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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA Back in the News, But Is Not Alone

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Our old friends at the Defense Contract Audit Agency are back in the news again.  In Hollywood they say there’s no such thing as “bad” publicity, but we doubt Mr. Fitzgerald and his Executive Committee would agree with that saying.

Before we relate DCAA’s latest woes, let us first look at its sister Executive Branch oversight agency, the Minerals Management Service (MMS).  We have posted before about the seemingly disproportionate focus on contractor wrongdoing, and the seeming lack of similar focus on government employee wrongdoing.  Recently we have learned that employees of the agency—which regulates offshore drilling such as that of BP in the Gulf of Mexico—accepted “lunches, football tickets, hunting trips and other gifts” from the same companies it was supposed to be overseeing.  That type of independence violation makes all the hoopla about DCAA’s “lack of independence under GAGAS” seem kind of de minimus, doesn’t it?  But that’s not all.

A so-far unreleased audit report issued by the Department of Interior’s Inspector General found evidence of a “cozy relationship” between the Federal regulators and those they regulated, according to statements made by Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar.  But that not anything new. In mid-May, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) reported that “In 2006 then-Interior Department Inspector General Earl Devaney gave Congress numerous explicit signs in testimony before the House's Energy and Resources Subcommittee, when he described the culture at the Department of the Interior as one that ‘sustains managerial irresponsibility and a lack of accountability.’”  Sound familiar?  DCAA received similar criticisms based on DOD IG and GAO reports.

Moreover, as the article (link above) reminded readers: “In 2008, federal inspectors rapped workers in MMS' Lakewood, Colo., office for having sexual relationships with and accepting gifts from energy company representatives. Federal investigators also documented millions of uncollected oil and gas royalties because of accounting problems at MMS.” On May 28, 2010, MMS Director Elizabeth Birnbaum resigned.  Sound familiar?  DCAA Director April Stephenson “accepted reassignment” after more than a year of constant criticism leveled at her agency.

But despite what you may hear about DCAA, at least we don’t have IG—or mainstream media—reports braying about defense auditors accepting gifts and going hunting with the defense contractors that they audit.  So they’ve got that going for them….

On the other hand, DCAA doesn’t seem to have completely silenced its critics, or persuaded Congress that it has turned the corner with respect to audit quality.  For example, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) has expressed concerns that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—the oversight agency charged with combating healthcare fraud—is overly reliant on DCAA for performance of audits.  This article at GovExec.com reported that Senator Grassley was drafting a letter to CMS acting Administrator Charlene Frizzera in which he stated his “deep concerns” with CMS’ reliance on DCAA, and asserted that DCAA was a “substandard auditor.”  According to the article, Grassley will request that CMS “provide a written justification to his office for its continued contracting with DCAA and details of any independent verification of the agency's work.”  The article also notes that DCAA has received roughly $3 million in inter-agency reimbursement payments from CMS over the past 3 Government Fiscal Years.

But that’s not all.  A May 28, 2010 blog post at POGO reported on a memo jointly prepared and signed by DCAA Director Patrick Fitzgerald and DCMA Director Charlie Williams.  The memo, which can be found at the POGO blog post (link above), largely reiterates testimony by Shay Assad (Defense Procurement & Acquisition Policy) before the Commission on Wartime Contracting.  It also reiterates language from the DCMA/DCAA dispute resolution process that Mr. Assad published earlier this year.  It seems pretty benign to us.  But POGO isn’t so sure.  The blog author writes—

I think there are two ways to look at this memo. On the one hand, this could be an effort from the new DCAA Director to try to ensure that DCAA findings aren't ignored by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), as many at DCAA have claimed was the case in the past, and that this is a step in the right direction to make sure that both agencies work together to hold contractors accountable.

