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Apogee Consulting Inc

Congress Wants to Fix DCAA

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The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform published its final report recently.  The final report was not much different from the interim report we told you about.  As it concerned DCAA, the HASC Panel recommended that “The Department [of Defense] should consider shifting the responsibility for certification of contractor business systems to independent teams within or outside of DCAA and DCAA should allocate its audit resources on the basis of risk.”

It should not be a surprise that recently introduced legislation puts forward some of the HASC Panel’s recommendations.  It should not be a surprise, but it is—mostly because there have been so many panels and commissions throughout the years, with so many recommendations, that have not made it into legislation.  Yet H.R. 5013 – the proposed “Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act of 2010,” does in fact address many (if not all) of the Panel’s recommendations.

More to our interests, H.R. 5013 proposes to amend Title 10 of the United States Code at §  131 as follows—

Sec. 2222a. Criteria for business system reviews

(a)  Criteria for Business System Reviews- The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that any contractor business system review carried out by a military department, a Defense Agency, or a Department of Defense Field Activity--

(1)  complies with generally accepted government auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General;

(2)  is performed by an audit team that does not engage in any other official activity (audit-related or otherwise) involving the contractor concerned;

(3)  is performed in a time and manner consistent with a documented assessment of the risk to the Federal Government; and

(4)  involves testing on a representative sample of transactions sufficient to fully examine the integrity of the contractor business system concerned.

(b)  Contractor Business System Review Defined- In this section, the term `contractor business system review' means an audit of policies, procedures, and internal controls relating to accounting and management systems of a contractor.'.

(c)  Contract Audit Guidance- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance relating to contract audits carried out by a military department, a defense agency, or a Department of Defense field activity that are not contractor business system reviews, as described under section 2222a of title 10, United States Code, that--

(1)  requires that such audits comply with generally accepted government auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General and are performed in a time and manner consistent with a documented assessment of risk to the Federal Government;

(2)  establishes guidelines for discussions of the scope of the audit with the contractor concerned that ensure that such scope is not improperly influenced by the contractor;

(3)  provides for withholding of contract payments when necessary to compel the submission of documentation from the contractor; and

(4)  requires that the results of contract audits performed on behalf of an agency of the Department of Defense be shared with other Federal agencies upon request, without reimbursement.

We have, in the past, occasionally complained (or whined?) about PWACs—Persons Without A Clue—who propose legislation or regulation without thinking through the consequences.  Looking over H.R. 5012, there is much to applaud.  However, with respect to the provision noted above, we are less sanguine.  Our objections to the proposed legislation are as follows—

  • The DAR Council is already in the midst of the rulemaking process regarding audit and administration of contractor “business systems.”  We’ve weighed-in on the proposed rule, ourselves.  If this legislation goes forward as-is, then the FAR Councils will need to revise the rulemaking they’ve already done, and make substantive changes to the regulations.  This will create confusion in the contracting community, not to mention being wasteful of government resources.
  • As we told Mr. Fitzgerald (Director, DCAA) back in January of 2010, not all DCAA audits need to be subject to generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS).  In particular, audits of contractor internal control systems seem like very good candidates for not being subject to such standards.  In general, we oppose Congress telling DCAA which audits should (or should not) be subject to GAGAS.  Back off, Legislators!
  • Moreover, legislating a requirement that DCAA should perform sufficient transaction sample testing to support its opinion seems both asinine and redundant.  As if any of the Congress members could tell a sufficient sample size from an insufficient one!
  • We do like making DCAA perform its audits timely, and we even support control system reviews being performed by trained, specialized staff.  (After all, the DCMA purchasing system reviewers are trained, specialized staff.)  However, we wonder whether DCAA actually can implement the legislative mandate, given its current lack of resources and management acumen.

It would seem to make sense to allow DCAA time to get its house in order, to keep well-intentioned outsiders from meddling in things of which they have little or any first-hand knowledge.  Unfortunately, it has been suggested that DCAA’s reform efforts are merely window-dressing, and that the audit agency is resistant to meaningful reform.  Perhaps Mr. Fitzgerald has had sufficient time to clean house, and it is now appropriate to “help” him along?

We are not sure this is the right time to “help”  DCAA fix itself.  We are not sure these are the right fixes.  We are not sure Congress is the right “home” for the fixes.  And we’re not sure that DCAA reform efforts should be undertaken without the input of the contractors who work hand-in-hand with DCAA auditors, and feel the effects of changes to DCAA audit guidance, every single day.

H.R. 5013 makes us nervous ….

UPDATE:  In a shocking display of bipartisanship, the House passed H.R. 5013 on April 28, 2010, 417 to 3.



