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DCAA Director Patrick Fitzgerald Discusses His First Eight Months

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On July 8, 2010, Robert Brodsky of GovExec.com interviewed Patrick Fitzgerald, Director of DCAA.  It was Mr. Fitzgerald’s first interview since taking the helm of the drifting auditing agency back in November, after the departure of April Stephenson.  The interview, which was characterized by Mr. Brodsky as being “upbeat, but occasionally guarded,” focused on the changes undertaken by the new regime.  According to Mr. Fitzgerald, “the agency has … increased training, revamped the promotion and hiring process, and introduced a pilot program that will put a single DCAA manager in charge of major contractor audits.” 

The article states that Mr. Fitzgerald attributes lingering audit problems to the “crushing workload” facing the audit agency.  To address the workload issues, DCAA “has hired 500 new auditors and will add 1,000 more by fiscal 2015, a 37 percent staffing increase. DCAA also is planning to shed several low-priority services and place more emphasis on high-risk contracts.”

Despite the foregoing, the article notes that the number of audits DCAA expects to accomplish this year will be “dramatically lower” than in prior years.  The article reports that, “In fiscal 2008, the average time to complete a contractor pricing review was 28 days, compared with 72 days in fiscal 2010.”  So perhaps it’s not really the workload that’s causing “lingering audit problems,” but might be instead the process by which audits are being executed? 

Rank and file auditors “remain skeptical about the agency’s course,” according to the article.  (We reported on this skepticism several months ago, here.)  The article reported that—

They [auditors] said managers have overreacted to the GAO reports and now are obsessively focused on documenting their audit opinions and submitting perfect working papers. In some cases, DCAA employees said they were being told to fix minor typos or grammatical errors, bogging down the process. In addition, Stephenson introduced a policy that requires a field office manager to sign off on all audits, which employees said has compounded delays that hamper price negotiations with contractors.

Mr. Fitzgerald recognized that he has a problem at the field auditor level.  The article reported that—

To address morale problems, [he] established an internal review division to tackle complaints from employees and has subsequently beefed up the office's staff to 23 employees, including a senior executive. The director also has taken to the road during the past two months to hold 17 town hall meetings.

‘One of our big challenges is that we have to restore the trust between DCAA management and the workforce,’ he said. ‘I sense that's not there today. And it's going to take some time to do that.’

One only need examine the comments on the GovExec.com website, submitted in response to the article, to see that Mr. Fitzgerald has deeper issues to address than simply auditor morale problems.  For example, here are two comments from DCMA contracting officers:

  • DCAA no longer provides a useful service for contracting officers. It takes less time to justify why I do not need a DCAA audit than it takes to wait months for the audit. It might be worth the wait if the report had useful information. But no more. The reports are so highly qualified with too much unsupported costs to be useful. So I just provide the request to DCAA and when they give me a due date of 90 days for a proposal audit, I document the file that the audit could not be completed in time for award and cancel the audit request. I have 10 contracts to be awarded by the end of September, 6 for sole-source fixed price. I could have used an audit, but given the 72 average days mentioned in this article, I will just document the file and move on. Thank you Fitzgerald for the documentation that DCAA takes at least 72 days for forward pricing. With this type of cycle time, DCAA will be out of the forward pricing audit business in no time. Sad because I used to get useful reports with a lot of questioned cost.

  • I am appalled that the Director would think that 72 days for an audit of a forward pricing proposal is something to be proud of. The 72 days is an average and I can attest that I usually receive reports in about 3-4 months. The proposal is outdated by the time I get the report. The report usually had too much unsupported costs to be useful. In the end, I waste a lot of time waiting for an audit that is not useful. To put the 72 days in perspective, for any awards that need to be made by the end of FY 2010, the audit report would already need to be in our hands. This is not feasible. Often times we do not get the requirements until May or June and then to factor in 72 to 120 days for an audit is not practical or useful. DCAA had some documentation issues and then went way overboard and now is not a useful organization. DCAA is not the GAO or IG that can take months for audits. Awarding contracts is very time sensitive and Mr. Fitzgerald needs to retool DCAA to complete audits in 30 days or less. Frankly, contracting officers liked the prior metric of 30 days or less for proposal audits. It provided a more useful report. In the end, many COs will be like me and any contracts that are negotiated this summer will be without the benefit of DCAA audits. We just cannot delay the awards waiting for the audit. Please someone resolve the lack of a sense of urgency with DCAA audits for forward pricing proposals.

