DOD SARs Paint Bleak Picture of Problematic Program Management
administrator
On April 2, 2010 the Department of
Defense released its annual Selected
Acquisition Reports (SARs). As the DOD release
noted—
SARs summarize the latest
estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with
submission of the President's Budget. Subsequent
quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs
experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule
delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are
also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that
are rebaselined at major
milestone decisions.
In summary, the December 2009 SARs
reported an aggregate increase in program estimates at completion (EACs)
of $107,241 million, which is an increase of 7.2 percent over the prior
quarter’s SARs. DOD reported that—
The cost increase is due
primarily to a net increase in planned quantities (+$44,851.5 million),
higher program cost estimates (+$51,338.8 million), an increase in
support requirements (+$25,434.6 million), and a net stretchout of development and procurement
schedules (+$8,973.4 million). These
increases are partially offset by the application of lower escalation
rates (-$23,980.3 million).
The DOD announcement also included a
listing of those programs that have breached
their Nunn-McCurdy limits. (We previously reported on two of those
programs here.)
There are two types of Nunn-McCurdy breaches. “Critical” breaches are
those programs that have experienced unit cost increases of at least 25
percent when compared to the current Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)
or at least 50 percent when compared to the program’s original APB.
“Significant” breaches are those programs that have experienced unit
cost increases of between 15 and 25 percent of the current APB, or that
have experienced unit cost increases of between 30 and 50 percent of the
original APB.
DOD notes that—
Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2433, for those programs with
significant breaches, Congressional notifications are required, as well
as detailed unit cost breach information in the SAR. For those programs with critical breaches, notifications and
unit cost breach information are also required. In
addition a certification determination by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics must be made no
later than June 1, 2010.
For this reporting period there are
six programs with “critical” breaches and one program with a
“significant” breach. In our previous article (link above) we discussed
breaches associated with the ATIRCM/CMWS program and WGS satellite
program. In addition, DOD announced breaches associated with the
following programs:
Apache Helicopter, Block III (AB3) – Breach does not stem from
poor program management. It stems from the addition of 56 new aircraft
to the APB, whereas the original APB only envisioned remanufacture of
existing aircraft.
Zumwalt-class
Destroyer (DDG 1000) – Breach does not stem from poor program
management. It stems from reduction in planned number of ships from 10
to 7.
F-25 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) – No surprises here. Breach stems from “larger-than-planned development costs driven by …
weight growth and a longer forecasted development schedule, increase in
labor and overhead rates, degradation of airframe commonality, lower
production quantities, increases in commodity prices (particularly
titanium), major subcontractor cost growth, and the impact of revised
inflation indices.” Additional causal factors included “substantially
higher change traffic (i.e., changes in design not resulting from
changes in requirements or capability), which led to increased
engineering and software staffing; extended manufacturing span times;
and delayed delivery of aircraft to flight test, led to a further slip
of the development and flight test program.”
Remote
Minehunting System (RMS) –
Breach stems from a combination of factors, including “a reduction in
production quantities [cut from 108 to 54 units], the use of an
incorrect average unit cost as a basis of estimate in the 2006 program
baseline calculation, and an increase in development costs needed to
address reliability issues.”
C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) – Breach stems from a
variety of factors that might be characterized as a failure to plan.
According to the DOD, “the program amended its strategy to provide for
depot installs during the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and
amended its estimate for the level of spares. It
also added costs for training systems not previously included, adjusted
for current inflation indices, and incurred a one-year gap in
production.”
DOD also reported that 35 other programs (some of
which have been discussed here before) experienced “program cost
changes” that did not give rise to Nunn-McCurdy breaches, or that
actually had decreases in estimated program
costs. You can find the entire list by clicking on the link at the
beginning of this article. In addition, DOD published a summary
document that can be found here.
As can
be seen from the foregoing, some Nunn-McCurdy breaches are caused by
factors beyond the program team’s control—such as decreases in the
number of units to be acquired or the addition of work beyond the scope
of the original program baseline. Some breaches, however, appear to be
caused by factors that were within the control of the program team. We
might suggest that those programs consider
upgrading their management effectiveness, lest they repeat the fate of
the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and Future Combat Systems—to name
just two of several programs recently terminated or severely curtailed.