But on the other hand—and I think this is probably the case—this memo demonstrates another instance where DCAA's independent audit findings may be undermined. The memo states that auditors and contracting officers should work together to ‘resolve’ audit issues and emphasized that even when differences occur, DCMA and DCAA should strive to work the issues within the respective organizations. This memo gives the impression that audit findings are something to be ‘resolved’ between the two organizations rather than audit findings to be acted upon by the contracting officer. And to the degree that this is the case, or that this memo confuses the independent role of DCAA, the Director of DCAA should consider withdrawing the memo.

The author demonstrates ignorance of the relationship between DCAA and DCMA in the DOD oversight process.  Most readers understand that DCAA’s role is advisory only, and it is the DCMA contracting officers and administrative contracting officers who have the authority to act officially on behalf of the Defense Department.  That relationship is not a gap in contractor oversight or internal controls—it’s the way the FAR requires it to be.

Moreover, when contrasted with the previous audit guidance in place at DCAA—which goes just short of expressly requiring auditors to report DCMA contracting officers to the DOD Inspector General if the CO’s don’t accept audit findings as submitted—it is clear that DCAA and DCMA are trying to patch-up their strained relationship.  It seems to us that POGO is trying to stir up a tempest in teapot.

Regardless of the foregoing, DCAA has yet to be let out of the doghouse.  Neither GAO nor the DOD IG has issued any reports that would suggest things have improved at the Defense Contract Audit Agency.  Until such reports are issued, Mr. Fitzgerald should be considered to be on probation.  But things could be worse for him—he could be assigned to the Minerals Management Agency!


 

Do You Really Need an Effective Compliance Program?

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Recently we posted an article about a defense contractor who “self-disclosed” cost accounting problems that led to overbilling the Department of Defense.  We noted that “Because the company had voluntarily reported its misconduct and cooperated with the DOJ in the investigation, its settlement was limited to damages actually incurred by the government. Had the circumstances been different, up to treble damages might have been sought.”

During 2007 and 2008, the FAR was revised to enhance requirements related to contractor ethics and business conduct policies.  Among the various changes was the addition of a new subpart at § 3.10 (Contractor Code of Ethics and Business Conduct) and significant revisions to the contract clause 52.203-13 (“Contractor Code of Ethics and Business Conduct”).  Our recent article in the May 2010 edition of West’s Government Contract Costs, Accounting & Pricing Report (entitled “Government Audits of Contractor Ethics and Business Conduct Compliance Programs”) discussed those changes and issues related to DCAA audits of the contractor policies.  Importantly, the FAR revisions eliminated the former “voluntary disclosure program” and implemented a new “mandatory disclosure program” (which DOD simply calls “contractor disclosure”).  Contractors who fail to timely disclose wrongdoing face suspension or debarment from federal contracting.

To be clear:  disclosure of certain acts of wrongdoing related to a contractor’s government contract(s) is no longer a matter within management’s discretion; it is now a contractual requirement.  Although Bell Helicopter Textron apparently benefited from the voluntary disclosure program, it is doubtful that another contractor in a similar situation would reap similar benefits today.

Moreover, it is questionable whether voluntary disclosure was always the wisest course of action.  It is poorly remembered today, but Arthur Andersen originally self-disclosed its document shredding to the Department of Justice during the Enron litigation.  That gesture of goodwill was insufficient to overcome the audit firm’s prior acts of wrongdoing, and the firm was eventually convicted of a crime related to obstruction of justice, and ceased to exist as a viable entity.  That the conviction was eventually overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court was a hollow victory to the roughly 26,000 U.S. employees who lost their jobs as a result of the original conviction.  One is left to wonder what Andersen gained—if anything—from its self-disclosure to the DOJ.

From that question, one might inquire whether having a robust compliance program is truly a value-added proposition.  Sure, a contractor must comply with the letter of the FAR requirements, but is there any value to going beyond the minimum necessary program requirements, and creating a truly robust compliance program that is designed to detect employee wrongdoing—one that deters wrongdoing by its very existence?  Do the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide contractors with a tangible reward for having effective compliance programs?  (Readers may recall that we discussed recent changes to the USSG in this article.)

