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Judge Firestone Says No CAS Standard Covers PRBs

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If our recent pension accounting discussion didn’t thrill you, it’s not likely that this article is going to float your boat either.  Two recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CoFC), both issued by Judge Firestone on April 29, 2010, appear to conclude that there is no Cost Accounting Standard that covers accounting for post-retirement benefits other than pensions (PRBs).

“What’s a PRB?” you may well be asking.  A PRB is a non-cash benefit (other than a pension distribution) that is provided to employees after retirement.  Typically, PRBs include life and medical insurance.  But some PRB plans include legal services, and even tuition credits.  PRBs may be fully funded by a company, or partially funded (with employees sharing the rest of the costs).  For GAAP purposes, companies need to account for PRB liabilities in accordance with SFAS 106.  Readers might notice that SFAS 106 was promulgated in 1990, far after the original CAS Board had finished promulgating Cost Accounting Standards.

The link above will allow you to review the SFAS 106 summary and learn about its requirements.  For purposes of this article, suffice to say the Statement requires that an employer’s obligation for PRBs expected to be provided to an employee “must be fully accrued by the date that the employee attains full eligibility” for the benefits. 

Importantly, the FAS Board expressly acknowledged that the provisions of SFAS were similar to provisions in Financial Accounting Statements governing accounting for pensions (i.e., SFAS Nos. 87 and 88).  In the words of the FAS Board, “to the extent the promise to provide pension benefits and the promise to provide postretirement benefits are similar, the provisions of this Statement [SFAS 106] are similar to those prescribed by Statements 87 and 88; different accounting treatment is prescribed only when … there is a compelling reason for different treatment.”  Keep the FAS Board’s linkage of the accounting for pensions and PRBs in mind as we take a look at Judge Firestone’s decisions.

Raytheon Company v. The United States

The complete decision can be found here.  Raytheon was required to calculate a segment-closing pension adjustment in accordance with CAS 413-50(c)(12).  The company wanted to include its PRB liabilities in that pension calculation. Judge Firestone reviewed the history of ERISA and CAS, before opining on Raytheon’s PRB plans.  In particular, she quoted the CAS Board’s preamble to CAS 416—

The [CASB] believes that these standards provide ample criteria for determining which standard is applicable to any given cost. In particular, the question of whether a benefit, such as insurance provided to retired persons, is an integral part of a pension plan and thereby governed by CAS . . . 412 or is a part of an insurance program and therefore governed by CAS 416 is a question of fact in each given instance. Moreover, application of either standard to this element would result in substantially the same amounts of allocable costs.

Judge Firestone also reviewed SFAS 106 and the proposed Standard 419 (which would have expressly covered PRBs), as well as the history of FAR 31.205-6(o)—which discusses the allowability of PRB costs.  (“… To be allowable, PRB costs must be reasonable and incurred pursuant to law, employer-employee agreement, or an established policy of the contractor.  In addition, to be allowable in the current year, PRB costs must be paid …”)

Finally, Judge Firestone concluded that Raytheon’s PRB plans were not “pension plans” as that term is defined in CAS.  She wrote, “… health benefits or medical benefits, which clearly do not vest and are terminable at will, are not ‘integral’ to a pension plan.” Raytheon’s PRB costs were not pension costs and could not be included in its CAS 413 pension calculations.  In forming her decision, the Judge relied heavily on the CAS Board’s published decision not to issue Standard 419.  She wrote—

The court is mindful of established rules of administrative law which provide that proposed regulations have no legal effect and are not entitled to deference. The court is also mindful of established rules of construction that caution against relying on the views of a legislature to interpret the meaning of a law written by a previous legislature. However, there are situations where policy pronouncements are entitled to appropriate deference based on the context of the pronouncement. The court finds that this is one of those circumstances.   (Citations omitted.)

Judge Firestone gave the “highest degree of deference” to the FAR Councils’ comments when publishing FAR 31.205-6(o).  The rule requires that the government is entitled to an equitable share of any previously funded PRB costs that “revert or inure” to the contractor if it decides to terminate or reduce PRB benefits.  However, the door only swings one way:  unlike pension plans, if a segment is closed with unfunded PRB liabilities remaining, the contractor is not entitled to a segment-closing PRB adjustment.

