DARPA in the News
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is in the news again. Actually, it’s in the news most every
day. What we mean to say is, it’s back on Apogee Consulting’s radar screen with a couple of items we think are of interest
to our clients and visitors. (We last reported on
DARPA’s budget request here.)
First,
this Aviation Week “Ares” blog article
discusses the role of complexity in the
aerospace industry design process. The article
reports that DARPA believes that the industry’s antiquated MIL-STD-499A
systems engineering approach—the famous “Vee”—is to blame for much of the recent spate of cost overruns
and schedule slips. DARPA produced the following chart to illustrate
its point—


As the Ares blog noted, “Integrated-circuit makers
have held development times steady even as chips
have soared in complexity. Car manufacturers have actually reduced their
development timespans. Only
the aerospace industry, according to the chart, has
seen development time (and cost) increase in lockstep with product
complexity.”
Ares reported that—
The research agency sees a lot of problems with the
process, arguing that because detailed design is done within functional
stovepipes that are ‘based on arbitrary cleavage lines’ - like between
power and thermal management - when components and subsystems come
together during integration there are ‘unmodeled and undesired interactions’ that force redesigns,
driving up delays and costs.
To address the issue, DARPA is
reportedly launching “META” to try to change the old system engineering
paradigm. As Ares reported, “A key part of META is using complexity as
the metric, rather than the traditional SWaP - size, weight and power. Apply that to the F-35 and you can
begin to see why development is proving so
difficult. A complexity metric would, DARPA says, allow ‘cyber-vs-physical’ trades - between
implementing a function in software or hardware - and trade-offs between
complexity, performance, cost, etc.”
Second, DARPA has reportedly
“scrapped plans” to develop its “Rapid Eye”
program, according to this article. Rapid
Eye envisioned encapsulating a folding ISR drone inside an
inter-continental ballistic missile, which would put surveillance assets
on scene—anywhere in the world—within an hour. As the article noted—
--the rocket-launched drone had some serious conceptual
flaws. For starters, lobbing an ICBM across the planet without warning
could be mistaken for a surprise nuclear attack. That’s the same general
issue that plagues other high-speed, hit-anywhere-in-the-world weapons
concepts like Prompt Global Strike. If you want to put non-nuclear payloads like a drone
or a conventional warhead on a ballistic missile, you need to make sure
you don’t trigger Armageddon.
So Rapid Eye is closed for good.
But as META shows us, DARPA is still trying to create the future today.
US Air Force Implements DCAA/Contracting Officer Resolution Process

As we previously
reported, DOD has moved to rectify the
dysfunctional relationship between DCAA and its contracting
officers—although we have opined that much
of what has been published looks like window-dressing and fails to
address fundamental problems. Regardless of our opinion(s) on the
matter, any progress is better than the stalemate between audit and
contracting that had become the status quo in the Defense acquisition
process.
So we are pleased to note that the
military services have begun to flow-down the DOD
resolution policy to their contracting officers.
As far as we know, the first to do so was the US Air Force. On March
17, 2010, the USAF issued this memorandum
that “sets forth Air Force policy for resolving significant
disagreements when the Contracting Officer does not concur with DCAA
recommendations while establishing pre-negotiation objective[s].” The
policy set forth is essentially a verbatim recap of Shay Assad’s
December 2009 memo. (You can find a link to his memo in the first link
above.)
To tailor the policy to the Air
Force, the memo states that—
Should
DCAA request Air Force management review, the Contracting Officer will
advance this issue through their management chain and provide the name
and phone number of the Senior Contracting Official (SCO) or Senior
Center Contracting Official (SCCO) to the cognizant DCAA representative. If the parties are still in
disagreement, the SCO or SCCO will advance the issue to the HCA [Head of
Contracting Activities] to
support any request from DCAA for further resolution.
As we have noted, there are many opportunities for disagreement between Contracting Officers and auditor that do
not involve establishing pre-negotiation objectives related to
questioned costs. For instance, determination of “business system”
internal control system adequacy does not necessarily involve
negotiating an amount of questioned costs, and determining whether a
contractor is or is not in non-compliance with Cost Accounting Standards
does not necessarily involve negotiating an amount of questioned
costs. In other words, while the DOD resolution process is a small step
forward, it does not address all the existing issues.
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Another Story of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Iraq—Or Is It?

