“Inherently Governmental”
On March 31, 2010, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP) issued a “notice of proposed policy
letter … to provide guidance to Executive Departments and agencies on
circumstances when work must be reserved for performance by Federal
government employees.” Comments on the proposed
policy letter were due June 1. The OFPP notice
referenced a March 4, 2009 Presidential Memorandum that requires the OMB “to clarify when governmental
outsourcing of services is, and is not, appropriate ….” The OFPP notice
also referenced § 321 of the FY 2009
National Defense Appropriation Act (Pub. Law
110-417), which required OMB to—
(i)
create a single definition for the term ``inherently governmental
function'' that addresses any deficiencies in the existing definitions
and reasonably applies to all agencies; (ii) establish criteria to be
used by agencies to identify ``critical'' functions and positions that
should only be performed by federal employees; and (iii) provide
guidance to improve internal agency management of functions that are
inherently governmental or critical.
According
to this story (written by Robert Brodsky)
at GovExec.com—
The notice also instructs
officials to avoid an overreliance on contractors for functions that are
‘closely associated with
inherently governmental’ or
that are ‘critical’ for the agency's mission. Agencies
with more than 100 employees would be required to develop new procedures
and training and to designate a senior official accountable for
implementing the changes.
The
proposal spells out 20 examples of inherently governmental activities
including awarding and administering contracts, determining budget
priorities and hiring or firing federal employees.
OFPP also would create a test to determine if
other functions meet the definition of inherently governmental. Agencies
would be asked to evaluate whether the function would commit the
government to a course of action or if sovereign power is involved.
The document lists 19 examples of functions
closely associated with inherently governmental work that require
additional oversight but which are not statutorily prohibited from
outsourcing. They include evaluating another contractor's performance,
assisting in contract management and any situation that might permit
access to confidential business information.
If an agency wants to use a contractor for any of these
functions, it must first establish guidelines in the contract regarding
specified ranges of acceptable decisions; assign an adequate number of
qualified federal employees to administer the work and take steps to
mitigate conflicts of interest, the policy letter states.
The guidance also requires greater supervision
of ‘critical’ functions, which are defined as jobs in
which at least a portion of the work ‘must be reserved to federal employees in order to ensure the
agency has sufficient internal capability to effectively perform and
maintain control of its mission and operations.’
Finally, we should note that FAR 7.5 addresses this topic by providing
“policies and procedures to ensure that inherently governmental
functions are not performed by contractors.”
So now that we have some background, let’s look at some of the
comments OFPP received. As Mr. Brodsky noted in his recent article at GovExec.com, “more than 100 individuals and organizations …
offered public comments” on the proposed
rule changes. As the article reported, “little consensus” was evidenced
by the comments.
We’re not going to recap the
comments; they can be found at the link above. But here are a few choice ones to give you some of the flavor—
- OMB Watch, a “nonprofit research and advocacy
organization,” teamed with CREDO Action to turn in a petition with more than 29,000 signatures.
According to this article, “Commenters
urged the government not to allow security contractors to perform
functions like ‘guard
services, convoy security services, pass and identification services,
plant protection services, the operation of prison or detention
facilities, and any security operations that might reasonably require
the use of deadly force.’
They also asked OFPP to prevent contractors from performing ‘support of intelligence activities
(including covert operations), interrogation, military and police
training, and the repair and maintenance of weapon systems.’
- The Small Business Administration (SBA) wrote that it was concerned about the impact of the proposed
rule(s) on small businesses. The SBA stated, “The net result of this
policy should not be a reduction in the percentage of contracts awarded
to small businesses.”
- The Council of Defense and Space Industry
Associations (CODSIA) stated that it was generally supportive of the
rule. However, CODSIA stated, “We are particularly concerned that the underlying adversarial
tone of the proposed policy is one which calls for the government to be
vigilant in order to guard against contractor attempts to overtake
portions of the government‘s mission. We find this language to be
counter-productive and would suggest that this proposed policy contain
explicit language emphasizing the government/industry partnership,
particularly for functions that are not inherently governmental, and our
mutual interest in conducting the public‘s business in as cost
effective a manner as possible.”