But Judge Firestone did offer Raytheon (and other contractors) a ray of hope.  She wrote—

The fact that Raytheon’s PRB costs are not included in the CAS 413.50(c)(12) segment closing adjustment does not mean that Raytheon will not be able to recover its PRB costs from the government following these segment closings. To the extent Raytheon continues to fund its PRBs, it will be able to allocate its PRB costs across all of its remaining segments under CAS 403.40(c), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.403-40(c) (2010). The government has agreed to allow contractors that continue to generate PRB costs to allocate those costs to the government as residual costs under other contracts following a segment closing.

General Electric Company v. The United States

In her next decision, Judge Firestone discussed GE’s “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) PRB plans in related to its segment-closing calculations.  In PAYG plans, costs are recognized for government contract cost accounting purposes only when they are actually paid to employees (or retired employees). 

We were interested to note that Judge Firestone entertained the testimony of “experts” to help her understand the interplay of the various regulatory requirements (which she discussed at length in the Raytheon decision).  She said, “Due to the complexity of the interrelationship of the various CAS and FAR provisions to the measurement, allocation and payment of PRB costs, the court found it beneficial to hold a hearing of experts to explain how these provisions are applied in practice.”

Given her decision in Raytheon (discussed at length above), it is hardly surprising that the Judge found against GE, deciding that its PRB costs could not be included in its segment-closing pension adjustment calculations.  She noted that “… the reason that CAS 413.50(c)(12) does not extend to GE’s PAYG PRB costs is that CAS 413 provides a means to sort out actuarial gains and losses and does not extend to situations where no such actuarial gains and losses were ever allocated to government contracts. Actuarial gains and losses only arise in the context of accrual accounting.” Moreover, she wrote—

Pension plans funded using PAYG accounting that do not have compellable benefits have not been allocated to contracts based on actuarial determinations. Accordingly, these non-compellable PAYG costs have not been allocated to government contracts based on actuarial assumptions, assumptions that, while meant to be as accurate as possible, inevitably result in over or under payments. Because non-compellable PAYG costs have been allocated to government contracts based only on the actual payments made to retirees, no assumptions were used and no costs based on actuarial gains or losses were allocated to government contracts. In such circumstances, there are no ‘previously determined costs’ that need to be adjusted in a CAS 413 segment closing adjustment.

Judge Firestone ran through several of the Standards, noting how each did not cover PRBs—at least as GE had decided to account for them.  She also dispensed with GE’s argument that, by virtue of the segment closing, the government had received an illegal “windfall” that could only be corrected by permitting GE to reduce its otherwise payable segment-closing pension adjustment.

To sum up, Judge Firestone concluded that the Federal cost accounting rules that cover pension plans do not extend to PRB plans, at least with respect to the Raytheon and General Electric Companies.  The only regulatory coverage is to be found in the FAR, whose provisions are relatively strict (at least from a contractor’s point of view).

It may seem forever to you by now, but remember back at the beginning of this article, when we noted that the FAS Board expressly called-out similarities between pension and PRB accounting?  Accountants may think that the similarities compel similar treatment—but Judge Firestone was not persuaded.


 

CAS Pension Accounting—Do You Hear That Train A’Comin’?

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Lots of news to report on pension accounting issues under the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).  If you’re not subject to CAS, or if you don’t have a defined-benefit pension plan, then perhaps this article will not be for you. But if you’re into pain, then previous articles on CAS pension accounting can be found here and here.

On May 10, 2010 the CAS Board issued its long-awaited Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) discussing proposed revisions to CAS 412 and 413 to bring them into “harmony” with the requirements of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006.  Here’s the full text of the NPRM—all 43 pages of it.  The proposed rule, if implemented as drafted, will significantly impact the way in which CAS-covered contractors account for their defined-benefit pension plans.

