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Apogee Consulting Inc

Secure Border Initiative Fails

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In September 2006 Boeing beat Raytheon and was awarded the “Secure Border Initiative” (SBI) contract to “to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal immigration, including an array of technical aids and elements on both the northern Canadian border and the southern border with Mexico.”  Known as “SBInet,” Boeing was to develop and install a “virtual fence” for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBPA).  The SBInet contract was initially valued at $2 billion. 

On March 16, 2010, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that she would reprogram $50 million from the SBInet contract and “spend it on proven, off-the-shelf technology to protect U.S. borders,”  according to this CNN storyCNN reported that—

As originally envisioned, SBInet was to give the United States control of its borders through a system of movable surveillance towers, high-tech sensors, radars, cameras and communication relays that would give Customs and Border Protection agents the ability to see and respond to intruders. But the system, which is being developed by Boeing, has come under withering criticism from the Government Accountability Office and others who say that it has been riddled with problems. Napolitano said the SBInet has been plagued with cost overruns and missed deadlines.

As a result, Secretary Napolitano said that she was freezing SBInet funding except for a 53-mile portion in Arizona, until a “re-assessment” of the project is complete.  Meanwhile, $50 million in ARRA stimulus funds that was to be used to “accelerate deployment of … surveillance technology and associated command and control technologies” would be reprogrammed and used to acquire “commercially available technology, including mobile surveillance, thermal imaging devices, ultra-light detection, backscatter (full body image) units, mobile radios, cameras and laptops for pursuit vehicles and remote video surveillance system enhancements.”

In February, 2010, Secretary Napolitano testified before the Senate’s Homeland Security Committee that “SBInet, a contract and a concept that was entered into years ago, has been plagued with troubles from day one… It has never met a deadline, it hasn’t met its operational capacities, and it doesn’t give us what we need to have.”  (Source: this Defense Industry Daily recap of SBInet history.)  The DID article links to several GAO reports critical of the project;  the article quotes GAO as reporting the following points—

·        SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016….

·        Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered, when and where they will be delivered, and how they will be delivered. For example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have continued to change since the program began and, even now, are unclear. Further, the program office does not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of the program, and GAO’s assimilation of available information indicates that the schedule has continued to change. This schedule-related risk is exacerbated by the continuous change in and the absence of a clear definition of the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet…. While the program office recently issued guidance that defines key practices associated with effectively developing and managing requirements, such as eliciting user needs and ensuring that different levels of requirements and associated verification methods are properly aligned with one another, the guidance was developed after several key activities had been completed. In the absence of this guidance, the program has not effectively performed key requirements definition and management practices. For example, it has not ensured that different levels of requirements are properly aligned, as evidenced by GAO’s analysis of a random probability sample of component requirements showing that a large percentage of them could not be traced to higher-level system and operational requirements. Also, some of SBInet’s operational requirements, which are the basis for all lower-level requirements, were found by an independent DHS review to be unaffordable and unverifiable, thus casting doubt on the quality of lower-level requirements that are derived from them. As a result, the risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as intended is increased, as are the chances of expensive and time-consuming system rework.

·        SBInet program uncertainties, such as not fully defined program expectations, changes to timelines, and confusion over the need to obtain environmental permits contribute to ongoing delays of SBInet technology deployments…. According to program officials, as of August 2008, fencing costs averaged $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $2.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing, up from estimates in February 2008 of $4 million and $2 million per mile, respectively. Furthermore, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, in part because of increasing construction costs and because the program office has yet to determine maintenance costs and locations for fencing projects beyond December 2008. In addition, land acquisition issues present a challenge to completing fence construction

.

Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, D-Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, was quoted as saying that SBInet has been a "grave and expensive disappointment.  Today's announcement is recognition that this troubled program needs better management and stronger oversight."

We have written over and over that effective program management is the key to survival in the current (and future) budget squeeze.  SBInet is yet another example of the ramifications associated with poor program management.  There is no doubt in our minds that it will not be the last program to pay the price for unacceptable contract outcomes.



 

DCAA Publishes New Audit Guidance on Allowable Air Fares

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In December 2009, we reported on changes to allowability rules regarding air fare costs.  We noted several problems with the new rule and predicted problems with implementation and with DCAA audit guidance.