Real Stories from the World of Government Oversight
administrator
he Federal government’s exercise
of contractor oversight has been in the news for months, and it’s been
the topic of several articles on this site as well. From the Commission
on Wartime Contracting to the proposed
DFARS rule on contractor “business systems,”
and from the “ad hoc Senate Committee on Contracting Oversight” to allegations of illegal favoritismtowards a certain LOGCAP III contingency contractor (who shall
remain nameless but whose initials are KBR) … the public has been
inundated with committee hearings and testimony and reports. But what about the “real world”? Can
anybody point to exercise of real oversight and the give-and-take of a
military leader being grilled by a Congressman over failure to properly
assess risk and plan for contingencies?
We
can.
Oh boy, do we have an example of
“real oversight” to share with you.
By way of
background, the Defense Department has been building new facilities and
preparing to transfer large numbers of personnel, ordnance, and weapon systems from bases in Japan
and elsewhere to the small island of Guam. The increase is so large—and
so impactful—on the island’s current population
that the island is now commonly referred to as
“Fortress Guam”. (The indigenous Guam population is largely comprised of U.S. citizens, by the way.)
Here’s a link to a 26 minute-long 2007 Australian
documentary on the military buildup on Guam, for
those who want more background.
Naturally,
Congress has been concerned about the build-up on Guam. There have been several hearings and much
testimony collected over the past few years. We came across this video
of one of those recent hearings,
where Representative Hank Johnson (D-Georgia) grilled Navy Admiral Robert
Willard (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command)
over potential problems associated with the military buildup.
Here is a two-and-a-half minute video of that encounter. Pay close
attention at the 1:20 mark.
We congratulate Admiral Willard on
maintaining his demeanor in the face of Congressman Johnson’s probing
questions. In particular, his
response to one hypothetical scenario advanced by the Congressman (“…
we don’t anticipate that.”) defused a potentially difficult encounter.
But we have to ask—doesn’t this Admiral
have, you know, important things to
accomplish? Doesn’t he have the lives of literally thousands of service
men and women at risk right now, and shouldn’t he be looking after those thousands of men and women, instead of
wasting his time in this sham of an “oversight” process?
If this is
real Congressional oversight, then we need to stop it, right now. We need to get our military leaders
back to leading their commands.
DARPA in the News
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The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is in the news again. Actually, it’s in the news most every
day. What we mean to say is, it’s back on Apogee Consulting’s radar screen with a couple of items we think are of interest
to our clients and visitors. (We last reported on
DARPA’s budget request here.)
First,
this Aviation Week “Ares” blog article
discusses the role of complexity in the
aerospace industry design process. The article
reports that DARPA believes that the industry’s antiquated MIL-STD-499A
systems engineering approach—the famous “Vee”—is to blame for much of the recent spate of cost overruns
and schedule slips. DARPA produced the following chart to illustrate
its point—
As the Ares blog noted, “Integrated-circuit makers
have held development times steady even as chips
have soared in complexity. Car manufacturers have actually reduced their
development timespans. Only
the aerospace industry, according to the chart, has
seen development time (and cost) increase in lockstep with product
complexity.”
Ares reported that—
The research agency sees a lot of problems with the
process, arguing that because detailed design is done within functional
stovepipes that are ‘based on arbitrary cleavage lines’ - like between
power and thermal management - when components and subsystems come
together during integration there are ‘unmodeled and undesired interactions’ that force redesigns,
driving up delays and costs.
To address the issue, DARPA is
reportedly launching “META” to try to change the old system engineering
paradigm. As Ares reported, “A key part of META is using complexity as
the metric, rather than the traditional SWaP - size, weight and power. Apply that to the F-35 and you can
begin to see why development is proving so
difficult. A complexity metric would, DARPA says, allow ‘cyber-vs-physical’ trades - between
implementing a function in software or hardware - and trade-offs between
complexity, performance, cost, etc.”