For reference, the CAS Board follows a four-step rulemaking process, as follows:

1.   Staff Discussion Paper

2.   Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)

3.   Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)

4.   Final Rule

So the May 10, 2010 NPRM indicates that the CAS Board is nearing the end of its process, and contractors should expect a final rule to be published in the Federal Register in mid-summer.  Of course, the final rule won’t take effect on its publication date.  The effectivity date will be up to 120 days after the publication date, “unless the Board determines that a longer period is necessary.”  And even then, implementation of the cost accounting practices can be delayed until “the beginning of the second fiscal year of the contractor … after the standard becomes effective.”  So the train’s a’comin’ round the bend, but it’s going to take a while to get here.  In the meantime, let’s review some background….

In 2006 Congress passed the PPA (Pub. Law 109-280), which has been described as “the most comprehensive reform of the nation’s pension laws since the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.”  The PPA established new defined benefit pension plan funding requirements, in order to increase the minimum funding requirements for pension plans and strengthen the pension insurance system. (It also addressed defined contribution and hybrid plans, but that’s not relevant to this article.)

The PPA required higher employer contributions to fund their pension liabilities.  It is fairly certain that defined benefit pension plans will experience significantly higher pension costs in the near term (for at least the period 2011 through 2016) as a result of the PPA requirements.  In contrast, the existing CAS requirements (found in CAS 412 and 413) mandated lower liability measurements and longer prepayment amortization periods.  The disconnect between PPA and CAS requirements resulted in CAS-covered contractors recording costs under GAAP that they could not recover under CAS, thus significantly impacting their cash flow.

Recognizing this inequity, the PPA exempted certain Government contractors from its requirements for a certain period of time.  Although the PPA became effective on January 1, 2008, for Government contractors with sales in excess of $5 billion (whose revenues were predominantly comprised of sales to the Government under CAS-covered contracts), the PPA requirements were deferred until January 1, 2011, in order to give the CAS Board time to “harmonize” its requirements with the PPA requirements.  Congress required the CAS Board to publish a “CAS Harmonization Rule” by not later than January 1, 2010, with a mandated applicability date of January 1, 2011.  (Astute readers may note that the CAS Board has missed its congressionally mandated deadline.)

Where’s this all leading, you may be asking?  Well, it’s like this.  The Standards dealing with defined-benefit pension plans are about to be revised, and contractors will have to change their cost accounting practices in order to comply with the revised CAS requirements.  The changes will lead to an increase in measured pension costs.  A “SWAG” by a DCMA pension expert estimated a 60% increase in pension costs!  Because the cost accounting practice changes are required by the revised Standards, contractors are entitled to an equitable adjustment to contract prices.  They are going to be hitting up their customers for the increased costs.  (Though the NPRM indicates that there will be a transition period, which may smooth out the immediate impact of the increased pension costs.)

The DOD has known about this upcoming day of reckoning for quite some time, and has taken actions that would prevent contractors (and their government customers) from doing anything about it until the CAS Board finishes its rulemaking work.  Yes, you heard that correctly.  The Pentagon has actively prevented DOD programs from creating reserves that would cover the upcoming cost impacts.  For example, in December 2006 the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) group issued a memo that directed DOD contracting officers to ignore the coming increases to contractor pensions costs when negotiating forward pricing rate agreements—even though the memo acknowledged that contractors might be entitled to equitable adjustments to contract prices affected by the changes to the Cost Accounting Standards. 

As a result of DOD’s willful blindness, someday soon there is going to be a reckoning, as CAS-covered contractors with defined benefit pension plans notify contracting officers of the contract price increases stemming from the new CAS rules.  DOD has no budget for the price increases and any attempt at proactive planning was effectively halted by the DPAP memo noted above.  Won’t Congress dearly love the upcoming surprises coming its way!


 

When is Loan Fraud Not Loan Fraud? When It’s a False Claim

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Run a Google news search on “mortgage fraud” or “loan fraud” and you’ll get literally scores, if not hundreds, of hits.  For example, our search turned up this CNN/Money story on “The Top 10 Mortgage Fraud States” in which Florida, New York, and California were the “Top Three” states.  Loan fraud is considered one of the significant contributing causes of the recent economic malaise.  Even though banks and underwriters are more conscious of potential fraud, this article reports that “incidents of residential mortgage fraud” increased 7 percent in the past year.  Clearly, such fraud is rampant and the citizenry is looking to law enforcement officials to catch the wrongdoers.

