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Two More Contractors Settle False Claims Suits

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We’ve reported on quite a number of military servicemen and civilian employees of the DOD who’ve been accused, indicted, and/or convicted of corruption and bribery charges.  But we also understand that defense contractors are just as frequently accused of similar crimes:  either attempting corrupt actions or violating one of the myriad requirements of the typical government contract.  Today’s article concerns two different defense contractors—two of the largest in the industry—who separately settled suits under the False Claims Act.

First, on June 10, 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Pratt & Whitney-Rocketdyne, Inc. (PWR) “has agreed to pay the government almost $3 million to resolve allegations … rising out of a dispute over fees charged on a contract with NASA after Pratt & Whitney merged with Rocketdyne in 2005.”  As the DOJ announcement reports—

Prior to the merger, Rocketdyne had subcontracted with Pratt & Whitney for work on a Space Shuttle flight support services contract Rocketdyne had with NASA. Following the August 2005 merger, Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne billed NASA fees under the pre-merger subcontract. In December 2006, the Defense Contract Audit Agency questioned whether those subcontract fee billings allowed the merged company to reap excess profits.

This case raises a very interesting question:  whether a subcontract in place prior to an acquisition should continue to be treated in the same manner after the acquisition, or whether it should then be treated as an inter-organizational transfer.  If the latter, then profit should be stripped-out pursuant to the requirements of the Cost Principles found at 31.205-26(e).  Clearly, we know how DCAA and DOJ felt about the proper treatment.  And just as clearly, it would be cheaper for PWR to settle the matter rather than to litigate the question.

The second matter involved Northrop Grumman.  Before we delve into Northrop’s issue, let’s also note that on June 3, 2010, the DOJ announced that the company had agreed to pay $700,000 to resolve allegations that it billed the government “for lodging expenses for Northrop employees who actually stayed in accommodations provided by the government” related to two “defense procurement contracts.”  But that’s not really a news-worthy item, in our view.  What’s seems more interesting (at least to us) are the various news stories reporting that the company agreed to pay $12.5 million in order to settle false claims allegations related to commercial items used in military navigation systems.  Reportedly, Northrop Grumman failed to properly test those items “to ensure that they would function at the extreme temperatures required for military and space uses.”  According to this article at Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “the U.S. alleged that the failures to test parts continued from November 1998 until February 2007.”  Moreover, this LA Times article notes that the settlement relates to a whistleblower suit filed in May 2006 by Allen Davis, a former quality assurance manager for Northrop.  The article reports Mr. Davis will receive roughly $2.4 million of the settlement.

Under the False Claims Act, companies are liable for up to $11,000 per false claim, plus up to treble damages.  In Northrop’s case, the allegedly fraudulent testing went on for nearly six-and-a-half years, and involved multiple military departments—and presumably multiple contracts, each with its own set of invoices.  Looks to us like Northrop (as with PWR), settled very smartly for perhaps pennies on the dollar—which is usually a good indication that the Government’s case was perceived to be weak or too complex to be confidently brought before a jury.  Where the Government believes it has a strong or easily litigable case, settlements are typically much higher.

We have reported on the recent emphasis on contractor past performance and the revitalization of the notion that a “responsible” contractor is one with a good record of integrity and ethics.  Although these two companies appear to have made smart business decisions to avoid costly litigation, it is not clear how these settlements ultimately will affect their ability to win new work from their Defense customers.



 

DOD Blames Contractors for Lack of Contract Definitization, Establishes New Process Groundrules

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To meet urgent needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) can authorize contractors to begin work and incur costs before reaching a final agreement on contract terms and conditions, including price. Such agreements are called undefinitized contract actions (UCAs).  UCAs are binding commitments used when the government needs the contractor to start work immediately and there is insufficient time to negotiate all of the terms and conditions for a contract. UCAs can be entered into via different contract vehicles, such as a letter contract (a stand-alone contract), a task or delivery order issued against a pre-established umbrella contract, or a modification to an already established contract.

