FAR Revised to Enhance Transparency and To Add Additional Mandatory Reporting Requirements
On July 8,
2010, FAC 2005-44 was published in the Federal Register, implementing FAR Case 2008-039 (“Reporting Executive
Compensation and First-Tier Subcontract Awards”) as an interim rule, “to implement section 2 of the Federal Funding Accountability
and Transparency Act of 2006, as amended by section 6202 of the
Government Funding Transparency Act of 2008, which requires the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a free, public, website
containing full disclosure of all Federal contract award information.”
Well, then.
What does the rule require? There
are two fundamental requirements:
- Prime contractors
will need to report “executive compensation” (see 31.205-6(p) for limitations on the allowability of executive
compensation) for its five most highly compensated executives. In
addition, the prime will need to report the compensation for the top
five most highly compensated executives of its first-tier
subcontractors.
- Prime contractors will
need to report all first-tier subcontract awards valued in excess of
$25,000.
The new rule revised FAR Part 4.14
(including renaming the section from “Reporting Subcontract Awards” to “Reporting Executive Compensation and First-Tier Subcontract
Awards”) and implemented a new solicitation provision/contract clause
(52.204-10, “Reporting Executive Compensation and First-Tier Subcontract
Awards”). The solicitation provision/contract clause is to be included
in all solicitations and contracts valued at $25,000 or more, except
for classified contracts and contracts with individuals.
Qualifying contractors must report annually on the executive
compensation of the entity’s top five most highly compensated employees
to http://www.ccr.gov. Qualifying contractors include those who, in the preceding
fiscal year—
- Received 80 percent or more of its annual gross revenues from
Federal contracts (and subcontracts), loans, grants (and subgrants) and
cooperative agreements; and
- Received
$25,000,000 or more in annual gross revenues from Federal contracts (and
subcontracts), loans, grants (and subgrants) and cooperative
agreements; and
- The public does not have access to information
about the compensation of the executives through periodic reports filed
under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78m(a), 78o(d)) or section 6104 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.
Prime contractors must also report
the executive compensation of their qualifying first-tier subcontractors
top five most highly compensated employees to http://www.fsrs.gov. First-tier subcontractors qualify for reporting based on
the same three conditions listed above.
With
respect to the second requirement (i.e., reporting awards of first-tier
subcontracts), the new rule provided—
- Until September 30, 2010, any newly awarded
subcontract must be reported if the prime contract award amount was
$20,000,000 or more.
- From October 1, 2010, until February 28, 2011,
any newly awarded subcontract must be reported if the prime contract
award amount was $550,000 or more.
- Starting March
1, 2011, any newly awarded subcontract must be reported if the prime
contract award amount was $25,000 or more.
The
following information must be reported (subject to the above phase-in
requirements)—
- Unique identifier (DUNS Number) for the subcontractor
receiving the award and for the subcontractor's parent company, if the
subcontractor has a parent company.
- Name of the
subcontractor.
- Amount of the subcontract award.
- Date of the subcontract award.
- A
description of the products or services (including construction) being
provided under the subcontract, including the overall purpose and
expected outcomes or results of the subcontract.
- Subcontract number (the subcontract number assigned by the
Contractor).
- Subcontractor's physical address including street address,
city, state, and country. Also include the nine-digit zip code and
congressional district.
- Subcontractor's primary performance location
including street address, city, state, and country. Also include the
nine-digit zip code and congressional district.
- The prime contract number, and order number if applicable.
- Awarding agency name and code.
- Funding
agency name and code.
- Government contracting office code.
- Treasury account symbol (TAS) as reported in FPDS.
- The applicable North American Industry Classification System
code (NAICS).
The new rule applies to contract
actions below the simplified acquisition threshold, acquisitions of
commercial items, and acquisitions of commercially available
off-the-shelf (COTS) items. Failure to comply with the new reporting
requirements—
The contracting officer shall
exercise appropriate contractual remedies. In addition, the contracting
officer shall make the contractor's failure to comply with the reporting
requirements a part of the contractor's performance information under
Subpart 42.15.
