Former COTR, Army Colonel, Pleads Guilty to Accepting Gratuities in Iraq
administrator
On April 13, 2010, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) announced that
Kevin Davis, of Springdale, Maryland, had pled guilty to three counts of
accepting gratuities from a contractor during his deployment in Iraq.
Davis is a retired U.S. Army Colonel and former Contracting Officer’s
Technical Representative (COTR). The DOJ press release provided the
following details—
Col. Davis served in 2004 as
the senior member of the source selection board responsible for the
award of a contract valued at nearly $12 million to build and operate
several Department of Defense warehouses around Iraq. In the period
during and after the solicitation of the warehouse contract, Davis
accepted two airplane tickets and $50,000 in cash from the contractor
who submitted the successful bid for the contract. Davis admitted that
he accepted the airplane tickets and money with the understanding and
belief that they were for or because of his assistance to the contractor
who received the warehouse contract.
The DOJ press
release reported that “Davis faces up to two years in prison and a fine of
$250,000 per charged count. In addition, Davis agreed to pay $62,500 in
restitution to the United States. A sentencing date has not yet been
scheduled by the court.” Clearly, this officer was no gentleman.
Moreover, as a COTR and member of a source selection board, he had
received special, focused, training regarding procurement integrity. We
would have thought this man would have been much smarter than his
actions make him out to be.
We
have previously noted that fraud seems to be everywhere.
We’ve also noted that the
press gives a lot of play to stories of alleged contractor fraud, but
seemingly does not give similar play to stories of bribery and fraud on
the part of government officials. This website aims to present a more
balanced approach, reporting bribery, fraud, and other similar
wrongdoing in the public procurement
process wherever it is found. We report on these items so
that government contractors can learn from them, and tighten controls
and increase scrutiny into the actions of their employees, so as to
prevent similar occurrences.
Much to our
frustration, the message does not seem to be received. Consequently, we
expect many future stories of government/contractor corruption.
Another Southwest Asia Contractor Under Fire
administrator
Whether you call them Public Warehousing Company KSC (PWC)
or Agility, they are facing
quite a few charges by the Department of Justice (DOJ), stemming from
their work in Southwest Asia (aka Iraq and Afghanistan). Reportedly,
PWC (or Agility, as the company is now known) won roughly $8.5 billion
worth of contracts to provide food services for U.S. troops stationed in
Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan.
In November 2009, PWC
was charged in a six-count indictment with “conspiracy to defraud the
United States, committing major fraud against the United States, making
false statements, submitting false claims and wire fraud,” according to this CNN story. Essentially, the
indictment alleged that PWC “submitted false information and manipulated
prices to overcharge for food,” and was based on a qui tam
(whistleblower) suit under the False Claims Act, filed by Kamal Mustafa
al-Sultan, “the owner of a Kuwaiti company that had partnered with
Public Warehousing to submit a proposal on the food supply contracts.”
The
CNN story reported that—
According to the indictment, the company violated
the False Claims Act by presenting false claims for payment,
overcharging for locally available fresh fruits and vegetables, and
failing to pass along to the U.S. government rebates and discounts it
had obtained, as required by its contracts.
This
New York Times article
provided further details and some additional quotes, as follows—
Barbara E. Nelan, assistant
United States attorney, said that during a 41-month period from 2003 to
2007, the company deprived the government of $62.2 million by inflating
the cost of local fruits, vegetables and other perishable items. ‘That
was just 41 months of the 76 months that a contract has been in place,
and it was just for one part of the fraud,’ she said. The company was
awarded a contract for $934 million in 2003. It received new contracts
for $1 billion and $6.6 billion in 2005. Prosecutors said the company
double-charged the government for certain transportation costs and did
not pass along discounts that it received from vendors. The Department
of Justice plans to file a related civil lawsuit against the company and
may eventually file charges against individuals within the company.
‘This is the first step in what we expect to be a long process,’ Ms.
Nelan said.
As might be expected, PWC denied the
allegations. In a published statement,
the company stated—
PWC has for some time worked with
the government to seek a mutually agreeable resolution to this contract
dispute and is surprised and disappointed that the government has
decided to take this action. The company has been the principal food
supplier for the U.S. military in Kuwait and Iraq since 2003. The prices
it charges have been negotiated with, agreed to, and continually
approved as by the U.S. government since then. The government has
consistently found PWC's prices to be fair and reasonable. Since 2006,
the company's ‘fill rates’ - the number of cases of food accepted
compared with the number ordered - were consistently more than 99
percent, a number that exceeds the fill rates of U.S. domestic service
providers. That means that PWC was more successful in delivering food
and other items to the military in a hostile war zone than other vendors
have been within the safe environs of the continental U.S. The
company has long cooperated with government reviews, inspections, audits
and inquiries necessary to ensure taxpayer dollars are being spent
appropriately.