As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported to Congress—

The FAR and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) govern how and when UCAs can be used. The regulations also establish requirements as to how quickly UCAs must be definitized. Although each regulation contains two criteria, they are not the same. The FAR states that a letter contract needs to be definitized within 180 days after the award date or before 40 percent of the work is complete, whichever occurs first. While the DFARS includes the 180-day time frame, it addresses all UCAs (including undefinitized task and delivery orders and contract modifications) and adds a requirement to definitize before more than 50 percent of funds are obligated. … The definitization time frame can also be extended an additional 180 days when a qualifying proposal is received from the contractor. The contractor does not receive profit or fee during the undefinitized period, but can recoup it once the contract is definitized.

In June 2007, GAO reported on DOD’s use of UCAs.  Fundamentally, GAO found that the Government’s timeliness in “definitizing” the UCAs—i.e., negotiating a final contract price played a key part in controlling costs (and profits) paid to contractors.  In particular, GAO found that—

We reported that DOD contracting officials were more likely to adhere to the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s advice regarding the disposition of questioned and unsupported costs when negotiations were timely and occurred before contractors had incurred substantial costs under UCAs. On the other hand, contracting officials were less likely to remove questioned costs from a contract proposal when the contractor had already incurred these costs during the undefinitized period.

The majority of UCAs reviewed by GAO were not definitized within the required timeframes.  GAO further reported that the number one reason for delays was an “untimely receipt of a qualifying proposal” from the contractor.  Among the other reasons cited were “protracted negotiations” between DOD and its contractors and “delays in obtaining certified cost and pricing data” (sic).

In January, 2010, GAO issued a follow-up report, in which it noted improvement by DOD in this area.  However, GAO also reported that “local commands are generally not meeting DOD’s management standards” with regard to UCA definitization and documentation of contractor negotiations.  GAO found that—

According to DOD regulations, contracting officers are required to consider any reduced cost risk to the contractor for costs incurred before negotiation of the final price. Further, contracting officers must document this risk assessment in the contract files. Sixty-six of the 83 contract actions we reviewed were definitized and should have documented a risk assessment in their contract file and used the weighted guideline worksheet or an alternative method to determine allowable profit or fee for negotiation purposes.  About half of the cases we reviewed—34 of 66—did not use the weighted guidelines or document any consideration of cost risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period when establishing profit or fee negotiation objectives. Instead, we found these contracting officers based their profit or fee negotiation objectives on previously negotiated rates under contracts for similar work or other factors. None of these included the required consideration of any reduced cost risk to determine whether the contractor’s proposal included fair and reasonable prices.  … In the remaining 32 of 66 UCAs we reviewed, the contract files included weighted guideline worksheets, but it was not always clear whether the contracting officers considered any reduced cost risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period as a factor when determining allowable profit or fee as required.

Based on the foregoing, it was not surprising when, on March 24, 2010, the US Air Force issued a memo to its Major Commands entitled, “Timely Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) Definitization/Negotiated Awards—Contractor Responsiveness.”  The memo focused on completing definitization within the required 180-day period, and asserted that open lines of communication and completion of established due dates would be key to meeting that objective.  The memo stated—

… it is imperative that we work effectively with our industry counterparts to receive quality documentation and data in a timely manner.  … Documentation supporting a contractor’s proposal should be readily available and should be provided upon request.  However, there may be circumstances where the requested data is not immediately available and reasonable timeframes should be established to provide such requested documentation.

The Air Force memo directed that “for all sole source contract actions greater than $50 million and any UCA greater than $1 million, contracting officers shall schedule a proposal kick-off meeting.”  The kick-off meeting should include all stakeholders, including the Air Force and contactor, DCAA auditors, DCMA functional specialists and, “at the prime contractor’s discretion,” major subcontractors.  The memo also directs that—

… after proposal submittal and preliminary review … the contracting officer shall require the contractor to provide a proposal walk-through for the Government to ensure an understanding of the proposal composition, validate or revisit the definitization/award schedule, and establish action items for any obvious data omissions. 