We also note that the new rule has a
powerful definition of first-tier subcontract. Historically, the FAR
has lacked such a definition; there is a definition in Part 44 but it is
not especially useful. Accordingly, we were pleased to see the FAR
Councils tackle the potentially contentious issue. Here is how the new
rule defines “first-tier subcontract”—
First-tier subcontract means a subcontract awarded directly by a
Contractor to furnish supplies or services (including construction) for
performance of a prime contract, but excludes supplier agreements with
vendors, such as long-term arrangements for materials or supplies that
would normally be applied to a Contractor's general and administrative
expenses or indirect cost.
Here’s a great
write-up of the new rule, published by the
law firm Crowell & Moring.
When we looked
at the rule, on first blush it appeared that the new requirements are
going to be burdensome. But on second look we’re not so sure. First,
most of the larger contractors will be exempted from the compensation
reporting requirements because they already publish executive
compensation information to the Securities & Exchange Commission.
Second, some of the commercial contractors will be
exempted from the compensation reporting requirements because they
don’t receive more than 80 percent of their revenue from the Federal
government. Finally, the very smallest contractors will be exempted
from the compensation reporting requirements because they receive less
than $25 million in annual Federal revenue. Those exemptions are going
to reduce significantly the number of entities for whom exemption
compensation information will need to be reported. That will leave the
requirement to report first-tier subcontract awards, which will be borne
by the prime contractors. And they should be able to handle the
additional reporting requirements. We hope.
Why Can’t DHS Manage Its Programs?

Nobody is thrilled with the
seemingly inexhaustible supply of troubled Federal programs that are
both behind schedule and over budget. In current environment of severe budgetary
pressure, with a threatened taxpayer
revolt just a nut-case away from reality,
nobody wants to hear about acquisition mismanagement and/or program
execution failures. Yet the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
seems to be having no trouble finding such programs to review.
We have reported, many times, on problems with DOD programs.
(See, for example, this article.) We have
reported a few times on problems with NASA programs. (See, for example,
this article.) But we rarely report on
issues with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs, with only one
article on the topic to date. Well, all that
changes today, dear readers, as we now turn out attention to DHS and
discuss a recent GAO report addressing
fifteen (15) ongoing programs—of which all but one were experiencing
cost and/or schedule problems.
(The numbers
will get confusing in a second. Let’s clarify: GAO examined eighteen
(18) “major” DHS programs and 2 “nonmajor” programs, for a total of 20
programs reviewed. One of the 20 was found to be in a “pre-acquisition”
phase and was excluded from further analysis. Two of the 15 major
programs were found to have “incomplete schedule data” and were excluded
from certain analyses. Of the 15 major programs reviewed, only one (1)
was found to have zero cost growth or schedule delays.)
What did GAO find? We looked at the 92-page report and
immediately discounted the weak pats on the agency’s back, such as “DHS
continues to develop its acquisition oversight function,” and that the agency
“has begun to implement a revised acquisition management directive that
includes more detailed guidance for programs to use when informing
component and departmental decision making.” That’s the kind of stuff
auditors write just before they add “BUT” and stick the knife in deep.
We skipped the platitudes and went for the good stuff. Here’s the
bottom-line—
GAO found that of the 15 major
programs that had started acquisition activities, 12 reported cost
growth, and almost all programs reported schedule delays. DHS policy
requires acquisition oversight officials to assess the accuracy of
life-cycle cost estimates for all major programs estimated to exceed $1
billion and provides guidance for programs to develop life-cycle cost
estimates. The responsible DHS acquisition oversight officials have
raised concerns about the accuracy of cost estimates for most major
programs, making it difficult to assess the significance of the reported
cost growth. Further, over half of the programs GAO reviewed initiated
acquisition activities without approved key planning documents that set
operational requirements and establish program baselines. Programs also
experienced other acquisition planning challenges, such as staffing
shortages, and lack of sustainment planning, as well as execution
challenges related to technical capability, partner dependence, and
funding issues. … Of the 11 programs with acquisition cost growth, 8
programs reported cost growth of over 25 percent. … Fifteen of the
[eighteen] major programs we reviewed reported estimated or actual
schedule delays in delivery of initial operating capability of an
average of 12 months, and eight programs reported delays of a year or
more. Thirteen programs reporting data on delivery of full operating
capability indicated estimated delays of over 2 years on average. None
of the selected programs reported delivering full operating capability
for all increments.
