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Apogee Consulting Inc

Two More Illustrative Cases of Wrongdoing

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On April 15, 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Thomas A. Drake had received a 10-count indictment from a Federal Grand Jury, accusing him of (among other things) willfully retaining classified information, obstruction of justice, and making false statements.  According to the DOJ press release, Drake (age 52) was a high-ranking senior executive with the National Security Agency (NSA, often called “No Such Agency” because of the highly classified nature of its work) from 2001 through 2008.  During the later years of his tenure with the NSA, “newspaper reporter published a series of articles about the NSA. The indictment alleges that Drake served as a source for many of those articles, including articles that contained classified information.”

According to the DOJ release—

The indictment alleges that in approximately November 2005, a former congressional staffer asked Drake to speak with a reporter. Between November 2005 and February 2006, according to the indictment, Drake signed up for a free account and then paid for a premium account with an e-mail service that enabled its users to exchange secure e-mails without disclosing the sender or recipient’s identity. Using an alias, Drake allegedly then contacted the reporter and volunteered to disclose information about the NSA. The indictment alleges that Drake directed the reporter to create the reporter’s own secure e-mail account. After the reporter created such an account, Drake also allegedly required the reporter to agree to certain conditions, including never revealing Drake’s identity; attributing information gathered from Drake to a "senior intelligence official"; never using Drake as a single source for information; never telling Drake who the reporter’s other sources were; and not commenting on what people, to whom Drake recommended the reporter speak, said to the reporter.

Drake allegedly attempted to conceal his relationship with the reporter and prevent the discovery of evidence linking Drake to his retention of classified documents after the FBI began a criminal investigation into the disclosure of classified information. Specifically, Drake allegedly shredded classified and unclassified documents, including his handwritten notes that he had removed from the NSA; deleted classified and unclassified information on his home computer; and made false statements to FBI agents.

The indictment also alleges that Drake took a series of steps to facilitate the provision of this information to the reporter, including:

  • exchanging hundreds of e-mails with and meeting with the reporter;
  • researching stories for the reporter to write in the future by e-mailing unwitting NSA employees and accessing classified and unclassified documents on classified NSA networks;
  • copying and pasting classified and unclassified information from NSA documents into untitled word processing documents which, when printed, had the classification markings removed;
  • printing both classified and unclassified documents, bringing them to his home, and retaining them there without authority;
  • scanning and emailing electronic copies of classified and unclassified documents to the reporter from his home computer; and
  • reviewing, commenting on, and editing drafts of the reporter’s articles.

The announcement ends with a reminder that, “Willful retention of classified documents carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. Obstruction of justice carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. The charge of making a false statement carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Each of the charged counts carries a maximum fine of $250,000.”

In a second story, DOJ announced on April 19, 2010, that Charles Jumet, a Virginia resident, had received the longest prison sentence for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) ever handed out to an individual.  The DOJ announcement stated that Jumet was sentenced to 87 months in prison “for paying bribes to “former Panamanian government officials to secure maritime contracts, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and for making a false statement to federal agents.” In addition to receiving the long prison term, Jumet was ordered to pay a $15,000 fine plus serve three years of supervised release.

The DOJ press released provided the following details of Jumet’s wrongdoing—

According to court documents, from approximately 1997 through July 2003, Jumet and others conspired to pay money secretly to Panamanian government officials in exchange for awarding contracts to Ports Engineering Consultants Corporation (PECC) to maintain lighthouses and buoys along Panama’s waterway. In December 1997, the Panamanian government awarded PECC a no-bid 20-year concession. Upon receipt of the concession, Jumet admitted that he and others authorized corrupt payments to be made to the Panamanian government officials. In total, Jumet and others caused corrupt payments of more than $200,000 to be paid to the former administrator and the former deputy administrator of the Panama Maritime Authority and to a former high-ranking elected executive official of the Republic of Panama.

Jumet also made a false statement to federal agents about a ‘dividend’ check payable to the bearer in the amount of $18,000 that was endorsed and deposited into an account belonging to the high-ranking elected Panamanian government official. Jumet falsely claimed that this ‘dividend’ check was a donation for the high-ranking elected official’s re-election campaign, when, in fact, Jumet admitted it was given to the elected Panamanian government official as a corrupt payment for allowing PECC to receive the contract.

