Another Story of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Iraq—Or Is It?

As the Commission
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan (CWC) was conducting
a hearing on March 29,
2010 to discuss “rightsizing and managing contractors during the
drawdown in Iraq,” a DOD Inspector General report was being brought to the attention of the press. The report alleged that maintenance services provided by
LOGCAP III contractor KBR (aka Kellogg, Brown & Root, formerly known
as Halliburton) were in
excess of the level actually needed.
In the words of the DOD IG—
--the utilization of contractor-provided
tactical vehicle field maintenance services was less than the 85 percent
required by Army Regulation 750-1. Specifically, from September 1,
2008, through August 31, 2009, the rate ranged from a low of 3.97
percent to a high of 9.65 percent. This occurred because the task order
159 statement of work did not contain requirements for the contractor to
report utilization data and supporting documentation to the Army. In
addition, the Army was not conducting adequate reviews of contractor
utilization data provided by KBR and taking proper corrective action. As
a result, about $4.6 million of the $5 million in costs incurred by DOD
were for tactical vehicle field maintenance services that were not
required. The Army internal controls were ineffective in monitoring
contractor-provided tactical vehicle field maintenance services.
Mother Jones is a “bimonthly magazine of investigative journalism that
exposes the evils of the corporate world, the government, and the
mainstream media.” Mother Jones, bastion of “smart, fearless journalism”
read the DOD IG report from which the above quote was taken, and reported it to their readers with the headline, “KBR Bills $5 Million For Mechanics Who Work
43 Minutes a Month.” If you click on the link, you’ll see
that the Mother Jones article included quotes from CWC co-chair Chris
Shays and member Charles Tiefer, both critical of KBR.
The DOD IG report was issued in early March; the media picked
it up on March 25, just a couple of days before the CWC hearing on the
same subject. Coincidence?
We think not.
As Mother Jones reported—
On March 29, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting—which
Congress set up in early 2007 to investigate waste and corruption in
the military private sector—will hold a hearing to examine whether
contractors are doing their part to prepare for leaving Iraq. Some
commissioners are raring for a showdown with KBR over its drawdown
plan—or lack thereof. The commission's co-chair, former Republican
congressman Christopher H. Shays, said in a statement: ‘Considering that KBR was just awarded a task order—now under
protest—that could bring them up to $2.3 billion in new [Iraq-related]
revenues, it's very important that we get a clear picture of the quality
of planning and oversight during the Iraq drawdown.’ The Balad report is likely to be a hot potato at the hearing.
Commissioner Charles Tiefer tells Mother Jones the report is a ‘dynamite
critique’ of the firm's
practices. ‘The numbers
translate into an astonishingly large pool of KBR employees standing
around idle and having the government be charged,’ he says.
It’s interesting (to us, at least)
that the thrust of the media reports is that, somehow, KBR is at fault
for maintaining staffing levels in excess of those needed. While KBR
may not be entirely innocent in this debacle, the DOD IG report (quoted
above) clearly points a finger at the Army’s contracting and oversight
as the root cause of the problem—and holds KBR largely blameless. (We
note assertions that KBR failed to cooperate with
Army oversight officials, including refusing to provide information
regarding its staffing levels. If the contract was a Firm, Fixed-Price
(FFP) type, the contractor may not have been required to provide that
kind of detailed information.)
Over the
past year, the CWC has been vocal in its criticism of the Defense
Department’s ineffective oversight and management of contractors
supporting warfighters in Southwest Asia. It’s puzzling that their
public criticism on this issue would focus on the contractor and omit
any finger-pointing at the Army contracting officers and support staff
(which is where the DOD IG said the problem lay). So while the CWC blames everybody except the culprits, Mother Jones
and other media outlets get a nice opportunity to voice outrage at KBR
and other contingency contractors.
Pat Fitzgerald’s First Testimony
While we’re on this subject, we note that the CWC hearing
marked Pat Fitzgerald’s first public testimony as Director of DCAA. His sixteen-page typewritten testimony can be found here. Mr. Fitzgerald’s testimony covered—
- Update on
DCAA Contingency Contracting Audit Efforts
- Oversight
of Contingency Contractors
- Contractor Business
System Audits
- Economy and Efficiency Audits
- Current Status of the Drawdown Audit
Mr. Fitzgerald made some interesting points in his testimony.
Following is a brief recap of some of those points; if you would like
the details, then clink on the link above.
Since
May 2009 (a period of about 10 months), DCAA has issued 23 “suspected
irregularity referrals” (aka Form 2000). DCAA uses Form 2000 when it
suspects that fraud, or other “irregular conduct” has occurred.
Appendix 1 to his testimony lists those 23 referrals by issue. The
issues range from “billed retainage from subcontractors” to “failure to
eliminate subcontractor errors” to “travel invoices appear fraudulent”
to “possible bid rigging of insurance coverage” to “human trafficking
and withholding of employee passports” to “avoidance of paying payroll
taxes.” In other words, the list is a veritable “soup-to-nuts” litany of soupçons of suspicious behavior.
