FAR Revised to Eliminate Profit on Cost of Direct-Charged Equipment
In August,
2009, we reported on a proposed FAR rule
that looked very much as if it would have required Contracting Officers
to exclude from profit consideration “all contractor-acquired property,
unless an item is expressly called-out as a contract deliverable,” when
establishing pre-negotiation profit objectives. Well, the final rule was published on July 2, 2010 and, while it contained some
changes from the proposed rule, it still contained some troubling
language.
First, as we noted in our article,
the location of the proposed profit language seemed illogical. We were
pleased to note that the FAR Councils relocated the profit language from
15.404-4(a)(3) to 15.404-4(c)(3).
Several
commenters disagreed with the elimination of profit on
contractor-acquired property. The FAR Councils heard the objections and
modified some aspects of the proposed rule. But they left intact the
elimination of profit/fee on items that the contractor acquires, where
those items are not part of a deliverable.
The
final rule now states—
15.404-4 Profit.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * * Before applying profit or fee
factors, the contracting officer shall exclude from the pre-negotiation
cost objective amounts the purchase cost of contractor-acquired property
that is categorized as equipment, as defined in FAR 45.101, and where
such equipment is to be charged directly to the contract. * * *
The term “equipment” is defined as—
Equipment means a tangible item that is
functionally complete for its intended purpose, durable, nonexpendable,
and needed for the performance of a contract. Equipment is not intended
for sale, and does not ordinarily lose its identity or become a
component part of another article when put into use. Equipment does not
include material, real property, special test equipment or special
tooling.
Why did the FAR Councils take this
approach? As they wrote in the promulgating comments—
While the application of this policy tended to be
obfuscated by the term ‘facilities,’ the underlying principle was
clear--that when the contractor buys equipment or acquires real property
on a ‘pass through’ basis, i.e., when not part of a deliverable, it is
the Government--not the contractor--who assumes the risk. Moreover, it
is generally held that upon contract award, contractors are required to
furnish all property necessary to perform Government contracts (FAR Part 45.102) as well as all
the necessary resources needed for contract performance (FAR 9.104-1(f),
General standards).
Accordingly, it is not appropriate for the Government to include the
cost of contractor acquired property (equipment) when calculating the
Government's pre-negotiation profit or fee objective. Including such
costs would unduly compensate the contractor for obtaining equipment it
should already have; and for risks it did not
incur. This is a long held view; however, up until the publication of
the proposed rule FAR Case 2008-011, it had not been adequately
addressed in the
FAR.
This policy does not exclude the otherwise
allowable cost of depreciation under FAR 31.205-11.
Accordingly, contractors now have a clear disincentive to
direct-charge costs of purchasing equipment to their Government
contracts. Instead, we should expect them to include such costs in
their overhead rates, as depreciation. However, given DOD’s recent emphasis on curbing contractor overhead, this strategy has its own
pitfalls.
The new rule contains much more
than the policy statement noted above. But this is the one that caught
our eye. Interested readers should follow the link above and review the
multi-faceted rule in its entirety.
The New Buzzword is “Affordability”
It was May 8, 2010, when U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fired the first salvo. In a speech at the Eisenhower Library marking the
anniversary of the allied victory in Europe, he quoted President
Eisenhower as saying, “the patriot today is the fellow who can do the
job with less money.” SecDef Gates asserted that the “gusher of defense
spending” that came after the 9/11 attacks “has been turned off, and
will stay off for a good period of time.” SecDef Gates continued—
On one level it’s a simple matter of math. The fact that we are a nation at war
and facing an uncertain world … calls for sustaining the current
military force structure...
This typically requires regular real growth in the defense budget
ranging from two and three percent above inflation. In this year’s budget request, the
Defense Department asked for, and I hope will receive, just under two
percent – roughly that level of growth. But, realistically, it is highly unlikely that we will
achieve the real growth rates necessary to sustain the current force
structure. … The changes we have made in the procurement arena represent
an important start. But
only a start. More is
needed – much more. The
Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it is
organized, staffed, and operated – indeed, every aspect of how it does
business. In each instance
we must ask: First, is this
respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal
duress? And second, is this
activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the
pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and
invest in the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and
lethal future threats?