In a related case, John Warwick pleaded guilty on Feb. 13, 2010, for his role in the same conspiracy to violate the FCPA. He is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Hudson on May 14, 2010.

Marshall J. Doke, Jr. (a noted legal practitioner) testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in February, 2010.  He testified—

Competition is required not only to obtain lower prices but also to prevent unjust favoritism, collusion, or fraud. I emphasize this last purpose because of what one federal judge called a growing culture of corruption in Washington. I personally believe we have had more reported fraud in government contracting in the last 10 years (including fraud by high level government officials) than the combined amount in the previous 40 years. I believe the deficiencies in our competition process have given such enormous discretion to contracting officials that, together with a lack of transparency, they have created an environment and circumstances that have contributed significantly to this increase in fraud.

Stories such as these two tend to confirm Doke’s impression.



 

US At Mercy of Chinese for Rare Earth Metals

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The U.S. Government has recently become aware that it has a supply chain in addition to an industrial base, and has grown vaguely concerned that its supply chain may be vulnerable to interruption, which may lead to disruptions in goods and services needed for warfighters.  We reported on this new focus in this article, but at that time the Pentagon’s Industrial Policy Directorate seemed to be worried more about loss of critical skills than anything else.  Meanwhile, § 843 of the FY National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate and report back to Congress on the state of “rare earth materials in the defense supply chain”.  The report was transmitted to Congress on April 1, 2010, but published on the internet on April 14, 2010.  The full report can be found at the GAO site.

For those of us lacking a scientific background, GAO provided a helpful definition of “rare earth materials” and explained why they are important to defense programs such as radars, precision-guided munitions, as well as to more mundane items such as cell phones and computer hard-drives.  GAO stated that—

Rare earth elements are used in many applications for their magnetic and other unique properties. These include the 17 chemical elements beginning with lanthanum, element number 57 in the periodic table, up to and including lutetium, element number 71, as well as yttrium and scandium….  Rare earth materials—rare earth ores, oxides, metals, alloys, semifinished rare earth products, and components containing rare earth materials—are used in a variety of commercial and military applications, such as cell phones, computer hard drives, andDepartment of Defense (DOD) precision-guided munitions. Some of these applications rely on permanent rare earth magnets that have unique properties, such as the ability to withstand demagnetization at very high temperatures.

As GAO noted, producing rare earth materials requires a number of steps, including mining, separating, refining, forming, and (finally) manufacturing.   (This background will be helpful later.)

GAO reported several rather alarming findings, including—

  • While rare earth ore deposits are geographically diverse, current capabilities to process rare earth metals into finished materials are limited mostly to Chinese sources.
  • The United States previously performed all stages of the rare earth material supply chain, but now most rare earth materials processing is performed in China, giving it a dominant position that could affect worldwide supply and prices.
  • Based on industry estimates, rebuilding a U.S. rare earth supply chain may take up to 15 years and is dependent on several factors, including securing capital investments in processing infrastructure, developing new technologies, and acquiring patents, which are currently held by international companies.
  • Government and industry officials have identified a wide variety of defense systems and components that are dependent on rare earth materials for functionality and are provided by lower-tier subcontractors in the supply chain.
  • Defense systems will likely continue to depend on rare earth materials, based on their life cycles and lack of effective substitutes.
  • We [GAO] found examples of components in defense systems that use Chinese sources for rare earth materials and are provided by lower-tier subcontractors.
  • DOD has not yet identified national security risks or taken department-wide action to address rare earth material dependency, but expects to consider these issues in its ongoing study expected to be completed by the end of September 2010.

GAO reported that, prior to 1985, the U.S. performed all rare earth material supply chain and production steps, from mining to manufacturing.  However, with the closure of the Mountain Pass (CA) production facility, the relocation of Magnequench’s plant to China, and the closure of Hitachi Magnetics Corporation’s Edmore, MI production facility, the U.S. has been essentially 100% out of the rare earth material production business since 2005.  Although the Mountain Pass facility resumed operations in 2007, return to the pre-1985 state could take as many as 15 years (i.e., not until 2025).  In the meantime (according to GAO)—

China has adopted domestic production quotas on rare earth materials and decreased its export quotas, which increases prices in the Chinese and world rare earth materials markets.  China increased export taxes on all rare earth materials to a range of 15 to 25 percent, which increases the price of inputs for non-Chinese competitors.