We wrote, “based on our experience with Government auditors, that is not how the rule will be interpreted in audits of such costs.”

We were correct.  Implementation has proved difficult, and DCAA has just issued audit guidance that will cause problems and—likely—litigation.

On March 22, 2010 DCAA issued MRD 10-PAC-010(R) entitled “Audit Guidance on Revision to FAR 31.205-46(b) and (c) – Limiting Airfare to the Lowest Airfare Available to the Contractor.” See the entire MRD hereThe MRD contains the following guidance—

  • Auditors should question airfare costs claimed in excess of the lowest airfare available to the contractor.
  • To comply with the revised rule, the contractor’s policies and procedures should provide for advance planning of travel to assure that the lowest priced airfare available to the contractor for flights during normal business hours is documented and utilized as the baseline allowable airfare cost.
  • To determine the lowest airfare available to the contractor for flights during normal business hours, the contractor must now consider nonrefundable airfares and lower airfares negotiated with airlines, travel service providers, credit card companies, etc. However, auditors should not question airfare costs claimed in excess of nonrefundable airfare available during normal business hours if the contractor’s data show that its experience with cancelling nonrefundable tickets results in increased cost in comparison to the cost of refundable tickets.
  • Ordinarily, with adequate advance planning, documentation substantiating the lowest airfare available takes the form of quotations from competing airlines or travel service providers from which the lowest priced airfare can be selected, giving proper consideration to any potential discounts or credits to the contractor’s cost. There may be instances where only one flight is available for a given mission need and, therefore, only one quote is obtained, in which case the one quotation would substantiate the lowest priced airfare available. However, auditors observing frequent instances in which a single quotation is obtained to support the airfare should assess whether the design or execution of the contractor’s policies and procedures results in unreasonable airfare costs.

Notice that DCAA has taken the ambiguous FAR rule and decided (without support for its position) that contractors now need “quotations from competing airlines … from which the lowest priced airfare can be selected….”   If one is to comply with DCAA’s position, one would need to run mini-competitions for each trip, and justify any fare paid over the lowest price offered.  This is a patently absurd position and one that is almost certain to result in a challenge from a contractor who has air fare costs questioned because of a lack of such competing quotes.

We predicted that the poorly drafted rule, whose language did not align with the purpose articulated in the promulgating comments, would cause unintended problems.  We don’t necessarily relish saying so, but we were right.

Contractors must review the rule and their travel practices, establish a position (which may or may not match DCAA’s flawed interpretation of the rule), and be prepared to fight with DCAA regarding differing interpretations and compliance mechanisms.

Not fun.  We told you so.  And we were right.



 

Accounting for IR&D—What Does “Required” Mean?

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There are a lot of hard things about compliant cost accounting in a Federal government environment.  Preparing a cost impact analysis pursuant to the CAS Administration clause is hard.  Preparing a segment closing pension adjustment pursuant to CAS 413 is hard.  And up until recently, accounting for Independent Research and Development (IR&D) expenses has been hard.  However, a recent case in the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, has clarified the rules quite a bit.

The case, known as ATK Thiokol, Inc. vs. United States, has wound its way through the courts over a period of years.  In 2005, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims issued an opinion in favor of the contractor, and the United States appealed. 

By way of background, in 1990 ATK moved design of a new rocket motor, the Castor® IVA-XL.  ATK marketed the motor and, in 1995, applied for an export license, identifying Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as a potential buyer.  At about that same time, ATK moved production of Castor® motors to its Utah facility, which necessitated facility enhancements (including new capital assets); ATK also undertook technical changes and testing of its Castor® motors at the new Utah facility.  In 1999, ATK conducted a “first article acceptance test firing” that was attended by ten potential buyers, including Lockheed Martin, Orbital Sciences Corporation, and the Japanese Government.  As of 2004, however, ATK had only sold the improved rocket motors to Mitsubishi. 