More recently, the Navy Times reported
that “Prosecutors have expanded their case” against Agility “by
charging two of the company’s subsidiaries with inflating prices and
defrauding the U.S. government.” The article recapped the prior charges,
but noted additional details, including that—
The company also [allegedly]
inflated fees by asking vendors to manipulate the way the products were
packed, enabling it to bill the government twice as much as it should
have, prosecutors said. And they said the firm encouraged a vendor in
the state of Georgia to conceal fees that should have been paid to the
company, leading to inflated prices.
The Navy Times also
noted that the case “has slowed in recent months” because—
Several
court hearings have been delayed as the company worked to reach a
settlement with prosecutors. And the firm’s lawyers have argued that
prosecutors failed to properly serve the company because it sent the
indictment to the company’s U.S. subsidiaries instead of through
diplomatic channels in Kuwait.
As we have previously discussed, the Federal
government takes a dim view of companies they view as holding federal
funds that don’t belong to them, such as when there is a failure to pass
on rebates or credits in compliance with the Credits cost principle
found at FAR 31.201-5. Regardless of whether Agility has complied with
its contract terms, merely being accused of violations of the False
Claims Act gives a company a “black eye” – leading to reputational and
other brand damage. That’s what has happened to PWC/Agility, as this blog entry demonstrates.
(Note: as with many blogs, this one expresses the author’s rather
extreme opinion … vividly. You have been warned.)
Next Generation UAVs
administrator
It would be hard to
argue that the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is the defense acquisition program
success story of the past decade. Ever since General Atomics’ MQ-1
Predator moved from a CIA-based reconnaissance role to an Air Force-led
offensive role during the Bosnian conflict in the late 1990’s, the
market for the “type” has grown exponentially, with multiple vehicles
filling niches at all levels. Every contractor seems to have its own
UAV that it touts as the best thing since the rifled muzzle. Defense
Industry Daily recently estimated that the market for UAV systems could
top $13.6 billion within five years. This article will take a brief
look at some of the “next generation” UAVs coming onto the scene.
PREDATOR C AVENGER
General
Atomics successfully produces many versions of the Predator, ranging
from the MQ-9 Predator B to the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) Sky
Warrior. Here’s a nice overview article
on the various versions of the UAV. Here’s a quick video of the
Predator B in action—
But
the latest version of the Predator—the
Avenger—is the latest and greatest version.
What
makes the Predator C different and exciting?
General
Atomics’ next generation Predator is powered by a jet engine, unlike
the previous versions. And also unlike the previous versions, the
Avenger is clearly designed for stealth. The Avenger flies higher and
faster than the Reaper, and may be designed for carrier operations
(perhaps to compete with the Northrop Grumman N-UCAS, which is discussed
below).
NORTHROP
GRUMMAN FIRE SCOUT MQ-8
According to this article, this unmanned
helicopter was originally developed for the Navy, but subsequently was
taken over by the Army as part of its Future Combat Systems (FCS)
program. The Fire Scout was identified as one of the first “spin outs”
from that troubled program. The Navy now has its own version (known as
the Sea Scout), which has been deployed on the USS McInerney.
Additionally, Northrop Grumman expects (or hopes) to deploy the UAV on
the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships. Here’s a brief overview of the program.
Here’s a nice video of
the Fire Scout undergoing testing, with musical accompaniment.
NORTHROP GRUMMAN
N-UCAS X-47B
Another UAV under development is
Northrop Grumman’s Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS) X-47B.
Originally this was one of the two contenders for the “Joint” Unmanned
Combat Air System, but in a deft political move the joint program was
killed and the Navy emerged—along with Northrop Grumman—as the sole
winner. The X-47B is designed for stealthy flight, and also fully
autonomous carrier launches and recoveries. The first aircraft is in
testing now. Here’s a pretty cool video combined real film with CGI to
show how the X-47B might operate when deployed.
LOCKHEED MARTIN
RQ-170 SENTINEL
One of the more interesting “secrets” of the war in
Southwest Asia is the recent confirmation of a new stealthy UAV,
Lockheed Martin’s RQ-170 “Sentinel”. The Air Force acknowledged
existence of the aircraft reluctantly, and only when faced with grainy
photographs taken of the vehicle at Kandahar International Airport in
Afghanistan. Not much is known about this UAV, except that it is
believed to be the first stealthy UAV that has been publicly
acknowledged. We can see from the picture below that the RQ-170 is a
jet-powered, tailless, “flying wing” design, reminiscent of the B-2
bomber. The RQ designation indicates that it is unarmed, and it appears
to have pods for reconnaissance and/or communications on the upper side
of its wings. Here is a link to a Wikipedia
article—but be warned that the article is lacking details.