That question was on the minds of attendees at the 2010 Compliance Week Conference in Washington, D.C., as they discussed the role and value of compliance programs.  Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler spoke to the attendees on May 25, 2010.  Among other topics, ADAG Grindler said—

Now, how can you best advise your clients in light of the Department’s enforcement priorities and given the climate we are in where there is so much distrust of corporate America.

First, you can make sure that your clients have robust, effective compliance programs and internal controls. A company’s compliance program continues to be one of the most important factors that we consider under the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. … Compliance programs must not exist only on paper.

In this context, I want to point out that the United States Sentencing Commission recently amended the Sentencing Guidelines on the issue of compliance programs. Specifically, the Commission clarified the importance of assessing and modifying compliance programs after you discover criminal conduct at your company. The current Guidelines provide that, following the discovery of criminal conduct, a company should, among other things, make ‘any necessary modifications to the organization’s compliance and ethics program.’

In addition, the latest Guideline amendments clarify the circumstances under which an effective compliance and ethics program can entitle an organization to a 3-level reduction in its culpability score. Specifically, the amendment allows an organization to receive the decrease if the organization meets four criteria: (1) the individual or individuals with operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program have direct reporting obligations to the organization’s governing authority or appropriate subgroup thereof; (2) the compliance and ethics program detected the offense before discovery outside the organization or before such discovery was reasonably likely; (3) the organization promptly reported the offense to the appropriate governmental authorities; and (4) no individual with operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense. These amendments reinforce the point that having a robust compliance program is critical not only to preventing misconduct in the first place, but also how your organization will be treated in the event criminal conduct does take place.

According to the article (link above), “some in the compliance industry have expressed doubts about the importance of a pre-existing compliance program, asserting that prosecutors will simply wrangle as many concessions out of a company facing a criminal action as they can, regardless of the state of its compliance efforts… Some of the uncertainty seems to stem from the lack of concrete examples in which compliance systems netted a better outcome for a defendant. …”

ADAG Grindler spoke directly to the skeptics when he said—

‘I want to emphasize… that having an effective compliance program will be taken under consideration when you have to talk to the government about a criminal violation.  I’ve reviewed … a number of negotiated resolutions where effective and solid compliance programs did make a difference.  Now I have heard that we don’t talk about the impact of compliance programs on our decision to absolve a matter, and at least when I was in the Fraud Section, I emphasized the importance of doing that. What we can’t do is get into all the details about it because … each case is different.’

Our position at Apogee Consulting, Inc. is that robust, effective compliance programs make good business sense.  The cost of a compliance failure—in terms of fines and penalties, litigation expense, opportunity cost of internal resources, loss of market capitalization, and even brand devaluation—clearly indicates a business case where the potential damages far outweigh the cost of a compliance detection and prevention program.  Regardless of whether you believe that the Department of Justice really will take a company’s compliance program into account when considering culpability, having that compliance program in place is simply good business.


 

GSA Schedule Foul-Up Leads to $87.5 Million False Claims Act Settlement

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Oops! 

We’re quite sure that Massachusetts-based EMC Corporation uttered that word (or worse) when the Department of Justice intervened in a whistleblower “qui tam” suit alleging, among other things, violations of the False Claims Act.  Here’s the DOJ announcement, reporting that EMC agreed to pay $87.5 million to settle various allegations stemming from its GSA Schedule.

EMC Corporation, a Fortune 500 company traded on the NYSE, is a multi-billion dollar global provider of IT services.  The company describes itself thusly:

EMC’s Information Infrastructure business provides a foundation for customers to manage and secure their vast and ever-increasing quantities of information, automate their data center operations, reduce power and cooling costs, and leverage critical information for business agility and competitive advantage. EMC’s Information Infrastructure business comprises three segments – Information Storage, Content Management and Archiving and RSA Information Security.