This is kind of a big deal, because
many contractors generate a large portion of their sales from providing
services to the Federal government. For the past 15 years or so, policy
in this area has been based on the notion that “privatizing” government
operations will lead to operational efficiencies and commensurate cost
reductions. Some critics have charged that the trend toward
privatization went too far, such that the government lost critical
skills and knowhow. The Obama Administration has expressed its interest
in reversing that trend, and has introduced the concept of “insourcing.”
We don’t necessarily have a dog in
this hunt, but we do note two interesting studies that would seem to
bear on the situation. First, in this previous
article we discussed a recent GAO study that
compared use by the State Department of private contractors versus
government employees to provide security services. The GAO study
concluded that using government employees was more than 10 times more
expensive than using contractor personnel on
three of four contract scenarios it evaluated. (In the fourth scenario,
the savings was much less, but it was still there.) In the upcoming
era of tight Federal budgets, one ignores that kind of math at one’s own
peril.
Second, we also reported on a recent blog post by Dr. Loren Thompson of the Lexington
Institute, in which he expressed a “contrarian” viewpoint regarding
commonly held acquisition reform myths. We wrote—
Adding more acquisition, audit, and program
management professionals to DoD’s ranks won’t solve the myriad problems with the Pentagon’s
acquisition process, but it will compound the problem. We are all familiar with the lack of
Government resources in this area, and the current reliance on
contractors to augment short-staffed contracting offices. But Dr. Thompson notes that those new
heads will take additional funds—not just to cover the costs of salary
and benefits, but also to cover the costs of training, equipping,
housing and supporting them.
As Dr. Thompson notes, ‘When you add up all these costs, the long-term
burden of taking on 20,000 new acquisition professionals will be over
$80 billion -- which just happens to be the projected cost of buying a
replacement for the Trident ballistic-missile sub.’
In other words, “insourcing” might make for great press and keep certain interests happy,
but it also carries with it tremendous budgetary impact, as well as a
potential impact to many current Federal contractors.
DCAA Back in the News, But Is Not Alone

Our old friends at the Defense Contract Audit Agency are back
in the news again. In Hollywood they say there’s no such thing as “bad”
publicity, but we doubt Mr. Fitzgerald and his Executive Committee
would agree with that saying.
Before we relate DCAA’s latest woes, let us first look at its sister
Executive Branch oversight agency,
the Minerals Management Service (MMS). We
have posted before about the seemingly
disproportionate focus on contractor wrongdoing, and the seeming lack of
similar focus on government employee wrongdoing. Recently we have
learned that employees of the agency—which
regulates offshore drilling such as that of BP in the Gulf of
Mexico—accepted “lunches, football tickets, hunting trips and other
gifts” from the same companies it was supposed to be overseeing. That
type of independence violation makes all the hoopla about DCAA’s “lack
of independence under GAGAS” seem kind of de minimus, doesn’t it? But that’s not all.
A
so-far unreleased audit report
issued by the Department of Interior’s
Inspector General found evidence of a “cozy relationship” between the
Federal regulators and those they regulated,
according to statements made by Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar. But that not anything new. In
mid-May, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) reported that “In 2006 then-Interior Department Inspector General Earl
Devaney gave Congress
numerous explicit signs in testimony before the House's Energy and
Resources Subcommittee, when he described the culture at the Department
of the Interior as one that ‘sustains managerial irresponsibility and a
lack of accountability.’” Sound familiar? DCAA
received similar criticisms based on DOD IG and
GAO reports.
Moreover, as the article (link above) reminded readers: “In 2008, federal
inspectors rapped workers in MMS' Lakewood, Colo., office for having
sexual relationships with and accepting gifts from energy company
representatives. Federal investigators also
documented millions of uncollected oil and gas royalties because of
accounting problems at MMS.” On May 28, 2010, MMS Director Elizabeth Birnbaum resigned. Sound familiar? DCAA
Director April Stephenson “accepted reassignment” after more than a year
of constant criticism leveled at her agency.
But despite what you may hear about
DCAA, at least we don’t have IG—or mainstream media—reports braying about defense
auditors accepting gifts and going hunting with
the defense contractors that they audit. So they’ve got that going for
them….
On the other hand, DCAA doesn’t seem
to have completely silenced its critics, or persuaded Congress that it
has turned the corner with respect to audit quality. For example,
Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) has expressed concerns that the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—the oversight agency
charged with combating healthcare fraud—is overly reliant on DCAA for
performance of audits. This article at
GovExec.com reported that Senator Grassley was drafting a letter to CMS
acting Administrator Charlene Frizzera in which he stated his “deep concerns” with CMS’ reliance on
DCAA, and asserted that DCAA was a “substandard auditor.”
