DOD Blames Contractors for Lack of Contract Definitization, Establishes New Process Groundrules
To
meet urgent needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) can authorize
contractors to begin work and incur costs before reaching a final
agreement on contract terms and conditions, including price. Such
agreements are called undefinitized contract actions (UCAs). UCAs are
binding commitments used when the government needs the contractor to
start work immediately and there is insufficient time to negotiate all
of the terms and conditions for a contract. UCAs can be entered into via
different contract vehicles, such as a letter contract (a stand-alone
contract), a task or delivery order issued against a pre-established
umbrella contract, or a modification to an already established contract.
As
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported to Congress—
The FAR and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) govern how and when UCAs can be used. The regulations also
establish requirements as to how quickly UCAs must be definitized.
Although each regulation contains two criteria, they are not the same.
The FAR states that a letter contract needs to be definitized within 180
days after the award date or before 40 percent of the work is complete,
whichever occurs first. While the DFARS includes the 180-day time
frame, it addresses all UCAs (including undefinitized task and delivery
orders and contract modifications) and adds a requirement to definitize
before more than 50 percent of funds are obligated. … The definitization
time frame can also be extended an additional 180 days when a
qualifying proposal is received from the contractor. The contractor does
not receive profit or fee during the undefinitized period, but can
recoup it once the contract is definitized.
In
June 2007, GAO reported on DOD’s use of UCAs. Fundamentally, GAO
found that the Government’s timeliness in “definitizing” the UCAs—i.e.,
negotiating a final contract price played a key part in controlling
costs (and profits) paid to contractors. In particular, GAO found that—
We reported that DOD contracting officials were more likely to
adhere to the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s advice regarding the
disposition of questioned and unsupported costs when negotiations were
timely and occurred before contractors had incurred substantial costs
under UCAs. On the other hand, contracting officials were less likely to
remove questioned costs from a contract proposal when the contractor
had already incurred these costs during the undefinitized period.
The
majority of UCAs reviewed by GAO were not definitized within the
required timeframes. GAO further reported that the number one reason
for delays was an “untimely receipt of a qualifying proposal” from the
contractor. Among the other reasons cited were “protracted
negotiations” between DOD and its contractors and “delays in obtaining
certified cost and pricing data” (sic).
In
January, 2010, GAO issued a follow-up
report, in which it noted
improvement by DOD in this area. However, GAO also reported that
“local commands are generally not meeting DOD’s management standards”
with regard to UCA definitization and documentation of contractor
negotiations. GAO found that—
According to DOD regulations, contracting officers are required to
consider any reduced cost risk to the contractor for costs incurred
before negotiation of the final price. Further, contracting officers
must document this risk assessment in the contract files. Sixty-six of
the 83 contract actions we reviewed were definitized and should have
documented a risk assessment in their contract file and used the weighted guideline worksheet
or an alternative method to determine allowable profit or fee for
negotiation purposes. About half of the cases we reviewed—34 of 66—did
not use the weighted guidelines or document any consideration of cost
risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period when establishing
profit or fee negotiation objectives. Instead, we found these
contracting officers based their profit or fee negotiation objectives on
previously negotiated rates under contracts for similar work or other
factors. None of these included the required consideration of any
reduced cost risk to determine whether the contractor’s proposal
included fair and reasonable prices. … In the remaining 32 of 66 UCAs
we reviewed, the contract files included weighted guideline worksheets,
but it was not always clear whether the contracting officers considered
any reduced cost risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period
as a factor when determining allowable profit or fee as required.
Based
on the foregoing, it was not surprising when, on March 24, 2010, the US
Air Force issued a memo to its Major Commands entitled, “Timely
Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) Definitization/Negotiated
Awards—Contractor Responsiveness.” The memo focused on completing
definitization within the required 180-day period, and asserted that
open lines of communication and completion of established due dates
would be key to meeting that objective. The memo stated—
… it is imperative that we work effectively with our industry
counterparts to receive quality documentation and data in a timely
manner. … Documentation supporting a contractor’s proposal should be
readily available and should be provided upon request. However, there
may be circumstances where the requested data is not immediately
available and reasonable timeframes should be established to provide
such requested documentation.
