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Apogee Consulting Inc

KC-X Aerial Tanker Update—The Russians Are Back!

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When last we looked at this problem-plagued plane procurement, President Obama and his Pentagon “indicated it would welcome” a bid from a foreign manufacturer—which at the time everybody thought would be EADS.  But then a wildcard was introduced into the game, as a Russian aircraft firm reportedly was gearing-up to offer a variant of the Illyushin-96 widebody jetliner, to be designated Il-98.  We smirked, picturing the face of Boeing executives, who had worked so hard to turn the competition into a “low-price, technically acceptable” game in which there was almost no chance for the other side to win—and forcing Northrop Grumman to concede.  Given the huge gap in labor and material costs between the two entities, we opined that there was essentially no chance for Boeing to beat the Russians on price.  The only way for Boeing to beat the Russians, and to secure what has been called the largest Pentagon contract ever, would be to change the game and, if that happened, there were many European nations prepared to cry “foul”.

But almost immediately the reports were denied, and the competition settled down to Boeing versus EADS.  But quite recently (July, 2010) reports surfaced that yet another bidder had entered the field—and this time it was Antonov out of the Ukraine.  Employing a strategy similar to that reported for Illyushin, Antonov has executed an agreement to sell through a Southern California.-based defense contractor, U.S. Aerospace, Inc.  According to the article at AirForceTimes (link above)—

Under terms of a “strategic cooperation agreement” signed July 1 in Kiev, Ukraine, “final assembly” of an U.S. Aerospace-Antonov tanker would take place on U.S. soil. Defense News obtained a copy of the agreement. The American company would oversee that stage of production.

U.S. Aerospace would coordinate the bidding process, negotiate with the Air Force, coordinate with subcontractors, ensure conformity of aircraft to requirements of RFP for KC-X Tanker Modernization Program,” according to the agreement.

Antonov would integrate components into the aircraft, work with its U.S. partner on preparing the aircraft for certification and testing, and “manufacturing and delivering to [U.S. Aerospace] specified aircraft and components,” states the pact.

What is Antonov offering the U.S. Air Force?  According to that same article—

The source said U.S. Aerospace and Antonov plan to enter the four-engine AN-124-100, and a two-engine variant of that airframe known as the AN-122.  In a further twist, the U.S.-Ukrainian team plans to enter “a new plane designed to meet the [KC-X] specs, dubbed the AN-112,” the source told Defense News.  The AN-112 would be, if eventually entered, the only plane in the race designed specifically for the Air Force’s tanker requirements.

Bids were due to be submitted by July 9, 2010.  But at least one source has reported that the new bidder has requested a 60-day extension in order to prepare its bid.  As of this date, it is not clear whether the Pentagon will agree to the extension.

This Reuters article notes that—

John Kirkland, a Los Angeles-based attorney for U.S. Aerospace, [said] the [Antonov] team would offer the Pentagon a ‘dramatically’ lower price for a far more capable plane.

Kirkland said Antonov, maker of the world's largest cargo planes, had modified an existing military cargo plane to meet U.S. specifications. Unlike the commercial derivative planes offered by rival bidders, the plane had a rear cargo door, a more stable airframe, and could land on dirt runways.

(We should note that Mr. Kirkland was also involved in the Illyushin bid as well.)

Some commenters dismissed the tardy bid as a “waste of time” (according to the Reuters article) because of various issues—among them the financial troubles of U.S. Aerospace, Inc.  The company, which trades over-the-counter (as USAE), “reported a net loss of $14 million in 2009,” according to Reuters.  The article also had this to say about the U.S. face of the Antonov team—

The company told investors in May it was in default on several notes and had an accumulated deficit of $28 million, which raised substantial concerns about its future unless it was able to secure additional debt and equity financing.

It’s an old adage that, if the RFP is the first time a bidder learns of an opportunity, it shouldn’t bother bidding—because it has already lost.  We wonder if the Antonov team (including Mr. Kirkland) has heard of that adage, or believes it applies to this situation.  Time will tell.