 

Proposed DFARS Rule on Organizational Conflicts of Interest

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We’ve discussed the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) several times.  (See, for example, this article or this one here.)  WSARA—aka Public Law 111-23—aimed to “improve the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense for the acquisition of major weapon systems, and for other purposes.”

Section 207 of WSARA required the DOD to “to revise the DFARS to provide uniform guidance and tighten existing requirements for organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) by contractors in major defense acquisition programs.”  Accordingly, on April 22, 2010, the DAR Council published a proposed revision to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) in the Federal Register.  The proposed rule can be found here.

According to the proposed rule—

The law sets out situations that must be addressed and allows DoD to establish such limited exceptions as are necessary to ensure that DoD has continued access to advice on systems architecture and systems engineering matters from highly qualified contractors, while ensuring that such advice comes from sources that are objective and unbiased.

In developing regulatory language, DoD is directed to consider the recommendation presented by the Panel on Contracting Integrity. ... DoD must also consider any findings and recommendations of the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) pursuant to section 841(b) of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 (Pub. L. 110-417). Section 841(b) of the NDAA for FY 2009 required review by OFPP, in consultation with OGE, of FAR coverage of OCIs.

So, basically, there are a lot of stakeholders with input into the rulemaking process.  But the public is also a stakeholder, as the proposed rule noted—

A public meeting was held on December 8, 2009 … to provide opportunity for dialogue on the possible impact on DoD contracting of the section 207 requirements relating to OCIs. In the formation of this proposed rule, DoD considered the comments provided at the public meeting, as well as other unsolicited comments received from the public. Various presenters at the public meeting (1) Expressed a desire for policy and regulation to emphasize the importance of using mitigation strategies to address OCIs, (2) sought a more consistent approach within the Government to resolve OCIs, and (3) voiced a strong interest in ensuring any rule is published for comment prior to taking effect.

A highlight of the proposed rule—which you should all review at the link provided above—is that it updates the acquisition regulations to reflect recent court cases.  Savvy readers will understand that the regulations are just words, and that the words are given meaning and come alive via interpretations provided by the Courts.  So it is, with respect to OCIs, that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CoFC) have interpreted various aspects of OCI rules in their bid protest decisions.  The DAR Council asserted that the proposed DFARS language takes the recent case law into consideration.

Cases cited in the promulgating comments included—

  • Aetna Government Health Plans (B-254397, July 27, 1995)
  • ICF Inc., (B-241372, February 6, 1991)
  • Overlook Systems Technologies, (B-298099.4, B-298099.5, November 28, 2006)

The proposed rule—including the all-important promulgating comments—was quite long and complex.  Among other things, it proposed to add a new DFARS subpart under Improper Business Practices and Personal Conflicts of Interest—Subpart 203.12 (Organizational Conflicts of Interest)—that covered such areas as:  Types of OCIs, Contracting Officer responsibilities, Identification and Resolution of OCIs, Waivers, and Solicitation Provisions/Contract Clauses to be used.

As always, the public may submit comments to www.regulations.gov by following the instructions found at the beginning of the proposed rule.



 

More Stories of Government Corruption

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Okay, even we are getting a bit tired of reporting, over and over, stories of corrupt military and civilian officials doing what they inherently know is wrong, what they have been trained to know is wrong, and what they should expect to get caught for doing.  Last time, we told you about an Army Colonel (well, now a former Colonel) who sold-out his commission as an “officer and a gentleman” for a paltry $50,000 in cash and $12,500 in plane tickets.  That fraudster was not only a commissioned officer, he was a Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR, sometimes also called COR) and the senior member of a source selection board—i.e., he led the team that picked the winning bidder.  As such, he had to have beaucoup training in procurement integrity, ethics, and the standards of conduct expected of someone in whom trust had been vested.

For instance, a quick visit to the Department of Defense Standards of Conduct Office in the General Counsel’s office (OSDGC-SOCO) reveals:

  • An Ethics Resources Library
  • Link to Joint Ethics Regulation (JER) 5500-7-R
  • Link to the website of the Government Ethics Office (OGE)
  • Link to on-line training in standards of conduct (note the 2009 training is off-line and the site does not yet have the 2010 training)

So there is no question that the former Army Colonel, COTR, and Senior Source Selection Board member could not plead ignorance of the standards of conduct to which he was expected to adhere.  But maybe he could plead not guilty by reason of insanity, because he sold his pension for $62,500.  Our opinion:  loser.

And we are back again with yet two more stories of government corruption—two men who both violated the expected standards of conduct and accepted “gratuities” for giving special treatment to contractors.

