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Apogee Consulting Inc

DARPA in the News

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The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is in the news again.  Actually, it’s in the news most every day.  What we mean to say is, it’s back on Apogee Consulting’s radar screen with a couple of items we think are of interest to our clients and visitors.  (We last reported on DARPA’s budget request here.)

First, this Aviation Week “Ares” blog article discusses the role of complexity in the aerospace industry design process.  The article reports that DARPA believes that the industry’s antiquated MIL-STD-499A systems engineering approach—the famous “Vee”—is to blame for much of the recent spate of cost overruns and schedule slips.  DARPA produced the following chart to illustrate its point—


DARPA Chart.jpg

As the Ares blog noted, “Integrated-circuit makers have held development times steady even as chips have soared in complexity. Car manufacturers have actually reduced their development timespans. Only the aerospace industry, according to the chart, has seen development time (and cost) increase in lockstep with product complexity.”

Ares reported that—

The research agency sees a lot of problems with the process, arguing that because detailed design is done within functional stovepipes that are ‘based on arbitrary cleavage lines’ - like between power and thermal management - when components and subsystems come together during integration there are ‘unmodeled and undesired interactions’ that force redesigns, driving up delays and costs.

To address the issue, DARPA is reportedly launching “META” to try to change the old system engineering paradigm.  As Ares reported, “A key part of META is using complexity as the metric, rather than the traditional SWaP - size, weight and power. Apply that to the F-35 and you can begin to see why development is proving so difficult. A complexity metric would, DARPA says, allow ‘cyber-vs-physical’ trades - between implementing a function in software or hardware - and trade-offs between complexity, performance, cost, etc.”

Second, DARPA has reportedly “scrapped plans” to develop its “Rapid Eye” program, according to this article.  Rapid Eye envisioned encapsulating a folding ISR drone inside an inter-continental ballistic missile, which would put surveillance assets on scene—anywhere in the world—within an hour.  As the article noted—

--the rocket-launched drone had some serious conceptual flaws. For starters, lobbing an ICBM across the planet without warning could be mistaken for a surprise nuclear attack. That’s the same general issue that plagues other high-speed, hit-anywhere-in-the-world weapons concepts like Prompt Global Strike. If you want to put non-nuclear payloads like a drone or a conventional warhead on a ballistic missile, you need to make sure you don’t trigger Armageddon.

So Rapid Eye is closed for good.  But as META shows us, DARPA is still trying to create the future today.




 

Another Story of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Iraq—Or Is It?

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As the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) was conducting a hearing on March 29, 2010 to discuss “rightsizing and managing contractors during the drawdown in Iraq,” a DOD Inspector General report was being brought to the attention of the press.  The report alleged that maintenance services provided by LOGCAP III contractor KBR (aka Kellogg, Brown & Root, formerly known as Halliburton) were in excess of the level actually needed.  In the words of the DOD IG—

--the utilization of contractor-provided tactical vehicle field maintenance services was less than the 85 percent required by Army Regulation 750-1.  Specifically, from September 1, 2008, through August 31, 2009, the rate ranged from a low of 3.97 percent to a high of 9.65 percent. This occurred because the task order 159 statement of work did not contain requirements for the contractor to report utilization data and supporting documentation to the Army. In addition, the Army was not conducting adequate reviews of contractor utilization data provided by KBR and taking proper corrective action. As a result, about $4.6 million of the $5 million in costs incurred by DOD were for tactical vehicle field maintenance services that were not required. The Army internal controls were ineffective in monitoring contractor-provided tactical vehicle field maintenance services.

Mother Jones is a “bimonthly magazine of investigative journalism that exposes the evils of the corporate world, the government, and the mainstream media.” Mother Jones, bastion of “smart, fearless journalism” read the DOD IG report from which the above quote was taken, and reported it to their readers with the headline, “KBR Bills $5 Million For Mechanics Who Work 43 Minutes a Month.”  If you click on the link, you’ll see that the Mother Jones article included quotes from CWC co-chair Chris Shays and member Charles Tiefer, both critical of KBR.

The DOD IG report was issued in early March; the media picked it up on March 25, just a couple of days before the CWC hearing on the same subject.  Coincidence?  We think not.