EMC’s VMware Virtual Infrastructure business, which is represented by EMC’s majority equity stake in VMware, Inc. (“VMware”), is the leading provider of virtual infrastructure software solutions from the desktop to the data center and to the cloud. VMware’s virtual infrastructure software solutions run on industry-standard desktop computers and servers and support a wide range of operating system and application environments, as well as networking and storage infrastructures.

We found an EMC brochure discussing its Federal government services.

Members of this website have access to our knowledge resources.  Among those resources one might find a couple of discussion papers covering risk areas associated with GSA Schedules.  Commonly thought to be “low risk” contracts with the Federal government, the reality is that GSA Schedule contracts are fraught with risk for unwary contractors.  Contractors whose only government contract is their GSA Schedule contract, or contractors who consider themselves to be “commercial companies” are at the most risk—because such companies typically fail to invest in control systems that would help to reduce the risk of a contract compliance failure. 

One of our discussion papers has this to say:

  • Risk Area: Pre-award disclosure of commercial sales practices and discounts
    • Contractor provides data on commercial sales practices and discounting policies.
    • Commercial Sales Practices (CSP) Format needs to be current, accurate and complete at submission.  If there is any doubt about category of customers, discounts or concessions, err on the side of disclosure.
  • Risk Area: Identification of Price Reduction Clause “Basis of Award” customers and pricing relationship
    • Contractor negotiates “Basis of Award” (BOA) category of customers and BOA/GSA pricing relationship.
    • Designate a category of customers that is realistic and manageable, not too broad such as all commercial customers or all national accounts.  Make sure the category of customers price is accurate.
    • Ensure that underlying terms and conditions of the most favored customer pricing are clearly disclosed and understood.
    • Be clear on pricing relationship between MAS contract price and BOA category of customers price (i.e., proportional vs. absolute relationship).

The DOJ had this to say about its allegations regarding EMC’s Schedule contract:

… by misrepresenting its commercial pricing practices, EMC fraudulently induced the General Services Administration (GSA) to enter into a contract with prices that were higher than they would have been had the information technology company not made false misrepresentations. Specifically, the United States alleged that the … company represented during contract negotiations that, for each government order under the contract, EMC would conduct a price comparison to ensure that the government received the lowest price provided to any of the company’s commercial customers making a comparable purchase. According to the government’s complaint, EMC knew that it was not capable of conducting such a comparison, and so EMC’s representations during the negotiations – as well as its subsequent representations to GSA that it was conducting the comparisons – were false or fraudulent.

Oops—EMC should have read our discussion paper!  But that’s not all the DOJ has to say about this particular contractor—

The United States also alleged that EMC engaged in an illegal kickback scheme designed to influence the government to purchase the company’s products. EMC maintained agreements whereby it paid consulting companies fees each time the companies recommended that a government agency purchase an EMC product. These kickback allegations are part of a larger investigation of government technology vendors that has resulted in settlements to date with three other companies, with several other investigations and actions still pending. The kickback investigation was initiated by a lawsuit filed under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act, which allow private citizens to sue for fraud on behalf of the United States and share in any recovery.

EMC’s latest quarterly 10Q report (May 7, 2010) had this to say in a footnote:

United States ex rel. Rille and Roberts v. EMC Corporation. Effective as of May 4, 2010, EMC entered into a settlement agreement (the “Agreement”) with the United States of America, acting through the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice (the “DoJ”). The Agreement relates to a previously disclosed “qui tam” action that followed an investigation conducted by the DoJ regarding (i) EMC’s fee arrangements with systems integrators and other partners in federal government transactions, and (ii) EMC’s compliance with the terms and conditions of certain agreements pursuant to which we sold products and services to the federal government, primarily a schedule agreement we entered into with the General Services Administration in November 1999. Pursuant to the Agreement, EMC will pay the United States $87.5 million. In consideration of this payment, the United States has agreed to release EMC with respect to the matters investigated and the claims alleged by the DoJ in the civil action. As set forth in the Agreement, EMC expressly denies any liability or wrongdoing in connection with such matters and claims, and the settlement represents a compromise to avoid the costs, distraction, and uncertainty of continued litigation. As previously disclosed, EMC recorded an $87.5 million accrual for this contingency as of December 31, 2009.