It is in this context that we found the following story to be of interest.  According to a May 6, 2010 press release, a lender based in the state of New York agreed to a settlement in which it will pay $26.3 million to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act.  The False Claims Act applies to Federal contractors that knowingly submit inaccurate invoices to the U.S. Government.  So how can a lender violate the False Claims Act?  The press release provided an interesting answer.

The press release stated—

Ciena Capital LLC, a private, non-depository lender located in New York City … and a subsidiary, Business Loan Center (BLC), a small business lending company licensed to originate and service loans under Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, are alleged to have submitted false claims for payment on loans made through the Small Business Administration (SBA). The SBA, through various lending programs, provides financial assistance to small businesses by guaranteeing up to 85% of the value of loans made by private lenders.

Okay.  We can see that Ciena Capital and BLC were making loans connected with the SBA, so that links them to the Federal government.  Where do the false claims come in?

… Ciena and BLC falsely certified that they complied with SBA regulations when they submitted claims for payment on loans they originated, underwrote, and serviced. Some of these loans defaulted shortly after they were made as a result of Ciena’s and BLC’s disregard of SBA rules, regulations, and underwriting requirements.

Now the picture becomes clearer.  Apparently, these lenders were paid by the SBA for making loans to small businesses, but they had to vet the businesses in accordance with SBA rules, and they (allegedly) failed to do so.  When they submitted their requests for payment, they (allegedly falsely) certified that they had followed the SBA’s rules.

What else does the DOJ press release say?

Other loans were originated by former BLC Executive Vice President Patrick Harrington, or his office, during his tenure. Harrington pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States and was sentenced to 10 years in prison for his prominent role in the fraudulent loan scheme, which included falsifying loan documents, inflating property appraisals, and using straw purchasers to engage in sham transactions.

The relators will receive $4.3 million as their share of the government’s recovery.

When is loan fraud not loan fraud?  When it’s fraud committed in the Federal contracting context.  Then it’s a false claim.




 

Proposed DFARS Changes: CSDRs and Data Rights

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On May 7, 2010 the DAR Council published several proposed DFARS rules in the Federal Register.  We’re going to discuss two of them:  (1) DFARS Case 2008-D027 (“Cost and Software Data Reporting System”), and (2) DFARS Case 2007-D003 (“Presumption of Development at Private Expense”). 

Cost and Software Data Reporting System

The first proposed rule, found here, set forth DOD’s “Cost and Software Data Reporting system requirements for major defense acquisition programs and major automated information system programs.” The proposed rule referenced two documents:  (1) DOD’s CDSR Manual (DoD 5000.04-M-1), and (2) the contract CDSR Plan found on DD Form 2794.  That’s not all.  Other DOD Forms were discussed, including DD Form 1921-3 (“Contractor Business Data Report”).  The proposed rule would add one solicitation provision to establish proposal requirements for offerors, and one contract clause to establish post-award requirements for successful contractors Whew. 

Let’s summarize.  You can find the details at the link above.

The solicitation provision required offerors to:

  • Describe the standard Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) process they intend to use to satisfy the requirements of the CSDR Manual, and the Government-approved contract CSDR plan, and the related Resource Distribution Table (RDT), in proposals in response to solicitations for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information System programs.

  • Submit with their pricing proposal: the DD Form 1921, Cost Data Summary Report; DD Form 1921-1, Functional Cost-Hour Report; and, DD Form 1921-2, Progress Curve Report.

The contract clause required successful awardees to:

  • Utilize a documented standard Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) process that satisfies the guidelines contained in the CSDR Manual DoD 5000.04-M-1.

  • Use management procedures that provide for generation of timely and reliable information for the Contractor Cost Data Reports, and Software Resources Data Reports.

  • Use the Government-approved contract CSDR plan, DD Form 2794, Cost and Software Data Reporting Plan with the related Resource Distribution Table, and DD Form 1921-3, Contractor Business Data Report, as the basis for reporting.

  • Require subcontractors, or subcontracted effort if subcontractors have not been selected, to comply with the Cost and Software Data Reporting requirements.