The
Air Force memo directed that “for all sole source contract actions
greater than $50 million and any UCA greater than $1 million,
contracting officers shall schedule a proposal kick-off meeting.” The
kick-off meeting should include all stakeholders, including the Air
Force and contactor, DCAA auditors, DCMA functional specialists and, “at
the prime contractor’s discretion,” major subcontractors. The memo
also directs that—
… after proposal submittal and preliminary review … the contracting
officer shall require the contractor to provide a proposal walk-through
for the Government to ensure an understanding of the proposal
composition, validate or revisit the definitization/award schedule, and
establish action items for any obvious data omissions.
Significantly,
the Air Force memo focuses on contractor responsiveness, stating, “If
the requested data is not provided by the requested date or … the
agreed-to date, and an acceptable resolution cannot be achieved, the
issue shall be immediately elevated to the appropriate senior management
for both the government and the contractor.” Even more significantly,
the Air Force memo then notes that “DCAA has issued guidance for
handling denial of access to contractor’s records IAW 15.404-2(d). We endorse the procedures …” (Emphasis added.)
On
May 25, 2010, DCAA issued the Air Force memo under MRD 10-PSP-016(R). The audit guidance directs auditors to
cooperate with the Air Force’s process. Among other actions, the audit
guidance states—
The proposal
kick-off meeting will occur soon after the contracting officer’s release
of the RFP. The meeting will focus on procurement schedule
requirements, expectations of timely contractor support, and the
identification of expected major subcontracts. DCAA auditors should
attend these kick-off meetings to get an understanding of the
acquisition milestones and general nature of the proposal. It should be
clearly communicated at this meeting that contractor supporting data should generally be readily
available once the proposal is submitted. … DCAA should attend these meetings to obtain an
understanding of the contractor’s proposal, including supporting data.
The contractor should also identify the contractor personnel responsible
for the underlying data and estimates. DCAA will require access to
these individuals during the audit process. … During these meetings, the
auditor should identify any apparent proposal inadequacies. If data
omissions are so significant as to render the proposal inadequate for
analysis, the auditor should recommend that the Contracting Officer
reject the proposal. Audit report due dates for the particular proposal
should be established after the completion of the audit risk assessment.
The audit guidance further cautions
auditors to avoid “comments that could be construed as advising the
contractor on how to develop its proposal” so as to avoid any
allegations that the auditors are participating in an Integrated Process
Team (IPT), an activity which has been prohibited as it has been
alleged to impair auditor independence.
Well,
then. We generally endorse any process that would definitize UCAs
within the required timeframes, but we wonder if the foregoing Air Force
and DCAA direction might not be avoiding addressing the real
problem—which is insufficient identification of Government requirements,
and subsequent changes to those requirements—which prevents contractors
from submitting timely and comprehensive proposals. (See the GAO
reports linked above, which show the lack of defined requirements is a
much a problem as any lack of cost or pricing data.) Focusing on
enforcing timely contractor provision of requested data to support
fact-finding and negotiations seems to be a fundamentally misplaced
management emphasis—particularly since the Air Force is now endorsing
DCAA’s arbitrary and punitive “denial of access to records” process.
(We criticized DCAA’s approach, which focuses on timeliness at the
expense of factual accuracy and audit quality, in our article that was
republished in West’s The
New Landscape of Government Contracting.)
We also note that DCAA has
(once again) attempted to extend its audit access to contractor
personnel, despite regulatory direction (supported by settled case law)
that limits auditor access to cost, accounting, and financial records—as
well as other cost or pricing data identified by the contractor.
Finally,
despite DCAA’s cautious directions to the contrary, this smells very
much like an IPT-like process and we smirk at DCAA’s protestations to
the contrary. Candidly, auditors should participate in IPTs and DCAA
should tell those who criticize that participation to stuff it.
It
is becoming an open secret that DCAA’s temper tantrum (stemming from
GAO findings and well-publicized Congressional criticism) is starting to
paralyze the Defense acquisition process. This guidance strikes us as a
small Band-Aid that looks good, but which fails to address fundamental
problems at the audit agency that continue to impair timely issuance of
quality audit reports, leaving DCMA and DOD buying commands in limbo as
they attempt to award, administrate, and manage contracts.
