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Apogee Consulting Inc

Theft of Government Property? How is This Theft of Government Property?

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Just when we thought we’d seen it all …

Here is a story from the Beaverton Valley Times, a media outlet that covers the local scene in Oregon.  The news article reports that a former U.S. Army Captain, Michael Dung Nguyen, age 28, was sentenced on May 3, 2010 to serve 30 months in prison plus three years of “supervised release” for the crime of theft of government property and “structuring financial transactions”.  We investigated further, being interested in the criminal aspects of structuring financial transactions, as well as the whole theft of government property thing.  What we found was a sordid little tale of stupidity and greed, reminiscent of an NCIS TV show episode we watched a couple of years ago.

What did our Captain Nguyen do?  According to the article—

During a December court hearing, Nguyen admitted that while on duty in Iraq, he stole about $690,000 in U.S. currency he had access to as the project purchasing officer in the Army’s 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment.

The money was stolen from commander's emergency response program funds, which were suppose[d] to be used for security-contract payments with the Sons of Iraq, as well as humanitarian relief and reconstruction programs.

Okay.  The “government property” Captain Nguyen stole was cash—“uncirculated bundles of $100 bills”.  Well, yes, we suppose U.S. dollar bills of any denomination are technically “government property;” they are printed by the U.S. Mint and were in the possession of the U.S. Government in Iraq.  But seriously—don’t you think there’s a better description of the crime?

While you ponder that question, back to the sad tale of Captain Nguyen.

According to the article, “Nguyen admitted that while on duty in Iraq, he stole about $690,000 in U.S. currency he had access to as the project purchasing officer in the Army’s 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment.”  Importantly, “Nguyen was the only person who had access to the money, which was kept in a safe at his battalion’s station in Iraq.”  That’s some cunning plan there, Captain Mike.  Make sure you’re the only person with the combination to the safe where the cash is stored, so that you are the only possible suspect when somebody comes to investigate where the money went.  And he would have gotten away with it too, if not for those meddling kids ….

Nguyen’s cunning plan consisted of three key parts:

  1. Steal money from the safe.
  2. Mail the money to himself at his family’s home in Beaverton, OR.
  3. Profit.

As the article reports, “When Nguyen returned from Iraq in June 2008, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, he opened new bank accounts at Bank of America, Washington Mutual Bank, America's Credit Union and Heritage Bank, and deposited $387,550 of the stolen cash into those accounts in Oregon and elsewhere.”  Moreover, “After depositing the money, Nguyen bought new cars – a 2008 BMW and a 2009 Hummer H3T – in addition to buying computers, firearms, electronics and furniture.”  But wait—there’s  more:  “A search of his Beaverton home turned up more than $300,000 in stolen cash hidden in the attic.”  Nice work, Mike.  We hoped you enjoyed tooling around in the Bimmer and the Hummer, no doubt displaying your firearms along the way.

So how was Captain Mike Nguyen caught?  Did somebody notice the missing $700,000 and start an investigation?  Did his commanding officer conduct an inventory on funds in his possession?  Did Nguyen’s replacement turn him in?  Nope.  None of the above.

In fact, it was the good old IRS who noticed something was amiss in the city of Beaverton.  According to the article, “The investigation was initiated by the Portland office of the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation, following the discovery of large and frequent currency deposits and substantial expenditures above Nguyen's legitimate income level.”  Oops.  Captain Mike was enjoying the ill-gotten funds just a little too much.

As an aside, in the past we have bemoaned the lack of controls over operations in Iraq.  As we wrote in a previous post (link above)—“where are the controls on this type of behavior?  We understand there is a war or two going on, and things get messy in a combat zone … but as taxpayers we expect better of our government personnel—and we expect better controls to prevent and/or detect the wrongdoing at the time the wrongdoing is committed, and not six or seven years after the fact.”

Hey, it’s nice Captain Mike got caught and was sentenced to 30 months in prison. It’s great that “Nguyen was also ordered … to serve three years of supervised release after his prison sentence, pay $200,000 in restitution and to forfeit his interest in all personal property he bought with the stolen money.”  That’s keen and no doubt represents a victory for the taxpayers.  But we have to ask:

  • Why didn’t the U.S. Army know that $700,000 was missing?
  • Was there an IG investigation?  If Nguyen could mail home $700,000, what could his brother and sister officers get away with?
  • Was his commanding officer disciplined?
  • Is “theft of government property” really the most appropriate charge here?
  • Is 30 months of prison time supposed to deter future wrongdoers?  Really?