As part of its agreement with Mitsubishi, ATK agreed not to charge for its nonrecurring efforts where those efforts would also benefit other Castor® customers.  In its proposal, ATK identified contract-unique nonrecurring efforts for adapting the motor to Mitsubishi’s needs, and other nonrecurring efforts that would be benefit all Castor® customers, which ATK would self-fund.  ATK notified its Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Divisional Administrative Contracting Officer (DACO) that it would begin to incur nonrecurring development costs and agreed that such costs would not be “specifically identified” in the Statement of Work for the Castor® motor.”  And indeed, while the final contract with Mitsubishi called for Adaptation efforts, it expressly excluded all other nonrecurring costs.

During the period in question, DCAA continuously reviewed ATK’s cost accounting practices and found them to be compliant with applicable requirements, including the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).  ATK maintained a CAS Disclosure Statement that clearly discussed how it distinguished direct costs from indirect costs.  Importantly, ATK disclosed that it “classified a cost that is normally an indirect cost as a direct cost only when: a) a contract specifically required that [ATK] incur the cost; b) the contract paid for the cost; or c) at the time [ATK] incurred the cost, the cost had no reasonably foreseeable benefit to more than one cost objective.” The Disclosure Statement also addressed capitalization versus expensing of various assets.  Although DCAA from time to time objected to ATK’s capitalization practices, the DACO overruled the auditors’ concerns and consistently found that ATK’s cost accounting practices were appropriate.

In 1999, however, the DACO notified ATK that it intended to disallow nonrecurring development costs and certain capital assets (tooling costs) because the costs ““required by and specifically benefit the [Mitsubishi] Contract, and [that] these costs should be charged to the Castor® IVA-XL program.” Following the process outlined in the Contract Disputes Act, ATK filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims after the DACO denied its claim.

The Court had to interpret the FAR 31.205-18 cost principle, CAS 402, and CAS 420 in arriving at its decision.  The parties’ contentions turned on the meaning of the phrase “required in the performance of a contract.”  Allowable IR&D costs are those that are not required in the performance of a contract, but the issue was whether the words meant “specifically” or “expressly” required, or whether they meant “implicitly” required.  The Government argued for “implicitly” required, which would mean that all of ATK’s costs should have been charged as direct costs of the Mitsubishi contract.  ATK, on the other hand, argued for an “expressly” required standard, which would permit costs not expressly required by the contract to be treated as IR&D expenses.

The Court looked at Interpretation No. 1 of CAS 402 (which deals with direct versus indirect charging of B&P costs) and found what it was looking for.  In the language of CAS 402 Interpretation No. 1—

Under 9904.402, costs incurred in preparing, submitting, and supporting proposals pursuant to a specific requirement of an existing contract are considered to have been incurred in different circumstances from the circumstances under which costs are incurred in preparing proposals which do not result from such specific requirement.  The circumstances are different because the costs of preparing proposals specifically required by the provisions of an existing contract relate only to that contract while other proposal costs relate to all work of the contractor. [Emphasis added by the Court.]

As the Court discussed, “Accordingly, under CAS 402, the definitions of ‘direct cost’ and ‘indirect cost’ and Interpretation No. 1, a contractor may, but is not required to, distinguish B&P costs that are ‘Sometimes direct/Sometimes indirect,’ on the basis of whether those costs are ‘specifically required by the provisions of an existing contract.’” The Court used that finding to interpret the requirements of CAS 420 and the cost principle at FAR 31.205-18.  The Court found the parties intended to exclude certain development efforts from the contract, so that those efforts were clearly “not required”—

the court has determined that whether IR&D costs are required in the performance of a contract, within the meaning of CAS 420, is determined by the contracting parties’ intent. Accordingly, the court declines to interpret required in the performance of a contract in the manner advocated by the Government, because doing so would undermine CAS 402, eliminating the primacy that the CAS Board intended the contracting parties intent to serve in the allocation of Sometimes direct/Sometimes indirect costs. Nor will the court interpret required in the performance of a contract in that manner for IR&D alone, because doing so would conflict with the identical phrase in the definition of B&P costs, required by the CAS Board’s retention of CAS 402 and Interpretation No. 1, when CAS 420 was promulgated.

In addition, ATK’s tooling costs were properly treated as capital assets whose depreciation was an allowable cost of its indirect cost pools.  Such costs were not required to be treated as direct costs of the Mitsubishi contract.