 

FAR Revised to Eliminate Profit on Cost of Direct-Charged Equipment

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In August, 2009, we reported on a proposed FAR rule that looked very much as if it would have required Contracting Officers to exclude from profit consideration “all contractor-acquired property, unless an item is expressly called-out as a contract deliverable,” when establishing pre-negotiation profit objectives.  Well, the final rule was published on July 2, 2010 and, while it contained some changes from the proposed rule, it still contained some troubling language.

First, as we noted in our article, the location of the proposed profit language seemed illogical.  We were pleased to note that the FAR Councils relocated the profit language from 15.404-4(a)(3) to 15.404-4(c)(3).

Several commenters disagreed with the elimination of profit on contractor-acquired property.  The FAR Councils heard the objections and modified some aspects of the proposed rule.  But they left intact the elimination of profit/fee on items that the contractor acquires, where those items are not part of a deliverable.

The final rule now states—

15.404-4   Profit.

* * * * *

    (c) * * *

    (3) * * * Before applying profit or fee factors, the contracting officer shall exclude from the pre-negotiation cost objective amounts the purchase cost of contractor-acquired property that is categorized as equipment, as defined in FAR 45.101, and where such equipment is to be charged directly to the contract. * * *

The term “equipment” is defined as—

Equipment means a tangible item that is functionally complete for its intended purpose, durable, nonexpendable, and needed for the performance of a contract. Equipment is not intended for sale, and does not ordinarily lose its identity or become a component part of another article when put into use. Equipment does not include material, real property, special test equipment or special tooling.

Why did the FAR Councils take this approach?  As they wrote in the promulgating comments—

While the application of this policy tended to be obfuscated by the term ‘facilities,’ the underlying principle was clear--that when the contractor buys equipment or acquires real property on a ‘pass through’ basis, i.e., when not part of a deliverable, it is the Government--not the contractor--who assumes the risk. Moreover, it is generally held that upon contract award, contractors are required to furnish all property necessary to perform Government contracts (FAR Part 45.102) as well as all the necessary resources needed for contract performance (FAR 9.104-1(f), General standards).

Accordingly, it is not appropriate for the Government to include the cost of contractor acquired property (equipment) when calculating the Government's pre-negotiation profit or fee objective. Including such costs would unduly compensate the contractor for obtaining equipment it should already have; and for risks it did not incur. This is a long held view; however, up until the publication of the proposed rule FAR Case 2008-011, it had not been adequately addressed in the

FAR.

This policy does not exclude the otherwise allowable cost of depreciation under FAR 31.205-11.

Accordingly, contractors now have a clear disincentive to direct-charge costs of purchasing equipment to their Government contracts.  Instead, we should expect them to include such costs in their overhead rates, as depreciation.  However, given DOD’s recent emphasis on curbing contractor overhead, this strategy has its own pitfalls.

The new rule contains much more than the policy statement noted above.  But this is the one that caught our eye.  Interested readers should follow the link above and review the multi-faceted rule in its entirety.



 

The New Buzzword is “Affordability”

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It was May 8, 2010, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fired the first salvo.  In a speech at the Eisenhower Library marking the anniversary of the allied victory in Europe, he quoted President Eisenhower as saying, “the patriot today is the fellow who can do the job with less money.”  SecDef Gates asserted that the “gusher of defense spending” that came after the 9/11 attacks “has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time.”  SecDef Gates continued—

On one level it’s a simple matter of math. The fact that we are a nation at war and facing an uncertain world … calls for sustaining the current military force structure... This typically requires regular real growth in the defense budget ranging from two and three percent above inflation. In this year’s budget request, the Defense Department asked for, and I hope will receive, just under two percent – roughly that level of growth. But, realistically, it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure. … The changes we have made in the procurement arena represent an important start. But only a start. More is needed – much more. The Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operated – indeed, every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask: First, is this respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal duress? And second, is this activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?