As a
starting point, no real progress toward savings will be possible without
reforming our budgeting practices and assumptions. Too often budgets are divied up and doled out every year as a
straight line projection of what was spent the year before. Very rarely is the activity funded in
these areas ever fundamentally re-examined – either in terms of
quantity, type, or whether it should be conducted at all. That needs to change. … Another
category ripe for scrutiny should be overhead – all the activity and
bureaucracy that supports the military mission. According to an estimate by the Defense Business Board,
overhead, broadly defined, makes up roughly 40 percent of the
Department’s budget. …
Almost a decade ago, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17
levels of staff between him and a line officer. The Defense Business Board recently estimated that in some
cases the gap between me and an action officer may be as high as 30
layers. … Finally, this Department’s approach to requirements must
change. Before making
claims of requirements not being met or alleged ‘gaps’ – in ships,
tactical fighters, personnel, or anything else – we need to evaluate the
criteria upon which requirements are based and the wider real world
context. For example,
should we really be up in arms over a temporary projected shortfall of
about 100 Navy and Marine strike fighters relative to the number of
carrier wings, when America’s military possesses more than 3,200
tactical combat aircraft of all kinds? Does the number of warships we
have and are building really put America at risk when the U.S. battle
fleet is larger than the next 13 navies combined, 11 of which belong to
allies and partners? Is it a
dire threat that by 2020 the United States will have only 20 times more advanced stealth fighters than China? … Therefore, as the Defense Department
begins the process of preparing next’s years Fiscal Year 2012 budget
request, I am directing the
military services, the joint staff, the major functional and regional
commands, and the civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard,
unsparing look at how they operate – in substance and style alike. The goal is to cut our overhead costs
and to transfer those savings to force structure and modernization
within the programmed budget. In other words, to convert sufficient ‘tail’ to ‘tooth’ to
provide the equivalent of the roughly two to three percent real growth –
resources needed to sustain our
combat power at a time of war and make investments to prepare for an
uncertain future. Simply
taking a few percent off the top of everything on a one-time basis will
not do. These savings must
stem from root-and-branch changes that can be sustained and added to
over time.
The Secretary called for trimming $100 billion (actually,
$101.9 billion) from within the Pentagon’s budget. Readers of this
website should not have been surprised at SecDef Gates’ words. We’ve
been posting articles about the state of Defense spending almost since
our inception. This has been a long time coming.
But notice the Secretary’s focus. It is not on contractors,
but instead on the Pentagon’s overhead—what he called the “bureaucracy
that supports the military mission.” SecDef Gates called for the
Pentagon to lean itself down and implement sustainable measures to cut
the DOD’s own overhead costs. Keep that in mind as you read further.
Six weeks later, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) Dr. Ashton Carter met with several defense
industry leaders “to discuss policy, process and workforce changes that
will help the Defense Department buy things more efficiently,”
according to this article. The Federal
Times article reported that “On June 4, Deputy Defense Secretary William
Lynn said a goal will be to find two-thirds of the money, about $66.3
billion over five years, from support programs.” It also noted that the
senior defense industry executives were “not exactly sure what to
expect,” because of the short-fuse timing of the meeting.
On June 28 and 29, details quickly emerged from the meeting.
First, Dr. Carter released a Memorandum addressed to “Acquisition
Professionals” entitled, “Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring
Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending.” The Memo called
for “delivering better value to the taxpayer and improving the way the
[Defense] Department does business.” USD (A,T&L) Carter wrote that—
Deputy Secretary Lynn expects that two-thirds of
the savings … can be found within [current] programs and activities. …
We need to restore affordability to our programs and activities … by
identifying and eliminating unproductive or low-value-added overhead; in
effect, doing more without more. The Department is spending … $400
billion on contracts issued to entities outside the Department of
Defense. … Each of these contracts contains a statement of the services
or products it is procuring; an arrangement between the government and
the contractor for how the costs of those items will be paid; and the
overheads, indirect charges, and fees that complete the business
transaction and make it possible for the defense industry to be
economically viable. The guidance memorandum I plan to issue will
require each of you … to scrutinize these terms to
ensure that they do not contain inefficiencies or unneeded overhead. …
The guidance will focus on getting better outcomes, not on our
bureaucratic structures. … Most of the rest of the economy exhibits
productivity growth, meaning that every year the buyer gets more for the
same amount of money. So it should be in the defense economy.