As the Commission
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan (CWC) was conducting
a hearing on March 29,
2010 to discuss “rightsizing and managing contractors during the
drawdown in Iraq,” a DOD Inspector General report was being brought to the attention of the press. The report alleged that maintenance services provided by
LOGCAP III contractor KBR (aka Kellogg, Brown & Root, formerly known
as Halliburton) were in
excess of the level actually needed.
In the words of the DOD IG—
--the utilization of contractor-provided
tactical vehicle field maintenance services was less than the 85 percent
required by Army Regulation 750-1. Specifically, from September 1,
2008, through August 31, 2009, the rate ranged from a low of 3.97
percent to a high of 9.65 percent. This occurred because the task order
159 statement of work did not contain requirements for the contractor to
report utilization data and supporting documentation to the Army. In
addition, the Army was not conducting adequate reviews of contractor
utilization data provided by KBR and taking proper corrective action. As
a result, about $4.6 million of the $5 million in costs incurred by DOD
were for tactical vehicle field maintenance services that were not
required. The Army internal controls were ineffective in monitoring
contractor-provided tactical vehicle field maintenance services.
Mother Jones is a “bimonthly magazine of investigative journalism that
exposes the evils of the corporate world, the government, and the
mainstream media.” Mother Jones, bastion of “smart, fearless journalism”
read the DOD IG report from which the above quote was taken, and reported it to their readers with the headline, “KBR Bills $5 Million For Mechanics Who Work
43 Minutes a Month.” If you click on the link, you’ll see
that the Mother Jones article included quotes from CWC co-chair Chris
Shays and member Charles Tiefer, both critical of KBR.
The DOD IG report was issued in early March; the media picked
it up on March 25, just a couple of days before the CWC hearing on the
same subject. Coincidence?
We think not.
As Mother Jones reported—
On March 29, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting—which
Congress set up in early 2007 to investigate waste and corruption in
the military private sector—will hold a hearing to examine whether
contractors are doing their part to prepare for leaving Iraq. Some
commissioners are raring for a showdown with KBR over its drawdown
plan—or lack thereof. The commission's co-chair, former Republican
congressman Christopher H. Shays, said in a statement: ‘Considering that KBR was just awarded a task order—now under
protest—that could bring them up to $2.3 billion in new [Iraq-related]
revenues, it's very important that we get a clear picture of the quality
of planning and oversight during the Iraq drawdown.’ The Balad report is likely to be a hot potato at the hearing.
Commissioner Charles Tiefer tells Mother Jones the report is a ‘dynamite
critique’ of the firm's
practices. ‘The numbers
translate into an astonishingly large pool of KBR employees standing
around idle and having the government be charged,’ he says.
It’s interesting (to us, at least)
that the thrust of the media reports is that, somehow, KBR is at fault
for maintaining staffing levels in excess of those needed. While KBR
may not be entirely innocent in this debacle, the DOD IG report (quoted
above) clearly points a finger at the Army’s contracting and oversight
as the root cause of the problem—and holds KBR largely blameless. (We
note assertions that KBR failed to cooperate with
Army oversight officials, including refusing to provide information
regarding its staffing levels. If the contract was a Firm, Fixed-Price
(FFP) type, the contractor may not have been required to provide that
kind of detailed information.)
Over the
past year, the CWC has been vocal in its criticism of the Defense
Department’s ineffective oversight and management of contractors
supporting warfighters in Southwest Asia. It’s puzzling that their
public criticism on this issue would focus on the contractor and omit
any finger-pointing at the Army contracting officers and support staff
(which is where the DOD IG said the problem lay). So while the CWC blames everybody except the culprits, Mother Jones
and other media outlets get a nice opportunity to voice outrage at KBR
and other contingency contractors.
Pat Fitzgerald’s First Testimony
While we’re on this subject, we note that the CWC hearing
marked Pat Fitzgerald’s first public testimony as Director of DCAA. His sixteen-page typewritten testimony can be found here. Mr. Fitzgerald’s testimony covered—
- Update on
DCAA Contingency Contracting Audit Efforts
- Oversight
of Contingency Contractors
- Contractor Business
System Audits
- Economy and Efficiency Audits
- Current Status of the Drawdown Audit
Mr. Fitzgerald made some interesting points in his testimony.