As a starting point, no real progress toward savings will be possible without reforming our budgeting practices and assumptions. Too often budgets are divied up and doled out every year as a straight line projection of what was spent the year before. Very rarely is the activity funded in these areas ever fundamentally re-examined – either in terms of quantity, type, or whether it should be conducted at all. That needs to change. … Another category ripe for scrutiny should be overhead – all the activity and bureaucracy that supports the military mission. According to an estimate by the Defense Business Board, overhead, broadly defined, makes up roughly 40 percent of the Department’s budget. … Almost a decade ago, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17 levels of staff between him and a line officer. The Defense Business Board recently estimated that in some cases the gap between me and an action officer may be as high as 30 layers. … Finally, this Department’s approach to requirements must change. Before making claims of requirements not being met or alleged ‘gaps’ – in ships, tactical fighters, personnel, or anything else – we need to evaluate the criteria upon which requirements are based and the wider real world context. For example, should we really be up in arms over a temporary projected shortfall of about 100 Navy and Marine strike fighters relative to the number of carrier wings, when America’s military possesses more than 3,200 tactical combat aircraft of all kinds? Does the number of warships we have and are building really put America at risk when the U.S. battle fleet is larger than the next 13 navies combined, 11 of which belong to allies and partners? Is it a dire threat that by 2020 the United States will have only 20 times more advanced stealth fighters than China? … Therefore, as the Defense Department begins the process of preparing next’s years Fiscal Year 2012 budget request, I am directing the military services, the joint staff, the major functional and regional commands, and the civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing look at how they operate – in substance and style alike. The goal is to cut our overhead costs and to transfer those savings to force structure and modernization within the programmed budget. In other words, to convert sufficient ‘tail’ to ‘tooth’ to provide the equivalent of the roughly two to three percent real growth – resources needed to sustain our combat power at a time of war and make investments to prepare for an uncertain future. Simply taking a few percent off the top of everything on a one-time basis will not do. These savings must stem from root-and-branch changes that can be sustained and added to over time.

The Secretary called for trimming $100 billion (actually, $101.9 billion) from within the Pentagon’s budget.  Readers of this website should not have been surprised at SecDef Gates’ words.  We’ve been posting articles about the state of Defense spending almost since our inception.  This has been a long time coming.

But notice the Secretary’s focus.  It is not on contractors, but instead on the Pentagon’s overhead—what he called the “bureaucracy that supports the military mission.”  SecDef Gates called for the Pentagon to lean itself down and implement sustainable measures to cut the DOD’s own overhead costs.  Keep that in mind as you read further.

Six weeks later, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) Dr. Ashton Carter met with several defense industry leaders “to discuss policy, process and workforce changes that will help the Defense Department buy things more efficiently,”  according to this article.  The Federal Times article reported that “On June 4, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said a goal will be to find two-thirds of the money, about $66.3 billion over five years, from support programs.”  It also noted that the senior defense industry executives were “not exactly sure what to expect,” because of the short-fuse timing of the meeting.

On June 28 and 29, details quickly emerged from the meeting.  First, Dr. Carter released a Memorandum addressed to “Acquisition Professionals” entitled, “Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending.”  The Memo called for “delivering better value to the taxpayer and improving the way the [Defense] Department does business.”  USD (A,T&L) Carter wrote that—

Deputy Secretary Lynn expects that two-thirds of the savings … can be found within [current] programs and activities. … We need to restore affordability to our programs and activities … by identifying and eliminating unproductive or low-value-added overhead; in effect, doing more without more. The Department is spending … $400 billion on contracts issued to entities outside the Department of Defense. … Each of these contracts contains a statement of the services or products it is procuring; an arrangement between the government and the contractor for how the costs of those items will be paid; and the overheads, indirect charges, and fees that complete the business transaction and make it possible for the defense industry to be economically viable.  The guidance memorandum I plan to issue will require each of you … to scrutinize these terms to ensure that they do not contain inefficiencies or unneeded overhead.  … The guidance will focus on getting better outcomes, not on our bureaucratic structures.  … Most of the rest of the economy exhibits productivity growth, meaning that every year the buyer gets more for the same amount of money.  So it should be in the defense economy.