According to the article, Grassley will request that CMS “provide a
written justification to his office for its continued contracting with
DCAA and details of any independent verification of the agency's work.”
The article also notes that DCAA has received roughly $3 million in
inter-agency reimbursement payments from CMS over the past 3 Government
Fiscal Years.
But that’s not all. A May 28, 2010 blog post at POGO
reported on a memo jointly prepared and signed by DCAA Director Patrick
Fitzgerald and DCMA Director Charlie Williams. The memo, which can be
found at the POGO blog post (link above), largely reiterates testimony by Shay Assad (Defense Procurement & Acquisition Policy)
before the Commission on Wartime Contracting. It also reiterates
language from the DCMA/DCAA dispute resolution process that Mr. Assad published earlier this year. It seems pretty benign to us. But POGO
isn’t so sure. The blog author writes—
I think there are two ways to look at this memo. On the one
hand, this could be an effort from the new DCAA Director to try to
ensure that DCAA findings aren't ignored by the
Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA), as many at DCAA have claimed was the case in the past, and that
this is a step in the right direction to make sure that both agencies
work together to hold contractors accountable.
But on the other hand—and I think this is
probably the case—this memo demonstrates another instance where DCAA's
independent audit findings may be undermined. The memo states that
auditors and contracting officers should work
together to ‘resolve’ audit issues and emphasized that even when differences occur,
DCMA and DCAA should strive to work the issues within the respective
organizations. This memo gives the impression that audit findings are
something to be ‘resolved’ between the two organizations rather
than audit findings to be acted upon by the contracting officer. And to
the degree that this is the case, or that this memo confuses the
independent role of DCAA, the Director of DCAA should consider
withdrawing the memo.
The author demonstrates ignorance
of the relationship between DCAA and DCMA in the DOD oversight process.
Most readers understand that DCAA’s role is advisory only, and it is the DCMA contracting officers and administrative
contracting officers who have the authority to act officially on behalf
of the Defense Department. That relationship is
not a gap in contractor oversight or internal controls—it’s the way the
FAR requires it to be.
Moreover, when contrasted with the
previous audit guidance in place at DCAA—which goes just short of
expressly requiring auditors to report DCMA contracting officers to the
DOD Inspector General if the CO’s don’t accept audit findings as
submitted—it is clear that DCAA and DCMA are trying to patch-up their
strained relationship. It seems to us that POGO is trying to stir up a
tempest in teapot.
Regardless of the foregoing, DCAA
has yet to be let out of the doghouse. Neither GAO nor the DOD IG has
issued any reports that would suggest things have improved at the
Defense Contract Audit Agency. Until such reports are issued, Mr.
Fitzgerald should be considered to be on probation. But things could be
worse for him—he could be assigned to the Minerals Management Agency!
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ANC May Not Qualify for 8(a) Status
By operation of statute, Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) enjoy preferential treatment in government contracting. Such firms receive special rights under the Small Business
Administration’s (SBA) “8(a)” program. Under the 8(a) program, ANCs can
receive sole source awards, regardless of dollar value, with no upper
limit. In contrast, other 8(a) firms are prohibited from receiving sole
source awards valued at more than $3 million. (See 13 C.F.R. 124.506(b).)
Sole-source procurements to tribes and ANC owned 8(a) firms may not be
protested, because there is no injured party. Moreover, a DOD
contractor that subcontracts with an ANC is
entitled to receive a “bonus” equal to 5 percent of the value of the
subcontract award.
As one analysis notes—
The
Justice Department has determined that tribal and ANC-owned 8(a) firms are not subject to the U. S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the Adarand case. As set out in the
Justice Department’s proposed policy, issued in the May 23, 1996 Federal Register, any
limitations that may end up being imposed on the
SDB and 8(a) programs as a result of Adarand will not be applicable to tribal and
ANC-owned 8(a) firms. This is because the tribes and ANC are included in the 8(a) and the SDB programs as a result of their
unique government to-government relationship with
the United States, not because of race or national origin factors.