But yes, it is true that auditors have some concerns with the lack of progress made by Mr. Fitzgerald in charting a new course.  Here are a couple of many comments submitted by (alleged) DCAA auditors (unedited)—

  • Fitzgerald, let me clue you in on something regarding the depth of the audits. The reason audits are taking longer is that we are spending more time on working paper documentation and responding to reviewer comments, not that we are performing a more comprehensive audit. In fact, I believe we are doing the opposite. Auditors are performing more superficial audits because it is easier to document the findings and judgements than when we use criticial thinking and more analytical skills. It is also eaiser to get the audit through management review. It is much more time consuming and difficult to pass the QA reviews when we reach conclusions based on in-depth analysis. Not to mention that the skill level of the auditors is much lower than needed and as a consequence, the auditors are more of a verifyer and spent their time ticking and tieing numbers rather than actually performing more in-depth auditing analysis. You should perform a few audits and then you will get a better idea of just how superficial DCAA has become. Town hall meetings may be fine, but spend several weeks on an audit and then you may get it.

  • During the Bill Reed administration at DCAA, the montra was "more with less" as DCAA downsized, performed more audits and had higher questioned cost and net savings. Pat Fitzgerald will be known for "less with more." Staffing will be increased to new levels while the number of audits will be less than the past 20 years, questioned cost will be less as well as net savings. Good job Fitzgerald, what a way to protect the taxpayers dollars. By the time you get done, auditors will be performing about 2-3 audits per year rather than 2-3 audits per months. You will get a pat on the back from Congress and the Pentagon because contractors will no longer be complaining about DCAA. Contractors will be happy as a clam and you will get many rewards. You will go down in history as the Director that instituted the "perfect" audit and guess what, DCAA effectiveness will be nonexistent. Contractors will sing your praises and they will probably offer you a well paying job when you retire. Good legacy to leave on the Agency. What a way to protect the taxpayers dollars. Might as well just give the money away to contractors, it would cost less.

There are plenty more comments where those came from – go see them at the link above.  But before we move on, here’s another perspective.  The highly respected Government Contracts attorneys over at Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton have this to say about Mr. Fitzgerald’s interview—

Just three months ago … DCAA Director Patrick Fitzgerald told contractors and acquisition agencies that his agency’s new mode of operations would aim at developing ‘mutually beneficial relationships’ with both contractors and DOD acquisition agencies. DCAA would spring ‘no surprises’ on contractors; it would conduct ‘more frequent communication with’ them; DCAA would assure the provision of ‘responsive and timely services to agency stakeholders’; and – in a marked sea change from its traditional attitude, DCAA would abide by DOD direction that, while ‘the contracting officer and auditor work together… it is the contracting officer’s ultimate responsibility to determine fair and reasonable contract values.’

Some contractors hoped that Director Fitzgerald’s purported ‘new mode’ would actually lead to reasonably cooperative relationships and more frequent communication with agency auditors, to include continuing communications through interim conferences during and informative exit conferences upon completion of the auditor’s fieldwork. .... [But] within weeks of Director Fitzgerald’s announcement, DCAA began shutting down communications with contractors, forcing at least some to fight just to have interim conferences with auditors, and informing others that post-audit exit conferences will now be held only after the auditor has written the draft report and it has been reviewed and approved by the Supervisory Auditor and the Branch Manager or Regional Auditor – in other words only after the report’s conclusions are set in stone and impossible for the contractor to change, even when shown to be based on erroneous factual conclusions. …

Those contractors and acquisition agency personnel who entertained hopes that Director Fitzgerald would keep his promises were not being entirely foolish – those promises were, after all, wonderfully consistent with provisions of the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (“CAM”) Chapter 4-300 … which, like the Director’s promises, were published within the last three months. …

It is difficult to know what to make of an agency that describes itself on its home page as ‘Dedicated To Providing Timely and Responsive Audit and Financial Advisory Services In Support of Our National Defense,’ yet behaves in a manner directly contrary to its own explicit—and newly-minted—instructions.