According to the article, the investigation took the combined efforts of “the FBI, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division’s Major Procurement Fraud Unit, and the Department of Defense’s Criminal Investigative Service.”  All that horsepower, and this is the result we get?  Color us disappointed.

Oh, and that “structuring financial transactions”  thing?  The article gives no details.  But here’s an overview article for your information.


 

Latest DOD Report on Situation in Iraq

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DOD is required by law to issue a report to Congress each quarter discussing “specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq.”  Nineteen such reports have been issued to date, including the latest, which was issued in March 2010 and covered the period ending February 2010.  We reported on two of the previous reports, here and here.

The reports document significant progress in restoring Iraq’s political, economic, and cultural stability.  The reports also document continued challenges facing both the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the US-led multi-national forces as they move toward the end of the combat mission by August 2010 and a complete redeployment of all US forces by December 31, 2011.  The current report notes that on January 1, 2010, the US forces “conducted a command and control (C2) transformation” as the theater command transitioned from a multi-national force to a US-only force.

With respect to the political landscape, the report states—

Efforts promoting national unity continue, with an increased commitment to the political process by Iraq’s political actors. Despite signs of progress, Iraqis have not yet reached agreement on some core issues. The contentious matters of oil wealth distribution, the management of oil resources, and the resolution of disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) continue as sources of tension between Arabs and Kurds. Sunni-Shi’a tensions persist over perceived Sunni marginalization, including transitioning the Sons of Iraq (SoI) program, reintegrating former detainees and regime elements, the ongoing de-Ba’athification controversy, and assisting in the return and reintegration of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Over half of the SoI have yet to be integrated into ministerial, security force, or private employment in order to facilitate election security in March 2010, although progress continues to be made in placements.

Importantly, endemic corruption is on the decline.  The report notes that—

The Iraqi government has made measured progress in its efforts to reduce corruption. In January 2010, the Council of Ministers (CoM) approved the GoI’s national anti-corruption strategy to improve compliance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), ratified by the GoI in 2008. Increased resources to identify and remedy government corruption have shown positive results and include a government launched anti-bribery campaign and an expanded public outreach effort to educate the public on the social and economic costs of corruption. In December 2009, Deputy Transportation Minister Adnan al-Ubaidi was convicted of receiving a $100,000 bribe and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment; in a separate case, three Ministry of Trade officials were convicted and sentenced on corruption charges. These cases mark significant progress compared to previous years in which political pressures often derailed corruption cases against major figures. Additionally, USF-I and other U.S. organizations continued to assist the GoI in its efforts to fight organized crime and other corruptive influences against private sector companies and professionals such as doctors and business owners.

Iran continues to exert influence in the country.  The report states—

Iran’s multi-pronged strategy in Iraq consists of political outreach, soft-power initiatives, and lethal support for surrogate groups. Iran continues to exert significant influence in Iraq, although many senior Iraqi officials are privately pushing back against Iranian pressure and appear intent on limiting Iran’s effort to manipulate Iraqi politics. During this reporting period, Iran viewed the Iraqi national elections as critical to balance U.S. influence in Iraq. Throughout the period of seating the government, Iran focused its levers of influence, including economic, financial, religious, and potentially lethal aid to Iraqi insurgents, to shape Iraqi politics toward Iran’s own interests. Leveraging its strong economic and religious ties to the Iraqi Shi’a population, Iran has intervened to moderate disputes between Iraq and Syria. Iranian security leaders also have long-standing contacts with many Kurdish leaders, including Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani. Destabilizing Iranian influence will continue to pose a significant challenge to Iraq’s stability and political independence.

Not to get too deep into the details, we would feel remiss not to note the discussion on security.  From the report:

Security in Iraq continues to improve and the ISF successfully maintained security throughout the elections. Overall, security incidents remained at low levels from December 2009 to February 2010, averaging 150 security incidents per week, which is a 14.8% decrease from the last reporting period and a 45% drop compared to the same period in 2008-2009. Monthly high-profile attacks (HPAs) nationwide remained essentially unchanged from the previous reporting period. Periodic spectacular, multiple-device HPAs seem to be emerging as the extremists’ preferred attack method to create outsized effects while husbanding resources. Although HPAs executed during the previous reporting period through February 2010 caused a large number of civilian deaths and injuries, thus far these attacks have not rekindled a cycle of ethno-sectarian violence. Finally, the disruption of attacks by ISF highlights the increasing Iraqi security capabilities that Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) faces as it attempts to operate. The Iraqi government’s success in preventing large-scale attacks during the Ashura holiday also demonstrates a growing capacity for increasing security during times of heightened threat of AQI attacks. Despite generally lower attack levels, significant longterm challenges remain, including control of border areas to reduce the import of lethal materials and continued development of MoI and Ministry of Defense (MoD) security coordination capabilities.