Significantly, the Air Force memo focuses on contractor responsiveness, stating, “If the requested data is not provided by the requested date or … the agreed-to date, and an acceptable resolution cannot be achieved, the issue shall be immediately elevated to the appropriate senior management for both the government and the contractor.”  Even more significantly, the Air Force memo then notes that “DCAA has issued guidance for handling denial of access to contractor’s records IAW 15.404-2(d).  We endorse the procedures …”  (Emphasis added.)

On May 25, 2010, DCAA issued the Air Force memo under MRD 10-PSP-016(R).  The audit guidance directs auditors to cooperate with the Air Force’s process.  Among other actions, the audit guidance states—

The proposal kick-off meeting will occur soon after the contracting officer’s release of the RFP. The meeting will focus on procurement schedule requirements, expectations of timely contractor support, and the identification of expected major subcontracts. DCAA auditors should attend these kick-off meetings to get an understanding of the acquisition milestones and general nature of the proposal. It should be clearly communicated at this meeting that contractor supporting data should generally be readily available once the proposal is submitted. … DCAA should attend these meetings to obtain an understanding of the contractor’s proposal, including supporting data. The contractor should also identify the contractor personnel responsible for the underlying data and estimates. DCAA will require access to these individuals during the audit process. … During these meetings, the auditor should identify any apparent proposal inadequacies. If data omissions are so significant as to render the proposal inadequate for analysis, the auditor should recommend that the Contracting Officer reject the proposal. Audit report due dates for the particular proposal should be established after the completion of the audit risk assessment.

The audit guidance further cautions auditors to avoid “comments that could be construed as advising the contractor on how to develop its proposal” so as to avoid any allegations that the auditors are participating in an Integrated Process Team (IPT), an activity which has been prohibited as it has been alleged to impair auditor independence.

Well, then.  We generally endorse any process that would definitize UCAs within the required timeframes, but we wonder if the foregoing Air Force and DCAA direction might not be avoiding addressing the real problem—which is insufficient identification of Government requirements, and subsequent changes to those requirements—which prevents contractors from submitting timely and comprehensive proposals.  (See the GAO reports linked above, which show the lack of defined requirements is a much a problem as any lack of cost or pricing data.)  Focusing on enforcing timely contractor provision of requested data to support fact-finding and negotiations seems to be a fundamentally misplaced management emphasis—particularly since the Air Force is now endorsing DCAA’s arbitrary and punitive “denial of access to records” process.  (We criticized DCAA’s approach, which focuses on timeliness at the expense of factual accuracy and audit quality, in our article that was republished in West’s The New Landscape of Government Contracting.)

We also note that DCAA has (once again) attempted to extend its audit access to contractor personnel, despite regulatory direction (supported by settled case law) that limits auditor access to cost, accounting, and financial records—as well as other cost or pricing data identified by the contractor. 

Finally, despite DCAA’s cautious directions to the contrary, this smells very much like an IPT-like process and we smirk at DCAA’s protestations to the contrary.  Candidly, auditors should participate in IPTs and DCAA should tell those who criticize that participation to stuff it.

It is becoming an open secret that DCAA’s temper tantrum (stemming from GAO findings and well-publicized Congressional criticism) is starting to paralyze the Defense acquisition process.  This guidance strikes us as a small Band-Aid that looks good, but which fails to address fundamental problems at the audit agency that continue to impair timely issuance of quality audit reports, leaving DCMA and DOD buying commands in limbo as they attempt to award, administrate, and manage contracts.


