Proposed DFARS Rule on Organizational Conflicts of Interest

We’ve
discussed the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) several times. (See, for
example, this article or this one here.) WSARA—aka Public Law 111-23—aimed to “improve
the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense for the
acquisition of major weapon systems, and for other purposes.”
Section 207 of WSARA required the DOD to “to revise
the DFARS to provide uniform guidance and tighten existing requirements
for organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) by contractors in major
defense acquisition programs.” Accordingly, on April 22, 2010, the DAR
Council published a proposed revision to the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) in the Federal Register. The
proposed rule can be found here.
According to the proposed rule—
The law
sets out situations that must be addressed and allows DoD to establish
such limited exceptions as are necessary to ensure that DoD has
continued access to advice on systems architecture and systems
engineering matters from highly qualified contractors, while ensuring
that such advice comes from sources that are objective and unbiased.
In
developing regulatory language, DoD is directed to consider the
recommendation presented by the Panel on Contracting Integrity. ... DoD
must also consider any findings and recommendations of the Administrator
of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Director of
the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) pursuant to section 841(b) of the
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
(FY) 2009 (Pub. L. 110-417). Section 841(b) of the NDAA for FY 2009
required review by OFPP, in consultation with OGE, of FAR coverage of
OCIs.
So, basically, there are a lot of
stakeholders with input into the rulemaking process. But the public is
also a stakeholder, as the proposed rule noted—
A public
meeting was held on December 8, 2009 … to provide opportunity for
dialogue on the possible impact on DoD contracting of the section 207
requirements relating to OCIs. In the formation of this proposed rule,
DoD considered the comments provided at the public meeting, as well as
other unsolicited comments received from the public. Various presenters
at the public meeting (1) Expressed a desire for policy and regulation
to emphasize the importance of using mitigation strategies to address
OCIs, (2) sought a more consistent approach within the Government to
resolve OCIs, and (3) voiced a strong interest in ensuring any rule is
published for comment prior to taking effect.
A highlight of the proposed rule—which you should
all review at the link provided above—is that it updates the acquisition
regulations to reflect recent court cases. Savvy readers will
understand that the regulations are just words, and that the words are
given meaning and come alive via interpretations provided by the
Courts. So it is, with respect to OCIs, that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CoFC)
have interpreted various aspects of OCI rules in their bid protest
decisions. The DAR Council asserted that the proposed DFARS language
takes the recent case law into consideration.
Cases cited in the promulgating comments included—
- Aetna Government Health Plans
(B-254397, July 27, 1995)
- ICF Inc., (B-241372, February 6, 1991)
- Overlook Systems Technologies,
(B-298099.4, B-298099.5, November 28, 2006)
The proposed rule—including the all-important
promulgating comments—was quite long and complex. Among other things, it
proposed to add a new DFARS subpart under Improper Business Practices
and Personal Conflicts of Interest—Subpart 203.12 (Organizational
Conflicts of Interest)—that covered such areas as: Types of OCIs,
Contracting Officer responsibilities, Identification and Resolution of
OCIs, Waivers, and Solicitation Provisions/Contract Clauses to be used.
As always, the public may submit comments to www.regulations.gov by following the instructions found at the
beginning of the proposed rule.
More Stories of Government Corruption
Okay,
even we are getting a bit tired of
reporting, over and over, stories of corrupt military and civilian
officials doing what they inherently know is wrong, what they have been
trained to know is wrong, and what they should expect to get caught for
doing. Last time, we told you about an
Army Colonel (well, now a former Colonel)
who sold-out his commission as an “officer and a gentleman” for a paltry
$50,000 in cash and $12,500 in plane tickets. That fraudster was not
only a commissioned officer, he was a Contracting Officer’s Technical
Representative (COTR, sometimes also called COR) and the senior
member of a source selection board—i.e., he led the team that picked the winning bidder. As such, he
had to have beaucoup training in
procurement integrity, ethics, and the standards of conduct expected of someone in whom trust had been vested.
For
instance, a quick visit to the Department of Defense Standards of
Conduct Office in the General Counsel’s office (OSDGC-SOCO) reveals:
- An Ethics Resources Library
- Link to Joint
Ethics Regulation (JER) 5500-7-R
- Link to the
website of the Government Ethics Office (OGE)
- Link to on-line training in standards of conduct (note the 2009
training is off-line and the site does not yet have the 2010 training)
So
there is no question that the former Army Colonel, COTR, and Senior
Source Selection Board member could not plead ignorance of the standards
of conduct to which he was expected to adhere. But maybe he could plead not guilty by reason of insanity, because he sold his
pension for $62,500. Our opinion: loser.
And we are back again
with yet two more stories of government
corruption—two men who both violated the expected
standards of conduct and accepted “gratuities” for giving special
treatment to contractors.