As wordy as the foregoing has been, in truth we have barely scratched the surface of the detailed 77-page report.  As the focus of the mainstream media is aimed at Afghanistan, many citizens have lost sight of the progress being made in Iraq.  Taking the time to review these quarterly reports leads to a more informed understanding of how the U.S. is progressing in restoring the country to its rightful role as a sovereign entity in the community of nations. 

Our advice?  You should click on the link above and read the report.

Photo Credit:  Sgt. Jamal Kennedy, a team leader with Co. B, TF 1-21 Inf., mans a .50 caliber machine gun outside the Rahemawa Iraqi Police station Jan. 30 in Kirkuk, Iraq. Soldiers provided secondary security, while Iraqi Security Forces provided the primary security for the elections. (Sgt. Sean Kimmons)


 

Changes to Rules Governng Award-Fee Contract Types

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FAR 16.305 says that a cost-plus-award-fee contract is “a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the contract and (b) an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the Government, sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance.”  (We suppose fixed-price-award-fee contracts are possible, but we’ve never seen one.)

As stated above, award fees are used to incentivize contractor performance.  FAR 16.4 has an extensive discussion of the administration of award fees.  According to 16.4(e)(1)—

An award-fee contract is suitable for use when— 

(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to cost, schedule, and technical performance;

(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will be enhanced by using a contract that effectively motivates the contractor toward exceptional performance and provides the Government with the flexibility to evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under which it was achieved; and

(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits as documented by a risk and cost benefit analysis to be included in the Determination and Findings referenced in 16.401(e)(5)(iii).

Table 16-1 establishes the official linkage between performance and incentive award.

Award-Fee Adjectival Rating

Award-Fee Pool Available To Be Earned

Description

Excellent

91%-100%

Contractor has exceeded almost all of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Very Good

76%-90%

Contractor has exceeded many of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Good

51%-75%

Contractor has exceeded some of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Satisfactory

No Greater Than 50%

Contractor has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Unsatisfactory

0%

Contractor has failed to meet overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

FAR 16.4 contains several administrative rules, including the prohibition on earning any award fee “when a contractor’s overall cost, schedule, and technical performance is below satisfactory,”  and the prohibition on the practice of “rolling over” unearned award fee. 

Not content with the administrative guidelines established in the FAR, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) recently issued a proposed rule that would, if implemented as drafted, tighten-up award-fee contract administrative rules for contracts administered by the Department of Defense.  Among the proposed changes are the following –

  • The contracting officer must perform an analysis of appropriate fee distribution to ensure at least 40% of the award fee is held for the final evaluation so that the award fee is appropriately distributed over all evaluation periods to incentivize the contractor throughout performance of the contract.

  • Award-fee payments other than payments resulting from the evaluation at the end of an award-fee period are prohibited. (This prohibition does not apply to base-fee payments.) The fee-determining official's rating for award-fee evaluations will be provided to the contractor within 45 calendar days of the end of the period being evaluated. The final award-fee payment will be consistent with the contracting officer's final evaluation of the contractor's overall performance against the cost, schedule, and performance outcomes specified in the award-fee plan.

In addition to the foregoing, the proposed rule would add a new contract clause that essentially restates the FAR limitations.  To wit—

AWARD FEE (DATE)

The Contractor may earn award fee from a minimum of zero dollars to the maximum amount stated in the award-fee plan in this contract.

In no event will award fee be paid to the Contractor for any evaluation period in which the Government rates the Contractor's overall cost, schedule, and technical performance below satisfactory. The Government may unilaterally revise the award-fee plan prior to the beginning of any rating period in order to redirect Contractor emphasis.

(End of clause)

In addition to the foregoing, on April 26, 2010 the Defense Department issued a Class Deviation that provided a new contract clause to be used for award-fee contracts administered by the DOD.  The Class Deviation stated that the new clause was necessary to implement § 823 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84).  The new clause provides that any award fee may be “reduced or denied” if the prime contractor – or subcontractor – has been determined to be liable for serious bodily injury or death to any civilian or military personnel of the Government through gross negligence or with reckless disregard for their safety.