Presumption of Development at Private Expense

The second rule, found here, proposed to implement § 802(b) of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. Law 109-364) and § 815(a)(2) of the FY 2008 NDAA (Pub. Law 110-181) to implement “special requirements and procedures related to the validation of a contractor’s or subcontractor’s asserted restrictions on technical data and computer software.” 

According to the rule’s background, the first Public Law “modified 10 U.S.C. 2321(f) with regard to the presumption of development at private expense for major systems” while the second Public Law “revised 10 U.S.C. 2321(f)(2) to exempt commercially available off-the-shelf items from the requirements” of the first Public Law. 

Previously, the “Commercial Rule” required a Contracting Officer “presume that a commercial item has been developed entirely at private expense, unless shown otherwise in accordance with the procedures at 10 U.S.C. 2321(f). The detailed procedures at 10 U.S.C. 2321(f)(1) require the contracting officer to presume that the asserted restrictions have been justified (on the basis that the item was developed exclusively at private expense), whether or not the contractor or subcontractor submits a justification in response to the challenge notice issued by the contracting officer. The contracting officer's challenge may be sustained only if information provided by DoD demonstrates that the item was not developed exclusively at private expense.”

The proposed rule would closely follow the “two-pronged statutory scheme” established by the two Public Laws, as follows:

  • Under the “Major Systems Rule” a Contracting Officer’s “challenge to asserted restrictions on technical data relating to a major system shall be sustained unless the contractor or subcontractor submits information demonstrating that the item was developed exclusively at private expense.” This rule would apply to all acquisitions of all commercial items, as well.
  • However, the second Public Law “altered the relationship between these two special rules” where they overlapped—i.e., in the case of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) acquisitions.  COTS acquisitions were exempted from the Major Systems Rule, and thus “Since COTS items are a subtype of commercial items, this change results in COTS items being governed by the Commercial Rule in all cases, regardless of whether the COTS items are included in a major system.”

There is a bit of potential confusion with respect to flowdown of the proposed DFARS rules to subcontractors.  As the promulgating comments note—

It is well established policy and practice in Federal and DoD acquisitions that the treatment of intellectual property rights creates a special, direct, relationship between the Government and subcontractors (at any tier). For example, the Government's license rights may be granted directly from the subcontractor to the Government, and the Government and subcontractor are allowed to transact business directly with one another on issues related to the subcontractor's intellectual property (such as delivery of technical data directly to the Government, and regarding the validation of asserted restrictions).

Accordingly, “this proposed rule revises section 212.504 to eliminate 10 U.S.C. 2320 and 2321 from the list of statutes that are inapplicable to subcontracts for commercial items, and makes corresponding changes to the flowdown requirements at 227.7102-4, and to the associated clauses at 252.227-7013(k)(2), -7015(e), and -7037(l).”  In other words, the proposed rule would flow down clause language from prime contractors to subcontractors when applied to acquisitions of commercial items.

In addition, although the Public Laws impose requirements only with respect to technical data rights, the proposed rule would also address computer software.  The promulgating comments state—

Although 10 U.S.C. 2320 and 2321 apply only to technical data and not to computer software (which is expressly excluded from the definition of technical data), it is longstanding Federal and DoD policy and practice to apply the same or analogous requirements to computer software, whenever appropriate. Many issues are common to both technical data and computer software, and in such cases, conformity of coverage between technical data and computer software is desirable.

    … This applicability model is used to guide the implementation of revisions analogous to those discussed previously for technical data (i.e., analogous revisions are made to the validation procedures only for noncommercial technologies).

    Accordingly, it is only the new Major Systems Rule that is applicable to, and implemented for, the validation procedures for noncommercial computer software. These new procedures are added at proposed 227.7203-13(d) and the associated clause at 252.227-7019(f). In each case, the paragraph numbers in the affected coverage are revised to incorporate the new paragraph. In addition, a conforming amendment is also made at 252.227-7019(g)(5) to state positively that the contracting officer's final decision will adhere to the new requirements.

As always, public comments may be submitted to the DAR Council via http://www.regulations.gov.  Each of the proposed rules has detailed instructions for submitting comments.