Accompanying the Memorandum was several PowerPoint slides providing additional details on the foregoing and establishing six overall objectives.  Among those objectives were:  “Restore affordability to defense goods and services,” “Improve defense industry productivity,” and “Maintain a vibrant and financially healthy defense industry.”  To incentivize industry and accomplish the objectives, the DOD will—

  • Phase-out award-fee contracts and favor fixed-price or cost-type incentive contracts …
  • Phase-out Time and Material and sole-source ID/IQ contracts wherever possible.
  • Identify and eliminate non-value-added overhead and G&A charged to contracts.
  • Limit B&P allowable costs in sole source contracts and encourage effective use of IRAD.
  • Adopt “should-cost” and “will-cost” management to inform managing of programs to cost objectives.
  • Improve consistency and quality of government audits, and focus them on value-added content.
  • Mandate affordability as a [contract award] requirement by having cost considerations shape requirements and design.

What is one to make of these initiatives?  Our first thought is that “everything old is new again,” as much of the foregoing seems to be a rehash of prior initiatives.  For example, remember the CAIV initiative of the mid-90’s?  In addition, the idea of limiting B&P and IR&D spending is a revisiting of pre-FASA ceilings on such costs—an idea that was repealed by Congress in order to foster innovation in the defense industry.  Moreover, the idea that contract budgets can be controlled solely by contract type (e.g., fixed-price types) without focusing on better definition of requirements and specifications is provably wrong.

There will be more on this topic, yes indeed.  But one final thought for this piece.  Look again at SecDef Gates’ original remarks.  Notice his focus was on the Pentagon, not the contractors.  Now look at Dr. Carter’s Memorandum and the accompanying slides.  Notice his focus is on the contractors, not the Pentagon.  We wonder how that metamorphosis took place within a mere six weeks’ time.  Maybe the sound bite just played better in media and in front of Congress.  But somehow, instead of fixing itself, the Pentagon has decided to launch a major initiative to fix its contractors.

Stay tuned.  More on this to follow, we’re quite sure.



 

Manned Space Exploration—Where Do We Go From Here?

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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been treated like a red-headed stepchild over the past few Presidential administrations.  Sure, Presidents talk a good game—return to the Moon, human exploration of Mars, et cetera—but we all know that the budget needs of the agency have taken a distant back seat to the needs of other Executive agencies, including the Department of Defense.  After all, fighting a Global War on Terror clearly takes precedence, as do the needs of the Department of Homeland Security.

Even if NASA had been given all the funding it needed, there is some question as to whether they could have spent wisely.  In any case, things look bleak for the beleaguered agency.  We have posted before about findings from the Augustine panel or Augustine Commission or The Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee (or whatever you want to call it).  See, for example, this post or this one.

The Augustine Commission told President Obama—

The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources. Space operations are among the most demanding and unforgiving pursuits ever undertaken by humans. … Space operations become all the more difficult when means do not match aspirations. Such is the case today. … Once the Shuttle is retired, there will be a gap in the capability of the United States itself to launch humans into space. … The Committee did not identify any credible approach employing new capabilities that could shorten the gap to less than six years. The only way to significantly close the gap is to extend the life of the Shuttle Program.

There are some who have called for NASA to get out of way, and let private industry tackle the problem.  For example, this blog entry asserted that the Government simply can’t oversee space exploration.  Conquering space?  Sure.  But exploring it?  Not a chance.  The Government needs to get out of the way of the entrepreneurs who have the necessary vision and passion to lead the exploration of space.  The author, Jim Wright, said—

Governments don’t explore.

Governments conquer. Governments grandstand and stage stunts. Governments argue and bicker and wage war. Some are good and some are bad and some are indifferent.

But they don’t explore.

It is human beings who explore. Individuals of courage and daring and burning passion and enterprise.  …

The Constellation program has been doomed from the start. Hell, the Constellation program has been doomed since July 20th, 1969. We’ve been there, we’ve done that – and America as a nation wasn’t interested in continuing when we had the hardware and the resources, what makes you think we’ll do it now when we have to recreate the entire infrastructure at a hundred or a thousand times the cost? Access to space hasn’t gotten cheaper or less complex, just the opposite in fact. The age of daring, of the test pilot astronaut is over – it’s the age of the bean counter. Constellation has always been underfunded, organized by committee after endless committee, awash in adminstrivia and paperwork and government bullshit – and really, it was never more than a political gambit by an uninspired and uninspiring twit of an anti-science President who tried to pull a do-over of JFK but couldn’t motivate his own Administration let alone galvanize the nation…

Constellation has always been doomed.