As can
be seen from the foregoing, in the competitive world of Federal
contracting, being an ANC is a huge competitive advantage—so much so,
that observers began to grow concerned that the ANCs had too much of an
advantage. For example, as this article
reported that “No-bid contracts awarded to ANCs ballooned from $508.4
million in 2000 to $5.2 billion in 2008....” It also noted that a 2006
GAO report “called the ANC loophole ‘an open checkbook’ for the
companies.” The article also discussed the “complex business
partnerships” that ANCs sometimes form with other “firms that have no
ties to the SBA program or Alaska” in order to
perform the contracts they win. Finally, the
article quotes Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) as saying, “Nobody begrudges giving small,
disadvantaged businesses a chance to win federal contracts. But the
Alaska Native Corporations have used their special preference to bust
the door down.”
Recently, the SBA Inspector General has questioned
the bona fides of one ANC, Alaska Native
Technologies LLC (ANT), suggesting that the company (a participant in the 8(a) program) “is not owned and
controlled by its disadvantaged owner, and that ANT non-disadvantaged
business owner has other business interests that conflict with his
managerial duties at ANT.” The SBA OIG report can be found here.
The OIG report discusses the formation of ANT, and
stated—
ANT was formed in January
2003 by Patrick Simpson, a non-disadvantaged individual, as a spin-off
division of his research and development company (Scientific Fishery
Systems, Inc.) for his defense contract business. ANT is 51-percent
owned by the Native Village of Eyak through its holding company, Alaska Native General
Services, LLC (ANGS) and 49-percent owned
by Skookum
Technologies, Inc.-another business for which Mr. Simpson is the
majority owner.
Our review identified irregularities
regarding the formation of ANT, indicating that Patrick Simpson, the
non-disadvantaged owner of Skookum, may be controlling ANT and operating it for the
benefit of his defense contract business. Mr. Simpson also entered into
multiple business arrangements that allowed him to capitalize on the
firm's 8(a) status and to profit through services performed for ANT by
other companies that he owned. Further, Mr. Simpson was involved in
managing the day-to-day activities of ANT and, through management
services performed by Skookum for ANT, had control over the payment of invoices that
were billed to ANT by other companies he owned. Consequently, DCAA
identified irregularities in fees invoiced and paid by Skookum.
As
usual, Robert Brodsky at GovExec.com was all over the issue, nicely summarizing some of the OIG’s findings. Some of those findings included—
- ANT
was formed with no tangible assets and with no cash on its books.
Instead, the firm was established with … goodwill that was transferred
to ANT by Skookum and ANGS. Annual audited financial statements for ANT
prepared from October 2003 to September 2008 do not reflect the …
goodwill used to establish ANT.
- Although ANGS
purchased … goodwill from Skookum that it then transferred to ANT, the purchase was made
without any exchange of funds. Instead, ANGS agreed to pay Skookum … from its share
of the future profits of ANT. Skookum provisionally forgave ANGS' debt on the same day that
the … debt was incurred. The two parties agreed that if ANT was dissolved with any amount of … debt
outstanding, ANGS would not owe Skookum anything further, regardless of the actual debt
balance.
- The financial statements of ANT do not recognize
the shared ownership arrangement between Skookum and ANGS. … Further, ANT's 2007 financial statements reported a
related party transaction between ANGS and ANT, which should not have
been classified in this manner if ANGS was an owner. According to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, distributions to owners reduce
their respective capital accounts, and therefore, are not treated as
related party transactions that are expensed against operations.

- Evidence suggests that the
disadvantaged owner, Alaska Native General Services, may no longer
exist. … a
search of the Alaska State Corporations' website showed that Alaska
Native General Services had not made biennial filings with the Alaska
Department of Commerce since November 9, 2005. Finally, the Federal
Employer Identification Number (FEIN) 02-0653329 provided to SBA for tax
verification of Alaska Native Government Services … could not be
located in the FEIN database, which contains more than 12 million
numbers. The data base contained no records for either Alaska Native
Government Services or Alaska Native General Services.
- Although SBA approved a business partner of Mr. Simpson
as the General Manager of ANT, it appears that Mr. Simpson was heavily
involved in managing the day-to-day activities of ANT. ANT stated that
Mr. Simpson was its Director due to company oversight responsibilities
passed onto Mr. Simpson by the Village of Eyak. Further, DCAA's review of 1,500 of Mr. Simpson's
emails showed that he was involved with employee clearances, timecards,
and other operational issues, which are consistent with performing as a
Director. Mr. Simpson obligated ANT to lease payments by signing leases
for office space as either its "President," "Director," or "member."