We don’t want to be overly alarmist here—but this is a potentially very serious problem that could affect a number of major defense acquisition programs, from the DDG-51’s Hybrid Electric Drive Ship Program to the M1A2 Abrams Tank’s reference and navigation system.  We encourage DOD’s Industrial Policy Directorate to get moving on this potential supply chain “interruption”.

In unrelated news, this is our 200th blog article posted on the website.



 

Proposed FAR Rule Would Make Certain Labor Relations Costs Unallowable

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One of President Obama’s first actions as President was to issue Executive Order No. 13494 (“Economy in Government Contracting”) on January 30, 2009.  It was subsequently amended on October 30, 2009.  The Executive Order “provided that to promote economy and efficiency in Government contracting, certain costs that are not directly related to the contractor's provision of goods and services to the Government shall be unallowable for payment.” It purported to accomplish its goals by making unallowable almost all costs associated with efforts “undertaken to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or concern the manner of exercising, rights to organize and bargain collectively.”  The Administration argued that this policy revision was consistent with prior Federal government policy to “remain impartial” with respect to labor-management disputes involving government contractors.

As our readers know, however, in order to implement such a policy change, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) must be changed via the public rulemaking process, which provides the public at large with an opportunity to comment—and perhaps affect—the regulatory language.  We at Apogee Consulting, Inc. recently participated in that process, when we provided the DAR Council with our comments on a proposed revision to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) that would significantly affect how DCAA audits contractor internal control systems.

So it was not surprising when, on April 14, 2010, the FAR Councils published a proposed rule that would, if implemented as drafted, revise the Cost Principle at 32.205-21 (Labor Relations Costs) to make unallowable—

…costs of any activities undertaken to persuade employees, of any entity, to exercise or not to exercise, or concerning the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of the employees' own choosing are unallowable.

Examples of unallowable costs in paragraph (b) of this section include, but are not limited to, the costs of--

    (1) Preparing and distributing materials;

    (2) Hiring or consulting legal counsel or consultants;

    (3) Meetings (including paying the salaries of the attendees at meetings held for this purpose); and

    (4) Planning or conducting activities by managers, supervisors, or union representatives during work hours.

Importantly, other costs of efforts “to maintain satisfactory [labor] relations between the contractor and its employees”  are still made expressly allowable by the revised rule.

As always, comments on the proposed rule may be submitted by following the directions in the Federal Register notice (link above).

 

UPDATES: Agility Replaced, F-35 Ramp-Up Flattened

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A couple of quick updates to stories we have been following.

Agility Replaced

First, we recently posted an article on Kuwait-based Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Corporation), the Mid-East’s largest logistics firm—supplier of food services to U.S. troops based in Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq.  We told you about allegations of fraud and violations of the False Statements Act and False Claims Act—among other allegations.  Although charges were originally unsealed in November, 2009, reports had surfaced of “delays” in the case, as the parties apparently attempted to settle charges out of court.  That effort did not appear to be progressing well, as we reported that the Department of Justice prosecutors had “expanded their case” by filing charges against two of Agility’s subsidiaries.

Agility published a release upon learning of the expanded charges, calling them “regrettable”.  Yes indeed.  Agility would indeed regret its inability to settle the charges—because just three days later, on April 15, 2010, news agencies reported that Agility was being “replaced” by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) as its food service provider.  For example, Reuters reported that Agility had announced it was being replaced, but that DLA had decided to have Agility continue to provide services for another six months “to guarantee continuity of supplies.” 

The new food service provider was not disclosed by either Reuters or Agility.  However, we subsequently learned that DLA has awarded the $2.2 billion follow-on contract to Dubai-based ANHAM FZCO.  The new contractor published a press release, in which it said “It is with great gratitude and a compelling sense of duty that all at ANHAM welcome the award to expand our support for those serving in the Middle East.”

F-35 Ramp-Up Flattened

Second, we have been following the “rough ride” of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for some time.  Our original F-35 article was the most popular article on this site (until recently overtaken by our article on Senate hearings regarding DCAA audit quality failures).  In that original F-35 article, we explored whether Lockheed Martin, the aircraft’s prime contractor, could ramp-up production to 20 aircraft per month or 240 planes per year (i.e., one per working day), producing three variants on one production line.  We were dubious, but willing to give LockMart the benefit of the doubt.  We concluded—

To sum up, the JSF program team has set for itself an incredibly ambitious goal of producing a finished aircraft every single working day. It’s set the goal despite early design and supply chain problems, and despite almost universal history among other aircraft programs that says it can’t be done. But at least the team has identified some worthy companies to benchmark against and learn lessons from. The question remains, however, whether the program team can forget the defense industry’s historical program management practices – that don’t work well in the 21st century – and deploy a truly innovative approach that breaks new ground. If they can, then they may have a chance.