Second, DARPA has reportedly
“scrapped plans” to develop its “Rapid Eye”
program, according to this article. Rapid
Eye envisioned encapsulating a folding ISR drone inside an
inter-continental ballistic missile, which would put surveillance assets
on scene—anywhere in the world—within an hour. As the article noted—
--the rocket-launched drone had some serious conceptual
flaws. For starters, lobbing an ICBM across the planet without warning
could be mistaken for a surprise nuclear attack. That’s the same general
issue that plagues other high-speed, hit-anywhere-in-the-world weapons
concepts like Prompt Global Strike. If you want to put non-nuclear payloads like a drone
or a conventional warhead on a ballistic missile, you need to make sure
you don’t trigger Armageddon.
So Rapid Eye is closed for good.
But as META shows us, DARPA is still trying to create the future today.
GAO Discusses Key DOD Programs; DOD Gets Ready to Report Nunn-McCurdy Breaches to Congress
administrator
On
March 30, 2010 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued its
annual “Assessment of Selected Weapon Programs” (GAO-10-388SP). The report, a 173-page tome, discussed the current status
of 70 different major defense programs. It focused on technological
maturity at three different points in the program lifecycle and
discussed the current cost, schedule, and technical challenges of each
program.
Overall, GAO made the following key points:
A majority of programs changed
key systems requirements after development start. Only a few programs reported holding
configuration steering boards to review requirements changes,
significant technical changes, or de-scoping options in 2009.
Many programs are at risk for cost growth and schedule delays
because of software development issues.
Programs’ reliance on nongovernmental personnel continues to
increase in order to make up for shortfalls in government personnel and
capabilities.
Looking at the individual programs, GAO made some interesting
observations. We are (obviously) not going to repeat all of them, but
the following comments caught our eyes:
EA-18G
“Growler” – The report detailed a difference of opinion between the
Navy and DOD’s Director of Operational Test & Evaluation
(DOT&E). The Navy found the Growler to be both “operationally
suitable and operationally effective” while DOT&E found the aircraft
“to be operationally effective for most missions and not operationally
suitable.” The issue seemed
to be the “poor reliability of the ALQ-99 jamming pod” plus issues with
simultaneous operation of the active electronically scanned array
(AESA) radar and the airborne electronic attack suite.
Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) – The
report stated that the
program “has a history of cost growth, due primarily to reliability
issues” and that the program “experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach” in 2007 and was restructured in 2008. In 2009, “the Air Force
stopped accepting delivery of … missiles and delayed negotiations …
after 4 out of 10 missiles failed during flight tests ….” GAO noted that “recent Lot 5 test results
raised concerns about the maturity and quality of the program’s
manufacturing process. Independent reviews have found that JASSM’s
reliability issues are primarily driven by supplier quality control
problems.”
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High – GAO reported that
this satellite program “continues to experience setbacks that could add
to cost overruns and schedule delays. All three of the program’s
critical technologies are mature and 99 percent of the expected drawings
are releasable. However, program costs continue to increase due to
software development problems, hardware quality issues, and testing
delays on the first GEO satellite. Unplanned work continues to be a
challenge for the software development effort. The program also recently
discovered hardware defects on the first GEO satellite.” GAO reported that “The SBIRS High program remains at high
risk for cost and schedule growth. DCMA is currently projecting over
$245 million in cost overrun from the current baseline at contract
completion. This amount has more than doubled in the past year and
continues to steadily grow. In December 2009, program officials began
coordination to rebaseline
the program to more realistic cost and schedule goals. Air Force
officials expect the rebaselining effort to take about 9 months, and be completed in mid-to-late
2010. Additional contractor cost increases and schedule delays are
expected due in part to hardware rework on the first satellite,
continued difficulty with the flight software development, and delays in
integration and test activities. The program’s management reserve—
funds set aside to address unanticipated problems— will likely be
depleted before the first GEO satellite launches, and additional funding
could be required if future problems occur. Additional schedule delays could also occur since meeting current launch estimates
depends on the results of system-level integration tests.”
Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774) – GAO
reported that “The Navy has identified extensive quality assurance
problems at one of the Virginia-class shipyards. These problems include
multiple contractor errors on Virginia-class submarines, the most recent
of which involved the installation of weapons loading systems. Navy
officials reported that the error in the weapons loading system
installation does not affect deployed submarines. The Navy continues to
investigate the extent of the quality assurance problems and the
potential cost and schedule implications.”