Following are two examples of the
detailed program assessments found in the GAO report—
- Automated
Commercial Environment (ACE) (Customs and
Border Protection) – ACE is intended to “facilitate the movement of
legitimate trade, strengthen border security, and serve as the single
point of collection and access for trade data among federal agencies.”
Unfortunately, “the initial software releases delivered between 2003 and
2005 significantly exceeded their estimated costs” and “three remaining
software releases will not be completed as initially planned.”
Moreover, GAO reported that “program officials do not expect ACE to
deliver all initially planned capabilities.” What’s going on here? GAO
noted that the number of lines of software code increased from 1.26
million to 4.26 million. Hello, that’s an increase of 338 percent! How did that happen? “Program officials said requirements
growth and lack of requirements definition contributed to the schedule
delays and contract cost overruns.” GAO reported that the future of the
program is in doubt.
- Electronic
Baggage Screening Program (EBSP)
(Transportation Security Administration – EBSP is responsible for
“screening all checked airline baggage in the United States.” The
program relies on Explosive Detection System and Explosives Trace
Detector devices as its primary screening technologies. GAO reported
that the program’s total acquisition cost has increased from $11.36
billion to $15.32 billion, and that the program’s total life-cycle cost
estimate has increased from $19.93 billion to $23.7 billion, an increase
of nearly 20 percent. The program recently received $700 million in
ARRA (Recovery Act) funds. Despite the cost growth, “a substantial
portion of legacy equipment is now nearing the projected end of its
useful life” and needs to be replaced. Thus, the program will likely be
funded and will continue.
GAO didn’t
stop there. The report also discussed the issues that led to the cost
and schedule impacts. GAO opined that the following problems
contributed to DHS program problems—
- The responsible officials have raised concerns
that many programs used cost estimation methods that did not follow
established best practices, such as fully defining program requirements,
accounting for sustainment costs, and including costs for the full life
cycle of a program. As a result, officials have doubts about the
credibility, comprehensiveness, and accuracy of most program cost
estimates.
- Inaccurate or incomplete cost estimates were likely a factor in
cost growth for the programs we reviewed, according to DHS officials.
In some cases, programs reported that changes in scope or requirements
contributed to cost growth. Further, initial cost estimates for most
programs were developed after the start of acquisition activities, so
they do not capture earlier cost changes.
- The major acquisition programs we assessed
experienced similar planning challenges affecting cost and schedule
outcomes: unapproved or unstable baseline requirements; program office
workforce shortages; long-term support, and acquisition cost planning.
- Over half of the
programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition
activities without component or department approval of documents
essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements,
and establishing acquisition program baselines. … 7 of 15 programs in
our review did not have approved baselines until 2 years or more after
program start. For example, the Secure Flight program did not have an
approved program baseline until over 4 years after program start, and
the TECS Modernization program did not have a component or department
approved baseline after more than 6 years. Most of the programs that
had established baseline requirements changed or plan to change them.
For example, seven programs with an approved program baseline changed
key requirements after their initial approval. An additional three
programs were revising baseline requirements, pending APB approval, at
the time we completed our review.
- Almost half of all programs reported concerns
over funding, although the nature and cause of those concerns varied
among programs. … For example, after DHS approved and funded the Automated Commercial Environment program, program officials
found that they did not have a full understanding of all requirements
and have experienced cost growth. Program officials said the future of
the program is dependent on departmental funding decisions. [In
addition] the Electronic Baggage Screening Program reported that annual
compliance costs and recapitalization expenses, when combined with
recurring programwide costs, have sometimes exceeded the budget. In
future years, program costs could grow significantly as cost estimates
are reassessed to include new requirements.