As Mother Jones reported—

On March 29, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting—which Congress set up in early 2007 to investigate waste and corruption in the military private sector—will hold a hearing to examine whether contractors are doing their part to prepare for leaving Iraq. Some commissioners are raring for a showdown with KBR over its drawdown plan—or lack thereof. The commission's co-chair, former Republican congressman Christopher H. Shays, said in a statement: ‘Considering that KBR was just awarded a task order—now under protest—that could bring them up to $2.3 billion in new [Iraq-related] revenues, it's very important that we get a clear picture of the quality of planning and oversight during the Iraq drawdown.’  The Balad report is likely to be a hot potato at the hearing. Commissioner Charles Tiefer tells Mother Jones the report is a ‘dynamite critique’ of the firm's practices. ‘The numbers translate into an astonishingly large pool of KBR employees standing around idle and having the government be charged,’ he says.

It’s interesting (to us, at least) that the thrust of the media reports is that, somehow, KBR is at fault for maintaining staffing levels in excess of those needed.  While KBR may not be entirely innocent in this debacle, the DOD IG report (quoted above) clearly points a finger at the Army’s contracting and oversight as the root cause of the problem—and holds KBR largely blameless.  (We note assertions that KBR failed to cooperate with Army oversight officials, including refusing to provide information regarding its staffing levels.  If the contract was a Firm, Fixed-Price (FFP) type, the contractor may not have been required to provide that kind of detailed information.)

Over the past year, the CWC has been vocal in its criticism of the Defense Department’s ineffective oversight and management of contractors supporting warfighters in Southwest Asia.  It’s puzzling that their public criticism on this issue would focus on the contractor and omit any finger-pointing at the Army contracting officers and support staff (which is where the DOD IG said the problem lay).  So while the CWC blames everybody except the culprits, Mother Jones and other media outlets get a nice opportunity to voice outrage at KBR and other contingency contractors.

Pat Fitzgerald’s First Testimony

While we’re on this subject, we note that the CWC hearing marked Pat Fitzgerald’s first public testimony as Director of DCAA.  His sixteen-page typewritten testimony can be found here.  Mr. Fitzgerald’s testimony covered—

  • Update on DCAA Contingency Contracting Audit Efforts
  • Oversight of Contingency Contractors
  • Contractor Business System Audits
  • Economy and Efficiency Audits
  • Current Status of the Drawdown Audit

Mr. Fitzgerald made some interesting points in his testimony.  Following is a brief recap of some of those points; if you would like the details, then clink on the link above.

Since May 2009 (a period of about 10 months), DCAA has issued 23 “suspected irregularity referrals” (aka Form 2000).  DCAA uses Form 2000 when it suspects that fraud, or other “irregular conduct” has occurred.  Appendix 1 to his testimony lists those 23 referrals by issue.  The issues range from “billed retainage from subcontractors” to “failure to eliminate subcontractor errors” to “travel invoices appear fraudulent” to “possible bid rigging of insurance coverage” to “human trafficking and withholding of employee passports” to “avoidance of paying payroll taxes.”  In other words, the list is a veritable “soup-to-nuts” litany of soupçons of suspicious behavior. 

With respect to audits of contractor “business systems,” Mr. Fitzgerald noted that “We believe that the real time reporting of significant deficiencies/material weaknesses of a particular system as opposed to an overall audit opinion on the adequacy of each of those systems is a better approach.”  DCAA’s “revised approach … will no longer require an opinion on the overall adequacy of the system of internal controls. Instead, the opinion will be limited to determining compliance with the applicable DFARS criteria. Our approach will result in increased transaction testing while ensuring that deficiencies are reported on a real time basis.”

We are excited to see DCAA move away from its binary pass/fail system audits towards a more meaningful report of control system deficiencies.  Our optimism is tempered however, by our concerns for the proposed DFARS contractor business systems rule that seems to omit any discussion of materiality and to expect perfection, with onerous penalties for a single mistake.  We are also concerned about a soi-disant independent and bipartisan commission that seems determined to make headlines at the expense of the truth, aided and abetted by certain media outlets that seem to favor attention-grabbing headlines instead of simply reporting the facts.  Color us naïve and idealistic, but we think taxpayers deserve better.