So while Director Fitzgerald speaks about progress being made and changes being implemented, his own auditors question his motivations and effectiveness while DCMA contracting officers are learning to do their jobs without auditor input.  Even knowledgeable attorneys—who might be expected to be a bit more academic and objective about the situation—think there’s a major disconnect between the platitudes that Headquarters publicly proclaims and the actions its auditors are directed to take in the field.  Washington, we have a problem here.


 

FAR Revised to Enhance Transparency and To Add Additional Mandatory Reporting Requirements

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On July 8, 2010, FAC 2005-44 was published in the Federal Register, implementing FAR Case 2008-039 (“Reporting Executive Compensation and First-Tier Subcontract Awards”) as an interim rule, “to implement section 2 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, as amended by section 6202 of the Government Funding Transparency Act of 2008, which requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a free, public, website containing full disclosure of all Federal contract award information.”  Well, then.

What does the rule require?  There are two fundamental requirements:

  1. Prime contractors will need to report “executive compensation” (see 31.205-6(p) for limitations on the allowability of executive compensation) for its five most highly compensated executives.  In addition, the prime will need to report the compensation for the top five most highly compensated executives of its first-tier subcontractors.
  2. Prime contractors will need to report all first-tier subcontract awards valued in excess of $25,000.

The new rule revised FAR Part 4.14 (including renaming the section from “Reporting Subcontract Awards” to “Reporting Executive Compensation and First-Tier Subcontract Awards”) and implemented a new solicitation provision/contract clause (52.204-10, “Reporting Executive Compensation and First-Tier Subcontract Awards”).  The solicitation provision/contract clause is to be included in all solicitations and contracts valued at $25,000 or more, except for classified contracts and contracts with individuals.

Qualifying contractors must report annually on the executive compensation of the entity’s top five most highly compensated employees to http://www.ccr.gov.  Qualifying contractors include those who, in the preceding fiscal year—

  • Received 80 percent or more of its annual gross revenues from Federal contracts (and subcontracts), loans, grants (and subgrants) and cooperative agreements; and
  • Received $25,000,000 or more in annual gross revenues from Federal contracts (and subcontracts), loans, grants (and subgrants) and cooperative agreements; and
  • The public does not have access to information about the compensation of the executives through periodic reports filed under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a), 78o(d)) or section 6104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

Prime contractors must also report the executive compensation of their qualifying first-tier subcontractors top five most highly compensated employees to http://www.fsrs.gov.  First-tier subcontractors qualify for reporting based on the same three conditions listed above.

With respect to the second requirement (i.e., reporting awards of first-tier subcontracts), the new rule provided—

  • Until September 30, 2010, any newly awarded subcontract must be reported if the prime contract award amount was $20,000,000 or more.
  • From October 1, 2010, until February 28, 2011, any newly awarded subcontract must be reported if the prime contract award amount was $550,000 or more.
  • Starting March 1, 2011, any newly awarded subcontract must be reported if the prime contract award amount was $25,000 or more.

The following information must be reported (subject to the above phase-in requirements)—

  • Unique identifier (DUNS Number) for the subcontractor receiving the award and for the subcontractor's parent company, if the subcontractor has a parent company.
  • Name of the subcontractor.
  • Amount of the subcontract award.
  • Date of the subcontract award.
  • A description of the products or services (including construction) being provided under the subcontract, including the overall purpose and expected outcomes or results of the subcontract.
  • Subcontract number (the subcontract number assigned by the Contractor).
  • Subcontractor's physical address including street address, city, state, and country. Also include the nine-digit zip code and congressional district.
  • Subcontractor's primary performance location including street address, city, state, and country. Also include the nine-digit zip code and congressional district.
  • The prime contract number, and order number if applicable.
  • Awarding agency name and code.
  • Funding agency name and code.
  • Government contracting office code.
  • Treasury account symbol (TAS) as reported in FPDS.
  • The applicable North American Industry Classification System code (NAICS).