So
it turns out that DHS can’t manage its programs for the generally the
same reasons that NASA and DOD can’t manage their programs—i.e., a lack of rigorous initial definition of requirements
leading to scope expansion, a lack of executive approvals and/or buy-in
for program business cases and budget baselines, and uncertainty over
long-term funding. Sounds like the normal program management
environment to us.
And as we noted at the beginning of
this article, the current environment is unforgiving to the typical
excuses for “suboptimal outcomes”. We hope DHS gets its act together,
soon.
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U.S. Army Major/Contracting Officer Gives Himself Extra Pay, Now Faces Jail Time
Life in a
warzone is stressful, not to mention dangerous. That’s why contractors
who deploy there often get hazardous duty and danger pay salary
uplifts. But typically, such salary uplifts are provided pursuant to
established policy and authorized by appropriate management levels. On
July 7, 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that “U.S. Army Major
Charles E. Sublett, 46, of Huntsville, Ala., pleaded guilty today … to
making false statements to a federal agency.” According to the
indictment, Major Sublett smuggled into the U.S. “more than $100,000 in
currency, concealed in a shipping package” mailed from his duty station
in Iraq.
The DOJ
announcement provided more details, as follows—
Sublett was deployed to Balad Regional
Contracting Center on Logistical Support Area (LSA) Anaconda in Iraq
from August 2004 through February 2005. LSA Anaconda is a U.S. military
installation that was established in 2003 to support U.S. military
operations in Iraq. [While there] Sublett served as a contracting
officer while deployed to LSA Anaconda. As a contracting officer,
Sublett was responsible for, among other things, evaluating and
supervising contracts with companies that provide goods and services to
the U.S. Army.
Sublett admitted that … he sent a package from Balad, Iraq, to
Killeen, Texas, which was seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
officers in Memphis. Sublett admitted that, on the international air
waybill, he falsely described the contents of the package as books,
papers, a jewelry box and clothes with a total declared customs value of
$140 when, in fact, Sublett knew the package contained $107,900 in U.S.
currency and 17,120,000 in Iraqi dinar. Sublett also admitted that he
failed to file a currency or monetary instruments transaction report
(CMIR) as required by federal law when transporting currency in amounts
of more than $10,000 into or out of the United States. [Additionally}
Sublett admitted to making false claims to investigators regarding his
attempt to bring the currency into the United States in an effort to
impede their investigation.
This reminds us of a previous
article, where former U.S. Army Captain
Michael Dung Nguyen was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison for the
crime of theft of government property. Captain Nguyen, a purchasing
officer, mailed at least $690,000 in funds from the safe located in his
battalion’s station—the safe to which only he had the combination—and
mailed the ill-gotten loot home to himself in Oregon. Capt. Mike
proceeded to live it up until his new lifestyle came to the attention of
the IRS. Oops.
Capt. Mike stole funds from his
commander, his battalion, and the U.S. Government. He received a prison
sentence of less than three years duration. Major Sublett stole more
than $107,000 and is facing a sentence of five years in prison plus a
fine of $250,000. Capt. Mike was convicted of “theft of government
property” and Major Sublett pleaded guilty to one count of violation of
the False Statements Act.
What the
heck is going on here, Department of Justice? Are there no other
criminal statutes available to your prosecutors? We have lamented the
rise of corruption—both in the ranks of government officials and in the
ranks of contractor employees. We have scolded the Department of
Defense for a lack of internal controls and a lack of common
sense-inventory management procedures which, if they had been
implemented, possibly would have detected or even prevented these brazen
thefts of military funds. Now we look at Attorney General Eric H.
Holder, Jr.—and we ask why his prosecutors don’t make some examples of
these miscreants?
Maybe it’s okay to do the crime,
when you can be pretty sure you won’t do the time.