 

Criminal Conflict of Interest

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On March 26, 2010 the Department of Justice reported that a former Department of Energy (DOE) employee, Ms. Donna Scott, had pled guilty to criminal conflict of interest and her husband had pled guilty to making a false statement to a federal agent.  We have written before about both organizational and personal conflicts of interest—notably here and here.  There is a proposed rule in play that would establish standards for contractor personal conflicts of interest similar to those already in place for government employees, making this an issue applicable to pretty much everybody.

According to the DOJ announcement, Mrs. Scott “coordinated the use and renovation of DOE office space.”  Included in her duties was the oversight of the renovation of a lobby and conference room in a DOE building in Germantown, MD.  Her duties also included the acquisition of new furniture for those spaces.  While employed by DOE, she “recommended to a co-worker that the co-worker obtain price quotes for furniture from her husband, Timothy Scott. Timothy Scott provided these price quotes to Donna Scott’s co-worker, both of which referenced Timothy Scott as the manufacturer’s representative.”  However, the co-worker was told that she needed two additional price quotes in order to “satisfy competitive bidding requirements.”

So, to help her co-worker satisfy “competitive bidding requirements,” Mrs. Scott—

--admitted that she subsequently obtained two additional price quotes for each transaction from her husband and provided them to her co-worker as the competitive price quotes. Donna Scott admitted that she knew, unlike the original price quotes, that none of these new price quotes referenced Timothy Scott by name. Moreover, the additional quotes bid a higher price for the furniture than the initial quote, making Timothy Scott’s original bid the lowest.

Mrs. Scott’s co-worker used the three quotes to justify why Mr. Scott’s low bid was fair and reasonable, and DOE then purchased the furniture from Mr. Scott.

In addition to the foregoing, Mrs. Scott—

--selected furniture worth approximately $300,000 from particular manufacturers for the cafeteria renovation project. [She] admitted that she knew these manufacturers’ representatives planned to use her husband as their dealer of record for these transactions, thus earning her husband a commission. [She] arranged for the furniture to be purchased by the General Services Administration (GSA) on behalf of the DOE. As a result, Timothy Scott earned approximately $24,174 in commissions from the manufacturers.

According to the DOJ announcement, “Donna and Timothy Scott each face maximum sentences of five years in prison and fines of $250,000 or the greater of twice the gross gain or loss from the offense. U.S. District Judge Peter J. Messitte has scheduled sentencing for June 3, 2010.”

 

US Air Force Implements DCAA/Contracting Officer Resolution Process

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As we previously reported, DOD has moved to rectify the dysfunctional relationship between DCAA and its contracting officers—although we have opined that much of what has been published looks like window-dressing and fails to address fundamental problems.  Regardless of our opinion(s) on the matter, any progress is better than the stalemate between audit and contracting that had become the status quo in the Defense acquisition process. 

So we are pleased to note that the military services have begun to flow-down the DOD resolution policy to their contracting officers.  As far as we know, the first to do so was the US Air Force.  On March 17, 2010, the USAF issued this memorandum that “sets forth Air Force policy for resolving significant disagreements when the Contracting Officer does not concur with DCAA recommendations while establishing pre-negotiation objective[s].”  The policy set forth is essentially a verbatim recap of Shay Assad’s December 2009 memo.  (You can find a link to his memo in the first link above.)

To tailor the policy to the Air Force, the memo states that—

Should DCAA request Air Force management review, the Contracting Officer will advance this issue through their management chain and provide the name and phone number of the Senior Contracting Official (SCO) or Senior Center Contracting Official (SCCO) to the cognizant DCAA representative.  If the parties are still in disagreement, the SCO or SCCO will advance the issue to the HCA [Head of Contracting Activities] to support any request from DCAA for further resolution.

As we have noted, there are many opportunities for disagreement between Contracting Officers and auditor that do not involve establishing pre-negotiation objectives related to questioned costs.  For instance, determination of “business system” internal control system adequacy does not necessarily involve negotiating an amount of questioned costs, and determining whether a contractor is or is not in non-compliance with Cost Accounting Standards does not necessarily involve negotiating an amount of questioned costs.  In other words, while the DOD resolution process is a small step forward, it does not address all the existing issues.