The new rule applies to contract actions below the simplified acquisition threshold, acquisitions of commercial items, and acquisitions of commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) items.  Failure to comply with the new reporting requirements—

The contracting officer shall exercise appropriate contractual remedies. In addition, the contracting officer shall make the contractor's failure to comply with the reporting requirements a part of the contractor's performance information under Subpart 42.15.

We also note that the new rule has a powerful definition of first-tier subcontract.  Historically, the FAR has lacked such a definition; there is a definition in Part 44 but it is not especially useful.  Accordingly, we were pleased to see the FAR Councils tackle the potentially contentious issue.  Here is how the new rule defines “first-tier subcontract”—

First-tier subcontract means a subcontract awarded directly by a Contractor to furnish supplies or services (including construction) for performance of a prime contract, but excludes supplier agreements with vendors, such as long-term arrangements for materials or supplies that would normally be applied to a Contractor's general and administrative expenses or indirect cost.

Here’s a great write-up of the new rule, published by the law firm Crowell & Moring.

When we looked at the rule, on first blush it appeared that the new requirements are going to be burdensome.  But on second look we’re not so sure.  First, most of the larger contractors will be exempted from the compensation reporting requirements because they already publish executive compensation information to the Securities & Exchange Commission.  Second, some of the commercial contractors will be exempted from the compensation reporting requirements because they don’t receive more than 80 percent of their revenue from the Federal government.  Finally, the very smallest contractors will be exempted from the compensation reporting requirements because they receive less than $25 million in annual Federal revenue.  Those exemptions are going to reduce significantly the number of entities for whom exemption compensation information will need to be reported.  That will leave the requirement to report first-tier subcontract awards, which will be borne by the prime contractors.  And they should be able to handle the additional reporting requirements.  We hope.



 

Why Can’t DHS Manage Its Programs?

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Nobody is thrilled with the seemingly inexhaustible supply of troubled Federal programs that are both behind schedule and over budget.  In current environment of severe budgetary pressure, with a threatened taxpayer revolt just a nut-case away from reality, nobody wants to hear about acquisition mismanagement and/or program execution failures.  Yet the Government Accountability Office (GAO) seems to be having no trouble finding such programs to review.

We have reported, many times, on problems with DOD programs.  (See, for example, this article.)  We have reported a few times on problems with NASA programs.  (See, for example, this article.)  But we rarely report on issues with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs, with only one article on the topic to date.  Well, all that changes today, dear readers, as we now turn out attention to DHS and discuss a recent GAO report addressing fifteen (15) ongoing programs—of which all but one were experiencing cost and/or schedule problems.

(The numbers will get confusing in a second.  Let’s clarify:  GAO examined eighteen (18) “major” DHS programs and 2 “nonmajor” programs, for a total of 20 programs reviewed.  One of the 20 was found to be in a “pre-acquisition” phase and was excluded from further analysis.  Two of the 15 major programs were found to have “incomplete schedule data” and were excluded from certain analyses.  Of the 15 major programs reviewed, only one (1) was found to have zero cost growth or schedule delays.)