Court of Appeals Says All CAS-Covered Contracts are Not “Affected” CAS-Covered Contracts
Three
years ago, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
sustained Lockheed Martin’s protest of a Contracting Officer’s final
decision. In doing so, the Court ruled on whether Lockheed Martin’s
$9.5 billion CPAF contract for F-22 engineering
and manufacturing development (EMD) met the CAS
and FAR definitions of an “affected CAS-covered contract”. This was a critical ruling, because “affected”
contracts must be included in contractors’ cost impact studies when
determining contract costs impacts associated with CAS noncompliances and voluntary accounting
changes.
FAR 30.001 defines the term “affected CAS-covered contract” as
follows—
‘Affected CAS-covered
contract or subcontract’
means a contract or subcontract subject to Cost Accounting Standards
(CAS) rules and regulations for which a contractor or subcontractor—
(1) Used one cost accounting
practice to estimate costs and a changed cost accounting practice to
accumulate and report costs under the contract or subcontract; or
(2) Used a noncompliant
practice for purposes of estimating or accumulating and reporting costs
under the contract or subcontract.
The CAS Administration regulations
at FAR 30.604 and 30.605 require a contractor to submit “information on the estimated overall impact” with respect to the
situations noted above, “on affected CAS-covered contracts and
subcontracts”. The requirements (and the
definition) are repeated in the CAS contract
clauses, notably 52.230-6 (Administration of Cost
Accounting Standards).
Clearly, only affected CAS-covered
contracts, as defined in the regulations, are to
be included in the contractor’s cost impact analysis, whether the
analysis is a “general dollar magnitude proposal” (GDM) or “detailed
cost-impact proposal” (DCI) to the “cognizant Federal Agency official”.
The problem the ASBCA had to resolve was whether Lockheed Martin’s F-22
contract was an “affected” contract, or not.
Although the exact cost impact to the contract was uncertain, including
the contract in the analysis would mean that Lockheed Martin would owe
the Government somewhere between $10 and $15 million.
The
facts—briefly—include a program replan and rebaseline
effort based on the changing Government funding profile (which increased
program costs by more than $1 billion), and a “should-cost” review of
Lockheed Martin’s overhead (which recommended movement of some personnel from indirect to
direct-charging). Lockheed Martin agreed with the recommendation, which was a change to its disclosed cost accounting
practices, and it negotiated program budgets based on those changed cost
accounting practices. The Court was impressed with Lockheed Martin’s
efforts to fully disclose its changes to the Government, noting that the
impacts to the F-22 EMD program were “thoroughly discussed and
negotiated” and that the discussions were “unusually comprehensive”.
The
Government argued that LockMart and its Air Force customer “understood that they were
negotiating a contract change proposal and did not price the equivalent
of a new contract” and therefore the contract was
not completely repriced by the negotiations. Because the contract was
not completely repriced, it was still an “affected” contract for
purposes of calculating the cost impact analysis. The Court was
unimpressed by the Government’s arguments, stating—
The
government contentions are based on superficial, mostly irrelevant
generalizations relating to the intent, scope and technical revisions of
the rephase modifications
and negotiations that miss the point. They do not convincingly and
substantively address the critical issues inherent in the definition of
‘affected contract,’ i.e., what accounting
practices were used in estimating the price of the F-22 contract as rephased. The essential questions are
whether the negotiating parties (LASC and the Air Force) knowingly
repriced the contract using the changed practices rather than the
practices used in pricing the original contract and whether the scope of
that repricing effort was
sufficiently comprehensive to justify a conclusion that the impact of
the changed practices were fully incorporated in the contract price as rephased. … The critical issue is
whether the cost impacts of the changed practices were fully integrated
into the pricing structure for the entire contract as rephased or solely the discrete technical
revisions to the work.
The ASBCA found for Lockheed Martin and the Government appealed to the Court
of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit was similarly unimpressed with the Government’s arguments.
