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Apogee Consulting Inc

It’s Not Always Government Contractors …

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We write quite a bit about alleged and/or admitted fraud by Government contractors.  We have posted many articles about alleged and/or admitted fraud by military and civilian government officials.  We’d post links but, frankly, there are already too many corruption stories here and all you have to do is visit the News Archive to find them for yourselves.

But today we take a different slant on things.  Today we look at fraud, alleged and/or admitted, outside the Governmental arena.  Why do we do that?  We do that because we hope it will be instructive.  Generally and broadly speaking, internal controls are largely the same whether one is a defense contractor or a manufacturer of consumer electronics.  The need for segregation of duties, for example, is largely the same—as is the need for an involved senior management and board of directors.

So let’s peek outside our box of government contracting; let’s look up from perusing the FAR and trying to interpret CAS for just a few minutes, and let’s see what the rest of the world is up to—in terms of fraud and corruption—courtesy of daily Department of Justice press releases.

First we look at two stories of international corruption.

Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty – There have been bigger FCPA penalties, but not very many.  According to this DOD press release, the Paris-based “global engineering, construction, and services company” agreed to pay that ginormous penalty in order to resolve FCPA charges related to “its participation in a decade-long scheme to bribe Nigerian government officials to obtain engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts.”  The DOJ release stated, “At crucial junctures… a senior executive of Technip, KBR’s former CEO, Albert "Jack" Stanley, and others met with … the executive branch of the Nigerian government to … designate a representative with whom the joint venture should negotiate bribes to Nigerian government officials. The joint venture paid approximately $132 million to a Gibraltar corporation controlled by Tesler and more than $50 million to the Japanese trading company during the course of the bribery scheme.”

Continuing our theme of international corruption, we offer the following.

Italian Executive Extradited from Germany to the United States to Face Foreign Bribery Charges – Another DOJ announcement stated, “Italian citizen Flavio Ricotti, a former executive of Rancho Santa Margarita, Calif.-based valve company Control Components Inc. (CCI), has been extradited to the United States from Germany in connection with his alleged participation in a conspiracy to secure contracts by paying bribes to officials of foreign state-owned companies as well as officers and employees of foreign and domestic private companies.”  Allegedly, “Ricotti, who served as CCI’s vice president and head of sales for Europe, Africa and the Middle East from 2001 through 2007,” oversaw more than $1 million worth of “corrupt payments” that were allegedly designed to secure work for his company.  In addition, five other CCI executives were charged in the 16-count indictment, including, “five former CCI executives also charged are Stuart Carson, CCI’s former chief executive officer; Hong (Rose) Carson, CCI’s former director of sales for China and Taiwan; Paul Cosgrove, CCI’s former director of worldwide sales; David Edmonds, CCI’s former vice president of worldwide customer service; and Han Yong Kim, the former president of CCI’s Korean office.”

Next, looking at the domestic U.S. commercial marketplace, we bring you the final story of corruption, as abetted by stupidity and naïveté. 

Former Koss VP of Finance Pleads Guilty to Embezzling Millions and Millions -- We have been following the tale of Koss Corporation and its former Vice President of Finance, Sujata Sachdeva, for some time. On July 17, 2010, Ms. Sachdeva pleaded guilty to six counts of wire fraud for embezzling roughly $34 million from her employer over a period of approximately 11 years.  Ms. Sachdeva (or “S-Squared” as she’s called on www.goingconcern.com, where one can find quite a few stories on this topic), faces anywhere from 6 to 20 years in prison.  According to this story, “she stole the money from the headphone maker to pay for extravagant shopping sprees and lifestyle amenities that included using Koss funds for clothes, cars, trips, china, statues and home furnishings.“ 

According to the stories linked-to above, S-Squared admitted that, “During the 12-year span she authorized the issuance of more than 500 cashier's checks costing Koss about $17.5 million. That figure includes $10 million to American Express, plus payments to high-end retailers, including Neiman Marcus and Saks Fifth Avenue. Payments also went to charitable groups.”  In addition, “From February 2008 to December 2009, she authorized 206 wire transfers totaling $16 million from Koss accounts to American Express to cover items she bought with the credit card.”  The plea agreement stated that Koss employees worked ‘in concert with Sachdeva or at her direction’ to make fraudulent entries to the company's books to conceal the embezzlement. ‘These entries would falsely overstate assets, understate liabilities, understate sales, overstate cost of sales, and overstate expenses,’ and the false entries ‘concealed the actual receipts and profitability of Koss,’ allowing the scheme to continue. 

S-Squared knew how the company’s auditors worked.  According to the plea agreement, “Sachdeva did not fraudulently take money from Koss accounts at Park Bank during the month of June, because transactions during that month were reviewed by outside accountants.” 