What did GAO find?  We looked at the 92-page report and immediately discounted the weak pats on the agency’s back, such as “DHS continues to develop its acquisition oversight function,” and that the agency “has begun to implement a revised acquisition management directive that includes more detailed guidance for programs to use when informing component and departmental decision making.”  That’s the kind of stuff auditors write just before they add “BUT” and stick the knife in deep.  We skipped the platitudes and went for the good stuff.  Here’s the bottom-line—

GAO found that of the 15 major programs that had started acquisition activities, 12 reported cost growth, and almost all programs reported schedule delays. DHS policy requires acquisition oversight officials to assess the accuracy of life-cycle cost estimates for all major programs estimated to exceed $1 billion and provides guidance for programs to develop life-cycle cost estimates. The responsible DHS acquisition oversight officials have raised concerns about the accuracy of cost estimates for most major programs, making it difficult to assess the significance of the reported cost growth. Further, over half of the programs GAO reviewed initiated acquisition activities without approved key planning documents that set operational requirements and establish program baselines. Programs also experienced other acquisition planning challenges, such as staffing shortages, and lack of sustainment planning, as well as execution challenges related to technical capability, partner dependence, and funding issues. … Of the 11 programs with acquisition cost growth, 8 programs reported cost growth of over 25 percent. … Fifteen of the [eighteen] major programs we reviewed reported estimated or actual schedule delays in delivery of initial operating capability of an average of 12 months, and eight programs reported delays of a year or more. Thirteen programs reporting data on delivery of full operating capability indicated estimated delays of over 2 years on average. None of the selected programs reported delivering full operating capability for all increments.

Following are two examples of the detailed program assessments found in the GAO report—

  • Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) (Customs and Border Protection) – ACE is intended to “facilitate the movement of legitimate trade, strengthen border security, and serve as the single point of collection and access for trade data among federal agencies.”  Unfortunately, “the initial software releases delivered between 2003 and 2005 significantly exceeded their estimated costs” and “three remaining software releases will not be completed as initially planned.”  Moreover, GAO reported that “program officials do not expect ACE to deliver all initially planned capabilities.”  What’s going on here?  GAO noted that the number of lines of software code increased from 1.26 million to 4.26 million.  Hello, that’s an increase of 338 percent!  How did that happen?  “Program officials said requirements growth and lack of requirements definition contributed to the schedule delays and contract cost overruns.”  GAO reported that the future of the program is in doubt.

  • Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) (Transportation Security Administration – EBSP is responsible for “screening all checked airline baggage in the United States.”  The program relies on Explosive Detection System and Explosives Trace Detector devices as its primary screening technologies.  GAO reported that the program’s total acquisition cost has increased from $11.36 billion to $15.32 billion, and that the program’s total life-cycle cost estimate has increased from $19.93 billion to $23.7 billion, an increase of nearly 20 percent.  The program recently received $700 million in ARRA (Recovery Act) funds.  Despite the cost growth, “a substantial portion of legacy equipment is now nearing the projected end of its useful life” and needs to be replaced. Thus, the program will likely be funded and will continue.

GAO didn’t stop there.  The report also discussed the issues that led to the cost and schedule impacts.  GAO opined that the following problems contributed to DHS program problems—

  • The responsible officials have raised concerns that many programs used cost estimation methods that did not follow established best practices, such as fully defining program requirements, accounting for sustainment costs, and including costs for the full life cycle of a program. As a result, officials have doubts about the credibility, comprehensiveness, and accuracy of most program cost estimates.

  • Inaccurate or incomplete cost estimates were likely a factor in cost growth for the programs we reviewed, according to DHS officials. In some cases, programs reported that changes in scope or requirements contributed to cost growth. Further, initial cost estimates for most programs were developed after the start of acquisition activities, so they do not capture earlier cost changes.

  • The major acquisition programs we assessed experienced similar planning challenges affecting cost and schedule outcomes: unapproved or unstable baseline requirements; program office workforce shortages; long-term support, and acquisition cost planning. 

  • Over half of the programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, and establishing acquisition program baselines. … 7 of 15 programs in our review did not have approved baselines until 2 years or more after program start. For example, the Secure Flight program did not have an approved program baseline until over 4 years after program start, and the TECS Modernization program did not have a component or department approved baseline after more than 6 years.  Most of the programs that had established baseline requirements changed or plan to change them. For example, seven programs with an approved program baseline changed key requirements after their initial approval. An additional three programs were revising baseline requirements, pending APB approval, at the time we completed our review.