With respect to audits of contractor “business systems,” Mr.
Fitzgerald noted that “We believe that the real
time reporting of significant deficiencies/material weaknesses of a
particular system as opposed to an overall audit opinion on the adequacy
of each of those systems is a better approach.” DCAA’s
“revised approach … will no longer require an opinion on the overall adequacy of
the system of internal controls. Instead, the opinion will be limited to
determining compliance with the applicable DFARS criteria. Our approach
will result in increased transaction testing while ensuring that
deficiencies are reported on a real time basis.”
We are excited to see DCAA move away from its binary pass/fail
system audits towards a more meaningful report of control
system deficiencies. Our optimism is tempered
however, by our concerns for the proposed
DFARS contractor business systems rule that seems to omit any discussion
of materiality and to expect perfection, with onerous penalties for a single mistake. We are also concerned about a soi-disant independent and bipartisan commission that seems determined to make headlines at the
expense of the truth, aided and abetted by certain media outlets that
seem to favor attention-grabbing headlines instead of simply reporting
the facts. Color us naïve and idealistic, but we think taxpayers
deserve better.
Criminal Conflict of Interest

On
March 26, 2010 the Department of Justice reported that a former Department of Energy (DOE) employee, Ms. Donna
Scott, had pled guilty to criminal conflict of interest and her husband
had pled guilty to making a false statement to a federal agent. We have
written before about both organizational and
personal conflicts of interest—notably here and here. There is a proposed rule in play that would establish
standards for contractor personal conflicts of interest similar to those already in place for government employees,
making this an issue applicable to pretty much everybody.
According
to the DOJ announcement, Mrs. Scott “coordinated the use and renovation
of DOE office space.” Included in her duties was the oversight of the
renovation of a lobby and conference room in a DOE building in
Germantown, MD. Her duties also included the acquisition of new
furniture for those spaces. While employed by DOE, she “recommended to a co-worker
that the co-worker obtain price quotes for furniture from her husband,
Timothy Scott. Timothy Scott provided these price quotes to Donna
Scott’s co-worker, both of which referenced Timothy Scott as the
manufacturer’s representative.” However,
the co-worker was told that she needed two additional price quotes in
order to “satisfy competitive bidding requirements.”
So, to help her co-worker satisfy “competitive bidding
requirements,” Mrs. Scott—
--admitted
that she subsequently obtained two
additional price quotes for each transaction from her husband and
provided them to her co-worker as the competitive price quotes. Donna
Scott admitted that she knew, unlike the original price quotes, that
none of these new price quotes referenced Timothy Scott by name.
Moreover, the additional quotes bid a higher price for the furniture
than the initial quote, making Timothy Scott’s original bid the lowest.
Mrs.
Scott’s co-worker used the three quotes to justify why Mr. Scott’s low
bid was fair and reasonable, and DOE then purchased the furniture from
Mr. Scott.
In addition to the foregoing, Mrs. Scott—
--selected furniture worth approximately $300,000 from
particular manufacturers for the cafeteria renovation project. [She] admitted that she knew these manufacturers’
representatives planned to use her husband as their dealer of record for
these transactions, thus earning her husband a commission. [She]
arranged for the furniture to be purchased by the General Services
Administration (GSA) on behalf of the DOE. As a result, Timothy Scott
earned approximately $24,174 in commissions from the manufacturers.
According
to the DOJ announcement, “Donna and Timothy Scott
each face maximum sentences of five years in prison and fines of
$250,000 or the greater of twice the gross gain or loss from the
offense. U.S. District Judge Peter J. Messitte has scheduled sentencing for June 3, 2010.”
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US Air Force Implements DCAA/Contracting Officer Resolution Process

As we previously
reported, DOD has moved to rectify the
dysfunctional relationship between DCAA and its contracting
officers—although we have opined that much
of what has been published looks like window-dressing and fails to
address fundamental problems. Regardless of our opinion(s) on the
matter, any progress is better than the stalemate between audit and
contracting that had become the status quo in the Defense acquisition
process.
So we are pleased to note that the
military services have begun to flow-down the DOD
resolution policy to their contracting officers.
As far as we know, the first to do so was the US Air Force. On March
17, 2010, the USAF issued this memorandum
that “sets forth Air Force policy for resolving significant
disagreements when the Contracting Officer does not concur with DCAA
recommendations while establishing pre-negotiation objective[s].” The
policy set forth is essentially a verbatim recap of Shay Assad’s
December 2009 memo. (You can find a link to his memo in the first link
above.)
To tailor the policy to the Air
Force, the memo states that—
Should
DCAA request Air Force management review, the Contracting Officer will
advance this issue through their management chain and provide the name
and phone number of the Senior Contracting Official (SCO) or Senior
Center Contracting Official (SCCO) to the cognizant DCAA representative. If the parties are still in
disagreement, the SCO or SCCO will advance the issue to the HCA [Head of
Contracting Activities] to
support any request from DCAA for further resolution.