 

Kickbacks are a No-No

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Do you remember that episode of Friends where Monica got fired from her restaurant job for accepting free steaks from the restaurant’s supplier?  It was in the second season, and is described thusly—

Monica gets a new position as Head Lunch Chef, also in charge of purchasing, who has her own little desk (when Roland's not there), and a beeper. However, she is soon fired for accepting a gift from the restaurant's new meat supplier.

We all learned then (if we didn’t know it already) that accepting kickbacks from a supplier creates a conflict of interest and is a “no-no” in the procurement world.  Soliciting or accepting a kickback is more serious in the world of Federal government contracting, as we shall discuss in some depth.

The FAR discusses kickbacks from subcontractors at 3.502.  Here are the relevant definitions—

  • “Kickback” means any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or compensation of any kind which is provided, directly or indirectly, to any prime contractor, prime contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in connection with a prime contract or in connection with a subcontract relating to a prime contract.
  • “Person” means a corporation, partnership, business association of any kind, trust, joint-stock company, or individual.
  • “Prime contract” means a contract or contractual action entered into by the United States for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind.
  • “Prime Contractor” means a person who has entered into a prime contract with the United States.
  • “Prime Contractor employee” means any officer, partner, employee, or agent of a prime contractor.
  • “Subcontract” means a contract or contractual action entered into by a prime contractor or subcontractor for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind under a prime contract.
  • “Subcontractor” (1) means any person, other than the prime contractor, who offers to furnish or furnishes any supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind under a prime contract or a subcontract entered into in connection with such prime contract; and (2) includes any person who offers to furnish or furnishes general supplies to the prime contractor or a higher tier subcontractor.

For a bit of the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulation policy, here’s a bit from 3.502-2

The Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (41 U.S.C. 51-58) was passed to deter subcontractors from making payments and contractors from accepting payments for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in connection with a prime contract or a subcontract relating to a prime contract.

The Act—

(a) Prohibits any person from—

(1) Providing, attempting to provide, or offering to provide any kickback;

(2) Soliciting, accepting, or attempting to accept any kickback; or

(3) Including, directly or indirectly, the amount of any kickback in the contract price charged by a subcontractor to a prime contractor or a higher tier subcontractor or in the contract price charged by a prime contractor to the United States.

(b) Imposes criminal penalties on any person who knowingly and willfully engages in the prohibited conduct addressed in paragraph (a) of this subsection.

(c) Provides for the recovery of civil penalties by the United States from any person who knowingly engages in such prohibited conduct and from any person whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee provides, accepts, or charges a kickback.

(d) Provides that—

(1) The contracting officer may offset the amount of a kickback against monies owed by the United States to the prime contractor under the prime contract to which such kickback relates;

(2) The contracting officer may direct a prime contractor to withhold from any sums owed to a subcontractor under a subcontract of the prime contract the amount of any kickback which was or may be offset against the prime contractor under paragraph (d)(1) of this subsection; and

(3) An offset under paragraph (d)(1) or a direction under paragraph (d)(2) of this subsection is a claim by the Government for the purposes of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.

(e) Authorizes contracting officers to order that sums withheld under paragraph (d)(2) of this subsection be paid to the contracting agency, or if the sum has already been offset against the prime contractor, that it be retained by the prime contractor.

(f) Requires the prime contractor to notify the contracting officer when the withholding under paragraph (d)(2) of this subsection has been accomplished unless the amount withheld has been paid to the Government.

(g) Requires a prime contractor or subcontractor to report in writing to the inspector general of the contracting agency, the head of the contracting agency if the agency does not have an inspector general, or the Department of Justice any possible violation of the Act when the prime contractor or subcontractor has reasonable grounds to believe such violation may have occurred.

(h) Provides that, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has been a violation of the Act with respect to any prime contract, the Government Accountability Office and the inspector general of the contracting agency, or a representative of such contracting agency designated by the head of the agency if the agency does not have an inspector general, shall have access to and may inspect the facilities and audit the books and records, including any electronic data or records, of any prime contractor or subcontractor under a prime contract awarded by such agency.