For example, the Appellate Court found—
The government
contends that a contract must be an ‘affected contract’ if the
accounting changes were integrated into the contract price and the final
estimated costs were not reduced to compensate for those additional
expenses. However, the Board did not determine that additional
accounting costs were tacked on to the contract estimate; it found that
the parties created a wholly new cost estimate incorporating all of the
additional expenses. Because those costs were consistently estimated and
accrued, the Board concluded that the F-22 contract was not an
‘affected contract.’ Based on the Board’s detailed findings and analysis
of the rephase negotiations
and the rules applicable to changes in accounting practices, we uphold
the Board’s conclusion that the statutory and regulatory provisions
governing ‘affected contracts’ were inapplicable to the rephased F-22 contract.
The
Federal Circuit also dealt with the Government’s contention that the
F-22 Contracting Officer lacked authority to agree
to accept additional contract costs stemming from LockMart’s change in cost accounting practice. The Court wrote—
Because
the PCO properly exercised the author-ity to negotiate and integrate the additional accounting costs
into the modified contract, no adjustment was required under the
relevant regulations, and the DACO’s authority to perform that
adjustment was not necessary.
In addition, the Court noted—
…
the government disputes the
Board’s finding that the Air Force validly agreed to the additional
accounting costs. The government points to the clause in the rephased contract stating that ‘[a]ward of this contract does not
constitute a determination [that Lockheed’s practices are CAS
compliant],’ and reserving
the government’s right to an adjustment if Lockheed’s practices are
ultimately determined to be non-compliant. That clause, however, does
not create a right to an adjustment or demonstrate a disagreement over
contract costs. It merely indicates that the Air Force was not waiving
whatever adjustment rights it may have had.
Because the rephased F-22
contract was not an ‘affected
contract,’ the government
did not have any adjustment rights to retain.
To sum
up, the Appellate Court upheld the ASBCA’s finding that a contract that
has been repriced using the changed cost accounting practices should not
be included in a contractor’s cost impact analysis. Once the
contract’s estimated cost and/or price had been renegotiated to include
the cost impact, it was no longer an “affected contract” and was
properly excluded from the various cost impact analyses negotiated
between the CFAO and the contractor.
This is an important series of
court decisions that should be studied by serious practitioners of the
art of complying with the Federal Cost Accounting Standards.
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L-3 Unit Suspended, Loses $5 Billion Contract to Lockheed Martin
On June 21, 2010, the Department of
Defense announced that Lockheed Martin had been awarded an ID/IQ
contract potentially worth as much as $5 billion. Here is the official
DOD announcement—
Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed
Martin Information Systems & Global Services, Gaithersburg, Md., is
being awarded a potential $5,000,000,000,
indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract with mixed payment
provisions including firm-fixed-price, incentive arrangements and
cost-reimbursable arrangements for contractor logistics support services
in support of US SOCOM worldwide. The work will
be performed at Special Operations Forces Support Activity in Lexington,
Ky., and other locations across the globe and is expected to have a
period of performance from March 2, 2009, to March 1, 2018. This contract was awarded through full and open competition. USSOCOM is the contracting activity (H92254-09-D-0001). This contract was previously awarded in March 2009, but was
terminated due to protest activity in June 2009.
The 2009 contract is now being reinstated to meet urgent operational
requirements.
What the announcement didn’t say was that on June
9, 2010, L-3 Communications announced that its business unit that had
performed the SOCOM logistics support work for years had been suspended
from receiving further Federal contract awards based on an ongoing
investigation into “inappropriate use of an email system” by L-3
employees. The official 8-K SEC filing to that effect can be found here. It said (in part)—
L-3 Communications Corporation
received notice that its Special Support Programs Division (L-3 SSPD)
[aka L-3 JOG] has been temporarily suspended from receiving any new
contracts or orders from U.S. Federal Government agencies, including
under its Special Operations Forces Support Activity (SOFSA) contract.
The notice of temporary suspension was received from the Office of the
Deputy General Counsel of the U.S. Air Force on June 4, 2010 and relates to an on-going governmental investigation
of L-3 SSPD concerning the alleged inappropriate use of an e-mail system
by L-3 SSPD employees. … The temporary suspension will remain in effect
until lifted at the discretion of the Air Force.