  • Almost half of all programs reported concerns over funding, although the nature and cause of those concerns varied among programs. … For example, after DHS approved and funded the Automated Commercial Environment program, program officials found that they did not have a full understanding of all requirements and have experienced cost growth. Program officials said the future of the program is dependent on departmental funding decisions.  [In addition] the Electronic Baggage Screening Program reported that annual compliance costs and recapitalization expenses, when combined with recurring programwide costs, have sometimes exceeded the budget. In future years, program costs could grow significantly as cost estimates are reassessed to include new requirements.

So it turns out that DHS can’t manage its programs for the generally the same reasons that NASA and DOD can’t manage their programs—i.e., a lack of rigorous initial definition of requirements leading to scope expansion, a lack of executive approvals and/or buy-in for program business cases and budget baselines, and uncertainty over long-term funding.  Sounds like the normal program management environment to us.

And as we noted at the beginning of this article, the current environment is unforgiving to the typical excuses for “suboptimal outcomes”.  We hope DHS gets its act together, soon.


 

U.S. Army Major/Contracting Officer Gives Himself Extra Pay, Now Faces Jail Time

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Life in a warzone is stressful, not to mention dangerous.  That’s why contractors who deploy there often get hazardous duty and danger pay salary uplifts.  But typically, such salary uplifts are provided pursuant to established policy and authorized by appropriate management levels.  On  July 7, 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that “U.S. Army Major Charles E. Sublett, 46, of Huntsville, Ala., pleaded guilty today … to making false statements to a federal agency.”  According to the indictment, Major Sublett smuggled into the U.S. “more than $100,000 in currency, concealed in a shipping package” mailed from his duty station in Iraq.

The DOJ announcement provided more details, as follows—

Sublett was deployed to Balad Regional Contracting Center on Logistical Support Area (LSA) Anaconda in Iraq from August 2004 through February 2005. LSA Anaconda is a U.S. military installation that was established in 2003 to support U.S. military operations in Iraq.  [While there] Sublett served as a contracting officer while deployed to LSA Anaconda. As a contracting officer, Sublett was responsible for, among other things, evaluating and supervising contracts with companies that provide goods and services to the U.S. Army.

Sublett admitted that … he sent a package from Balad, Iraq, to Killeen, Texas, which was seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers in Memphis. Sublett admitted that, on the international air waybill, he falsely described the contents of the package as books, papers, a jewelry box and clothes with a total declared customs value of $140 when, in fact, Sublett knew the package contained $107,900 in U.S. currency and 17,120,000 in Iraqi dinar. Sublett also admitted that he failed to file a currency or monetary instruments transaction report (CMIR) as required by federal law when transporting currency in amounts of more than $10,000 into or out of the United States. [Additionally} Sublett admitted to making false claims to investigators regarding his attempt to bring the currency into the United States in an effort to impede their investigation.

This reminds us of a previous article, where former U.S. Army Captain Michael Dung Nguyen was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison for the crime of theft of government property.  Captain Nguyen, a purchasing officer, mailed at least $690,000 in funds from the safe located in his battalion’s station—the safe to which only he had the combination—and mailed the ill-gotten loot home to himself in Oregon.  Capt. Mike proceeded to live it up until his new lifestyle came to the attention of the IRS.  Oops.

Capt. Mike stole funds from his commander, his battalion, and the U.S. Government.  He received a prison sentence of less than three years duration.  Major Sublett stole more than $107,000 and is facing a sentence of five years in prison plus a fine of $250,000.  Capt. Mike was convicted of “theft of government property” and Major Sublett pleaded guilty to one count of violation of the False Statements Act.

What the heck is going on here, Department of Justice?  Are there no other criminal statutes available to your prosecutors?  We have lamented the rise of corruption—both in the ranks of government officials and in the ranks of contractor employees.  We have scolded the Department of Defense for a lack of internal controls and a lack of common sense-inventory management procedures which, if they had been implemented, possibly would have detected or even prevented these brazen thefts of military funds.  Now we look at Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.—and we ask why his prosecutors don’t make some examples of these miscreants?

Maybe it’s okay to do the crime, when you can be pretty sure you won’t do the time.