Our first story today concerns Bill Collins, of Bartlett, Tennessee.  Mr. Collins was a U.S. Army Contracting Officer who pleaded guilty to soliciting “more than $17,000 in bribes and other payments from an Egyptian businessman in Kuwait,” according to this Department of Justice press release. In other words, he’s another sell-out who received next-to-nothing for his corrupt actions—which were described with the wonderful euphemism, “unlawful salary supplementation.”  According to the DOJ release—

Collins was employed by the U.S. Army Area Support Group-Kuwait (ASG-KU). ASG-KU is responsible for maintaining Camp Arifjan, a U.S. military installation providing support for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other locations in the Southwest Asian Theater. As part of those responsibilities, ASG-KU maintains an off-post housing office, located in downtown Kuwait City, which procures, leases and supervises off-post housing for government employees and military service members stationed at Camp Arifjan. According to court records, Collins worked in ASG-KU’s off-post housing office as a housing specialist responsible for supervising private contractors and procuring off-post apartment rentals.

In his guilty plea, Collins admitted that between July and December 2009 he solicited more than $11,000 in bribes from an Egyptian businessman in exchange for submitting an inflated off-post apartment lease for approval. Collins also admitted that between July and December 2009 he received at least $5,600 from the Egyptian businessman as compensation for Collins’s services in connection with a fixed-price U.S. government contract awarded to the Egyptian businessman’s company. The government contract was for maintenance services for off-post housing managed by Collins and the ASG-KU off-post housing office.

At sentencing, Collins faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $500,000 fine.

Let’s do the math, gentle readers.  Collins received less than $20,000 for which he may have to pay $500,000 and spent up to 20 years in a Federal prison.  Our opinion:  another loser.

Our second story concerns a more intelligent fraudster—this time a (former) Sergeant with the U.S. Army.  This Sergeant, Ray Chase, pleaded guilty to accepting “approximately $1.4 million in illegal gratuities from private contractors during his deployment in Kuwait in 2002 and 2003,” according to this DOJ announcement.  The announcement provides the following details—

Chase was a sergeant first class during his deployment to Kuwait from January 2002 through December 2003. Chase served as the contracting officer’s representative and the non-commissioned officer in charge of the military dining facility at U.S. Central Command at Camp Doha, Kuwait. During 2003, Chase also served as the non-commissioned officer in charge for the military dining facility at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. Chase supervised the food procurement, preparation and service operations at Camp Doha and Camp Arifjan. As a part of his official duties, Chase also coordinated orders for certain blanket purchase agreements the U.S. Army had with various private contractors to provide supplies and services to both of those dining facilities.

During … court proceeding and according to court documents, Chase admitted that he received approximately $1.4 million from private contractors for official acts he performed and was going to perform in 2002 through the end of 2003. According to court documents, he was paid by private contractors that included Tamimi Global Company Ltd., LaNouvelle General Trading & Contracting Corp., and another unnamed company.

In addition to accepting the illegal gratuities, Chase admitted that after he returned to the United States in 2004, he structured various financial transactions to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. Chase also admitted at today’s hearing that he made false statements when interviewed by federal authorities in February 2007.

At sentencing, scheduled for Aug. 6, 2010 … Chase faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison. Chase has agreed to forfeit assets traceable to the proceeds of his crimes.

First, let us acknowledge that Sergeant Chase at least got decent money for selling-out.  Sure, he’s going to have to pay it back, and spend up to 5 years in a Federal prison, but compare his math to Collins and you’ll have to agree that it at least makes more sense.  Looks to us like he had a decent defense attorney, who helped him avoid the punishments associated with violations of wire fraud, money laundering, and the False Statements Act.  Perhaps we should be unsurprised.  After all, he was a non-commissioned officer and would thus be expected to be clued-in to what was what—as opposed to, say, a Colonel or a Contracting Officer.

But we also noticed that Sergeant Chase was yet another Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR/COR) who decided to take a little more than he was legally entitled to receive.  Plus he was the non-commissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC) of the military dining “facility”—and, as such, he would have received much of the standards of conduct training we discussed at the beginning of this article.

To conclude, we know that there are corrupt contractors.  We know that fraud is rampant, especially in the Southwest Asia Area of Operations.  But we continue to be shocked and amazed as the number of well-trained, experienced, civilian and military officials in the public procurement process that are crooked.  We are doing our part to publicize the cases and highlight the penalties and punishments, but the word does not seem to be getting out to the troops.  Do we need to bring capital punishment back in order to create a decent deterrent?