Accompanying the Memorandum was
several PowerPoint slides providing additional details on the foregoing
and establishing six overall objectives. Among those objectives were:
“Restore affordability to defense goods and services,” “Improve defense
industry productivity,” and “Maintain a vibrant and financially healthy
defense industry.” To incentivize industry and accomplish the
objectives, the DOD will—
- Phase-out award-fee
contracts and favor fixed-price or cost-type incentive contracts …
- Phase-out Time and Material and sole-source ID/IQ
contracts wherever possible.
- Identify
and eliminate non-value-added overhead and G&A charged to
contracts.
- Limit B&P
allowable costs in sole source contracts and encourage effective use of
IRAD.
- Adopt “should-cost” and
“will-cost” management to inform managing of programs to cost
objectives.
- Improve consistency
and quality of government audits, and focus them on value-added content.
- Mandate affordability as a [contract award]
requirement by having cost considerations shape requirements and design.
What is one to make of these initiatives? Our first thought
is that “everything old is new again,” as much of the foregoing seems to
be a rehash of prior initiatives. For example, remember the CAIV initiative of the mid-90’s? In addition, the idea of
limiting B&P and IR&D spending is a revisiting of pre-FASA
ceilings on such costs—an idea that was repealed by Congress in order to
foster innovation in the defense industry. Moreover, the idea that
contract budgets can be controlled solely by contract type (e.g.,
fixed-price types) without focusing on better definition of requirements
and specifications is provably wrong.
There will
be more on this topic, yes indeed. But one final thought for this
piece. Look again at SecDef Gates’ original remarks. Notice his focus
was on the Pentagon, not the contractors.
Now look at Dr. Carter’s Memorandum and the accompanying slides. Notice
his focus is on the contractors, not the
Pentagon. We wonder how that metamorphosis took place within a mere six
weeks’ time. Maybe the sound bite just played better in media and in
front of Congress. But somehow, instead of fixing itself, the Pentagon
has decided to launch a major initiative to fix its contractors.
Stay tuned. More on this to follow, we’re quite sure.
|
Manned Space Exploration—Where Do We Go From Here?

The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) has been treated like a red-headed stepchild over
the past few Presidential administrations. Sure, Presidents talk a good
game—return to the Moon, human exploration of Mars, et cetera—but we
all know that the budget needs of the agency have taken a distant back
seat to the needs of other Executive agencies, including the Department
of Defense. After all, fighting a Global War on Terror clearly takes
precedence, as do the needs of the
Department of Homeland Security.
Even if
NASA had been given all the funding it needed, there is some question as
to whether they could have spent wisely.
In any case, things look bleak for the beleaguered agency. We have
posted before about findings from the Augustine panel or Augustine
Commission or The Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee (or
whatever you want to call it). See, for example, this post or this one.
The Augustine Commission told President Obama—
The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be
on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals
that do not match allocated resources. Space operations are among the most demanding and unforgiving
pursuits ever undertaken by humans. … Space operations become all the
more difficult when means do not match aspirations. Such is the case today. … Once the Shuttle is retired, there
will be a gap in the capability of the United States itself to launch
humans into space. … The Committee did not identify any credible
approach employing new capabilities that could shorten the gap to less
than six years. The only
way to significantly close the gap is to extend the life of the Shuttle
Program.
There are some who have called for
NASA to get out of way, and let private industry tackle the problem.
For example, this blog entry asserted that
the Government simply can’t oversee space
exploration. Conquering space? Sure. But exploring it? Not a
chance. The Government needs to get out of the way of the entrepreneurs
who have the necessary vision and passion to lead the exploration of space. The author, Jim Wright, said—
Governments don’t explore.
Governments conquer. Governments grandstand
and stage stunts. Governments argue and bicker and wage war. Some are
good and some are bad and some are indifferent.
But they don’t explore.
It is human beings who explore. Individuals of
courage and daring and burning passion and enterprise. …
The Constellation
program has been doomed from the start. Hell, the Constellation program
has been doomed since July 20th, 1969. We’ve been there, we’ve done that –
and America as a nation wasn’t interested
in continuing when we had the hardware and the
resources, what makes you think we’ll do it now when we have to recreate
the entire infrastructure at a hundred or a thousand times the cost?