Well there you go.  Readers might recall our recent article on kick-backs.  We told you they are a “no-no”—especially in the government contracting environment.

Saying “we told you so” somehow seems to lack the air of professionalism for which we generally try to achieve.  But we will say this:

Sorry, EMC Corporation, but you should have checked this site before you decided to get into the GSA Schedule contracting business.



 

Bell Textron Pays for Mischarging Interorganizational Transfers

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Properly accounting for cost transfers between affiliated entities under common control—commonly known as “interorganizational transfers” or “intracompany transfers”—is a difficult task.  For revenue recognition purposes, profit on such transfers needs to be eliminated during consolidation.  For government contract cost accounting purposes, profit needs to be eliminated as well.

As one textbook on the subject states—

If it is determined that common control exists, transfers of goods and services must be made at cost.  This rule was established to avoid the pyramiding of profits that would be possible if profits were allowed on intracompany transfers.  … Interorganizational transfers between such firms at other than cost, however, can be made under special circumstances.  (Pricing and Cost Accounting: A Handbook for Government Contractors, by Darrell Oyer)

Looking at the FAR, the Cost Principle on Material Costs (31.205-26) has this to say—

(e) Allowance for all materials, supplies and services that are sold or transferred between any divisions, subdivisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of the contractor under a common control shall be on the basis of cost incurred in accordance with this subpart. However, allowance may be at price when—

(1) It is the established practice of the transferring organization to price interorganizational transfers at other than cost for commercial work of the contractor or any division, subsidiary or affiliate of the contractor under a common control; and

(2) The item being transferred qualifies for an exception under 15.403-1(b) and the contracting officer has not determined the price to be unreasonable.

(f) When a commercial item under paragraph (e) of this subsection is transferred at a price based on a catalog or market price, the contractor—

(1) Should adjust the price to reflect the quantities being acquired; and

(2) May adjust the price to reflect the actual cost of any modifications necessary because of contract requirements.

So now that we all understand the rules, we have a contextual foundation to understand a May 27, 2010 announcement by the Department of Justice.  The DOJ reported that Bell Helicopter Textron agreed to pay the United States a total of $16,570,018 “to resolve civil claims arising from the company’s cost charging practices.” According to the DOJ press release, the company’s “billing of the costs of certain subcontracts, work transfers, and other transactions with its subsidiaries, divisions, and affiliated companies had resulted in overcharges to the government.”

Importantly, the company voluntarily reported its accounting problems.  DOJ reported that Bell Helicopter Textron first reported its overbillings in 2004.  DOJ stated—

The company submitted a report in 2006 describing its conduct and the financial impact on the government and paid the government $12,851,248.  While the government was investigating and analyzing the conduct the company disclosed, Bell submitted additional reports detailing similar intra-company transactions with Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited that resulted in overcharges.

Because the company had voluntarily reported its misconduct and cooperated with the DOJ in the investigation, its settlement was limited to damages actually incurred by the government.  Had the circumstances been different, up to treble damages might have been sought.

So the lesson is clear.  Do things right if you can.  But if you can’t—be forthright with the government.


 

Cost-Reimbursement Contracting Class

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Nick Sanders, Principal Consultant, has been invited to instruct a 3-day class in Cost-Reimbursement Contracting.  The class, sponsored by Federal Publication Seminars, will be held in Las Vegas June 15-17, 2010.  The course material is based on the famous Nash & Cibinic book, Cost-Reimbursement Contracting.
 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.