BOEING X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle
Not
strictly a UAV in the same sense as the other aircraft in this article,
the X-37B appears to be a “robotic spacecraft” and resembles the Space
Shuttle more than a traditional aircraft or helicopter. As with the
Sentinel, not much is known about this vehicle. Apparently, it is the
result of more than a decade of design and development. It is scheduled
to be launched aboard an Atlas V rocket from Cape Canaveral in
mid-April 2010. According to this article,
“The Air Force says the program objectives are ‘space experimentation,
risk reduction and … development [of] reusable space vehicle
technologies.’” The article notes that the spacecraft may be in orbit
for up to 270 days. This article from CNET
notes that the spacecraft will deploy solar panels to generate
electricity in orbit. (The article also has some pics of the
spacecraft, such as the one shown below.)
EADS TALARION
But
all is not rosy in the UAV marketplace. EADS, which famously has waffled on bidding for the US Aerial
Tanker replacement, and has had development problems on both its Airbus A380 commercial jet and its Airbus A400M military transport
planes, has also had problems developing its Euro-centric UAV. The
Talarion is a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) focused on the UAV
needs of France, Germany, and Spain. It is no coincidence that those
countries are EADS shareholders. Other countries, including the United
Kingdom of Great Britain, have also been mentioned as possible buyers.
EADS is currently
paying for Talarion system development and risk-reduction studies, even
though it still lacks firm orders. According to this Der Spiegel article, if EADS doesn’t
receive firm orders, the program will be “frozen”. The article reports—
EADS defense chief Stefan Zoller
said the Talarion project would have to be frozen by this summer if
Germany, France and Spain do not place concrete orders for the drone.
Developing the drone will cost the three countries an estimated total of
€1.5 billion, plus a further €1.4 billion to procure 45 models. So far
the countries have invested €60 million into the project.
The
article concludes: “The company has said it would continue to invest
its own money in the project, but only until mid-2010.”
There
are many more UAV programs and aircraft that we could have discussed,
but these six seem to represent a good cross section. Of course, there
are many smaller drones and UAVs that are in use today, and the
marketplace keeps expanding. However, it is obvious from the Talarion
program that just having a UAV isn’t enough; one must also have
customers with money and need.
Learn from Learning Tree: Give Back Funds Owed to Uncle Sam
administrator
The Department of Justice reported on April 7, 2010 that
Learning Tree International, Inc. had agreed to pay $4.5 million to
settle allegations of violations of the False Claims Act. Now as FCA
settlements go, $4.5 million isn’t particularly large. In September
2009, Pfizer paid the U.S. Government $1 billion as part of an FCA
settlement. In April 2009, Network Appliance (NetApp) paid $128 million
as part of its FCA settlement. (For those interested, the Top 100 FCA
settlements are listed here.)
The point is, a settlement of $4.5 million indicates either a weak or a
complex case.
But what interested us was the
nature of Learning Tree’s alleged FCA violation. According to the DOJ
announcement, Learning Tree had a contract with the General Services
Administration (GSA) to provide information technology training to
Federal government employees. Learning Tree sold its courses in
multiple-course packages known as “vouchers” or “passports,” according
to the DOJ. Normally, one purchases a passport that entitles one to
attend several courses over a period of time. Obviously Learning Tree
receives the passport price up-front and if one doesn’t use all the
courses one has purchased before the expiration date, then too bad.
But
according to the DOJ, the GSA negotiated different payment terms in
order to “prevent the
United States from paying for training services that are not actually
rendered.” The contract reportedly required that Learning Tree invoice
the Government only for courses that were actually taken—or, as the DOJ
phrased it, “as services are provided.” Learning Tree was accused of
“knowingly invoic[ing] federal agencies in advance for multi-course
training packages before employees of the purchasing agencies had
attended the full number of courses available under each.” In addition,
the company allegedly retained the fees it had billed in advance after
the passport period had expired and it had become clear that the federal
employees would not be able to take the courses for which the Federal
government had been billed. It never offered its Federal customers a
refund or credit for funds it had billed in advance, for services never
provided—i.e., for money to which it was not contractually entitled.
We take away two lessons from this story. The first
lesson is that commercial business practices don’t often work well in
the world of Federal government contracting. What determines acceptable
business practices is determined by the contract terms and conditions,
not what makes “common sense.” In particular, contractors must clearly
identify their Federal contracts and make sure their accounting and
billing departments treat them differently than their other commercial
contracts. Billing terms and conditions must be communicated to the
accounting and billing departments to avoid problems. When all else
fails, read the contract and do what it says.