The Government appealed, but only to the extent of the IR&D costs.  It chose not to appeal the Court of Federal Claims decision regarding capital assets.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims decision.  According to the appellate decision—

In light of the language and interpretation of CAS 402, it was appropriate for ATK to treat the Development Effort costs at issue in this case as indirect costs. First, those costs were not specifically required by the Mitsubishi contract. Second, as the trial court found, ATK had a disclosed and established cost accounting practice of charging as indirect costs those costs that were not paid for or required by a particular contract and that had a reasonably foreseeable benefit to more than one contract.we agree with the trial court and ATK that the meaning of that phrase in the definition of IR&D must be the same as the meaning of the identical phrase in the definition of bid and proposal (‘B&P’) costs. B&P costs are defined to mean costs incurred in preparing, submitting, and supporting bids and proposals, but not to include the costs of effort ‘required in the performance of a contract.’ FAR 31.205-18(a); CAS 420-30(a)(2). B&P costs are addressed in the same regulations that govern IR&D costs and are treated similarly to IR&D costs in all pertinent respects. See generally FAR 31.205-18; CAS 420-30. B&P costs ‘benefit all business of a contractor rather than a specific existing contract [and thus] treating all such costs as indirect overhead is logical.’  … There is no support anywhere in the text or history of the regulations for treating that identical regulatory formulation differently. We therefore construe the reference to costs ‘required in the performance of a contract’ to mean, in both contexts, costs that are specifically required by the contract. … Because the research and development costs at issue in this case were related to the Mitsubishi contract but were not specifically required by that contract, we uphold the trial court’s decision that those costs were indirect IR&D costs within the meaning of the pertinent regulatory provisions.

For the past seven years, contractors have had to manage a certain amount of ambiguity in their cost accounting practices, as they struggled to comply with an ambiguous set of regulations.  This important decision clarifies the proper cost accounting for IR&D expense, and contractors are advised to study it closely.

We believe that one of the lessons to be learned is that a contractor’s Disclosure Statement is a key tool to establishing its cost accounting practices.  In our experience, contractors too often fail to take advantage of the Disclosure Statement to declare which costs will be direct and which will be indirect, and under what circumstances.  The second lesson is that the drafting of the contract language matters.  As the ATK decisions demonstrated, the combination of clear Disclosure Statement language with clear contract language is difficult to beat.



 

FAPIIS Finally Here!

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We told you about FAPIIS (Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System) last September, when FAR Case 2008-027 (implementing § 827 of the FY 2009 Defense Authorization Act) was published as a proposed rule.  We called it “past performance information on steroids” and said it was “a significant proposed rule that may affect the ability of certain contractors to receive Federal contract or grant awards.”  On March 23, 2010 the FAR Councils issued the final FAPIIS rule, which can be found here.

Summary of the final rule:

FAPIIS is intended to significantly enhance the scope of information available to contracting officers as they evaluate the integrity and performance of prospective contractors. In addition to providing one-stop access to EPLS and PPIRS, FAPIIS will also include contracting officers' non-responsibility determinations (i.e., agency assessments that prospective contractors do not meet requisite responsibility standards to perform for the Government), contract terminations for default or cause, agency defective pricing determinations, administrative agreements entered into by suspension and debarment officials to resolve a suspension or debarment, and contractor self-reporting of criminal convictions, civil liability, and adverse administrative actions. The system will collect this information, on an ongoing basis, from existing systems within the Government (i.e., EPLS and PPIRS), contracting officers (for determinations of non-responsibility and contract terminations), suspension and debarment officials (for information on administrative agreements), and contractors (for information related to criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings).

We’re not going to reiterate all the aspects of this fairly complex rule.  You can click the link to our original article to get the gist, or click the link to the final rule to get all the details.  Instead, we’re going to focus on the FAR Councils’ promulgating comments, where they disposition the public comments received.  Here are some (but not all) of the Councils’ comments.