Reorgs and Layoffs as Defense Industry Prepares for New Budget Squeezes
We’ve been predicting this
situation for over a year, talking about DOD funding shortfalls and budget cuts at Federal
agencies, leading to a downturn affecting
the entire aerospace and defense industry. The future is now the
present, and A&D companies are making the necessary adjustments to
retain their market share in the face of industry challenges. As we reported in September 2009, some industry insiders expected company
leadership to be smarter about making downsizing decisions this time
around, hopefully having learned painful lessons from the last round of
cuts in the 90’s. In fact, we even noted
that a couple of defense companies (including Lockheed Martin) were
adding to their executive ranks under the assumption that an enhanced
focus on strategy, execution, and customer relationships would lead to
better results. We could go on, listing and linking to more articles on
this topic, but we believe we’ve made the point—times are getting
tough, and the tough times were predictable.
Companies continue to make adjustments in response to market
pressures, which now include a new DOD initiative to slash contractor overhead. In mid-June 2010, BAE Systems announced a reorganization designed for “better delivering our strategy
in an increasingly cost-conscious marketplace.” The reorganization
details were not provided but, as part of the realignment BAE reportedly
will close down its operating headquarters of Electronics, Intelligence
and Support divisions (EI&S) effective July 1, 2010.
In addition, Lockheed Martin announced on July 6, 2010 that it was “offering incentives to thin out
its executive ranks in a move to lower overhead costs” (according to the
Wall Street Journal article, link above). The WSJ article also reports
that—
‘Our customers are facing
increasing demands with constrained resources, and they're relying on us
to give them the very best value within these constraints,’ Chairman
and Chief Executive Bob Stevens said Tuesday. He specifically mentioned
recent comments by Pentagon officials regarding productivity and
cost-savings programs.
His
comments echo others he made recently about how the defense giant is
bracing for belt-tightening at the U.S. Department of Defense. The
company also has undergone a business reorganization and has cut back
its participation in international trade shows, and it plans to sell two
units.
The company is reportedly offering
Directors and Vice Presidents a “Voluntary Executive Separation
Program,” which consists of “financial incentives” if they leave the
company by February, 2011. While Lockheed Martin declined to specify a
target number of employees it hopes will accept the VESP incentives,
reports indicate that a reduction of 7 percent would not be out of line.
Meanwhile, DOD Comptroller Robert Hale said in a recent interview that “U.S. spending on weapons through 2016 likely will grow
faster than the overall defense budget, which will have annual increases
of only about 1 percent above inflation,” according to an article at
Bloomberg Businessweek (link above). The article reports that—
‘Procurement and research are in the ‘gaining’
portion of the budget,’ Hale said. ‘The goal would be to move money from
support-type activities -- operations and maintenance, military
construction -- into acquisition.’
The
foregoing was seen as “good news for defense contractors,” according to
one industry analyst quoted in the article.
What
is one to make of these seemingly contradictory statements—i.e.,
stating that overhead must be cut and programs must become more
“affordable” while concurrently stating that weapons spending (and
indeed the entire DOD budget) will continue to grow? Quite candidly,
readers of this site should have seen it coming. We reported that “current Defense budget levels are nearly double what they were a decade ago, even
after adjusting for inflation.” We also opined that, “if Obama Defense spending is reaching a
plateau, that plateau is at least 5 percent higher than recent history
in inflation-adjusted dollars.” We provided a link to a study by the
Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) that probed the seeming
contradiction between real budget growth and the need for more budget.
One of the causal factors the PDA study mentioned was DOD spending per
uniformed service member, which had increased by nearly 50 percent per individual over the decade between 2000 and 2010.
The study reported that, “the increase was
enough to bring total personnel expenditures back up to Cold War levels –
for a military only 69% as large.”
To sum up,
it appears as if DOD spending—and not
contractor spending—is driving the need to develop weapon systems more
efficiently, and certainly less expensively, than has been the historic
norm. Whether that is possible or not remains to be seen. But in the
meantime, defense contractors are reorganizing and cutting overhead in
an attempt to be seen as part of the solution, rather than part of the
problem.
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