Our first story today concerns Bill
Collins, of Bartlett, Tennessee. Mr. Collins was a
U.S. Army Contracting Officer who pleaded guilty to soliciting “more
than $17,000 in bribes and other payments from an Egyptian businessman
in Kuwait,” according to this Department of Justice press release. In other words, he’s another sell-out who received
next-to-nothing for his corrupt actions—which were
described with the wonderful euphemism, “unlawful salary
supplementation.” According to the DOJ release—
Collins was
employed by the U.S. Army Area Support Group-Kuwait (ASG-KU). ASG-KU is
responsible for maintaining Camp Arifjan, a U.S. military installation providing support for
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other locations in the Southwest
Asian Theater. As part of those responsibilities, ASG-KU maintains an
off-post housing office, located in downtown Kuwait City, which procures, leases and supervises off-post
housing for government employees and military service members stationed
at Camp Arifjan. According
to court records, Collins worked in ASG-KU’s off-post housing office as a
housing specialist responsible for supervising private contractors and
procuring off-post apartment rentals.
In his guilty plea, Collins admitted that between
July and December 2009 he solicited more than $11,000 in bribes from an
Egyptian businessman in exchange for submitting an inflated off-post
apartment lease for approval. Collins also admitted that between July
and December 2009 he received at least $5,600 from the Egyptian
businessman as compensation for Collins’s services in connection with a fixed-price U.S. government contract awarded
to the Egyptian businessman’s company. The government contract was for
maintenance services for off-post housing managed by Collins and the
ASG-KU off-post housing office.
At sentencing, Collins faces a
maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $500,000 fine.
Let’s
do the math, gentle readers. Collins received less than $20,000 for which he may have to pay $500,000
and spent up to 20 years in a Federal prison. Our opinion: another
loser.
Our second story concerns a more intelligent fraudster—this
time a (former) Sergeant with the U.S. Army. This Sergeant, Ray Chase,
pleaded guilty to accepting “approximately $1.4 million in illegal
gratuities from private contractors during his deployment in Kuwait in
2002 and 2003,” according to this DOJ announcement. The announcement provides the
following details—
Chase was a sergeant first
class during his deployment to Kuwait from January 2002 through December
2003. Chase served as the contracting officer’s representative and the
non-commissioned officer in charge of the military dining facility at
U.S. Central Command at Camp Doha, Kuwait. During 2003, Chase also
served as the non-commissioned officer in charge for the military dining
facility at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait. Chase supervised the food procurement, preparation and service
operations at Camp Doha and Camp Arifjan. As a part of his official duties, Chase also coordinated
orders for certain blanket purchase agreements the U.S. Army had with
various private contractors to provide supplies and services to both of
those dining facilities.
During … court proceeding and according to court documents, Chase
admitted that he received approximately $1.4 million from private
contractors for official acts he performed and was going to perform in
2002 through the end of 2003. According to court documents, he was paid
by private contractors that included Tamimi Global Company Ltd., LaNouvelle General Trading & Contracting Corp., and another unnamed
company.
In addition to accepting the illegal
gratuities, Chase admitted that after he returned to the United States
in 2004, he structured various financial transactions to avoid currency
transaction reporting requirements. Chase also admitted at today’s
hearing that he made false statements when interviewed by federal
authorities in February 2007.
At sentencing, scheduled for
Aug. 6, 2010 … Chase faces a
maximum sentence of five years in prison. Chase has agreed to forfeit
assets traceable to the proceeds of his crimes.
First,
let us acknowledge that Sergeant Chase at least got decent money for
selling-out. Sure, he’s going to have to pay it back, and spend up to 5
years in a Federal prison, but compare his math to Collins and you’ll
have to agree that it at least makes more sense. Looks
to us like he had a decent defense attorney, who helped him avoid the
punishments associated with violations of wire fraud, money laundering,
and the False Statements Act. Perhaps we should be unsurprised. After
all, he was a non-commissioned officer and would thus be expected to be
clued-in to what was what—as opposed to, say, a Colonel or a Contracting
Officer.
But we also noticed that Sergeant Chase was yet another Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR/COR) who
decided to take a little more than he was legally entitled to receive.
Plus he was the non-commissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC) of the
military dining “facility”—and, as such, he would have received much of
the standards of conduct training we discussed at the beginning of this
article.
To conclude, we know that there are corrupt contractors. We
know that fraud is rampant, especially in the Southwest Asia Area of
Operations. But we continue to be shocked and amazed as the number of
well-trained, experienced, civilian and military officials in the public
procurement process that are crooked. We are
doing our part to publicize the cases and highlight the penalties and
punishments, but the word does not seem to be getting out to the
troops. Do we need to bring capital punishment back in order to create a
decent deterrent?