As we have noted, there are many opportunities for disagreement between Contracting Officers and auditor that do
not involve establishing pre-negotiation objectives related to
questioned costs. For instance, determination of “business system”
internal control system adequacy does not necessarily involve
negotiating an amount of questioned costs, and determining whether a
contractor is or is not in non-compliance with Cost Accounting Standards
does not necessarily involve negotiating an amount of questioned
costs. In other words, while the DOD resolution process is a small step
forward, it does not address all the existing issues.
Secure Border Initiative Fails

In September 2006 Boeing beat Raytheon and was awarded the
“Secure Border Initiative” (SBI) contract to “to secure U.S. borders and
reduce illegal immigration, including an array of technical aids and
elements on both the northern Canadian border and the southern border
with Mexico.” Known as “SBInet,” Boeing was to
develop and install a “virtual fence” for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Agency (CBPA). The SBInet contract was initially valued at $2
billion.
On March 16, 2010, DHS Secretary
Janet Napolitano announced that she would reprogram $50 million from the
SBInet contract and “spend
it on proven, off-the-shelf technology to protect U.S. borders,”
according to this CNN story. CNN reported that—
As
originally envisioned, SBInet
was to give the United States control of its borders through a system
of movable surveillance towers, high-tech sensors, radars, cameras and
communication relays that would give Customs and Border Protection
agents the ability to see and respond to intruders. But the system, which is being developed by
Boeing, has come under withering criticism from the Government
Accountability Office and others who say that it has been riddled with
problems. Napolitano said
the SBInet has been ‘plagued with cost overruns and missed
deadlines.’
As a
result, Secretary Napolitano said that she was freezing SBInet funding except for a 53-mile
portion in Arizona, until a “re-assessment” of the project is complete.
Meanwhile, $50 million in ARRA stimulus funds that was to be used to
“accelerate deployment of … surveillance technology and associated
command and control technologies” would be reprogrammed and used to
acquire “commercially available technology, including mobile
surveillance, thermal imaging devices, ultra-light detection,
backscatter (full body image) units, mobile radios, cameras and laptops
for pursuit vehicles and remote video surveillance system enhancements.”
In February, 2010, Secretary Napolitano testified before the
Senate’s Homeland Security Committee that “SBInet, a contract and a concept that was entered into years ago,
has been plagued with troubles from day one… It has never met a
deadline, it hasn’t met its operational capacities, and it doesn’t give
us what we need to have.” (Source: this Defense Industry Daily recap of SBInet history.) The DID article links to several GAO reports
critical of the project; the
article quotes GAO as reporting the following points—
· SBInet technology
deployment for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early
fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the completion
date had slipped to 2016….
· Important aspects of SBInet
remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear
and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered, when and
where they will be delivered, and how they will be delivered. For
example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet
deployments and capabilities have continued to change since the program
began and, even now, are unclear. Further, the program office does not
have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of
the program, and GAO’s assimilation of available information indicates
that the schedule has continued to change. This schedule-related risk is
exacerbated by the continuous change in and the absence of a clear
definition of the approach that is being used to define, develop,
acquire, test, and deploy SBInet…. While the program
office recently issued guidance that defines key practices associated
with effectively developing and managing requirements, such as
eliciting user needs and ensuring that different levels of requirements
and associated verification methods are properly aligned with one
another, the guidance was developed after several key activities had
been completed. In the absence of this guidance, the program has not
effectively performed key requirements definition and management
practices. For example, it has not ensured that different levels of
requirements are properly aligned, as evidenced by GAO’s analysis of a
random probability sample of component requirements showing that a large
percentage of them could not be traced to higher-level system and
operational requirements. Also, some of SBInet’s
operational requirements, which are the basis for all lower-level
requirements, were found by an independent DHS review to be unaffordable
and unverifiable, thus casting doubt on the quality of lower-level
requirements that are derived from them. As a result, the risk of SBInet
not meeting mission needs and performing as intended is increased, as
are the chances of expensive and time-consuming system rework.
· SBInet
program uncertainties, such as not fully defined program expectations,
changes to timelines, and confusion over the need to obtain
environmental permits contribute to ongoing delays of SBInet
technology deployments…. According to program officials, as of August
2008, fencing costs averaged $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian
fencing and $2.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing, up from estimates
in February 2008 of $4 million and $2 million per mile, respectively.
Furthermore, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, in part because of
increasing construction costs and because the program office has yet to
determine maintenance costs and locations for fencing projects beyond
December 2008. In addition, land acquisition issues present a challenge
to completing fence construction
.
Rep. Bennie
G. Thompson, D-Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee, was quoted as saying that SBInet has been a "grave and expensive disappointment. Today's
announcement is recognition that this troubled program needs better
management and stronger oversight."
We have written over and over that effective program
management is the key to survival in the current (and future) budget
squeeze. SBInet is yet
another example of the ramifications associated with poor program
management. There is no doubt in our minds that it will not be the last
program to pay the price for unacceptable contract outcomes.
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