Meanwhile,
InsideDefense.com recently reported that the ATIRCM/CMWS program (which
is intended to protect Army helicopters against infrared-guided missile
threats) has breached its Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. It did so not
because of technology maturity issues, requirements changes, or
contractor quality problems. It did so because last year the program
was restructured into three subprograms, one of which experienced cost
growth. (We previously discussed Nunn-McCurdy limits in this article.) According to InsideDefense.com, “The
original ATIRCM objective was 3,400; the decision to slash the buy to
just 208 amounted to a 93 percent cut—a change that drove the unit cost
into ‘critical’ Nunn-McCurdy breach territory.”
In
addition, that same source reported that a “major
satellite program” also breached Nunn-McCurdy thresholds, “forcing the
Defense Department to choose between killing the program or certifying to Congress that it must
continue.” The InsideDefense.com article reports
that the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) program “has increased by more
than 25 percent over the current baseline, exceeding the Nunn-McCurdy
law’s critical unit cost threshold.” Air Force Secretary Michael Donley
reported told Congress in a letter that the breach stemmed from
“production breaks [of a two-year duration] and new plans to buy two
more satellites.” Donley also “stresses the first three satellites had
‘an artificially low cost’.”
According to the article, “an
industry source said the contractor, not the government, eats cost
increases when they occur” under the program’s fixed-price contract
type. However, we can speculate that it is possible for the contractor
to insist on “get-well” funds if the customer wants to purchase new,
unplanned, satellites (as is the case here)—in a manner similar to how
Boeing insistedon certain terms and
conditions related to its Air Force launch contracts.
Finally,
InsideDefense.com also reported recent remarks by Dr. Ashton Carter
(USD, AT&L) regarding the Pentagon’s troubled programs. When asked
about other DOD programs that warrant similar scrutiny as that applied to the Joint Strike Fighter, the site
reported Dr. Carter’s remarks as follows—
I don’t know
where to start. There are so many. There are too many programs that
resemble the Joint Strike Fighter in the sense that they are not
performing in the way that they said they were going to and that we
expected. There are lots of reasons for that. It’s obviously very troubling to me.
We have posted over
and over again on the importance of meeting program expectations in the
current budgetary environment. These various reports indicate that
there is still room for improvement.
Another Story of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Iraq—Or Is It?
administrator
As the Commission
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan (CWC) was conducting
a hearing on March 29,
2010 to discuss “rightsizing and managing contractors during the
drawdown in Iraq,” a DOD Inspector Generalreport was being brought to the attention of the press. The report alleged that maintenance services provided by
LOGCAP III contractor KBR (aka Kellogg, Brown & Root, formerly known
as Halliburton) were in
excess of the level actually needed.
In the words of the DOD IG—
--the utilization of contractor-provided
tactical vehicle field maintenance services was less than the 85 percent
required by Army Regulation 750-1. Specifically, from September 1,
2008, through August 31, 2009, the rate ranged from a low of 3.97
percent to a high of 9.65 percent. This occurred because the task order
159 statement of work did not contain requirements for the contractor to
report utilization data and supporting documentation to the Army. In
addition, the Army was not conducting adequate reviews of contractor
utilization data provided by KBR and taking proper corrective action. As
a result, about $4.6 million of the $5 million in costs incurred by DOD
were for tactical vehicle field maintenance services that were not
required. The Army internal controls were ineffective in monitoring
contractor-provided tactical vehicle field maintenance services.
Mother Jones is a “bimonthly magazine of investigative journalism that
exposes the evils of the corporate world, the government, and the
mainstream media.” Mother Jones, bastion of “smart, fearless journalism”
read the DOD IG report from which the above quote was taken, and reported it to their readers with the headline, “KBR Bills $5 Million For Mechanics Who Work
43 Minutes a Month.” If you click on the link, you’ll see
that the Mother Jones article included quotes from CWC co-chair Chris
Shays and member Charles Tiefer, both critical of KBR.
The DOD IG report was issued in early March; the media picked
it up on March 25, just a couple of days before the CWC hearing on the
same subject. Coincidence?
We think not.