More seriously, where are the
controls on this type of behavior? We understand there is a war or two
going on, and things get messy in a combat zone … but as taxpayers we
expect better of our government personnel—and we expect better controls
to prevent and/or detect the wrongdoing at the time the wrongdoing is
committed, and not six or seven years after the fact.
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Toward a Secure Supply Chain—A Rant for Your Amusement

Two
trends dominate our thinking about supply chain management—programs are
ever-more reliant on effective management of their supply chains, and
supply chains are ever-more global in scope. What this means is that
contractors are vulnerable.
They are vulnerable to execution problems caused by suppliers three or
four tiers deep in their supply chains—or even lower. They are
vulnerable to cost and schedule impacts from vendors of whom they’ve
never even heard, let alone run through a risk identification and
mitigation process. And the quality of their finished product is
dependent on suppliers located tiers deep and countries away. From
“specialty metals” to resisters and diodes, the supply chain is—for
better or worse—truly a global one.
Some companies and
members of Congress want to make the competition for design and
construction of the next generation U.S. Air Force’s aerial refueling
tanker to be about the country in which the prime contractor is headquartered. Regardless of whether an “American” or “European” company wins
the prime contract, it is a certainty that some portion of the tanker
will be built outside the borders of this country. Deal with it.
As
we reported in this article,
many major defense acquisition programs are dependent on rare earth
magnets produced in China. You have a problem with that? It’s called free-market capitalism, cupcake.
Free-market capitalism is what our country is supposed to be about.
Free-market
capitalism is what happens when companies close-down production in
locations with high labor costs or high insurance costs or high income
taxes, and move their production facilities and/or workforce down the
road a piece to where it’s cheaper to operate and the margins are
higher. If by “down the road” one means “across the ocean to a foreign
land” then so be it. You don’t like the results, then change the
business climate, sweetheart.
You got a problem with
loss of manufacturing capacity, loss of skilled jobs and industrial
capacity, loss of critical technologies, and/or loss of ability to
produce “American-made” defense weapons and programs? Then you better
turn the Titanic around, Einstein, ‘cause the Pentagon hit that
particular iceberg about 20 years ago.
In
the meantime, while you’re running for the wheelhouse and pleading with
the Captain to turn the ship around, we have work to do. We’ve got to
secure our supply chain.
Securing the supply
chain doesn’t mean to stop dealing with foreign suppliers. It doesn’t
mean building barriers that inhibit communication, visibility, and
establishment of long-term partnerships. It doesn’t mean adding a bunch
of labor or costs into the transactional hand-offs between buyer and
seller. It doesn’t mean getting the lawyers involved. We have some
thoughts toward what it does mean, but nobody has it down to a science
yet.
Frankly, the aerospace and defense industry is
behind the times. You want state of the art? You’ve got to look at the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). They have been concerned with
securing the supply chain—particularly as that term applies to
prescription drugs, for many years. In January 2009, the FDA announced a “secure supply chain
pilot program” aimed at allowing the FDA to determine the “practicality”
of developing a secure supply chain program “to prevent the importation
of adulterated, misbranded, or unapproved drugs by allowing the agency
to focus its resources on imported drugs outside the program that may
pose such risks.”
Pentagon PEO’s, are
you listening? While the FDA is concerned with adulterated or
unapproved drugs, you need to be concerned about counterfeit parts and
components, or electronics designed to fail upon command. As a recent
article in the April 19, 2010 edition of Aviation
Week & Space Technology magazine reported, “It’s only a
matter of time, say experts … before a fake component in a major piece
of Pentagon equipment leads to catastrophe because the Pentagon lacks
the ability to track or identify the counterfeits.”
That
same article reported on a November 2009 study by the Commerce
Department, commissioned by the DOD that put the Pentagon on notice that
its supply chains were vulnerable to counterfeit parts. This article in the EETimes discussed
that report. The EETimes article reported—
The survey … revealed extensive
problems in the electronic industry supply chain and showed
counterfeiters are targeting discrete products as well as microcircuit
with ‘fake non-working parts’ or ‘working copies of the original
designs.’ Some counterfeit parts were also ‘new products re-marked as
higher grade product,’ the Bureau said, adding that many of the new
parts would work ‘but not at the desired level of functionality.’ ‘The
majority of counterfeit parts are being discovered because they are
returned as defective, exhibit poor performance, or have incorrect
markings or physical appearance,’ the Bureau said in a report. ‘A
significant number of counterfeit incidents were uncovered because the
customer suspected the parts were counterfeit.’ Counterfeiters are
lured by the easy profit they can make from pouring fake or substandard
products into the supply chain and also because it is often very easy to
introduce their counterfeit products into the system.
So
what can be done about this problem?