  • The Councils seek to ensure that FAPIIS provides contracting officers with efficient and effective access to the information they need to evaluate the business ethics and quality of prospective contractors competing for Federal contracts. To achieve this goal, the Councils have taken a phased approach to the implementation of FAPIIS, focusing first on the information specifically identified by Congress in section 872(c) of the FY 2009 NDAA. … Going forward, this approach will allow the Councils to carefully consider policy and procedural issues as new sources of information are identified pursuant to section 872(b) and (c)(6).  For the next phase of FAPIIS, the Councils and OMB are carefully considering a proposed rule that would build on several suggestions made by the public and augment reporting by: (1) lowering the threshold for covered actions that trigger FAPIIS reporting from $500,000 to the simplified acquisition threshold and (2) expanding the current scope of reporting to include other violations of laws, as opposed to violations only in the context of Federal contracts. This information can further enhance the utility of FAPIIS and give contracting officers a fuller picture of a contractor's history of compliance.  However, a number of the other above-described suggestions for expansion raised concerns for the Councils. For example: Requiring the collection of information on all proceedings, regardless of outcome, could potentially create instances where negative judgments on contractors' responsibility are made regardless of the outcome of the referenced proceedings. If information regarding yet-to-be-concluded proceedings were allowed, negative perceptions could unfairly influence contracting officers to find a contractor non-responsible, even in situations that later end with the contractor being exonerated. The Councils are strongly committed to helping contracting officials avoid these types of situations.  Incorporating all the information from ORCA is inappropriate. Much of the information in this system is not designed to support contracting officers in making responsibility determinations.  Extending the archival period (for retaining information beyond five years) is also inappropriate as this period was created for auditing purposes, not for use by contracting officers in making responsibility determinations.

  • The Councils appreciate the need to ensure that information included in FAPIIS will contribute to the stated purpose of the database and that appropriate training is provided to help contracting officers in their use of this information. The Councils did not agree, however, that significant revisions were warranted based on the requested refinements. In particular, the collection of information on administrative agreements entered into to resolve a suspension or debarment is required by section 872, so it must be included in the system. Regarding the concern raised with the definition of ``covered person,'' the existing requirement at FAR 52.209-5 includes certification regarding both the offeror and the principals. Additionally, since the FAPIIS requirement for information does not relate to all offenses by the principals, but only to those that relate to the performance of a Federal contract or grant, this information should be available to the offeror.  As further clarification, the Councils have removed an inconsistency within the definition of ``principal'' between the stated meaning (person within the business entity) and one of the examples (head of a subsidiary). A subsidiary is not generally within the business entity, but is a separate and distinct legal entity. Therefore, the Councils have removed ``head of a subsidiary'' from the list of examples in the definitions of ``principal'' throughout the FAR, because it can imply a meaning broader than the stated definition. Deletion of this example should not result in any change of meaning, since this is just an example, and the definition clearly states that principals are persons within the business entity.

  • the Administrator of GSA shall develop policies to require the timely and accurate input of information into the database. To this end, the Councils will work with the FAPIIS Program Manager, the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI), and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to develop guidance for contracting officials and SDOs on proper input, accuracy, and timeliness of data into FAPIIS. In addition, the Councils have added a requirement to the rule similar to that at FAR 4.604 for data entry into the Federal Procurement Data System, stating that the contracting officers and SDOs are responsible for the timely submission and sufficiency of the data. There is no single entity that can be held accountable because the information in FAPIIS comes from various sources. However, each system to which FAPIIS connects has its own guidelines for timeliness and accountability and separate initiatives are being pursued to strengthen these systems. For example, OFPP's memorandum of July 29, 2009, Improving the Use of Contractor Performance Information … requires the submission of report cards to the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS). PPIRS has a standard format for supplying all the report card information collected from the Federal agencies to authorized Government users for use in source selection decisions, and the Government is working to improve compliance by Federal agencies in reporting this data and the quality of the information entered into PPIRS. In improving the compliance and quality of the data, over time, the accuracy of the data should improve. In the meantime, the Councils have added a requirement for timeliness and accountability for the Government personnel who will be entering data directly into the database. With respect to contractors, there are a range of penalties available to the Government for non-compliance with the requirements of a contract, such as determination of non-responsibility, termination for default, or suspension or debarment.

