US At Mercy of Chinese for Rare Earth Metals

The U.S. Government
has recently become aware that it has a supply chain in addition to an
industrial base, and has grown vaguely concerned that its supply chain
may be vulnerable to interruption, which may lead to disruptions in
goods and services needed for warfighters. We reported on this new
focus in this article, but at that time the
Pentagon’s Industrial Policy Directorate seemed to be worried more
about loss of critical skills than anything else. Meanwhile, § 843 of the FY National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate and report
back to Congress on the state of “rare earth materials in the defense
supply chain”. The report was transmitted to
Congress on April 1, 2010, but published on the internet on April 14,
2010. The full report can be found at the
GAO site.
For those of us lacking a scientific background, GAO provided a
helpful definition of “rare earth materials” and explained why they are
important to defense programs such as radars, precision-guided
munitions, as well as to more mundane items such as cell phones and
computer hard-drives. GAO stated that—
Rare earth elements are used in many applications for
their magnetic and other unique properties.
These include the 17 chemical elements
beginning with lanthanum, element number 57 in
the periodic table, up to and including lutetium, element number 71, as well as yttrium and scandium…. Rare earth
materials—rare earth ores, oxides, metals, alloys, semifinished rare earth
products, and components containing rare earth
materials—are used in a variety of commercial and military applications, such as cell phones, computer hard
drives, andDepartment of Defense (DOD)
precision-guided munitions. Some of these
applications rely on permanent rare earth magnets that have unique properties, such as the ability to withstand
demagnetization at very high temperatures.
As GAO
noted, producing rare earth materials requires a number of steps,
including mining, separating, refining, forming, and (finally)
manufacturing. (This background will be helpful later.)
GAO
reported several rather alarming findings, including—
- While rare earth ore deposits are geographically
diverse, current capabilities to process rare earth metals into finished
materials are limited mostly to Chinese sources.
- The United States previously performed all stages
of the rare earth material supply chain, but now most rare earth
materials processing is performed in China, giving it a dominant
position that could affect worldwide supply and prices.
- Based on industry estimates, rebuilding a U.S. rare
earth supply chain may take up to 15 years and is dependent on several
factors, including securing capital investments in processing
infrastructure, developing new technologies, and acquiring patents,
which are currently held by international companies.
- Government and industry officials have identified
a wide variety of defense systems and components that are dependent on
rare earth materials for functionality and are provided by lower-tier
subcontractors in the supply chain.
- Defense systems will likely continue to depend on rare
earth materials, based on their life cycles and lack of effective
substitutes.
- We [GAO] found examples of components
in defense systems that use Chinese sources for rare earth materials
and are provided by lower-tier subcontractors.
- DOD has
not yet identified national security risks or taken department-wide
action to address rare earth material dependency, but expects to
consider these issues in its ongoing study expected to be completed by
the end of September 2010.
GAO reported that, prior to 1985,
the U.S. performed all rare earth material supply chain and production
steps, from mining to manufacturing. However, with the closure of the Mountain
Pass (CA) production facility, the relocation
of Magnequench’s plant to
China, and the closure of Hitachi Magnetics Corporation’s Edmore, MI
production facility, the U.S. has been essentially 100% out of the rare
earth material production business since 2005.
Although the Mountain Pass facility resumed operations in 2007, return to the pre-1985 state could take as many as
15 years (i.e., not until 2025). In the
meantime (according to GAO)—
China has
adopted domestic production quotas on rare earth
materials and decreased its export quotas, which increases prices in the Chinese and world rare earth materials markets. China increased export taxes
on all rare earth materials to a range of
15 to 25 percent, which increases the price of inputs for non-Chinese competitors.
We
don’t want to be overly alarmist here—but this is a potentially very
serious problem that could affect a number of major defense acquisition
programs, from the DDG-51’s Hybrid Electric Drive Ship Program to the
M1A2 Abrams Tank’s reference and navigation system. We encourage DOD’s
Industrial Policy Directorate to get moving on this potential supply
chain “interruption”.
In unrelated news, this is our 200th blog article posted on the website.