More seriously, where are the controls on this type of behavior?  We understand there is a war or two going on, and things get messy in a combat zone … but as taxpayers we expect better of our government personnel—and we expect better controls to prevent and/or detect the wrongdoing at the time the wrongdoing is committed, and not six or seven years after the fact.



 

Toward a Secure Supply Chain—A Rant for Your Amusement

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Two trends dominate our thinking about supply chain management—programs are ever-more reliant on effective management of their supply chains, and supply chains are ever-more global in scope.  What this means is that contractors are vulnerable.  They are vulnerable to execution problems caused by suppliers three or four tiers deep in their supply chains—or even lower.  They are vulnerable to cost and schedule impacts from vendors of whom they’ve never even heard, let alone run through a risk identification and mitigation process.  And the quality of their finished product is dependent on suppliers located tiers deep and countries away.  From “specialty metals” to resisters and diodes, the supply chain is—for better or worse—truly a global one. 

Some companies and members of Congress want to make the competition for design and construction of the next generation U.S. Air Force’s aerial refueling tanker to be about the country in which the prime contractor is headquartered.  Regardless of whether an “American” or “European” company wins the prime contract, it is a certainty that some portion of the tanker will be built outside the borders of this country.  Deal with it.

As we reported in this article, many major defense acquisition programs are dependent on rare earth magnets produced in China.  You have a problem with that?  It’s called free-market capitalism, cupcake.  Free-market capitalism is what our country is supposed to be about.

Free-market capitalism is what happens when companies close-down production in locations with high labor costs or high insurance costs or high income taxes, and move their production facilities and/or workforce down the road a piece to where it’s cheaper to operate and the margins are higher.  If by “down the road” one means “across the ocean to a foreign land” then so be it.  You don’t like the results, then change the business climate, sweetheart. 

You got a problem with loss of manufacturing capacity, loss of skilled jobs and industrial capacity, loss of critical technologies, and/or loss of ability to produce “American-made” defense weapons and programs?  Then you better turn the Titanic around, Einstein, ‘cause the Pentagon hit that particular iceberg about 20 years ago.

In the meantime, while you’re running for the wheelhouse and pleading with the Captain to turn the ship around, we have work to do.  We’ve got to secure our supply chain.

Securing the supply chain doesn’t mean to stop dealing with foreign suppliers.  It doesn’t mean building barriers that inhibit communication, visibility, and establishment of long-term partnerships.  It doesn’t mean adding a bunch of labor or costs into the transactional hand-offs between buyer and seller.  It doesn’t mean getting the lawyers involved.  We have some thoughts toward what it does mean, but nobody has it down to a science yet.

Frankly, the aerospace and defense industry is behind the times.  You want state of the art?  You’ve got to look at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  They have been concerned with securing the supply chain—particularly as that term applies to prescription drugs, for many years.  In January 2009, the FDA announced a “secure supply chain pilot program” aimed at allowing the FDA to determine the “practicality” of developing a secure supply chain program “to prevent the importation of adulterated, misbranded, or unapproved drugs by allowing the agency to focus its resources on imported drugs outside the program that may pose such risks.”

Pentagon PEO’s, are you listening?  While the FDA is concerned with adulterated or unapproved drugs, you need to be concerned about counterfeit parts and components, or electronics designed to fail upon command.  As a recent article in the April 19, 2010 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reported, “It’s only a matter of time, say experts … before a fake component in a major piece of Pentagon equipment leads to catastrophe because the Pentagon lacks the ability to track or identify the counterfeits.”

That same article reported on a November 2009 study by the Commerce Department, commissioned by the DOD that put the Pentagon on notice that its supply chains were vulnerable to counterfeit parts.  This article in the EETimes discussed that report.  The EETimes article reported—

The survey … revealed extensive problems in the electronic industry supply chain and showed counterfeiters are targeting discrete products as well as microcircuit with ‘fake non-working parts’ or ‘working copies of the original designs.’ Some counterfeit parts were also ‘new products re-marked as higher grade product,’ the Bureau said, adding that many of the new parts would work ‘but not at the desired level of functionality.’ ‘The majority of counterfeit parts are being discovered because they are returned as defective, exhibit poor performance, or have incorrect markings or physical appearance,’ the Bureau said in a report. ‘A significant number of counterfeit incidents were uncovered because the customer suspected the parts were counterfeit.’   Counterfeiters are lured by the easy profit they can make from pouring fake or substandard products into the supply chain and also because it is often very easy to introduce their counterfeit products into the system.

So what can be done about this problem?