Constellation has always been doomed because governments don’t explore. Bean counters and bureaucrats don’t explore. Because when Congress runs your space program, indeed any program, you are doomed from the start.  …

It is private corporations who explore, hunting profit and new markets and assets and resources. …

Governments don’t explore, but if they do the job right their citizens do.

We have discussed several private industry initiatives that would advance the state of space exploration technology.  For example, we reported on the VASIMIR© plasma propulsion engine and the company developing the promising technology, the Ad Astra Rocket Company.  We also reported on ALICE (Aluminum/ICE) propellant that would drastically lower launch expenses because it could be manufactured on the Moon or Mars instead of being transported there.  So President Obama’s recent call to NASA to “jump-start development of a commercial space industry” instead of focusing on the Constellation program is not as far-fetched as it may at first seem.

Here is a link to details of the Obama Space Plan, over at Space.com. 

One of the private companies best positioned to capitalize on the Obama Plan is SpaceX (Space Exploration Technologies).  We have written about SpaceX before—notably here, where we noted its aim of reducing launch costs “by a factor of ten.”  The company is also linked to VASIMIR©, as we reported it was in negotiations to deliver Ad Astra’s VX-200 model to the International Space Station for testing in space.

Here is a snippet from Elan Musk’s statement on the Obama Space Plan, as found on the company’s site.

In 2003, following the Columbia accident, President Bush began development of … the Ares I rocket and Orion spacecraft. It is important to note that this too would only have been able to reach low Earth orbit. Many in the media mistakenly assumed it was capable of reaching the Moon. As is not unusual with large government programs, the schedule slipped by several years and costs ballooned by tens of billions.

By the time President Obama cancelled Ares I/Orion earlier this year, the schedule had already slipped five years to 2017 and completing development would have required another $50 billion. Moreover, the cost per flight, inclusive of overhead, was estimated to be at least $1.5 billion compared to the $1 billion of Shuttle, despite carrying only four people to Shuttle's seven and almost no cargo.

The President quite reasonably concluded that spending $50 billion to develop a vehicle that would cost 50% more to operate, but carry 50% less payload was perhaps not the best possible use of funds. To quote a member of the Augustine Commission, which was convened by the President to analyze Ares/Orion, ‘If Santa Claus brought us the system tomorrow, fully developed, and the budget didn't change, our next action would have to be to cancel it,’ because we can't afford the annual operating costs.

Cancellation was therefore simply a matter of time and thankfully we have a president with the political courage to do the right thing sooner rather than later. We can ill afford the expense of an ‘Apollo on steroids’, as a former NASA Administrator referred to the Ares/Orion program. …

Thankfully, as a result of funds freed up by this cancellation, there is now hope for a bright future in space exploration. The new plan is to harness our nation's unparalleled system of free enterprise … to create far more reliable and affordable rockets. Handing over Earth orbit transport to American commercial companies, overseen of course by NASA and the FAA, will free up the NASA resources necessary to develop interplanetary transport technologies. This is critically important if we are to reach Mars, the next giant leap in human exploration of the Universe.

… For the first time since Apollo, our country will have a plan for space exploration that inspires and excites all who look to the stars. Even more important, it will work.

On June 7, 2010, SpaceX reported that its Falcon 9 launch vehicle had successfully launched “and achieved full Earth orbit right on target.”  As the company announced—

SpaceX currently has an extensive and diverse manifest of over 30 contracted missions, including 18 missions to deliver commercial satellites to orbit. In addition, the Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft have been contracted by NASA to carry cargo, which includes live plants and animals, to and from the ISS. Both Falcon 9 and Dragon have already been designed to meet NASA’s published human rating standards for astronaut transport, allowing for a rapid transition to astronauts within three years of receiving a contract to do so. The critical path item is development and testing of the launch escape system, which would be a significant improvement in safety over the Space Shuttle, which does not possess an escape system.