The Air Force has also notified L-3 that it is considering
whether a suspension of L-3 Communications Integrated Systems L.P., as
the parent of L-3 SSPD, is also warranted.
What the L-3 filing
didn’t say was that it had lost the program recompete and, in March
2009, it had protested award of the contract to Lockheed Martin in the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) protest forum. This brief Reuters article summarized the situation—
L-3
Communications Holdings Inc has filed a formal challenge to a potential
nine-year, $5-billion U.S. Special Operations Command logistics deal
awarded to Lockheed Martin Corp last week. L-3, which holds the current
contract, protested on March 10 to the Government Accountability
Office, an umpire of such disputed federal awards. … The Defense
Department said on March 3 that Lockheed's Information Systems &
Global Services business unit based in Gaithersburg, Maryland, was
receiving the contract for logistics services in support of U.S. Special
Operations Command forces worldwide.
The contract was expected to run through March 1,
2018. It said it had been awarded through full and open competition.
InsideDefense.com, an online trade publication that was the first to
report the protest, said L-3's loss to Lockheed Martin ‘may have both a
psychological and financial impact as it was one of LLL's largest, best
recognized programs.’
What the Reuters article didn’t say
was that L-3 had been recording roughly $450 million in annual revenue
from its SOCOM support contract. This amount represented about two to
three percent of its total annual sales and bottom-line earnings. Loss
of the contract will require L-3 to lower its 2010 earnings forecast.
Oops.
According to this article (which
quotes another Reuters report)—
The June 3 memo from the
Office of the Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force said the U.S.
Special Operations Command used a third-party vendor to audit email
applications used at the command that were managed by L-3. The audit
showed the L-3 unit ‘purposefully and intentionally’ monitored emails of
employees of L-3, workers
with other contractors and U.S. government employees, it said. The
L-3 unit arranged to have specific emails copied to and kept on an L-3 monitored database, then released and sent to
recipients in such a manner that neither the government, nor those whose
emails were monitored, would know communications had been copied, according to the memo. ‘L-3 JOG says it used the SOCOM network willfully and deliberately
in an attempt to discover whether its employees had shared its
information with another contractor,’ it said.
Moreover,
the article continued—
The [Air Force] memo also said L-3 obtained information tied to a
competition for follow-on contract work and collected material that
involved a bid protest to which the company was a party. The Air Force
memo did not identify the protest, but L-3 in March 2009 filed a protest
with the Government Accountability office against a nine-year,
$5-billion logistics deal awarded to Lockheed Martin Corp by Special
Operations Command. GAO, the congressional agency that rules on contract
protests, said it dismissed the matter a month later after the command
said it would reevaluate the submitted proposals. The new competition is
still under way, and L-3′s
contract continues through the first quarter of 2011. Lockheed declined
comment.
The Air Force memo said there was ‘adequate
evidence’ to establish that L-3 committed ‘criminal offenses in connection with obtaining,
attempting to obtain or performing a public contract or subcontract’ and
added there was ‘adequate evidence’ that L-3
‘committed theft.’
This article from The Wall
Street Journal ties the SOCOM award directly
to the L-3 suspension, stating—
With orders building up,
Special Operations Command said it had to reinstate the contract again
to Lockheed. ‘U.S. SOCOM must ensure Special Operations Forces have
continuous logistics support as they deploy, prepare to deploy, conduct
combat operations, redeploy and refit,’ said U.S. Air Force Major Wes Ticer, the agency's spokesman. ‘It would be very difficult to
ensure continuous support to the warfighter from L-3 while the
suspension is in place.’
We have noted before that investing in an effective compliance program makes good
business sense. This L-3 compliance debacle is Lockheed Martin’s win,
and provides an object lesson on the costs associated with compliance
failure.
Bagram Airbase: Hub of U.S. Influence or Den of Iniquity?
We have
previously noted a rash of corruption by
Government officials, both military and civilian, in Southwest Asia. To be sure, it takes two to tango—and for every corrupt
Government official there is a corrupt contractor or wannabe
contractor—but the shenanigans over at Bagram Airfield caught our attention. We perceive an inequitable distribution of iniquity, with Bagram seemingly receiving more than its
fair share of noteworthy corruption stories.