 

Reorgs and Layoffs as Defense Industry Prepares for New Budget Squeezes

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We’ve been predicting this situation for over a year, talking about DOD funding shortfalls and budget cuts at Federal agencies, leading to a downturn affecting the entire aerospace and defense industry.  The future is now the present, and A&D companies are making the necessary adjustments to retain their market share in the face of industry challenges.  As we reported in September 2009, some industry insiders expected company leadership to be smarter about making downsizing decisions this time around, hopefully having learned painful lessons from the last round of cuts in the 90’s.  In fact, we even noted that a couple of defense companies (including Lockheed Martin) were adding to their executive ranks under the assumption that an enhanced focus on strategy, execution, and customer relationships would lead to better results.  We could go on, listing and linking to more articles on this topic, but we believe we’ve made the point—times are getting tough, and the tough times were predictable. 

Companies continue to make adjustments in response to market pressures, which now include a new DOD initiative to slash contractor overhead.  In mid-June 2010, BAE Systems announced a reorganization designed for “better delivering our strategy in an increasingly cost-conscious marketplace.”  The reorganization details were not provided but, as part of the realignment BAE reportedly will close down its operating headquarters of Electronics, Intelligence and Support divisions (EI&S) effective July 1, 2010.

In addition, Lockheed Martin announced on July 6, 2010 that it was “offering incentives to thin out its executive ranks in a move to lower overhead costs” (according to the Wall Street Journal article, link above).  The WSJ article also reports that—

‘Our customers are facing increasing demands with constrained resources, and they're relying on us to give them the very best value within these constraints,’ Chairman and Chief Executive Bob Stevens said Tuesday. He specifically mentioned recent comments by Pentagon officials regarding productivity and cost-savings programs.

His comments echo others he made recently about how the defense giant is bracing for belt-tightening at the U.S. Department of Defense. The company also has undergone a business reorganization and has cut back its participation in international trade shows, and it plans to sell two units.

The company is reportedly offering Directors and Vice Presidents a “Voluntary Executive Separation Program,” which consists of “financial incentives” if they leave the company by February, 2011.  While Lockheed Martin declined to specify a target number of employees it hopes will accept the VESP incentives, reports indicate that a reduction of 7 percent would not be out of line.

Meanwhile, DOD Comptroller Robert Hale said in a recent interview that “U.S. spending on weapons through 2016 likely will grow faster than the overall defense budget, which will have annual increases of only about 1 percent above inflation,” according to an article at Bloomberg Businessweek (link above).  The article reports that—

‘Procurement and research are in the ‘gaining’ portion of the budget,’ Hale said. ‘The goal would be to move money from support-type activities -- operations and maintenance, military construction -- into acquisition.’

The foregoing was seen as “good news for defense contractors,” according to one industry analyst quoted in the article.

What is one to make of these seemingly contradictory statements—i.e., stating that overhead must be cut and programs must become more “affordable” while concurrently stating that weapons spending (and indeed the entire DOD budget) will continue to grow?  Quite candidly, readers of this site should have seen it coming.  We reported that “current Defense budget levels are nearly double what they were a decade ago, even after adjusting for inflation.”  We also opined that, “if Obama Defense spending is reaching a plateau, that plateau is at least 5 percent higher than recent history in inflation-adjusted dollars.”  We provided a link to a study by the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) that probed the seeming contradiction between real budget growth and the need for more budget.  One of the causal factors the PDA study mentioned was DOD spending per uniformed service member, which had increased by nearly 50 percent per individual over the decade between 2000 and 2010.  The study reported that, “the increase was enough to bring total personnel expenditures back up to Cold War levels – for a military only 69% as large.”

To sum up, it appears as if DOD spending—and not contractor spending—is driving the need to develop weapon systems more efficiently, and certainly less expensively, than has been the historic norm.  Whether that is possible or not remains to be seen.  But in the meantime, defense contractors are reorganizing and cutting overhead in an attempt to be seen as part of the solution, rather than part of the problem.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.