 

Court of Appeals Says All CAS-Covered Contracts are Not “Affected” CAS-Covered Contracts

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Three years ago, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) sustained Lockheed Martin’s protest of a Contracting Officer’s final decision.  In doing so, the Court ruled on whether Lockheed Martin’s $9.5 billion CPAF contract for F-22 engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) met the CAS and FAR definitions of an “affected CAS-covered contract”.  This was a critical ruling, because “affected” contracts must be included in contractors’ cost impact studies when determining contract costs impacts associated with CAS noncompliances and voluntary accounting changes.

FAR 30.001 defines the term “affected CAS-covered contract” as follows—

‘Affected CAS-covered contract or subcontract’ means a contract or subcontract subject to Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) rules and regulations for which a contractor or subcontractor—

(1) Used one cost accounting practice to estimate costs and a changed cost accounting practice to accumulate and report costs under the contract or subcontract; or

(2) Used a noncompliant practice for purposes of estimating or accumulating and reporting costs under the contract or subcontract.

The CAS Administration regulations at FAR 30.604 and 30.605 require a contractor to submit “information on the estimated overall impact” with respect to the situations noted above, “on affected CAS-covered contracts and subcontracts”.  The requirements (and the definition) are repeated in the CAS contract clauses, notably 52.230-6 (Administration of Cost Accounting Standards). 

Clearly, only affected CAS-covered contracts, as defined in the regulations, are to be included in the contractor’s cost impact analysis, whether the analysis is a “general dollar magnitude proposal” (GDM) or “detailed cost-impact proposal” (DCI) to the “cognizant Federal Agency official”.  The problem the ASBCA had to resolve was whether Lockheed Martin’s F-22 contract was an “affected” contract, or not.  Although the exact cost impact to the contract was uncertain, including the contract in the analysis would mean that Lockheed Martin would owe the Government somewhere between $10 and $15 million.

The facts—briefly—include a program replan and rebaseline effort based on the changing Government funding profile (which increased program costs by more than $1 billion), and a “should-cost” review of Lockheed Martin’s overhead (which recommended movement of some personnel from indirect to direct-charging).  Lockheed Martin agreed with the recommendation, which was a change to its disclosed cost accounting practices, and it negotiated program budgets based on those changed cost accounting practices.  The Court was impressed with Lockheed Martin’s efforts to fully disclose its changes to the Government, noting that the impacts to the F-22 EMD program were “thoroughly discussed and negotiated” and that the discussions were “unusually comprehensive”. 

The Government argued that LockMart and its Air Force customer “understood that they were negotiating a contract change proposal and did not price the equivalent of a new contract” and therefore the contract was not completely repriced by the negotiations.  Because the contract was not completely repriced, it was still an “affected” contract for purposes of calculating the cost impact analysis.  The Court was unimpressed by the Government’s arguments, stating—

The government contentions are based on superficial, mostly irrelevant generalizations relating to the intent, scope and technical revisions of the rephase modifications and negotiations that miss the point. They do not convincingly and substantively address the critical issues inherent in the definition of ‘affected contract,’ i.e., what accounting practices were used in estimating the price of the F-22 contract as rephased. The essential questions are whether the negotiating parties (LASC and the Air Force) knowingly repriced the contract using the changed practices rather than the practices used in pricing the original contract and whether the scope of that repricing effort was sufficiently comprehensive to justify a conclusion that the impact of the changed practices were fully incorporated in the contract price as rephased. … The critical issue is whether the cost impacts of the changed practices were fully integrated into the pricing structure for the entire contract as rephased or solely the discrete technical revisions to the work.

The ASBCA found for Lockheed Martin and the Government appealed to the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit was similarly unimpressed with the Government’s arguments.  For example, the Appellate Court found—

The government contends that a contract must be an ‘affected contract’ if the accounting changes were integrated into the contract price and the final estimated costs were not reduced to compensate for those additional expenses. However, the Board did not determine that additional accounting costs were tacked on to the contract estimate; it found that the parties created a wholly new cost estimate incorporating all of the additional expenses. Because those costs were consistently estimated and accrued, the Board concluded that the F-22 contract was not an ‘affected contract.’ Based on the Board’s detailed findings and analysis of the rephase negotiations and the rules applicable to changes in accounting practices, we uphold the Board’s conclusion that the statutory and regulatory provisions governing ‘affected contracts’ were inapplicable to the rephased F-22 contract.