Proposed FAR Rule Would Make Certain Labor Relations Costs Unallowable

One of
President Obama’s first actions as President was to issue Executive Order No. 13494
(“Economy in Government Contracting”) on January 30, 2009. It was
subsequently amended
on October 30, 2009. The Executive Order “provided that to promote
economy and efficiency in Government contracting, certain costs that are
not directly related to the contractor's provision of goods and
services to the Government shall be unallowable for payment.” It
purported to accomplish its goals by making unallowable almost all costs
associated with efforts “undertaken to persuade employees to exercise
or not to exercise, or concern the manner of exercising, rights to
organize and bargain collectively.” The Administration argued that this
policy revision was consistent with prior Federal government policy to
“remain impartial” with respect to labor-management disputes involving
government contractors.
As our readers know,
however, in order to implement such a policy change, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) must be changed via the public rulemaking
process, which provides the public at large with an opportunity to
comment—and perhaps affect—the regulatory language. We at Apogee
Consulting, Inc. recently participated
in that process, when we provided the DAR Council with our comments on a
proposed revision to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) that would significantly affect how DCAA audits
contractor internal control systems.
So it was not
surprising when, on April 14, 2010, the FAR Councils published a proposed rule that would,
if implemented as drafted, revise the Cost Principle at 32.205-21
(Labor Relations Costs) to make unallowable—
…costs of any activities undertaken
to persuade employees, of any entity, to exercise or not to exercise, or
concerning the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of the employees' own choosing are
unallowable.
Examples of
unallowable costs in paragraph (b) of this section include, but are not
limited to, the costs of--
(1) Preparing and distributing
materials;
(2) Hiring or
consulting legal counsel or consultants;
(3) Meetings (including paying
the salaries of the attendees at meetings held for this purpose); and
(4) Planning or conducting
activities by managers, supervisors, or union representatives during
work hours.
Importantly, other costs of efforts
“to maintain satisfactory [labor] relations between the contractor and
its employees” are still made expressly allowable by the revised rule.
As
always, comments on the proposed rule may be submitted by following the
directions in the Federal Register notice (link above).
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UPDATES: Agility Replaced, F-35 Ramp-Up Flattened
A couple of quick updates to stories we have been
following.
Agility Replaced
First,
we recently posted an article on Kuwait-based Agility (formerly Public Warehousing
Corporation), the Mid-East’s largest logistics firm—supplier of food
services to U.S. troops based in Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq. We told you
about allegations of fraud and violations of the False Statements Act
and False Claims Act—among other allegations. Although charges were
originally unsealed in November, 2009, reports had surfaced of “delays”
in the case, as the parties apparently attempted to settle charges out
of court. That effort did not appear to be progressing well, as we
reported that the Department of Justice prosecutors had “expanded their
case” by filing charges against two of Agility’s subsidiaries.
Agility
published a release upon learning of the
expanded charges, calling them “regrettable”. Yes
indeed. Agility would indeed regret its inability to settle the
charges—because just three days later, on April
15, 2010, news agencies reported that Agility was being “replaced” by
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) as its food service provider. For
example, Reuters reported that Agility had
announced it was being replaced, but that DLA had decided to have
Agility continue to provide services for another six months “to
guarantee continuity of supplies.”
The new food service provider was
not disclosed by either Reuters or Agility.
However, we subsequently learned that DLA
has awarded the $2.2 billion follow-on contract to Dubai-based ANHAM
FZCO. The new contractor published a press
release, in which it said “It is with great
gratitude and a compelling sense of duty that all at ANHAM welcome the
award to expand our support for those serving in the Middle East.”
F-35 Ramp-Up Flattened
Second,
we have been following the “rough ride” of
the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for some time. Our original
F-35 article was the most popular article on
this site (until recently overtaken by our article on Senate hearings regarding DCAA audit quality failures). In that original
F-35 article, we explored whether Lockheed Martin, the aircraft’s prime
contractor, could ramp-up production to 20 aircraft per month or 240 planes per year (i.e., one per working day), producing three
variants on one production line. We were dubious, but willing to give LockMart the benefit of the doubt. We
concluded—
To sum up, the JSF program team has set for itself
an incredibly ambitious goal of producing a finished aircraft every
single working day. It’s set the goal despite early design and supply
chain problems, and despite almost universal history among other
aircraft programs that says it can’t be done. But at least the team has
identified some worthy companies to benchmark against and learn lessons
from. The question remains, however, whether the program team can forget
the defense industry’s historical program management practices – that
don’t work well in the 21st century –
and deploy a truly innovative approach that breaks new ground. If they
can, then they may have a chance.