As Mother Jones reported—
On March 29, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting—which
Congress set up in early 2007 to investigate waste and corruption in
the military private sector—will hold a hearing to examine whether
contractors are doing their part to prepare for leaving Iraq. Some
commissioners are raring for a showdown with KBR over its drawdown
plan—or lack thereof. The commission's co-chair, former Republican
congressman Christopher H. Shays, said in a statement: ‘Considering that KBR was just awarded a task order—now under
protest—that could bring them up to $2.3 billion in new [Iraq-related]
revenues, it's very important that we get a clear picture of the quality
of planning and oversight during the Iraq drawdown.’ The Balad report is likely to be a hot potato at the hearing.
Commissioner Charles Tiefer tells Mother Jones the report is a ‘dynamite
critique’ of the firm's
practices. ‘The numbers
translate into an astonishingly large pool of KBR employees standing
around idle and having the government be charged,’ he says.
It’s interesting (to us, at least)
that the thrust of the media reports is that, somehow, KBR is at fault
for maintaining staffing levels in excess of those needed. While KBR
may not be entirely innocent in this debacle, the DOD IG report (quoted
above) clearly points a finger at the Army’s contracting and oversight
as the root cause of the problem—and holds KBR largely blameless. (We
note assertions that KBR failed to cooperate with
Army oversight officials, including refusing to provide information
regarding its staffing levels. If the contract was a Firm, Fixed-Price
(FFP) type, the contractor may not have been required to provide that
kind of detailed information.)
Over the
past year, the CWC has been vocal in its criticism of the Defense
Department’s ineffective oversight and management of contractors
supporting warfighters in Southwest Asia. It’s puzzling that their
public criticism on this issue would focus on the contractor and omit
any finger-pointing at the Army contracting officers and support staff
(which is where the DOD IG said the problem lay). So while the CWC blames everybody except the culprits, Mother Jones
and other media outlets get a nice opportunity to voice outrage at KBR
and other contingency contractors.
Pat Fitzgerald’s First Testimony
While we’re on this subject, we note that the CWC hearing
marked Pat Fitzgerald’s first public testimony as Director of DCAA. His sixteen-page typewritten testimony can be found here. Mr. Fitzgerald’s testimony covered—
Update on
DCAA Contingency Contracting Audit Efforts
Oversight
of Contingency Contractors
Contractor Business
System Audits
Economy and Efficiency Audits
Current Status of the Drawdown Audit
Mr. Fitzgerald made some interesting points in his testimony.
Following is a brief recap of some of those points; if you would like
the details, then clink on the link above.
Since
May 2009 (a period of about 10 months), DCAA has issued 23 “suspected
irregularity referrals” (aka Form 2000). DCAA uses Form 2000 when it
suspects that fraud, or other “irregular conduct” has occurred.
Appendix 1 to his testimony lists those 23 referrals by issue. The
issues range from “billed retainage from subcontractors” to “failure to
eliminate subcontractor errors” to “travel invoices appear fraudulent”
to “possible bid rigging of insurance coverage” to “human trafficking
and withholding of employee passports” to “avoidance of paying payroll
taxes.” In other words, the list is a veritable “soup-to-nuts” litany of soupçons of suspicious behavior.
With respect to audits of contractor “business systems,” Mr.
Fitzgerald noted that “We believe that the real
time reporting of significant deficiencies/material weaknesses of a
particular system as opposed to an overall audit opinion on the adequacy
of each of those systems is a better approach.” DCAA’s
“revised approach … will no longer require an opinion on the overall adequacy of
the system of internal controls. Instead, the opinion will be limited to
determining compliance with the applicable DFARS criteria. Our approach
will result in increased transaction testing while ensuring that
deficiencies are reported on a real time basis.”
We are excited to see DCAA move away from its binary pass/fail
system audits towards a more meaningful report of control
system deficiencies. Our optimism is tempered
however, by our concerns for the proposed
DFARS contractor business systems rule that seems to omit any discussion
of materiality and to expect perfection, with onerous penalties for a single mistake. We are also concerned about a soi-disant independent and bipartisan commission that seems determined to make headlines at the
expense of the truth, aided and abetted by certain media outlets that
seem to favor attention-grabbing headlines instead of simply reporting
the facts. Color us naïve and idealistic, but we think taxpayers
deserve better.
Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.