First, use of
technological enablers can help sort out the good parts from the bad
ones. Currently available technologies include:
- Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). RFID is wireless technology that
communicates part identification data by radio waves. Data is encoded
into a chip which is integrated with an antenna and packaged into a
finished tag. The encoded data is read with read/write devices,
commonly known as “readers” or “interrogators.”
- Electronic Product Codes (EPC) (aka Unique Item Identifier or UID in the defense industry). Each
mission critical part/component is assigned a unique identification
number in the supply chain.
But those solutions have
their own problems. For example, you don’t want a component
broadcasting its RFID to the world while installed on a stealthy B-2
bomber. An UID numbers can be faked. They are good first steps, but
are ultimately ineffective at securing the supply chain. There are some
other innovative technologies can and should be adapted to our needs,
including use of light-bending color and nanotechnology (“taggans”).
The
risks for the A&D industry sector are real. The risks demand a
serious and near-term response. Our goal should be to establish a
“product pedigree” for our supply chain through creating an unbreakable
chain of custody from first source through the various manufacturing and
fabrication and assembly and finishing steps. We need to be able to
follow our raw stock and piece parts and components and sub-assemblies
into final assembly and test, ideally by satellite monitoring. One the
product is assembled and tested, we need to follow the finished item as
it makes its way to the warfighters. And we need to do it without
alerting the enemy or giving away our position.
It’s
not an easy task, but the easiest way to drown on the Titanic was to
pretend there was no iceberg or that the ship wouldn’t sink. Listen up,
Lunchbox, the ship is taking on water and it’s time to get a bucket.
We’re not fooling you. But your foreign supplier might be.
FAPIIS Goes Live—Or Does It?
We called it “past
performance on steroids” and we see no reason to back away from that
description. As we originally posted,
FAPIIS was to be used for evaluating contractor past performance or
making a determination of contractor responsibility when making a new
contract award decision.
As we told you, the final rule (published
in March 2010) summarized FAPIIS as follows—
FAPIIS is intended to significantly
enhance the scope of information available to contracting officers as
they evaluate the integrity and performance of prospective contractors.
…FAPIIS will also include contracting officers' non-responsibility
determinations (i.e., agency assessments that prospective contractors do
not meet requisite responsibility standards to perform for the
Government), contract terminations for default or cause, agency
defective pricing determinations, administrative agreements entered into
by suspension and debarment officials to resolve a suspension or
debarment, and contractor self-reporting of criminal convictions, civil
liability, and adverse administrative actions. The system will collect
this information … from existing systems … contracting officers …
suspension and debarment officials … and contractors ….
FAPIIS
went “live” on April 22, 2010—as this
story on TheHill.com reports. In the words of the article—
The Federal Awardee Performance and
Integrity Information System aims to prevent less-than-ethical
contractors from taking overlapping jobs, covering up past poor
performances, or not being upfront about conflicts of interests. Federal
procurement officers are supposed to use the information in the
database when certifying a vendor.
The article quotes
Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO)—who should be known to our readers as
the Senator who spearheaded the inquiries into audit quality problems at
DCAA—as saying—
If
we’re going to get the best bang for our buck, we need to make sure the
people who are awarding contracts have access to all the information
they need to make smart decisions. Because we didn’t have a centralized
place for the information, bad actors were being awarded new contracts
despite countless dollars lost to waste, fraud and abuse.
Though
FAPIIS has been implemented, it hasn’t been fully
implemented.
As part of implementing FAPIIS, FAR
9.406-3 was revised to require that Suspension/Debarment Officials
(SDOs) enter data about administrative agreements (which are
alternatives to suspension or debarment) into the FAPIIS database. It
was judged to be critical that contracting officers learn which
contractors have avoided suspension or debarment through executing
administrative agreements. Such contractors may have avoided dire
consequences, but the creators of FAPIIS still thought contracting
officers ought to know—and to take into account—how close the
contractors came to the “death penalty” of government contracting. But
the Department of Defense (DOD) won’t be submitting its data into the
system.
On April 15, 2010, Mr. Shay Assad (Director,
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy) issued a Class Deviation to
military services, DOD agencies, and DOD field activities, directing
that DOD SDOs not to enter information regarding administrative
agreements into FAPIIS. The Class Deviation can be found here. The language is unclear
regarding the rationale for not submitting the data, though it hints at
the lack of a “template for storage” of the data. The Class Deviation
states that the template is anticipated to be “incorporated into FAPIIS
by the fall of 2010.”
How serious is this
gap in the FAPIIS inputs? It’s difficult to state with any certainty.
But it seems strange that FAPIIS should be ready in all respects—except
for this one. One wonders which contractors have administrative
agreements, and might be put at a competitive disadvantage were those
agreements to be brought to the attention of the contracting officer
overseeing a source evaluation? We’ll have to wait until October or
November to learn the answer to that question. In the meantime, take a
stroll through the Federal Contractor
Misconduct Database.
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