We would note that the F-35
continues to receive press. In fact, it’s a rare week that doesn’t have
some story—either positive or negative—about the JSF program. Several
reports have focused on even more program cost growth. For example,
this BusinessWeek/Bloomberg article reports
that an additional $51 billion in cost growth—over and above the $328
billion price just reported to Congress on April 1, 2010—may soon be
reported, once the Pentagon has completed its in-process JET II
analysis. Of course, LockMart disputes the “worst-case scenario” program value.
On the
other hand, this DODBuzz.com article
reports on Senate hearings in which testimony asserted that the JSF
production has “turned the corner” and “that the most recent
restructuring of the JSF program will deliver an aircraft without
further cost increases or delays in delivery.” We note this statement buried in the middle of the article—
‘We’ve turned the corner on production line delays,’ said Air Force Lt. Gen. Mark
Shackelford, the service’s top buyer, who expects to take delivery of
the first test aircraft this year. The jump in the JSF’s price tag and
the delays were due primarily to small design changes, which while
minor, rippled through the production line causing excessive ‘churn and stress.’ That production line is now well on the way to ‘maturing,’ he said. He declared the F-35 airframe itself as solid;
although the plane’s software package has proven a bit more problematic.
We could
devote an entire article to that one paragraph, discussing risk
management, supply chain management, change management, software
management, and program management. But we’ll refrain and simply note
that there’s a Masters’ thesis to be mined in that motherlode.
Finally, on April 16, 2010, InsideDefense.com reported
to its subscribers that the Air Force had halted plans to increase JSF
production to 110 aircraft per year, and has decided to “top-out” its
purchases at 80 planes per year, starting in GFY 2016. The article
quotes Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz as saying, “As
the program continues to progress, we will analyze production capacity
and available funding for potential production rate adjustment beyond
the 80 aircraft per year rate reflected in the current program.”
The
article further notes that Lockheed Martin stated “that once its …
assembly line reaches its optimal production rate in 2016, it could
build as many as 230 jets per year”—so LockMart is ready “to build more jets if
requested.”
It may not matter what Lockheed Martin’s throughput
is, or will be, if its No.1 customer (the USAF) doesn’t have the
funding to purchase any more than 80 aircraft per year. It will be an
interesting exercise to calculate how much F-35 program cost growth will
be driven—or how much LockMart will claim was driven—by lost economies of scale if production
peaks at 80 jets per year versus 240 (or 230, depending on the
article). This situation may degenerate into a “he said/she said”
finger-pointing exercise, where the Air Force says that LockMart could only produce 80 aircraft
per year and any lost volume savings stemmed from its own inadequacies,
while LockMart accuses the
Air Force of delay and/or disruption because its lack of available
funding kept LockMart from
reaching available production efficiencies.
We predict a continued
rough-ride for the JSF program—as well as smooth seas and fair winds
for the attorneys involved in the nearly inevitable litigation.
OFPP Establishes Executive Compensation Ceiling for 2010
The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Office
of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has published its annual Executive
Compensation Benchmark in the Federal Register. The 2010 Executive
Compensation Benchmark ($693,951) establishes the GFY 2010 ceiling for
Executive Compensation for those contractors subject to the allowability
requirements of the FAR 31.205-6 (Compensation)
Cost Principle. Executive compensation
amounts (as calculated pursuant to the Cost Principle at 31.205-6(p)) in excess of the OFPP
Benchmark are unallowable for the top 5 highest-paid executives of the
corporation and each of its segments. It is
important to note, however, that compensation amounts below the ceiling
value are still subject to the "reasonableness" test of allowability. In other words, DCAA auditors will not automatically accept
executive compensation amounts as allowable, even if total compensation
is below the OFPP ceiling.
The 2010 amount represents a nearly de
minimus $9,770 (or 1.4%) increase over last
year’s value. Perhaps that’s not an unreasonable escalation factor,
given the past year’s economic situation. We’ve never been able to get a
clear understanding of how the OMB and OFPP calculate the value. If
you have a strong understanding, please post a
comment below.
View the full notice here.
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