  • FAPIIS will provide access to data on active suspensions and debarments, even if the suspension or debarment was imposed more than five years ago. FAPIIS will also provide access to data on expired suspensions and debarments for five years after the expiration date. To access records after this period, agencies would need to utilize the Excluded Parties List System's archives. With respect to the $10 million threshold, the Councils concur that additional clarification is needed to capture the value of modifications when calculating the total value of all current, active contracts and grants. The language in the final rule has been refined to clarify that offerors must consider the total value of the contracts and grants including all priced options and modifications.

  • The Councils appreciate the importance of helping contracting officials obtain the skill and aptitude necessary to discern the relevance and weight to be given the information reviewed.  The Councils believe that training, rather than more specific standards in the regulations, is a better way to achieve this goal. The Councils will work with FAI and DAU to develop guidance and training for contracting officials on the proper use of the information contained in FAPIIS, and the type of information that would warrant submission to agency SDOs.

  • The Councils recognize that some of the data in the database may not be relevant when determining present responsibility and are committed to avoiding situations of unjustified determinations of non-responsibility. Without the language, contracting officers may think they are required to utilize outdated information that has no bearing on a contractor's present responsibility. The statement does not, as one commenter suggested, limit a contracting officer from considering any information that can be appropriately considered and that is relevant. In light of the comments, the Councils have clarified the explanation for the caution by stating that FAPIIS may contain information on any of the offeror's previous contracts and therefore may contain information relating to contractors for products or services that are completely different from those being acquired. The Councils have also added cross references to FAR 15.305(a)(2) as a reminder of relevance requirements in the consideration of past performance.

  • In the final rule, FAR section 9.104-6 focuses just on responsibility determinations. For past performance evaluations, the contracting officer is referred to FAR section 15.305(a)(2), which addresses how to evaluate the relevance of data and clearly states that this evaluation is separate from the responsibility determination required under subpart 9.1. The final rule also incorporates use of FAPIIS into the procedures addressing agency evaluations of contractor performance in FAR 42.1503 since there may be information in FAPIIS, such as terminations for default or cause and defective pricing assessments, that is not in PPIRS but still may be appropriately used, along with the information in PPIRS to evaluate an offeror's performance.

  • The proposed language, which has been retained without change in the final rule, requires contracting officers to notify, prior to proceeding with award, the agency official responsible for initiating debarment or suspension action in accordance with agency procedures. This notification process closely tracks that already established in FAR 9.104-5 for situations where an offeror provides an affirmative response on its responsibility certification and therefore should not create undue additional delay. In addition, no changes have been made to procedures currently used to ensure an opportunity for the offeror to provide its input where responsibility is in question. The final rule follows the current practice for providing offerors with an opportunity to explain their responsibility if the contracting officer obtains relevant information from FAPIIS that could lead to a non-responsibility determination. Similarly, the rule makes no changes to the due process obligations associated with suspension or debarment actions.

  • The Councils disagree with the arguments set forth to oppose application of the rule to commercial item and COTS acquisitions. An exemption for commercial item and COTS acquisitions would exclude a significant portion of Federal contractors, thereby undermining an overarching public policy to achieve greater integrity and performance quality in contracting that this law is intended to further. There also does not appear to be any unique burden that would undermine access to the commercial marketplace. The requirement for contractors to submit information into FAPIIS applies to those contractors with active Federal contracts and grants totaling more than $10 million at the time of proposal submission, and contractors with this level of activity generally should be equipped to collect and update the information in the system. The commenter even acknowledged that there is a reasonable likelihood a contractor offering a commercial item or COTS item may already be covered by the reporting requirement by virtue of past awards for other than commercial items and COTS.  … The required determinations have been made and, consistent with these determinations, the final rule has been promulgated to cover acquisitions of commercial items and COTS.

  • The Councils have incorporated the business rules that impact the contractor into a new clause addressing updates of information regarding responsibility matters: (1) The Contractor will receive notification when the Government posts new information to the Contractor's record. (2) Only Government personnel and authorized users conducting business on behalf of the Government can view system information, with the exception that a Contractor can view its own information. Public requests for information will be handled under the Freedom of Information Act procedures including, where appropriate, procedures promulgated under E.O. 12600. (3) The Contractor will have an opportunity to post comments regarding information that has been posted by the Government. The contractor comments will be retained as long as the associated information is retained, i.e., for a total period of six years. Contractor comments will remain a part of the record unless the Contractor revises them.