The Federal Circuit also dealt with the Government’s contention that the F-22 Contracting Officer lacked authority to agree to accept additional contract costs stemming from LockMart’s change in cost accounting practice.  The Court wrote—

Because the PCO properly exercised the author-ity to negotiate and integrate the additional accounting costs into the modified contract, no adjustment was required under the relevant regulations, and the DACO’s authority to perform that adjustment was not necessary.

In addition, the Court noted—

… the government disputes the Board’s finding that the Air Force validly agreed to the additional accounting costs. The government points to the clause in the rephased contract stating that ‘[a]ward of this contract does not constitute a determination [that Lockheed’s practices are CAS compliant],’ and reserving the government’s right to an adjustment if Lockheed’s practices are ultimately determined to be non-compliant. That clause, however, does not create a right to an adjustment or demonstrate a disagreement over contract costs. It merely indicates that the Air Force was not waiving whatever adjustment rights it may have had. Because the rephased F-22 contract was not an ‘affected contract,’ the government did not have any adjustment rights to retain.

To sum up, the Appellate Court upheld the ASBCA’s finding that a contract that has been repriced using the changed cost accounting practices should not be included in a contractor’s cost impact analysis.  Once the contract’s estimated cost and/or price had been renegotiated to include the cost impact, it was no longer an “affected contract” and was properly excluded from the various cost impact analyses negotiated between the CFAO and the contractor.

This is an important series of court decisions that should be studied by serious practitioners of the art of complying with the Federal Cost Accounting Standards.




 

L-3 Unit Suspended, Loses $5 Billion Contract to Lockheed Martin

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On June 21, 2010, the Department of Defense announced that Lockheed Martin had been awarded an ID/IQ contract potentially worth as much as $5 billion.  Here is the official DOD announcement—

Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Information Systems & Global Services, Gaithersburg, Md., is being awarded a potential $5,000,000,000, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract with mixed payment provisions including firm-fixed-price, incentive arrangements and cost-reimbursable arrangements for contractor logistics support services in support of US SOCOM worldwide. The work will be performed at Special Operations Forces Support Activity in Lexington, Ky., and other locations across the globe and is expected to have a period of performance from March 2, 2009, to March 1, 2018. This contract was awarded through full and open competition. USSOCOM is the contracting activity (H92254-09-D-0001). This contract was previously awarded in March 2009, but was terminated due to protest activity in June 2009. The 2009 contract is now being reinstated to meet urgent operational requirements.

What the announcement didn’t say was that on June 9, 2010, L-3 Communications announced that its business unit that had performed the SOCOM logistics support work for years had been suspended from receiving further Federal contract awards based on an ongoing investigation into “inappropriate use of an email system” by L-3 employees.  The official 8-K SEC filing to that effect can be found here.  It said (in part)—

L-3 Communications Corporation received notice that its Special Support Programs Division (L-3 SSPD) [aka L-3 JOG] has been temporarily suspended from receiving any new contracts or orders from U.S. Federal Government agencies, including under its Special Operations Forces Support Activity (SOFSA) contract.  The notice of temporary suspension was received from the Office of the Deputy General Counsel of the U.S. Air Force on June 4, 2010 and relates to an on-going governmental investigation of L-3 SSPD concerning the alleged inappropriate use of an e-mail system by L-3 SSPD employees. … The temporary suspension will remain in effect until lifted at the discretion of the Air Force.

The Air Force has also notified L-3 that it is considering whether a suspension of L-3 Communications Integrated Systems L.P., as the parent of L-3 SSPD, is also warranted.