According to the news reports, the scheme “came to light in December when American Express told Michael Koss - who at the time held five high-level titles at the company, including CEO and chief financial officer - that money was being transferred from company accounts to pay for Sachdeva's luxury shopping bills.”

This blog post by Francine McKenna at www.retheauditors.com makes some good points about Sachdeva and Koss.  Here are a few of Ms. McKenna’s comments—

  • Listing standards for the NYSE require an internal audit function. NASDAQ, where Koss was listed, does not.
  • Management oversight of the financial reporting process is severely limited by Mr. Koss Jr.’s lack of interest, aptitude, and appreciation for accounting and finance. Koss Jr., the CEO and son of the founder, held the titles of COO and CFO, also. Ms. Sachdeva, the Vice President of Finance and Corporate Secretary who is accused of the fraud, has been in the same job since 1992 and during one ten year period worked remotely from Houston!

Despite the foregoing, the Koss Corporation has filed suit against American Express (contending that it should have alerted the company earlier), against former auditors Grant Thornton (contending that it should have detected the embezzlement during performance of audit procedures), and against Ms. Sachdeva herself (d’oh).

Conclusion

Each of the stories included herein describe unfortunate actions of a corporate executive management team, actions that violated law as well as ethical standards. In some instances, the executives colluded with each other, or with executives of other companies, in order to carry out their schemes. DCAA audit procedures direct that an assessment be made of management integrity and “tone at the top.”  We don’t know, exactly, how one does that.  But we do know that these stories reinforce the importance of doing so.



 

Organizational Conflicts of Interest – A Success Story!

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The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) define an organizational conflict of interest as a conflict that may occur when “because of other activities or relationships with other persons, a person is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the Government, or the person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or might be otherwise impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage.”

Accountants don’t care very much about organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs).  OCIs have nothing to do with debits or credits or dollar signs.  But companies who want to successfully capture government work need to care about OCIs—quite a bit, actually.  We’ve previously discussed OCIs here and also here, and also over here, noting that—

Savvy readers will understand that the regulations are just words, and that the words are given meaning and come alive via interpretations provided by the Courts. So it is, with respect to OCIs, that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CoFC) have interpreted various aspects of OCI rules in their bid protest decisions.

OCIs are intractable little problems, both vague and complex by their very nature.  Normally, one hears about OCIs when somebody protests an award.  Sometimes OCIs arise in the context of testing products for acceptance and/or suitability.  Here’s a story about an OCI in the context of a bid protest.  What makes this story different is that the Court found the elimination of a bidder, based solely on an alleged OCI, to be unreasonable.  We think it’s worth exploring a little.

On July 16, 2010, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims issued a decision in the matter of Turner Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, with McCarthy/Hunt, J.V. and B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, as intervenors.  At stake was the contract to replace the Army Community Hospital at Fort Benning, Georgia.  The contract was originally awarded to Turner in September, 2009, after 15 months of conducting the procurement and evaluating offerors.  Two competitors (the “intervenors” in the current action) protested the award to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  In February, 2010, GAO recommended that the Army should “strip Turner of the contract” because of Turner’s alleged OCIs, and “reprocure the contract.”  In March, 2010, the Army announced that it would “not waive” Turner’s OCIs, and follow the GAO recommendation.  Turner protested that decision before the Court of Federal Claims.

Turner argued that the GAO bid protest decision and subsequent recommendation to the Army “lacked a rational basis.”  In addition, Turner argued that the Army accepted GAO’s recommendation without evaluating it, and did not “reasonably evaluate” Turner’s request to waive its OCIs.  Turner’s alleged OCIs are rather complex so we’ll devote some space to discussing them.

To develop its hospital design, the Army obtained technical design assistance from a Joint Venture consisting of Hayes, Seay, Mattern, & Mattern (HSMM) and Hellmuth, Obata & Kassbaum, Inc. (HOK).  HSMM was a wholly owned subsidiary of AECOM.  As part of its duties, HSMM assisted the Army’s Technical Review Board in evaluating proposals received from bidders on the hospital replacement project.  Turner was not only the lowest price offer, but the company also scored well in the technical evaluations. 

Turner’s proposal anticipated awarding a subcontract to a Joint Venture consisting of Ellerbe Becket (EB) and another firm.  In October, 2009, after a long courtship, EB was acquired by AECOM.  In July 2009 (during the courtship), it came to the attention of one the HSMM participants that an OCI might exist, as AECOM was then in negotiations to acquire EB.  (Note that the OCI might be created because AECOM would own a participant in the proposed project (EB) and a participant in the project design (as well as a participant in the technical evaluation) (HSMM).  This “alignment of interests” might be sufficient to create an OCI.)  The HSMM employee immediately brought the matter to the attention of the Contracting Officer and the Army’s legal counsel.  They decided that the one HSMM participant who knew of the potential merger would recuse himself from further participation in the proposal evaluations, but that the other HSMM participants, who were not aware of the ongoing discussions between EB and AECOM, would be allowed to continue their participation.