First, use of technological enablers can help sort out the good parts from the bad ones.  Currently available technologies include:

  • Radio Frequency Identification (RFID).  RFID is wireless technology that communicates part identification data by radio waves.  Data is encoded into a chip which is integrated with an antenna and packaged into a finished tag.  The encoded data is read with read/write devices, commonly known as “readers” or “interrogators.”
  • Electronic Product Codes (EPC) (aka Unique Item Identifier or UID in the defense industry).  Each mission critical part/component is assigned a unique identification number in the supply chain.

But those solutions have their own problems.  For example, you don’t want a component broadcasting its RFID to the world while installed on a stealthy B-2 bomber.    An UID numbers can be faked.  They are good first steps, but are ultimately ineffective at securing the supply chain.  There are some other innovative technologies can and should be adapted to our needs, including use of light-bending color and nanotechnology (“taggans”).

The risks for the A&D industry sector are real.  The risks demand a serious and near-term response.  Our goal should be to establish a “product pedigree” for our supply chain through creating an unbreakable chain of custody from first source through the various manufacturing and fabrication and assembly and finishing steps.  We need to be able to follow our raw stock and piece parts and components and sub-assemblies into final assembly and test, ideally by satellite monitoring.  One the product is assembled and tested, we need to follow the finished item as it makes its way to the warfighters.  And we need to do it without alerting the enemy or giving away our position.

It’s not an easy task, but the easiest way to drown on the Titanic was to pretend there was no iceberg or that the ship wouldn’t sink.  Listen up, Lunchbox, the ship is taking on water and it’s time to get a bucket.  We’re not fooling you.  But your foreign supplier might be.



 

FAPIIS Goes Live—Or Does It?

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We called it “past performance on steroids”  and we see no reason to back away from that description.  As we originally posted, FAPIIS was to be used for evaluating contractor past performance or making a determination of contractor responsibility when making a new contract award decision. 

As we told you, the final rule (published in March 2010) summarized FAPIIS as follows—

FAPIIS is intended to significantly enhance the scope of information available to contracting officers as they evaluate the integrity and performance of prospective contractors. …FAPIIS will also include contracting officers' non-responsibility determinations (i.e., agency assessments that prospective contractors do not meet requisite responsibility standards to perform for the Government), contract terminations for default or cause, agency defective pricing determinations, administrative agreements entered into by suspension and debarment officials to resolve a suspension or debarment, and contractor self-reporting of criminal convictions, civil liability, and adverse administrative actions. The system will collect this information … from existing systems … contracting officers … suspension and debarment officials … and contractors ….

FAPIIS went “live” on April 22, 2010—as this story on TheHill.com reports.  In the words of the article—

The Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System aims to prevent less-than-ethical contractors from taking overlapping jobs, covering up past poor performances, or not being upfront about conflicts of interests. Federal procurement officers are supposed to use the information in the database when certifying a vendor. 

The article quotes Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO)—who should be known to our readers as the Senator who spearheaded the inquiries into audit quality problems at DCAA—as saying—

If we’re going to get the best bang for our buck, we need to make sure the people who are awarding contracts have access to all the information they need to make smart decisions.  Because we didn’t have a centralized place for the information, bad actors were being awarded new contracts despite countless dollars lost to waste, fraud and abuse.

Though FAPIIS has been implemented, it hasn’t been fully implemented. 

As part of implementing FAPIIS, FAR 9.406-3 was revised to require that Suspension/Debarment Officials (SDOs) enter data about administrative agreements (which are alternatives to suspension or debarment) into the FAPIIS database.  It was judged to be critical that contracting officers learn which contractors have avoided suspension or debarment through executing administrative agreements.  Such contractors may have avoided dire consequences, but the creators of FAPIIS still thought contracting officers ought to know—and to take into account—how close the contractors came to the “death penalty” of government contracting.  But the Department of Defense (DOD) won’t be submitting its data into the system.

On April 15, 2010, Mr. Shay Assad (Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy) issued a Class Deviation to military services, DOD agencies, and DOD field activities, directing that DOD SDOs not to enter information regarding administrative agreements into FAPIIS.  The Class Deviation can be found here.  The language is unclear regarding the rationale for not submitting the data, though it hints at the lack of a “template for storage” of the data.  The Class Deviation states that the template is anticipated to be “incorporated into FAPIIS by the fall of 2010.”

How serious is this gap in the FAPIIS inputs?  It’s difficult to state with any certainty.  But it seems strange that FAPIIS should be ready in all respects—except for this one.  One wonders which contractors have administrative agreements, and might be put at a competitive disadvantage were those agreements to be brought to the attention of the contracting officer overseeing a source evaluation?  We’ll have to wait until October or November to learn the answer to that question.  In the meantime, take a stroll through the Federal Contractor Misconduct Database.



 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.