What the L-3 filing didn’t say was that it had lost the program recompete and, in March 2009, it had protested award of the contract to Lockheed Martin in the Government Accountability Office (GAO) protest forum.  This brief Reuters article summarized the situation—

L-3 Communications Holdings Inc has filed a formal challenge to a potential nine-year, $5-billion U.S. Special Operations Command logistics deal awarded to Lockheed Martin Corp last week.  L-3, which holds the current contract, protested on March 10 to the Government Accountability Office, an umpire of such disputed federal awards. … The Defense Department said on March 3 that Lockheed's Information Systems & Global Services business unit based in Gaithersburg, Maryland, was receiving the contract for logistics services in support of U.S. Special Operations Command forces worldwide.

The contract was expected to run through March 1, 2018. It said it had been awarded through full and open competition. InsideDefense.com, an online trade publication that was the first to report the protest, said L-3's loss to Lockheed Martin ‘may have both a psychological and financial impact as it was one of LLL's largest, best recognized programs.’

What the Reuters article didn’t say was that L-3 had been recording roughly $450 million in annual revenue from its SOCOM support contract.  This amount represented about two to three percent of its total annual sales and bottom-line earnings.  Loss of the contract will require L-3 to lower its 2010 earnings forecast.  Oops.

According to this article (which quotes another Reuters report)—

The June 3 memo from the Office of the Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force said the U.S. Special Operations Command used a third-party vendor to audit email applications used at the command that were managed by L-3. The audit showed the L-3 unit ‘purposefully and intentionally’ monitored emails of employees of L-3, workers with other contractors and U.S. government employees, it said.  The L-3 unit arranged to have specific emails copied to and kept on an L-3 monitored database, then released and sent to recipients in such a manner that neither the government, nor those whose emails were monitored, would know communications had been copied, according to the memo. ‘L-3 JOG says it used the SOCOM network willfully and deliberately in an attempt to discover whether its employees had shared its information with another contractor,’ it said.

Moreover, the article continued—

The [Air Force] memo also said L-3 obtained information tied to a competition for follow-on contract work and collected material that involved a bid protest to which the company was a party. The Air Force memo did not identify the protest, but L-3 in March 2009 filed a protest with the Government Accountability office against a nine-year, $5-billion logistics deal awarded to Lockheed Martin Corp by Special Operations Command. GAO, the congressional agency that rules on contract protests, said it dismissed the matter a month later after the command said it would reevaluate the submitted proposals. The new competition is still under way, and L-3′s contract continues through the first quarter of 2011. Lockheed declined comment.

The Air Force memo said there was ‘adequate evidence’ to establish that L-3 committed ‘criminal offenses in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain or performing a public contract or subcontract’ and added there was ‘adequate evidence’ that L-3 ‘committed theft.’

This article from The Wall Street Journal ties the SOCOM award directly to the L-3 suspension, stating—

With orders building up, Special Operations Command said it had to reinstate the contract again to Lockheed. ‘U.S. SOCOM must ensure Special Operations Forces have continuous logistics support as they deploy, prepare to deploy, conduct combat operations, redeploy and refit,’ said U.S. Air Force Major Wes Ticer, the agency's spokesman. ‘It would be very difficult to ensure continuous support to the warfighter from L-3 while the suspension is in place.’

We have noted before that investing in an effective compliance program makes good business sense.  This L-3 compliance debacle is Lockheed Martin’s win, and provides an object lesson on the costs associated with compliance failure.




 

Bagram Airbase: Hub of U.S. Influence or Den of Iniquity?

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We have previously noted a rash of corruption by Government officials, both military and civilian, in Southwest Asia.  To be sure, it takes two to tango—and for every corrupt Government official there is a corrupt contractor or wannabe contractor—but the shenanigans over at Bagram Airfield caught our attention.  We perceive an inequitable distribution of iniquity, with Bagram seemingly receiving more than its fair share of noteworthy corruption stories.