We would note that the F-35 continues to receive press.  In fact, it’s a rare week that doesn’t have some story—either positive or negative—about the JSF program.  Several reports have focused on even more program cost growth.  For example, this BusinessWeek/Bloomberg article reports that an additional $51 billion in cost growth—over and above the $328 billion price just reported to Congress on April 1, 2010—may soon be reported, once the Pentagon has completed its in-process JET II analysis.  Of course, LockMart disputes the “worst-case scenario” program value.

On the other hand, this DODBuzz.com article reports on Senate hearings in which testimony asserted that the JSF production has “turned the corner” and “that the most recent restructuring of the JSF program will deliver an aircraft without further cost increases or delays in delivery.”  We note this statement buried in the middle of the article—

‘We’ve turned the corner on production line delays,’ said Air Force Lt. Gen. Mark Shackelford, the service’s top buyer, who expects to take delivery of the first test aircraft this year. The jump in the JSF’s price tag and the delays were due primarily to small design changes, which while minor, rippled through the production line causing excessive ‘churn and stress.’ That production line is now well on the way to ‘maturing,’ he said. He declared the F-35 airframe itself as solid; although the plane’s software package has proven a bit more problematic.


We could devote an entire article to that one paragraph, discussing risk management, supply chain management, change management, software management, and program management.  But we’ll refrain and simply note that there’s a Masters’ thesis to be mined in that motherlode.

Finally, on April 16, 2010, InsideDefense.com reported to its subscribers that the Air Force had halted plans to increase JSF production to 110 aircraft per year, and has decided to “top-out” its purchases at 80 planes per year, starting in GFY 2016.  The article quotes Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz as saying, “As the program continues to progress, we will analyze production capacity and available funding for potential production rate adjustment beyond the 80 aircraft per year rate reflected in the current program.” 

The article further notes that Lockheed Martin stated “that once its … assembly line reaches its optimal production rate in 2016, it could build as many as 230 jets per year”—so LockMart is ready “to build more jets if requested.”

It may not matter what Lockheed Martin’s throughput is, or will be, if its No.1 customer (the USAF) doesn’t have the funding to purchase any more than 80 aircraft per year.  It will be an interesting exercise to calculate how much F-35 program cost growth will be driven—or how much LockMart will claim was driven—by lost economies of scale if production peaks at 80 jets per year versus 240 (or 230, depending on the article).  This situation may degenerate into a “he said/she said” finger-pointing exercise, where the Air Force says that LockMart could only produce 80 aircraft per year and any lost volume savings stemmed from its own inadequacies, while LockMart accuses the Air Force of delay and/or disruption because its lack of available funding kept LockMart from reaching available production efficiencies.

We predict a continued rough-ride for the JSF program—as well as smooth seas and fair winds for the attorneys involved in the nearly inevitable litigation.




 

OFPP Establishes Executive Compensation Ceiling for 2010

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The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has published its annual Executive Compensation Benchmark in the Federal Register. The 2010 Executive Compensation Benchmark ($693,951) establishes the GFY 2010 ceiling for Executive Compensation for those contractors subject to the allowability requirements of the FAR 31.205-6 (Compensation) Cost Principle. Executive compensation amounts (as calculated pursuant to the Cost Principle at 31.205-6(p)) in excess of the OFPP Benchmark are unallowable for the top 5 highest-paid executives of the corporation and each of its segments. It is important to note, however, that compensation amounts below the ceiling value are still subject to the "reasonableness" test of allowability. In other words, DCAA auditors will not automatically accept executive compensation amounts as allowable, even if total compensation is below the OFPP ceiling.

The 2010 amount represents a nearly de minimus $9,770 (or 1.4%) increase over last year’s value.  Perhaps that’s not an unreasonable escalation factor, given the past year’s economic situation.  We’ve never been able to get a clear understanding of how the OMB and OFPP calculate the value.  If you have a strong understanding, please post a comment below.

View the full notice here.




 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.