We have discussed before the three “different flavors” of OCI.  With respect to the award of the hospital replacement contract to Turner, “both protesters alleged the existence of ‘biased ground rules’ and ‘impaired objectivity’ OCIs, and McCarthy/Hunt additionally alleged an ‘unequal access to information’ OCI,” according to the Court.

During the protest proceedings before the GAO, the Contracting Officer “addressed each possible type of OCI and found that no OCIs existed prior to award of the contract.”  However, GAO “disagreed” with those conclusions, and “sustained the ‘unequal access to information’ and ‘biased ground rules’ protests.”

While the protest was pending before the GAO, much discussion and debate ensued regarding whether the Army would waive any OCIs.  As the Judge Futey (writing for the Court) reports, ultimately the Army decided not to grant Turner a waiver.

After receiving the GAO’s recommendation, the Army terminated Turner’s contract and Turner filed a protest with the CoFC.  Based on the protest grounds, the Court needed to review the GAO’s decision, even though normally such decisions are granted “a high degree of deference.”  But the deference shown to GAO’s decisions is not absolute, and executive agencies cannot simply rely on a GAO decision to implement an unreasonable course of action.  As the Judge Futey wrote, “an Agency’s decision to follow the recommendation of the GAO in a bid protest decision is arbitrary and capricious if the GAO decision was irrational.”  Judge Futey found—

According to Turner, the GAO conducted a de novo review of the record that supplanted the CO’s decision, which was based on ‘hard facts,’ with a decision based on ‘mere inference and suspicion.’ … plaintiff [Turner] argues that ‘the assessment of OCIs is a fact-specific inquiry the CO must undertake, and under the facts here, the CO reasonably concluded there was no OCI, and GAO erred in substituting its judgment for that of the CO.’

Judge Futey concluded that, “it was irrational in this case to depart from precedent and not consider the factually-based arguments of Turner and the Army, especially when the GAO was tasked with looking for ‘hard facts’ of an OCI.”  Moreover, Judge Futey wrote that—

This Court thus finds that the GAO lacked a rational basis because it overturned the CO’s determination without highlighting any hard facts that indicate a sufficient alignment of interests. Because the GAO lacked a rational basis, the Army was not justified in following its recommendation. …

… the GAO failed to adhere to the proper standard of review. The GAO’s task was to review the agency’s decision for reasonableness. That agency decision, as described above, tracked the precise state of negotiations between AECOM and EB, the exact dates upon which critical changes to the RFP occurred, the exact employees that could have known of the merger, and numerous other facts. Using this data, the CO concluded that no OCI existed. The GAO failed to address this OCI decision; in fact, the GAO decision on a biased ground rules OCI does not even cite the agency decision that it was tasked with reviewing. Instead, the GAO cites exactly one piece of information—the text of AECOM’s contract with the agency—to support its finding that the record ‘suggests’ that AECOM had ‘special knowledge’ that would have given Turner an unfair advantage. 

(Emphasis in original.)

Turner was granted the permanent injunction it sought.  The Army was ordered by the Court to “restore” the original hospital replacement contract to Turner and “not reprocure the contract to another firm.”

Are there any lessons to be learned here?  We think so.  When two Government contractors are considering a merger/acquisition, it is important to review existing contractual relationships to see if any actual, or potential, OCIs might exist.  And it is not only existing contracts that need to be reviewed, but also future contracts and pending proposal submissions.  Pipelines of potential contract activity need to be reviewed with a discerning eye, to see if a situation like that experienced by Turner might exist.

And please note that Turner itself did not have the alleged OCI.  It was Turner’s subcontractor, EB (who was actually one member of a Joint Venture), that had the alleged OCI.  This fact suggests that the level of due diligence inquiry needs to be quite a bit more granular than simply looking at the two prime contractors to see if a potential OCI might exist.  This is a demanding task, and one that time and budgetary constraints might not always permit.  But as this article demonstrates, one ignores that level of inquiry at one’s own peril.



 

ASBCA Discusses Prompt Payment Act

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We have noted before that the DOD has attempted to wiggle out of complying with the requirements of the Prompt Payment Act (Public Law 97-177, or PPA) when involved in military contingency operations.  In August 2009, DOD issued a “class deviation” to evade requirements of FAR 32.9 with respect to such operations.  On July 13, 2010, DFARS 232.908 was revised and a related contract clause was implemented (252.232-7011 “Payments in Support of Emergencies and Contingency Operations”) to permanently exempt such operations from the requirements of the Prompt Payment Act.