Bagram Airfield, as described by this article on Wikipedia, is a “militarized airport and housing complex” that was once an important Soviet military base and is now an important U.S. military base.  Home of the Theater Internment Facility, the Airfield also has two runways, three hangars, and numerous support buildings.  In addition, Wikipedia states that “there are more than 32 acres of ramp space and five aircraft dispersal areas, with a total of over 110 revetments.” Secured by British and U.S. forces in December 2001, the Airfield has grown from housing roughly 350 troops to now housing at least 20,000 personnel.  Though focused on supporting air force missions, the base is run by a two-star Army General.

Bagram Airfield is noted for, among other things, being home to Bagram Theater Internment Facility, the Heathe Craig Joint Theater Hospital, and a second internment facility that nobody discusses.  However, Bagram is becoming noted for other things as well, such as traffic jams, sexual assaults by military personnel and general corruption.  As of the date of this writing, the Wikipedia article on Bagram includes three links to stories of corruption at Bagram (unrelated to allegations of prisoner abuse at the internment facilities).  We noted one of the stories in a prior article—here.

Is Bagram just another military base, with the number of corrupt fraudsters simply in proportion to its overall population?  Or is it something more—perhaps a poster child for failed leadership and ineffective oversight and missing controls.  Time may tell, but until then all we have are news stories and press releases from the Department of Justice, like this one.

On June 9, 2010, the DoJ announced that “two military officials, two contractors, and [a] contracting company” were indicted for “alleged roles in bribery and money laundering” related to “award of a DOD trucking services contract in Afghanistan.”  The two military officials involved—retired U.S. Army Sergeant Charles Finch (now residing in Hawaii) and 1st Sgt. Gary Canteen (of Delaware)—were assigned to Bagram Airfield at the time.

The DOJ press release reported that—

According to an indictment … retired U.S. Army Sgt. Charles O. Finch … accepted a $50,000 bribe in the fall of 2004 to influence the award of a DOD trucking contract to AZ Corporation, an Afghan contracting company. The indictment alleges that the owners of AZ Corporation, brothers Assad John Ramin, 40, and Tahir Ramin, 32, both of Pennsylvania, offered the bribe to Finch. According to the indictment, the bribe was paid through the business account of Finch’s roommate at Bagram, 1st Sgt. Gary M. Canteen … to disguise the nature and source of the payment. Canteen allegedly passed on a portion of the funds to Finch. According to the indictment, shortly after the money was delivered to Canteen, Finch recommended the award of the contract to AZ Corporation, which was awarded the contract.

Finch, John Ramin, Tahir Ramin and AZ Corporation are each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, one count of bribery, one count of conspiracy to launder money and one count of money laundering. Canteen is charged with one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, one count of conspiracy to launder money and one count of money laundering.

Each individual faces a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison and a fine of $250,000 or three times the value of the bribe for the bribery charge; a maximum of five years in prison and a fine of $250,000 for the bribery conspiracy charge; and a maximum of 20 years in prison and a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the laundered funds for each of the money laundering and money laundering conspiracy charges. AZ Corporation faces a fine of up to $500,000 for the bribery and conspiracy charges and $500,000 for the money laundering and money laundering conspiracy charges. The maximum fine could be increased to twice the gain derived from the crimes or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crimes if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine.

You may have heard of the contractor—AZ Corporation—before.  The DoJ announcement notes—

John Ramin, Tahir Ramin and AZ Corporation were also charged in August 2008 and June 2009 … with bribery, conspiracy to commit bribery and mail fraud related to the procurement and delivery of concrete bunkers and barriers at Bagram Airfield. John Ramin, Tahir Ramin and AZ Corporation are scheduled to begin trial on these charges on Aug. 16, 2010. Three former military officials have pleaded guilty … to receiving bribes from the Ramins and AZ Corporation.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.