Mr. Simpson signed ANT's tax returns as "President" or "Director."
Although non-disadvantaged individuals are allowed to provide management
services to a tribally-owned concern with SBA's approval, such an
approval was not sought from or granted by SBA for Mr. Simpson.
- In addition to his Director role at ANT, Mr.
Simpson is also the President of Scientific Fishery, and owner of RV
Montague, Skookum, PKS Consulting, Inc., P&P Properties, LLC, and
6100 A Street, LLC. Although members, directors, and officers of a
tribally-owned firm are precluded from having other business interests
that conflict with the management of the
concern, Mr. Simpson entered into business arrangements
with ANT on behalf of other companies that he owned.
- According
to ANT's audited financial statements, from October 2003 through
September 2008, Mr. Simpson:
o rented equipment to ANT through a company he
owned, called P&P Properties, LLC;
o rented office space to ANT through another one of
his companies, 6100 A Street;
o provided subcontracting services to ANT through his
company, Scientific Fishery;
o provided consulting services to ANT through his company,
PKS consulting;
o provided
professional services to ANT through his company, Skookum, including the
processing of payroll, accounts payable,
and accounts receivable;
o According to DCAA, Mr. Simpson also leased the exclusive
use of his boat (the Research Vessel Montague) to ANT.
- [A]s majority owner of Skookum, Mr. Simpson was
in a position to process invoices sent to ANT by other companies he
owned that were performing work for ANT.
- In 2008, DCAA questioned the validity of$124,000 of
fees paid to PKS Consulting for consulting services supposedly provided
to ANT on one contract. Mr. Simpson's FY 2006 average of 140 hours of
consulting services per month on this cost-type contract may have been
excessive as Mr. Simpson had little time to perform these services,
given his role as ANT Director, President of Scientific Fishery, and as
owner of RV Montague and Skookum. DCAA also reported a lack of documentation supporting
these fees. Further, Mr. Simpson appeared to be managing the day-to-day
activities of ANT that were unrelated to providing ANT with systems
engineering expertise.
Based on the
foregoing, the SBA OIG concluded that “it appears that ANT’s primary
purpose is to benefit Mr. Simpson …”
What
might be the outcome if the SBA confirms that ANT did not qualify as a ANC participant in the
8(a) program? Well, we’re not sure. But we remember a contractor who was
fined for falsely reporting socioeconomic awards, and another contractor
who was fined for falsely certifying that it had implemented controls to
detect and prevent violations of its business conduct policy.
Consequently, we expect Mr. Simpson to face significant monetary
penalties if he is convicted of making false statements with respect to
ANC’s qualifications to participate in the 8(a) program.
Do You Really Need an Effective Compliance Program?
Recently we
posted an article about a defense
contractor who “self-disclosed” cost accounting problems that led to
overbilling the Department of Defense. We noted that “Because the company had voluntarily reported its misconduct
and cooperated with the DOJ in the investigation, its settlement was
limited to damages actually incurred by the government. Had the circumstances been different,
up to treble damages might have been sought.”
During 2007 and 2008, the FAR was revised to enhance
requirements related to contractor ethics and business conduct
policies. Among the various changes was the addition of a new subpart
at § 3.10 (Contractor Code of Ethics and Business Conduct) and
significant revisions to the contract clause 52.203-13 (“Contractor Code
of Ethics and Business Conduct”). Our recent article in the May 2010
edition of West’s Government Contract Costs, Accounting & Pricing
Report (entitled “Government Audits of
Contractor Ethics and Business Conduct Compliance Programs”) discussed those changes and issues related to DCAA audits of
the contractor policies. Importantly, the FAR revisions eliminated the
former “voluntary disclosure program” and implemented a new “mandatory
disclosure program” (which DOD simply calls “contractor disclosure”). Contractors who fail to timely
disclose wrongdoing face suspension or debarment from federal
contracting.
To be clear: disclosure of certain
acts of wrongdoing related to a contractor’s government contract(s) is no longer a matter within
management’s discretion; it is now a contractual
requirement. Although Bell Helicopter
Textron apparently benefited from the voluntary disclosure program, it
is doubtful that another contractor in a similar situation would reap
similar benefits today.