Yes, we are heartsick at the United States Government’s abandonment of its commitment to manned space flight.  But so long as the future of the program is in the hands of companies such as Ad Astra and SpaceX, we are not overly despondent.  To put it another way, we’d rather have Elan Musk and Franklin Chang Diaz running the show, instead of the current NASA administrator and his team.

PHOTO CREDIT:  The Russian Progress resupply craft on track to dock with the International Space Station.  The first attempt was aborted, but the second attempt was successful.  Photo courtesy of NASA.



 

Miscellaneous Morsels of Misadventures

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We’ve been saving up some news tidbits:  each one not really worth an individual article but still somewhat interesting (to us, at least).  Here we go—

  • Bagram Update – We’ve written about “issues” at Bagram Airfield before.  We wrote, “we perceive an inequitable distribution of iniquity, with Bagram seemingly receiving more than its fair share of noteworthy corruption stories.”  Now comes word that “Two Afghan trucking companies pleaded guilty today to paying multiple bribes to U.S. public officials in exchange for unfair advantages in procuring contract work at the Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.”  The news story continued—

Afghan International Trucking (AIT) and Afghan Trade Transportation (ATT) each pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia to one count of bribery. According to the companies' plea agreements, AIT will pay $3.36 million in criminal fines and ATT will pay $1.04 million in criminal fines. … AIT made corrupt payments of more than $120,000 to military officials in Afghanistan, including James Paul Clifton, Ana Chavez and a third, unnamed individual. ATT made corrupt payments totaling more than $30,000 to Clifton. According to the statement of facts, employees for AIT started offering money to officials in the transportation office beginning in 2004. At one point, AIT paid Chavez with a candy box stuffed with $70,000. … in mid-2008, AIT was paying Clifton $20,000 a month for preferable treatment. In May 2008, ATT entered into a similar illegal agreement with Clifton by which ATT paid bribes of $15,000 a month in exchange for Clifton assigning ATT an additional day of trucking service a month.

  • Oil for Food Corruption – The Department of Justice reported that “Canadian/Lebanese dual national Ousama M. Naaman pleaded guilty today to participating in an eight-year conspiracy to defraud the United Nations Oil for Food Program (OFFP) and to bribe Iraqi government officials in connection with the sale of a chemical additive used in the refining of leaded fuel.”  According to the DOJ release, “He pleaded guilty today to a two-count superseding information filed June 24, 2010, charging him with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and falsify the books and records of a U.S. issuer; and one count of violating the FCPA.”  The release continued—

From 2001 to 2003, acting on behalf of Innospec, Naaman offered and paid 10 percent kickbacks to the then Iraqi government in exchange for five contracts under the OFFP.   Naaman negotiated the contracts, including a 10 percent increase in the price to cover the kickback, and routed the funds to Iraqi government accounts in the Middle East.   Innospec inflated its prices in contracts approved by the OFFP to cover the cost of the kickbacks.  Naaman also admitted that from 2004 to 2008, he paid and promised to pay more than $3 million in bribes, in the form of cash, as well as travel, gifts and entertainment, to officials of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the Trade Bank of Iraq to secure sales of tetraethyl lead in Iraq, as well as to secure more favorable exchange rates on the contracts.   Naaman provided Innospec with false invoices to support the payments, and those invoices were incorporated into the books and records of Innospec.  Naaman faces a maximum prison sentence of 10 years.   His sentencing has not yet been scheduled.

  • Aerovironment – Last (but not least), we have to follow-up our very recent article on a couple of False Claims settlements with news that another defense contractor, Aerovironment, reported that the Department of Justice is investigating “certain of its billing practices” and that the company “is voluntarily cooperating” with the investigation.  According to the report, the investigation is focused on three matters:  (1) the appropriateness of certain expenses included in AV’s fiscal year 2006 Incurred Indirect Cost Claim, (2) billing labor rates associated with time and materials government contracts, and (3) billing rates for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems maintenance and repair contracts.  In addition, the company denied that the recent departure of its CFO was unrelated to the investigation.  Let’s hope the company comes through the DOJ investigation as well as the other companies did—i.e., by settling the matter quickly.



 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.