 

Secure Border Initiative Fails

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In September 2006 Boeing beat Raytheon and was awarded the “Secure Border Initiative” (SBI) contract to “to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal immigration, including an array of technical aids and elements on both the northern Canadian border and the southern border with Mexico.”  Known as “SBInet,” Boeing was to develop and install a “virtual fence” for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBPA).  The SBInet contract was initially valued at $2 billion. 

On March 16, 2010, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that she would reprogram $50 million from the SBInet contract and “spend it on proven, off-the-shelf technology to protect U.S. borders,”  according to this CNN story.  CNN reported that—

As originally envisioned, SBInet was to give the United States control of its borders through a system of movable surveillance towers, high-tech sensors, radars, cameras and communication relays that would give Customs and Border Protection agents the ability to see and respond to intruders. But the system, which is being developed by Boeing, has come under withering criticism from the Government Accountability Office and others who say that it has been riddled with problems. Napolitano said the SBInet has been ‘plagued with cost overruns and missed deadlines.’

As a result, Secretary Napolitano said that she was freezing SBInet funding except for a 53-mile portion in Arizona, until a “re-assessment” of the project is complete.  Meanwhile, $50 million in ARRA stimulus funds that was to be used to “accelerate deployment of … surveillance technology and associated command and control technologies” would be reprogrammed and used to acquire “commercially available technology, including mobile surveillance, thermal imaging devices, ultra-light detection, backscatter (full body image) units, mobile radios, cameras and laptops for pursuit vehicles and remote video surveillance system enhancements.”

In February, 2010, Secretary Napolitano testified before the Senate’s Homeland Security Committee that “SBInet, a contract and a concept that was entered into years ago, has been plagued with troubles from day one… It has never met a deadline, it hasn’t met its operational capacities, and it doesn’t give us what we need to have.”  (Source: this Defense Industry Daily recap of SBInet history.)  The DID article links to several GAO reports critical of the project;  the article quotes GAO as reporting the following points—

·        SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016….

·        Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered, when and where they will be delivered, and how they will be delivered. For example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have continued to change since the program began and, even now, are unclear. Further, the program office does not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of the program, and GAO’s assimilation of available information indicates that the schedule has continued to change. This schedule-related risk is exacerbated by the continuous change in and the absence of a clear definition of the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet…. While the program office recently issued guidance that defines key practices associated with effectively developing and managing requirements, such as eliciting user needs and ensuring that different levels of requirements and associated verification methods are properly aligned with one another, the guidance was developed after several key activities had been completed. In the absence of this guidance, the program has not effectively performed key requirements definition and management practices. For example, it has not ensured that different levels of requirements are properly aligned, as evidenced by GAO’s analysis of a random probability sample of component requirements showing that a large percentage of them could not be traced to higher-level system and operational requirements. Also, some of SBInet’s operational requirements, which are the basis for all lower-level requirements, were found by an independent DHS review to be unaffordable and unverifiable, thus casting doubt on the quality of lower-level requirements that are derived from them. As a result, the risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as intended is increased, as are the chances of expensive and time-consuming system rework.

·        SBInet program uncertainties, such as not fully defined program expectations, changes to timelines, and confusion over the need to obtain environmental permits contribute to ongoing delays of SBInet technology deployments…. According to program officials, as of August 2008, fencing costs averaged $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $2.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing, up from estimates in February 2008 of $4 million and $2 million per mile, respectively. Furthermore, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, in part because of increasing construction costs and because the program office has yet to determine maintenance costs and locations for fencing projects beyond December 2008. In addition, land acquisition issues present a challenge to completing fence construction

.

Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, D-Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, was quoted as saying that SBInet has been a "grave and expensive disappointment.  Today's announcement is recognition that this troubled program needs better management and stronger oversight."

We have written over and over that effective program management is the key to survival in the current (and future) budget squeeze.  SBInet is yet another example of the ramifications associated with poor program management.  There is no doubt in our minds that it will not be the last program to pay the price for unacceptable contract outcomes.



 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.