added capability of
a larger tanker, precluding us from any competitive opportunity.” Moreover, the public statement includes a promise
not to submit a protest on the allegedly biased evaluation
methodology. The EADS press release included similar wording.
The
situation leaves Boeing as the sole remaining bidder and apparent
winner-by-default. The question now is whether this situation will
give Boeing control of the tanker’s pricing. Without competition,
there is little incentive for Boeing to slash its costs. And as this New York Times article
notes, every single change made by the Air Force after contract award
will tend to drive up the price. (We note that there is nothing wrong
with that; it’s a normal part of fixed-price contracting.)
Predictably,
European leaders were less than restrained in calling-out the political
implications of the evaluation methodology. Even U.S. leaders noted
that the EADS/NOC team had little to be optimistic about in the new RFP. The New York Times article linked to above reports that Congressman Norm Dicks (D-WA, Chair, House Appropriations Committee’s Defense Appropriations Subcommittee)
said “that he insisted the Pentagon consider how much the smaller
Boeing plane would save in fuel and other costs over 40 years, rather
than just over 25 years, as in the earlier competition. Referring to
Northrop and EADS, he added, ‘I think those factors alone made it almost impossible for them to win.’”
Let’s
ignore the politics and focus on the government contracting. Vern
Edwards, doyen of government acquisition, was kind enough to post the
actual Section M evaluation criteria from the Tanker RFP on the
internet. Following is a cut-n-paste of his post—
In
accordance with FAR 15.304(e), all evaluation factors other than cost
or price, when combined, are approximately equal to cost or price.
* * *
1.1.1
The Government will evaluate the Mission Capabilities Factor (Factor 1)
to determine technical acceptability. The Mission Capability subfactors
(Key Systems Requirements, Systems Engineering, Product Support,
Program Management, Technology Maturity, and Past Performance) will not
be weighted and each subfactor will be evaluated as acceptable or unacceptable. Any subfactor that is evaluated as unacceptable will render the entire proposal unacceptable and ineligible for award.
1.1.2
The Government will evaluate the 93 non-mandatory technical
requirements (Factor 3). Each of these requirements will be evaluated
as having been met or not met. For those non-mandatory requirements
proposed by the offeror which are deemed to have been met, a point
value for that requirement will be awarded as described in paragraph
2.4.2 below. The Government will calculate a total point score for
Factor 2 by adding together all points awarded for each non-mandatory
requirement that the offeror fully meets, except as otherwise indicated.
1.1.3 The Government will evaluate each offeror's Total Proposed Price (TPP) in accordance with Section M, paragraphs 2.3.1, 2.3.1.1, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.2.3. The Government
will evaluate Total Proposed Price in discounted present value dollars,
defined as TPP (PV), Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment
(IFARA), Fuel Usage Rate Assessment (FURA), and Military Construction
(MILCON) in accordance with Section M, paragraphs 2.3.2, 2.3.2.1,
2.3.2.2, and 2.3.2.3. The Government will calculate a present value
total evaluated price (TEP) [Factor 3] for each acceptable offeror by
applying their IFARA, FURA, and MILCON adjustments to their respective
TPP (PV).
1.1.4 The Government will then compare the resulting TEPs for all acceptable proposals to determine the lowest TEP. If
there are no acceptable proposals with a TEP [total evaluated price]
that is less than or equal to 101% of the lowest acceptable proposal
TEP, the Government will award a contract to that acceptable offeror
with the lowest TEP without consideration of the Factor 3 score.
1.1.5
If one or more acceptable proposals have a TEP that is less than or
equal to 101% of the lowest acceptable proposal TEP, the Government
will then compare the scores obtained in the Factor 3 evaluation for
only these proposals, according to the criteria in paragraph 2.4.4.
What
can we conclude from our evaluation of the RFP’s evaluation
methodology? We can conclude that the EADS/NOC assessment was
correct. The evaluation methodology clearly favored Boeing’s smaller
plane and there was almost zero chance that the larger EADS/NOC
aircraft would be evaluated as the better choice.
What leads us to that conclusion. Consider the following:
1. Price is the most important factor; equal to the aggregation of all other factors.
2. The Mission Capabilities Factor (Factor 1) is simply pass or fail. There is no weighting for more capability.
3. Factor
3 includes 93 “non-mandatory technical requirements” that could tilt
the evaluation in favor of the more capably aircraft—but only if the proposed prices are within one percent of each other. In all other circumstances, Factor 3 will not be evaluated.