(i) Requires each contracting agency to include in each prime contract exceeding $100,000 for other than commercial items (see Part 12), a requirement that the prime contractor shall—

(1) Have in place and follow reasonable procedures designed to prevent and detect violations of the Act in its own operations and direct business relationships (e.g., company ethics rules prohibiting kickbacks by employees, agents, or subcontractors; education programs for new employees and subcontractors, explaining policies about kickbacks, related company procedures and the consequences of detection; procurement procedures to minimize the opportunity for kickbacks; audit procedures designed to detect kickbacks; periodic surveys of subcontractors to elicit information about kickbacks; procedures to report kickbacks to law enforcement officials; annual declarations by employees of gifts or gratuities received from subcontractors; annual employee declarations that they have violated no company ethics rules; personnel practices that document unethical or illegal behavior and make such information available to prospective employers); and

(2) Cooperate fully with any Federal agency investigating a possible violation of the Act.

(j) Notwithstanding paragraph (i) of this subsection, a prime contractor shall cooperate fully with any Federal government agency investigating a violation of Section 3 of the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (41 U.S.C. 51-58).

But we’re not done yet.  Contract clause 52.203-7 (“Anti-Kickback Procedures”) will be found in most every Federal contract valued in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold (except for commercial contracts).  It says pretty much what’s posted above, verbatim, and also requires that essentially all of the prohibitions and requirements must be flowed-down to subcontractors “in all subcontracts under this contract which exceed $100,000.”

So we can all agree that accepting kickbacks in return for a favorable evaluation and award of a subcontract is a bad thing.  Monica just got fired for accepting her kickbacks, but when a Federal contract is involved, criminal penalties may be imposed in addition to civil ones. 

It’s kind of a big deal—which is why we are so surprised at the number of government contractors—both big and small—who lack the kind of controls mandated by the contract clause.  What do we mean?  Notice (for example) the clause language, which is unusually focused for a discussion of required contractor internal controls: 

…procurement procedures to minimize the opportunity for kickbacks; audit procedures designed to detect kickbacks; periodic surveys of subcontractors to elicit information about kickbacks; procedures to report kickbacks to law enforcement officials; annual declarations by employees of gifts or gratuities received from subcontractors; annual employee declarations that they have violated no company ethics rules; personnel practices that document unethical or illegal behavior and make such information available to prospective employers)….

How many of those controls do you have in place?  Do you have a Government contract that includes the Anti-Kickback Procedures clause?  (Of course you do, but go look and confirm for yourself.)  See that clause?  If you don’t have the required procedures and controls, you are in breach of your contract.  You have termination and litigation exposure, and you didn’t even know it.  Tsk, tsk.  You should have hired Apogee Consulting, Inc. a long time ago.

What happens to a company when its employees are accused of accepting kickbacks and there are some Government contracts involved?  Glad you asked, because we have an example of that situation right here.

Today’s example is (once again) KBR, prime contractor under the multi-billion dollar LOGCAP III contract.  KBR has been accused of employing persons in its transportation department who accepted kickbacks from two freight forwarders (presumably in return for the award of subcontracts).  The DOJ press release states—

The United States is pursuing allegations that the two freight forwarders, Eagle Global Logistics (which has since merged with TNT Logistics and become CEVA) and Panalpina provided unlawful kickbacks in the form of meals, drinks, tickets to sports events and golf outings to KBR employees. The government will seek damages and penalties under the False Claims Act and common law, as well as penalties under the Anti-Kickback Act.  (Italics added.)

The suit against KBR was filed by two “whistle-blowers” (called “relators”) under the False Claims Act.  The U.S. Government has investigated the allegations, and has decided to “intervene” in the lawsuit with respect to some (but not all) of them.  When the U.S. Government intervenes, it essentially takes over the lawsuit and, if the government is successful in securing a conviction or settlement, the relators will receive a percentage of the recovery.  The case is United States of America ex rel. Vavra, et al. v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 1:04-CV-00042 (E.D. Tex.).

In the world of Government contracting, acceptance of kickbacks from subcontractors and other vendors is a serious matter that can lead to litigation and large-dollar pay-outs.  Investing in the appropriate controls won’t prevent 100% of employee wrongdoing—but it will go a long way toward limiting your exposure if they occur.  Go ahead and do the cost-benefit analysis; you’ll see that implementing the controls—the ones that you already agreed to implement when you executed that Government contract—is a smart investment.



 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.