Moreover, it is questionable
whether voluntary disclosure was always the wisest course of action. It
is poorly remembered today, but Arthur Andersen originally
self-disclosed its document shredding to the Department of Justice
during the Enron litigation. That gesture of goodwill was insufficient
to overcome the audit firm’s prior acts of wrongdoing, and the firm was
eventually convicted of a crime related to obstruction of justice, and
ceased to exist as a viable entity. That the conviction was eventually
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court was a hollow victory to the roughly
26,000 U.S. employees who lost their jobs as a result of the
original conviction. One is left to wonder what Andersen
gained—if anything—from its self-disclosure to the DOJ.
From that question, one might inquire whether having a robust
compliance program is truly a value-added proposition. Sure, a contractor must comply with
the letter of the FAR requirements, but is there any value to going
beyond the minimum necessary program requirements, and creating
a truly robust compliance program that is designed to detect employee
wrongdoing—one that deters wrongdoing by its very existence? Do the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide contractors with a
tangible reward for having effective compliance programs? (Readers may
recall that we discussed recent changes to the USSG in this article.)
That question was on the minds of
attendees at the 2010 Compliance Week Conference in Washington, D.C., as
they discussed the role and value of compliance programs. Acting
Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler spoke to the attendees on May 25, 2010. Among other topics, ADAG Grindler said—
Now, how can you best advise
your clients in light of the Department’s enforcement priorities and
given the climate we are in where there is so much distrust of corporate
America.
First, you can make sure that
your clients have robust, effective compliance programs and internal
controls. A company’s compliance program continues to be one of the most
important factors that we consider under the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations. … Compliance programs must not exist only on paper.
In this context, I want to point out that the
United States Sentencing Commission recently amended the Sentencing
Guidelines on the issue of compliance programs. Specifically, the
Commission clarified the importance of assessing and modifying
compliance programs after you discover criminal conduct at your company.
The current Guidelines provide that, following the discovery of
criminal conduct, a company should, among other things, make ‘any necessary modifications to the
organization’s compliance and ethics program.’
In addition, the latest Guideline amendments
clarify the circumstances under which an effective compliance and ethics
program can entitle an organization to a 3-level reduction in its
culpability score. Specifically, the amendment allows an organization to
receive the decrease if the organization meets four criteria: (1) the
individual or individuals with operational responsibility
for the compliance and ethics program have direct reporting obligations
to the organization’s governing authority or appropriate subgroup
thereof; (2) the compliance and ethics program detected the offense
before discovery outside the organization or before such discovery was
reasonably likely; (3) the organization promptly reported the offense to
the appropriate governmental authorities; and (4) no individual with
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program
participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense.
These amendments reinforce the point that having a robust compliance
program is critical not only to preventing misconduct in the first
place, but also how your organization will be treated in the event
criminal conduct does take place.
According
to the article (link above), “some in the compliance industry have
expressed doubts about the importance of a pre-existing compliance
program, asserting that prosecutors will simply wrangle as many
concessions out of a company facing a criminal action as they can,
regardless of the state of its compliance efforts… Some of the
uncertainty seems to stem from the lack of concrete examples in which
compliance systems netted a better outcome for a defendant. …”
ADAG Grindler spoke directly to the skeptics when he said—
‘I want to emphasize… that having an effective
compliance program will be taken under consideration when you have to
talk to the government about a criminal violation. I’ve reviewed … a
number of negotiated resolutions where effective and solid compliance
programs did make a difference. Now I have heard that we don’t talk
about the impact of compliance programs on our decision to absolve a
matter, and at least when I was in the Fraud Section, I emphasized the
importance of doing that. What we can’t do is get into all the details
about it because … each case is different.’
Our
position at Apogee Consulting, Inc. is that robust, effective compliance programs make good
business sense. The cost of a compliance failure—in terms of fines and
penalties, litigation expense, opportunity cost of internal resources,
loss of market capitalization, and even brand devaluation—clearly
indicates a business case where the potential damages far outweigh the
cost of a compliance detection and prevention program. Regardless of whether you believe that the Department of
Justice really will take a company’s compliance program
into account when considering culpability, having that compliance program in place is simply good
business.
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