4. Once an offeror passes Factor 1, then the lowest “Total Evaluated Price” (TEP) wins.
Fact:
smaller planes are always cheaper than larger planes. In fact, Boeing
estimators can provide a rough order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost estimate
if you tell them the weight of a plane and how many engines it has.
Once the Air Force decided to move the evaluation methodology from a
“best value” trade-off (price vs. capability) to a
“lowest-price-technically acceptable” (LPTA) methodology, the larger
plane had almost zero chance of winning the competition.
A while ago, we posted an article
inquiring whether the evaluation methodology might be found to be
illegal, because it failed to comply with the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). We
thought there was a fairly decent argument that the RFP needed to
conform to the statutory requirements, though (as noted) Northrop has
declined to pursue a course of action that would test this argument. Regardless,
the fact that this huge MDAP is being awarded without effective
competition is—or should be—embarrassing to the Obama Administration,
which has publicly committed to reduce
“the combined share of dollars obligated through new contracts in FY
2010 that are: … awarded non-competitively and/or receive only one bid
in response to a solicitation or a request for quote ….”
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Defense Acquisition Reform Panel Submits Recommended Fixes
On
March 4, 2010, after a year of “holding 12 hearings and numerous
briefings covering a broad range of issues in defense acquisition,” the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition
Reform (PDAR, DAR, or DARP) issued its interim report. The interim
report covered many topics, and is summarized below—
The
Panel found that while the nature of defense acquisition has
substantially changed, the defense acquisition system has not kept
pace. The system remains structured primarily for the acquisition of
weapon systems at a time when services represent a much larger share of
the Department’s acquisitions. As a result, the Department’s formal
acquisition policy has limited application to the majority of the
Department’s acquisitions. Furthermore, while the Department is currently working to modernize in the ‘information age,’
the acquisition system is particularly poorly designed for the
acquisition of information technology. Even in the acquisition of
weapon systems, the Department’s historical strength, the system
continues to generate development timeframes for major systems measured
in decades, an approach which has resulted in unacceptable cost growth,
negative effects on industry, and in too many cases, a failure to meet
warfighter needs.
The
DARP interim report looked at the entire defense acquisition/program management system and also focused on a
few select areas. Following are some selected quotes from the report.
- The
bulk of the system is largely outside the day to day purview of USD
AT&L and many of the most well known acquisition statutes (e.g.
Nunn-McCurdy) don’t apply to the entire acquisition system. A much
greater share of the defense acquisition system is run entirely by the
military departments and is not centrally managed.
- Put
simply, the Panel believes that there is a mismatch between the culture
of weapon systems acquisition and the demands that current operational
requirements put on the acquisition system. Even in the Department’s
ninth year of active warfare during which large quantities of equipment
have been consumed and numerous new mission
needs have been generated, weapon systems acquisition remains typified
by programs with development timelines lasting more than a decade.
- The
Panel notes with concern that in contrast to the formal, even rigid,
requirements process for weapons systems acquisition the requirements
process for services contracting is almost entirely ad hoc. In many
cases the user community on a services contract is a military base
commander or operational commander. However, these users are not
accustomed to thinking of themselves, or operating, as requirements
generators. They are not staffed or trained to perform these
responsibilities, and for this reason, requirements for services
contracts are often poorly written. As a result, the Department is
either unable to obtain what it needs, is unable to hold contractors
accountable for poor performance, or both.
- Only
16% of IT projects are completed on time and on budget. 31% are
cancelled before completion. The remaining 53% are late and over
budget, with the typical cost growth exceeding the original budget more
than 89%. Of the IT projects that are completed, the final product
contains only 61% of the originally specified features.
- The
Panel reviewed a recent study by the National Research Council which
indicated a number of findings that reflect the reality that DOD’s
weapon systems acquisition focused process is insufficient to deal with
IT acquisition. As was pointed out in testimony before the Panel, the
traditional defense acquisition process is ‘ill-suited
for information technology systems. Phase A is intended to mature
technology; yet information technologies are now largely matured in the
commercial sector. Phase B is intended to ready a program for
production; yet information technologies are not produced in quantity.
Phase C is a production phase, which again is generally not relevant to information technology that is not produced in quantity.’