Bagram Airfield, as described by this article on Wikipedia, is a “militarized airport and housing complex”
that was once an important Soviet military base and is now an important
U.S. military base. Home of the Theater Internment Facility, the
Airfield also has two runways, three hangars, and numerous support
buildings. In addition, Wikipedia states that “there are more than 32
acres of ramp space and five aircraft dispersal areas, with a total of
over 110 revetments.” Secured by British and U.S. forces in December 2001, the
Airfield has grown from housing roughly 350 troops
to now housing at least 20,000 personnel. Though focused on supporting
air force missions, the base is run by a two-star Army General.
Bagram Airfield is
noted for, among other things, being home to Bagram Theater Internment Facility, the Heathe Craig Joint Theater Hospital, and a second internment
facility that nobody discusses. However, Bagram is becoming noted for other things as well, such as traffic jams, sexual
assaults by military personnel and general
corruption. As of the
date of this writing, the Wikipedia article on Bagram includes three links to stories of corruption at Bagram (unrelated to allegations of
prisoner abuse at the internment facilities). We
noted one of the stories in a prior article—here.
Is Bagram just another military base, with the number of corrupt
fraudsters simply in proportion to its overall population? Or is it
something more—perhaps a poster child for failed leadership and
ineffective oversight and missing controls. Time may tell, but until
then all we have are news stories and press releases from the Department
of Justice, like this one.
On June 9, 2010, the DoJ announced that “two military
officials, two contractors, and [a] contracting company” were indicted
for “alleged roles in bribery and money laundering” related to “award of
a DOD trucking services contract in Afghanistan.” The two military
officials involved—retired U.S. Army Sergeant Charles Finch (now
residing in Hawaii) and 1st Sgt. Gary
Canteen (of Delaware)—were assigned to Bagram Airfield at the time.
The DOJ
press release reported that—
According to an indictment … retired U.S. Army Sgt. Charles O. Finch … accepted a $50,000 bribe in the fall of 2004 to influence the
award of a DOD trucking contract to AZ Corporation, an Afghan
contracting company. The indictment alleges that the owners of AZ
Corporation, brothers Assad John Ramin, 40, and Tahir Ramin,
32, both of Pennsylvania, offered the bribe to Finch. According to the
indictment, the bribe was paid through the business account of Finch’s
roommate at Bagram, 1st Sgt. Gary M. Canteen … to disguise the nature and source of the payment. Canteen
allegedly passed on a portion of the funds to Finch. According to the
indictment, shortly after the money was delivered to Canteen, Finch
recommended the award of the contract to AZ Corporation, which was
awarded the contract.
Finch, John Ramin, Tahir Ramin and AZ Corporation are each charged
with one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, one count of bribery,
one count of conspiracy to launder money and one count of money
laundering. Canteen is charged with one count of conspiracy to commit
bribery, one count of conspiracy to launder money and one count of money
laundering.
Each individual faces a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison
and a fine of $250,000 or three times the value of the bribe for the
bribery charge; a maximum of five years in prison and a fine of $250,000
for the bribery conspiracy charge; and a maximum of 20 years in prison
and a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the laundered funds for
each of the money laundering and money laundering conspiracy charges. AZ
Corporation faces a fine of up to $500,000 for the bribery and
conspiracy charges and $500,000 for the money laundering and money
laundering conspiracy charges. The maximum fine could be increased to
twice the gain derived from the crimes or twice the loss suffered by the
victims of the crimes if either of those amounts is greater than the
statutory maximum fine.
You may
have heard of the contractor—AZ Corporation—before. The DoJ announcement notes—
John Ramin, Tahir Ramin and AZ Corporation were also charged in August 2008 and June
2009 … with bribery,
conspiracy to commit bribery and mail fraud related to the procurement
and delivery of concrete bunkers and barriers at Bagram Airfield. John Ramin, Tahir Ramin and AZ Corporation are scheduled to begin trial on these
charges on Aug. 16, 2010. Three former military officials have pleaded
guilty … to receiving bribes
from the Ramins and AZ
Corporation.
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