  • The Councils acknowledge the concern regarding standardization of the collection of all past performance data in general. As mentioned above, the Federal Government is making strides to improve the collection of past performance information required by FAR subpart 42.15. This includes the memorandum issued by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) on July 29, 2009, which required the submission of report cards to the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS). PPIRS has a standard format for report card information, and provides that information to all authorized Government users for use in source selection decisions. We are working to improve compliance with the requirement to submit data to this system and to improve the quality of the data submitted. As these efforts proceed, the accuracy of the data should improve.

There you have it.  FAPIIS is now in play and contractors will have to deal with it.



 

TANKER UPDATE: Be Careful What You Wish For!

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We have posted numerous articles on the sad soap-opera saga of the US Air Force’s attempt to contract for its next generation aerial tanker.  Our latest article, discussing the current Request for Proposals (RFP) and its Section M evaluation criteria, can be found here.  In that same article, we concurred with the Northrop Grumman (NOC) analysis (insofar as we understood it from published accounts) that the EADS/NOC team essentially had zero chance of winning its competition with Boeing, that the evaluation scheme was, in essence, a “lowest-price, technically acceptable” (LPTA) instead of a true “best-value trade-off”.  A best-value trade-off would have permitted the evaluators to trade a higher price for more military capability.  Instead, the RFP called for the offerors to be evaluated against pass/fail “Mission Capabilities” subfactors (including such areas as Program Management and Past Performance).  If each offeror passed the Mission Capabilities subfactors, then the lowest price won.  Period.

(Sure there were 93 “non-mandatory technical requirements” that might have helped the EADS/NOC team, but those factors would not be evaluated unless the offerors’ prices were within one percent of each other.  In such circumstances, the 93 other factors would be used as a tie-breaker. The chances of the offerors’ prices being within one percent of each other, given that Boeing was proposing a significantly lighter plane?  Effectively zero.)

So NOC walked, and it looked like a good decision to us.  But that left EADS with no US partner and, apparently, no chance of bidding.  Boeing to win be default.  But hold on a second.  First, reports emerged that the Air Force was considering a delay in the RFP deadline, in order to give EADS a chance to find another partner and to submit a bid without Northrop Grumman.  Next, according to this report, the Pentagon “indicated it would welcome” a bid from EADS.  The Financial Times article noted that EADS might need more time than the Defense Department would offer, reporting—

EADS executives were due yesterday to meet Pentagon officials to discuss the terms of any bid extension. ‘It has got to be more than just another 30 days," said a person close to the situation.

One report stated that EADS was asking for a 90-day extension to the deadline, in order to line up a new partner.

Now it gets weird.  We have been pessimistic about this competition for months.  We thought nothing could surprise us.  But never would we have predicted this bizarre turn of events. Never.

According to this Wall Street Journal article, a Russian aircraft firm (United Aircraft) is planning to bid on the contract, offering its Ilyushin-96 widebody jetliner, which would be called the Il-98.  According to the article—

The planes would be largely built in Russia, and assembled in the U.S., this person says. United Aircraft will partner with a ‘small U.S. defense contractor, which will be renamed United Aircraft Corp. America Inc., this person said, declining to name that contractor.

According to this article on Wikipedia, each Il-96 has a unit cost of $40 to $50 million.  Figure a 50% increase to meet military specs and you’re looking at an offer of roughly $75 million per plane.  Boeing’s KC-767 reportedly will have a unit cost of $130 to $150 million.  Think about that for a moment.

Assuming Russia can pass the Mission Capabilities subfactors, there is no way Boeing can come in with the low bid.  The US Air Force seems to have shot itself in the proverbial foot with its flawed evaluation methodology. 

We have written before about Russia’s recent defense activity, both on the import and export side.  It would be bitingly ironic if Russia ended up as the Air Force’s tanker contractor, because it wanted to skew award to the low bidder and damn the consequences.  Well this is one possible consequence that we hope does not come to pass.

Be careful what you wish for, DOD.  Because you may not like what you get.




 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.