The second lesson concerns failure to promptly disclose
to one’s Federal customers that they are due a refund or credit. This
most commonly happens when final indirect cost rates are less than
contractual billing rates on cost-plus and/or T&M contract types.
Many companies see no reason to let their customers know they’ve been
overbilled, even though contract clause 52.216-7 (“Allowable Cost and
Payment”) clearly states that they must do so. This situation is also
found when a company receives a year-end volume rebate or retroactive
discount from a commercial vendor—and they do not record that
transaction as a credit to the original debit (expense) they included as
either a direct or indirect cost billed to the Federal government (in
violation of the cost principle at FAR 31.201-5 (“Credits”). In either
situation, companies are holding on to funds that don’t belong to
them—also known as receipt of “overpayments”.
The Federal government takes a dim view of contractors
that don’t promptly notify customers of overpayments that they’ve
received. Learn the lesson from Learning Tree and don’t bill Federal
customers in violation of contract terms, and promptly notify customers
when overpayments are received. Don’t be accused of violations of the
False Claims Act.
KBR Bills DOD for its Private Security Force, Faces False Claims and Other Charges
administrator
On April 1, 2010 the
Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that
it had filed suit against LOGCAP contractor KBR, alleging violations of
the False Claims Act. Unfortunately for
KBR, this was no April Fool’s
Day joke. According to the DOJ press release—
The
government’s lawsuit alleges that some 33 KBR subcontractors, as well
as the company itself, used private armed security at various times
during the 2003-2006 time period. KBR allegedly violated the LOGCAP III contract by failing to
obtain Army authorization for arming subcontractors and by allowing the
use of private security contractors who were not registered with the
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. The subcontractors using private
security are alleged to have also violated subcontract terms requiring
travel only in military convoys. The government’s lawsuit further
alleges that at the time, KBR managers considered the use of private
security unacceptable and were concerned that the Army would disallow
any costs for such services. KBR nonetheless charged the United States
for the costs of the unauthorized services.
In
a statement, KBR said the Army was aware of the private security costs.
‘Nothing in KBR's contract
with the Army prohibits KBR or its subcontractors from using private
security to fulfill its mission to support America's troops,’ the company said. The company added that the Army breached its contract
responsibilities ‘by
repeatedly failing to provide the necessary force protection and, in
fact, frequently left KBR, its employees and its subcontractors
unprotected.’ KBR said it
had had taken that issue to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
in 2008.
This Business Week article quotes KBR as saying that “it believes the costs incurred by
it and subcontractors ‘were reasonable, necessary and appropriate under
the contractual arrangement between KBR and the Army.’”
We reported
recently on the tension between using
Government personnel versus private security personnel to support military operations. In that article, we discussed the GAO’s report to Congress, in
which it concluded that, in some instances, use of private contractors was saving the State Department more than 10 times what it would have paid for equivalent Government personnel.
Unfortunately DOD was unable to provide GAO with sufficient information
to support a meaningful analysis. Nonetheless, we were struck by the
enormous cost savings the Government received via use of
non-governmental personnel to support military operations. Sure, that
point is not dispositive in the matter of whether KBR billed DOD for
costs expressly prohibited by its contract, or whether DOD breached its
duty to protect KBR employees in the Southwest Asia Area of Operations.
But it’s an interesting point, nonetheless—and one that we believe is
not getting sufficient play in the “mainstream media.”
Meanwhile,
this article by the Indianapolis Star reported that 47 National Guardsmen have refilled a lawsuit against KBR
in a Houston District Court. This lawsuit is one of many filed by
“hundreds” of members of the National Guard who provided security for
KBR personnel at the Qarmat
Ali water-pumping station near Basra, Iraq—according to the report. The
Star reported that—
The plant the KBR employees
were rebuilding was vital to restoring oil production in the area. The
site initially was covered in an orange, sand like dust, the remnant of an anti-corrosive chemical
that had been spread around, according to the suit. It contained heavy concentrations of a carcinogen called hexavalent chromium. … The possible exposure has inspired legislation in Congress
that would create a registry of affected service members and extend
their access to health care.
We have noted a spate of recent
KBR-related “issues” over the past few months. For instance, the Franken
Amendment reportedly originated with a KBR
employee’s rape at the hands of her fellow co-workers. In another
article, we discussed allegations that KBR
billed DOD for excessive levels of maintenance staff. And of course,
like all other LOCAP contractors, KBR spends its fair share of time
before the Commission on Wartime Contracting,
getting grilled on staff drawdown, DCAA audit issues, and alleged
deficiencies in its “business systems.”
One might argue that
“where there’s so much smoke, there must be fire.” But another point of
view might be that these are complex matters involving disputed facts
and circumstances, and that it will take a wise trier of fact to
determine where fault lies. We favor the latter interpretation.
Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.