The need for such a clause likely stems from several news articles laying the deaths of Government personnel at the feet of contractors.  For example, this article says that an Army report calls the electrocution death of a soldier “negligent homicide,” and says KBR is to blame.  Here’s a quote from another article:  “The waste of government money is unfortunate, but the death of a soldier due to possible managerial incompetence is both inexcusable and tragic.”

Clearly, the DOD needed to do something immediately to address the problem and safeguard personnel.  But as others have noted, there is a rulemaking process in place, one that provides for public input.  Issuing a Class Deviation bypasses that process and eliminates the ability of the public to participate in the rulemaking process.

To sum up, award fee contract types are difficult to administer.  The proposed DFARS rule and the recently issued DOD Class Deviation make such contracts even more difficult for both DCMA Contracting Officer and contractors.


 

Risk Management for Complex U.S. Government Contracts & Projects

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On Thursday, June 10, 2010, Nick Sanders (Principal Consultant) will co-instruct on the topic of“Risk Management for Complex U.S. Government Contracts and Projects” at the National Educational Symposium at NCMA’s Golden Gate Chapter.  He will be instructing with Charles Rumbaugh, Esq.

Details of the Educational Symposium can be found here:  http://www.ncmahq.org/files/PDFs/Golden%20Gate%20Reg%20Form%20and%20Flyer%2006.10.2010.pdf


 

Travel Rules Cause Problems for Everybody—Even DOD!

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One of the largest drivers of unallowable costs is business-related travel expenses.  The Cost Principle at FAR 31.205-46 requires (among other things) that contractors can only claim travel expenses that do not exceed the ceilings imposed by the Federal Travel Regulations, Joint Travel Regulations, and/or the Standardized Regulations, depending on which set of travel regulations is applicable to the trip.  Importantly, these regulations are designed to regulate the travel of employees of the Federal government—and not contractor employees.  Consequently, only certain parts of those travel regulations apply to contractor employees.  It’s a difficult Cost Principle to navigate through, made more difficult by references to the various sets of Federal regulations noted above.

Compliance with the FAR Cost Principle is difficult, requires personnel resources, and costs the contractor additional expense.  In addition to the back-office employees necessary to assure compliance and support Government audits of compliance, there is the not insignificant additional cost associated with requiring employees to provide more detail than they would if they were not traveling on government-related business, and to provide more explanations and documentation than they otherwise would.  We’ve suspected for a while that compliance with this particular Cost Principle may actually cost the Federal government more than it “saves” in unallowable contractor costs—but of course we have no evidence to support our suspicion.

Recently, the travel Cost Principle was revised to narrow the range of allowable airfare costs a contractor can incur.  We didn’t like the revision, and told you why at the time.  We predicted that Government auditors would misinterpret the rule and cause problems.  And our prediction was proven correct a couple of months later, when DCAA published its audit guidance telling auditors how to audit for compliance with the revised rule.  A complex Cost Principle was made even more complex by a poorly drafted rule revision, and the situation was exacerbated by DCAA’s flawed interpretation of the rule.

So it is with a bit (or perhaps a bit more than that) of Schadenfreude that we note this article in FederalTimes.com, which reports that “Pentagon officials” have asked Congress for a relaxation to the byzantine set of rules governing travel on behalf of the Department of Defense.  The reason for the request is that the current regulatory regime is too complex, according to officials of the Defense Transformation Agency.  According to the article, the Defense Department “has defined 76 types of trips that its employees might take,” making programming the Defense Travel System software too difficult.  The project to automate the Defense Travel System has been an on-going project for more than 15 years.

The FederalTimes.com article quoted Mr. David Fisher as saying, “We'd have to spend millions and millions of dollars to get it right.  We'd like to be able to continue that investment in a simpler world."  The article reported that Fisher and his co-worker, Ms. Pam Mitchell, “asked for the subcommittee's help in navigating about 2,000 pages of sometimes contradictory rules and regulations that govern Defense travel. Reforming the system will require legislative action.” 

Contractors would like to ask Congress to undertake similar reform efforts.  While it is true that certain travel costs might be subject to abuse, the majority of such costs are “commercial”  in nature and pricing is largely governed by market forces.  It’s time for the travel rules to be simplified, for everybody.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.