Weapon system acquisition processes are often applied to IT systems
acquisition, without addressing unique aspects of IT. As one witness
before the Defense Acquisition Reform panel put it, ‘the
weapon systems acquisition process is optimized to manage production
risk and does not really fit information technology acquisition that does not lead to significant production quantities.’ …
As a result, the Department is unable to keep pace with the rate of IT
innovation in the commercial market place, cannot fully capitalize on
IT-based opportunities, and seldom delivers IT-based capabilities
rapidly. By way of example, the private sector is able to deliver
capabilities and incrementally improve on those initial deliveries on a
12 to 18 month cycle; defense IT systems typically take 48-60 months to
deliver. In an environment where technology is obsolete after 18
months, defense IT systems are typically two to three generations out
of date by the time they are delivered. [Emphasis in original.]
- Requirements
in the weapon system acquisition context are governed by the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The problems
with the JCIDS process that the Panel heard about include: (1) An
inability to meaningfully prioritize, (2) An inability to understand
the costs and trade-offs inherent in establishing requirements, (3)
Excessive paperwork and bureaucratic delay in the process of
considering new requirements, (4) A lack of clear communication between
those setting requirements and those in the acquisition process turning
requirements into evaluation criteria and contract specifications, (5)
A lack of sufficient communication on requirements with defense
industry necessary to allow industry planning for appropriate R&D
and capacity investments, (6) The achievement of “jointness”
by accommodating inputs from all commenters, including inputs from
those with no resources at stake, (7) A lack of capacity on the joint
staff devoted to requirements, (8) A consistent pattern of
“requirements creep” that happens after a JROC-approved requirement is
established but before and during the period of contract specification
and execution, (9) A lack of ability to monitor “requirements creep” in
between program milestones, (10) An inability to properly incorporate
requirements relating to system sustainability.
The
Panel made a number of recommendations to address the problems
reported above (as well as others in the interim report). Among the
recommendations that our readers are likely to find to be of interest
are the following—
- Congress
should expand the role of the Office of Performance Assessment and Root
Cause Analysis (PARCA) to operate as an auditable performance
management function for the entire defense acquisition system.
- PARCA
and all Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and buying activities should
negotiate specific measurable goals for each PEO/buying activity
relating, at a minimum, to cost, quality, delivery, acquisition
workforce quality (including program manager tenure where relevant), quality of market
research, small business utilization, and utilization of acquisition
best practices. In cases where they are unable to negotiate a set of
goals by consensus, PARCA’s recommendation would take precedence with
the possibility of review by the USD AT&L.
- The
Department and Congress should review and clarify the Goldwater-Nichols
Act’s separation between acquisition and the military service chiefs to
allow detailed coordination and interaction between the requirements
and acquisition processes and to encourage for enhanced military
service chief participation in contract quality assurance.
- The
Department should work the Department of Commerce, Small Business
Administration, General Services Administration, and the private sector
to proactively notify relevant firms, especially small businesses, of
contract solicitations rather than only relying on firms to find those
notifications on FedBizOpps.
- Congress should repeal the 3% contract payment withholding requirement.
- The
Department should identify potential contractors and grantees with
serious tax delinquencies and include that information in databases
relating to past performance and contractor integrity.
- The
Department should consider shifting the responsibility for
certification of contractor business systems to independent teams
within or outside of DCAA and DCAA should allocate its audit resources
on the basis of risk.
The entire interim report can be found here.
We
are pleased by some of the recommendations, notably numbers 5 and 7
above. We hope the rest of Congress is listening and decides to take
appropriate action. Our optimism is tempered, however, by the
knowledge that literally hundreds of panels and commissions have made
literally thousands of similar recommendations over the past four
decades, without noticeably improving the Defense acquisition system and/or
its program management framework.
Using Contractors to Support Warfighters—Cost Savings or Wasteful Spending?

Recently the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a letter to Congress (GAO-10-266R, Warfighter Support) comparing the cost of using contractors versus the cost of using Government employees in military support
operations. As everybody (including GAO and Congress) knows, at this
point the DOD is almost entirely reliant on contractors to support its
in-theater operations. Regardless of whether you think that’s a good
or bad thing, it’s an uncontroverted fact. More recently, DOD has
announced its intention of “in-sourcing” some functions currently
performed by contractors, gearing up to hire as many as 20,000 new
employees.