Access to space hasn’t gotten cheaper or less complex, just the opposite
in fact. The age of daring, of the test pilot astronaut is over – it’s
the age of the bean counter. Constellation has always been underfunded, organized by committee after
endless committee, awash in adminstrivia and paperwork and government
bullshit – and really, it was never more than a political gambit by an
uninspired and uninspiring twit of an anti-science President who tried
to pull a do-over of JFK but couldn’t motivate his own Administration
let alone galvanize the nation…
Constellation has always been doomed.
Constellation has always been doomed because governments don’t
explore. Bean counters and bureaucrats don’t explore. Because when
Congress runs your space program, indeed any program, you are doomed
from the start. …
It is
private corporations who explore, hunting profit and new markets and
assets and resources. …
Governments
don’t explore, but if they do the job right their citizens do.
We have
discussed several private industry initiatives that would advance the
state of space exploration technology. For example, we reported on the VASIMIR© plasma propulsion engine and the company
developing the promising technology, the Ad Astra Rocket Company. We also reported on ALICE
(Aluminum/ICE) propellant that would drastically lower launch expenses
because it could be manufactured on the Moon or Mars instead of being
transported there. So President Obama’s recent call to NASA to “jump-start development of a commercial space
industry” instead of focusing on the Constellation program is not as
far-fetched as it may at first seem.
Here is a
link to details of the Obama Space Plan, over
at Space.com.
One of the private companies best
positioned to capitalize on the Obama Plan is SpaceX (Space Exploration Technologies). We have written about
SpaceX before—notably here, where we noted
its aim of reducing launch costs “by a factor of ten.” The company is
also linked to VASIMIR©, as we reported it was in negotiations to
deliver Ad Astra’s VX-200 model to the International Space Station for
testing in space.
Here is a snippet from Elan Musk’s
statement on the Obama Space Plan, as found on the company’s site.
In 2003, following the
Columbia accident, President Bush began development of … the Ares I
rocket and Orion spacecraft. It is important to note that this too would
only have been able to reach low Earth orbit. Many in the media
mistakenly assumed it was capable of reaching the Moon. As is not
unusual with large government programs, the schedule slipped by several
years and costs ballooned by tens of billions.
By the time President Obama cancelled Ares
I/Orion earlier this year, the schedule had already slipped five years
to 2017 and completing development would have required another $50
billion. Moreover, the cost per flight, inclusive of overhead, was
estimated to be at least $1.5 billion compared to the $1 billion of
Shuttle, despite carrying only four people to Shuttle's seven and almost
no cargo.
The
President quite reasonably concluded that spending $50 billion to
develop a vehicle that would cost 50% more to operate, but carry 50%
less payload was perhaps not the best possible use of funds. To quote a
member of the Augustine Commission, which was convened by the President
to analyze Ares/Orion, ‘If Santa Claus brought us the system tomorrow,
fully developed, and the budget didn't change, our next action would
have to be to cancel it,’ because we can't afford the annual operating
costs.
Cancellation was therefore
simply a matter of time and thankfully we have a president with the
political courage to do the right thing sooner rather than later. We can
ill afford the expense of an ‘Apollo on steroids’, as a former NASA
Administrator referred to the Ares/Orion program. …
Thankfully, as a result of funds freed up by
this cancellation, there is now hope for a bright future in space
exploration. The new plan is to harness our nation's unparalleled system
of free enterprise … to create far more reliable and affordable
rockets. Handing over Earth orbit transport to American commercial
companies, overseen of course by NASA and the FAA, will free up the NASA
resources necessary to develop interplanetary transport technologies.
This is critically important if we are to reach Mars, the next giant
leap in human exploration of the Universe.
… For the first time since Apollo, our country will have a
plan for space exploration that inspires and excites all who look to the
stars. Even more important, it will work.
On
June 7, 2010, SpaceX reported that its
Falcon 9 launch vehicle had successfully launched “and achieved full
Earth orbit right on target.” As the company announced—
SpaceX currently has an extensive and diverse
manifest of over 30 contracted missions, including 18 missions to
deliver commercial satellites to orbit. In addition, the Falcon 9 launch
vehicle and Dragon spacecraft have been contracted by NASA to carry
cargo, which includes live plants and animals, to and from the ISS. Both
Falcon 9 and Dragon have already been designed to meet NASA’s published
human rating standards for astronaut transport, allowing for a rapid
transition to astronauts within three years of receiving a contract to
do so. The critical path item is development and testing of the launch
escape system, which would be a significant improvement in safety over
the Space Shuttle, which does not possess an escape system.