Following is a brief recap of some of those points; if you would like
the details, then clink on the link above.
Since
May 2009 (a period of about 10 months), DCAA has issued 23 “suspected
irregularity referrals” (aka Form 2000). DCAA uses Form 2000 when it
suspects that fraud, or other “irregular conduct” has occurred.
Appendix 1 to his testimony lists those 23 referrals by issue. The
issues range from “billed retainage from subcontractors” to “failure to
eliminate subcontractor errors” to “travel invoices appear fraudulent”
to “possible bid rigging of insurance coverage” to “human trafficking
and withholding of employee passports” to “avoidance of paying payroll
taxes.” In other words, the list is a veritable “soup-to-nuts” litany of soupçons of suspicious behavior.
With respect to audits of contractor “business systems,” Mr.
Fitzgerald noted that “We believe that the real
time reporting of significant deficiencies/material weaknesses of a
particular system as opposed to an overall audit opinion on the adequacy
of each of those systems is a better approach.” DCAA’s
“revised approach … will no longer require an opinion on the overall adequacy of
the system of internal controls. Instead, the opinion will be limited to
determining compliance with the applicable DFARS criteria. Our approach
will result in increased transaction testing while ensuring that
deficiencies are reported on a real time basis.”
We are excited to see DCAA move away from its binary pass/fail
system audits towards a more meaningful report of control
system deficiencies. Our optimism is tempered
however, by our concerns for the proposed
DFARS contractor business systems rule that seems to omit any discussion
of materiality and to expect perfection, with onerous penalties for a single mistake. We are also concerned about a soi-disant independent and bipartisan commission that seems determined to make headlines at the
expense of the truth, aided and abetted by certain media outlets that
seem to favor attention-grabbing headlines instead of simply reporting
the facts. Color us naïve and idealistic, but we think taxpayers
deserve better.
Criminal Conflict of Interest

On
March 26, 2010 the Department of Justice reported that a former Department of Energy (DOE) employee, Ms. Donna
Scott, had pled guilty to criminal conflict of interest and her husband
had pled guilty to making a false statement to a federal agent. We have
written before about both organizational and
personal conflicts of interest—notably here and here. There is a proposed rule in play that would establish
standards for contractor personal conflicts of interest similar to those already in place for government employees,
making this an issue applicable to pretty much everybody.
According
to the DOJ announcement, Mrs. Scott “coordinated the use and renovation
of DOE office space.” Included in her duties was the oversight of the
renovation of a lobby and conference room in a DOE building in
Germantown, MD. Her duties also included the acquisition of new
furniture for those spaces. While employed by DOE, she “recommended to a co-worker
that the co-worker obtain price quotes for furniture from her husband,
Timothy Scott. Timothy Scott provided these price quotes to Donna
Scott’s co-worker, both of which referenced Timothy Scott as the
manufacturer’s representative.” However,
the co-worker was told that she needed two additional price quotes in
order to “satisfy competitive bidding requirements.”
So, to help her co-worker satisfy “competitive bidding
requirements,” Mrs. Scott—
--admitted
that she subsequently obtained two
additional price quotes for each transaction from her husband and
provided them to her co-worker as the competitive price quotes. Donna
Scott admitted that she knew, unlike the original price quotes, that
none of these new price quotes referenced Timothy Scott by name.
Moreover, the additional quotes bid a higher price for the furniture
than the initial quote, making Timothy Scott’s original bid the lowest.
Mrs.
Scott’s co-worker used the three quotes to justify why Mr. Scott’s low
bid was fair and reasonable, and DOE then purchased the furniture from
Mr. Scott.
In addition to the foregoing, Mrs. Scott—
--selected furniture worth approximately $300,000 from
particular manufacturers for the cafeteria renovation project. [She] admitted that she knew these manufacturers’
representatives planned to use her husband as their dealer of record for
these transactions, thus earning her husband a commission. [She]
arranged for the furniture to be purchased by the General Services
Administration (GSA) on behalf of the DOE. As a result, Timothy Scott
earned approximately $24,174 in commissions from the manufacturers.
According
to the DOJ announcement, “Donna and Timothy Scott
each face maximum sentences of five years in prison and fines of
$250,000 or the greater of twice the gross gain or loss from the
offense. U.S. District Judge Peter J. Messitte has scheduled sentencing for June 3, 2010.”
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