We recently posted
an article on “contrarian” views published by the Lexington Institute.
The author, Dr. Loren Thompson, asserted that adding more positions
wasn’t the right answer. In summarizing Dr. Thompson’s thoughts, we wrote—
Adding more acquisition, audit, and program management professionals to DoD’s ranks … will compound the problem.
… Dr. Thompson notes that those new heads will take additional
funds—not just to cover the costs of salary and benefits, but also to
cover the costs of training, equipping, housing and supporting them.
As Dr. Thompson notes, ‘When you add up all these costs, the long-term
burden of taking on 20,000 new acquisition professionals will be over
$80 billion -- which just happens to be the projected cost of buying a
replacement for the Trident ballistic-missile sub.’
So when GAO’s analyzes the relative cost of hiring contractors versus hiring Government employees, it is relevant to our interests.
The
GAO “report” (we hesitate to call it a report because it is not in the
usual GAO report format) started off by noting a 2005 Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) report that concluded “over a 20-year period, using
Army military units would cost roughly 90 percent more than using the
contractor.” But it also noted a 2008 CBO report that concluded “for
the 1-year period beginning June 11, 2004, the costs of the private
contractor did not differ greatly from the costs of having a comparable
military unit performing similar functions.” Accordingly, the results
of this GAO analysis would be an interesting addition to the history of
the topic.
The
GAO next notes that DOD was unable to provide it with sufficient
information to conduct a meaningful analysis, so it was forced to look
only at the State Department’s use of military contractors. While
that’s better than nothing, it is disappointing that GAO couldn’t get
the necessary DOD information that would have permitted it to really
add to the on-going debate on the subject.
GAO
reviewed four task orders from the State Department’s Worldwide
Personal Protective Services (WPSS) II contracts and one contract for
Baghdad embassy security. As GAO reports—
Our
comparison of likely State Department costs versus contractor costs for
four task orders and one contract awarded by the State Department for
security services in Iraq showed that for
three of the task orders and the contract, the cost of using State
Department employees would be greater than using contractors, while the
State Department’s estimated cost to use federal employees was less for
the other task order. For example, using State Department employees to provide static security for the embassy in Baghdad would have cost the department
approximately $858 million for 1 year compared to the approximately $78
million charged by the contractor for the same time period. In
contrast, our cost comparison of the task order for providing personal
security for State Department employees while in the Baghdad
region—which required personnel that have security clearances—showed
that for this task order, the State Department’s estimated annual cost
would have been about $240 million, whereas the contractor charged
approximately $380 million for 1 year.
(Emphasis added.)
So
in three of four contract scenarios evaluated, using contractors
actually saved the State Department money. And not just a little bit
of money—GAO reported that use of Government employees was more than 10 times more expensive
than using contractors. Moreover, where use of Government employees
would have been cheaper, GAO noted that “because the State Department
does not currently have a sufficient number of trained personnel to
provide security in Iraq, the department would need to recruit, hire,
and train additional employees at an additional cost of $162 million.”
In other words, when one adds the additional $162 million in government
costs to the State Department’s estimated annual estimated cost of $240
million, one gets $402 million versus the contractor’s charges of $380
million—i.e., the contractor is marginally cheaper.
To sum up, GAO found no instance where use of State Department
employees to replace contractors would result in any cost savings to
the U.S. Government or to the taxpayers.
What drove the Government’s costs? GAO reported that—
… over
one-half of the State Department’s estimated costs for deployed
employees were to cover costs required to sustain the employees
overseas. The State Department’s estimated cost to provide security
included components such as salaries, benefits, cost of living
allowances and overtime, overseas costs, and other support costs
associated with deploying and sustaining U.S. citizen employees
overseas. Overseas costs included things such as furniture, furnishings
and equipment for office spaces and residences, maintenance and repair
of living quarters, and travel cost for rest and relaxation for
deployed personnel.
In addition, GAO noted
that “some costs associated with providing Iraq security services using
federal employees—such as developing new career fields, providing
additional overhead, and building new housing—are difficult to
quantify.”
So to those who think
the costs of the “Global War on Terrorism” were driven up by increased
use of contractors, this GAO report seems to an effective rebuttal.
It’s too bad the DOD couldn’t or wouldn’t provide sufficient
information to put a final nail in the coffin of that point of view.
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