Yes, we are heartsick at the United States Government’s
abandonment of its commitment to manned space flight. But so long as
the future of the program is in the hands of companies such as Ad Astra
and SpaceX, we are not overly despondent. To put it another way, we’d
rather have Elan Musk and Franklin Chang
Diaz running the show, instead of the current
NASA administrator and his team.
PHOTO
CREDIT: The Russian Progress resupply craft on track to
dock with the International Space Station. The first attempt was
aborted, but the second attempt was successful. Photo courtesy of NASA.
Miscellaneous Morsels of Misadventures
We’ve been saving up some news
tidbits: each one not really worth an individual article but still
somewhat interesting (to us, at least). Here we go—
- Bagram Update –
We’ve written about “issues” at Bagram Airfield before. We wrote, “we perceive an inequitable distribution of
iniquity, with Bagram seemingly receiving more than its fair share of
noteworthy corruption stories.” Now comes word that “Two Afghan trucking companies pleaded guilty today to
paying multiple bribes to U.S. public officials in exchange for unfair
advantages in procuring contract work at the Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.” The news story continued—
Afghan International Trucking (AIT) and Afghan Trade
Transportation (ATT) each pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia to one count of bribery.
According to the companies' plea agreements, AIT will pay $3.36 million in criminal fines and ATT will pay $1.04 million in criminal fines. … AIT made
corrupt payments of more than $120,000 to military
officials in Afghanistan, including James Paul Clifton, Ana Chavez and a third, unnamed individual. ATT made corrupt payments totaling more than $30,000 to Clifton. According to the
statement of facts, employees for AIT started offering money to
officials in the transportation office beginning in 2004. At one point, AIT paid Chavez with a candy box stuffed with $70,000. … in mid-2008, AIT was paying Clifton $20,000 a month for preferable treatment. In May 2008, ATT entered into a similar illegal
agreement with Clifton by which ATT paid bribes of $15,000 a month in exchange for Clifton assigning ATT an
additional day of trucking service a month.
- Oil for Food Corruption – The Department of Justice reported that “Canadian/Lebanese
dual national Ousama M. Naaman pleaded guilty today to participating in
an eight-year conspiracy to defraud the United Nations Oil for Food
Program (OFFP) and to bribe Iraqi government officials in connection
with the sale of a chemical additive used in the refining of leaded
fuel.” According to the DOJ release, “He pleaded guilty today to a
two-count superseding information filed June 24, 2010, charging him with
one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, violate the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and falsify the books and records of a
U.S. issuer; and one count of violating the FCPA.” The release
continued—
From 2001 to 2003, acting on behalf of Innospec, Naaman offered
and paid 10 percent kickbacks to the then Iraqi government in exchange
for five contracts under the OFFP. Naaman negotiated the contracts,
including a 10 percent increase in the price to cover the kickback, and
routed the funds to Iraqi government accounts in the Middle East.
Innospec inflated its prices in contracts approved by the OFFP to cover
the cost of the kickbacks. Naaman also admitted that from 2004 to 2008,
he paid and promised to pay more than $3 million in bribes, in the form
of cash, as well as travel, gifts and entertainment, to officials of
the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the Trade Bank of Iraq to secure sales of
tetraethyl lead in Iraq, as well as to secure more favorable exchange
rates on the contracts. Naaman provided Innospec with false invoices
to support the payments, and those invoices were incorporated into the
books and records of Innospec. Naaman faces a maximum prison sentence
of 10 years. His sentencing has not yet been scheduled.
- Aerovironment –
Last (but not least), we have to follow-up our very recent article on a couple of False Claims settlements with news that
another defense contractor, Aerovironment, reported that the Department of Justice is investigating “certain of its
billing practices” and that the company “is voluntarily cooperating”
with the investigation. According to the report, the investigation is
focused on three matters: (1) the
appropriateness of certain expenses included in AV’s fiscal year 2006
Incurred Indirect Cost Claim, (2) billing labor rates associated with
time and materials government contracts, and (3) billing rates for Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems maintenance and repair contracts. In
addition, the company denied that the recent departure of its CFO was
unrelated to the investigation. Let’s hope the company comes through
the DOJ investigation as well as the other companies did—i.e., by
settling the matter quickly.
|