These actions concerned us.  As we said in our previous article on the topic—

The purpose of the Act, and its implementing regulations in the FAR, was to protect contractors from a government bureaucracy that was notoriously slow to pay, and from the cash flow hardships caused by such slow payments. These contractors, who generally must follow all direction given to them by authorized government representatives, and who generally must continue to perform their government contracts regardless of any losses they may be incurring, had little if any recourse available to them for such contract breaches, short of litigation. But under the Prompt Payment Act, contractors could typically expect to receive payment for properly prepared invoices within 30 days (often sooner), or else receive an additional interest payment automatically--i.e., without making another request.

But this article isn’t really about the DOD evading its statutory obligations to pay its contractors timely.  It’s more about a recent decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), who were asked to decide a contractor’s claim for interest due it pursuant to the requirements of the Act.  Before the Court was a request for summary judgment, with the Government moving for a dismissal – i.e., the Government asserted that it was entitled to a decision without a trial because it was clearly going to prevail as a matter of law.  Judge Peacock wasn’t so sure.

Calvary Security Group (CSG) supplied equipment and supplies to the Iraqi police forces under an ID/IQ contract, originally with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  The contract provided that—

Inspection and acceptance was to be ‘conducted by DCMA QAR’ at a third Baghdad warehouse and … ‘Invoices are submitted to the contracting officer, end user for approval certification and submission to the USACE Finance Center [in Tennessee] in conjunction with the receiving report (DD250).’

CSG submitted a certified claim to the contracting officer in the amount of $196,640 alleging that the government owed it PPA interest penalty for late payments for deliveries made under the contract. CSG was asking only for the interest that was payable ‘automatically’ under the regulatory provisions implementing the PPA (which were recited at length by the Judge in the decision). 

The Government contended that “payments were timely issued within 30 days of actual acceptance of the supplies” and, therefore, CSG was not entitled to any interest under the PPA.  The Government asserted that the contract required inspection by the DCMA QAR and that Government acceptance took place only upon the QAR’s execution of the Form DD250.  According to the government, the 30 day PPA payment period did not commence until the date of the QAR’s completion of the form for each of the deliveries in dispute. The government asserted that payments generally were made within 30 days of the actual acceptance/signature dates indicated in the DD250 forms and, therefore, the payments were not subject to PPA interest. 

Judge Peacock, writing for the Court, disagreed with the Government’s position, stating—

OMB regulations establish as a general rule that PPA interest penalty begins to accrue 30 days following the later of the date of actual receipt of the invoice if annotated or seven days after delivery of the supplies ordered, or the invoice date if not annotated, absent circumstances and exceptions not germane to disposition of the present motion. The actual acceptance date is relevant to the extent that it occurs prior to the end of the “constructive acceptance” period of seven days for this contract.  … The government’s interpretation of the Prompt Payment clause ignores ¶ (a)(5)(i) of that clause which states that ‘acceptance is deemed to occur constructively on the 7th day (unless otherwise stated in this contract) after the Contractor delivers the supplies….’ Although FAR 32.908(c)(1) and FAR 32.904(b)(4) authorize extension of the seven day ‘constructive acceptance’ period if justified, no such modification of the date was specified here or permitted for this … contract. The ‘constructive acceptance’ provision in the clause is reiterated in FAR 32.904. See also DFARS 232.905(1). Of course, the government is entitled to take reasonable and appropriate actions to ensure conformance of the delivered supplies with contractual requirements. However, inspection delays extending beyond the prescribed seven days do not postpone accrual of interest penalty where there are no disagreements regarding quantity, quality or contractor compliance with contractual requirements.

The Government’s motion for summary judgment was denied.

We think this case is illustrative of some of the mechanics of the Prompt Payment Act.  In our experience, contractors are often reluctant to assert their right to interest on late payments.  This case shows that contractors may have a good chance of prevailing in litigation when they assert their rights under the Act.


 

DOD Contractors Look to Get “Affordable” While Pentagon Adds Bureaucracy

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We’ve previously discussed the latest fad amongst Pentagon leadership:  the notion that the DOD needs to focus on weapon system “affordability”—and that the primary means for doing so is to focus on cutting contractor overhead.  In this article, we reported that DOD intends to “identify and eliminate non-value-added overhead and G&A charged to contracts” (among other actions), so that affordability will be “restored” to defense goods and services.  It’s as if the entire national security leadership woke up one morning and suddenly realized they all were overdrawn at the bank. 

“Gosh!  How could this have happened to such outstanding managers?” they would have cried.  “Our defense goods and services are no longer affordable!  Since it can’t be our fault, then obviously it must be the fault of all those greedy contractors!” 

We reply to that hypothetical (yet all too real) assertion using the immortal words of Cher Horowitz (played by Alicia Silverstone) in the 1995 movie, “Clueless”—

“As If!”

Lt. Gen. Larry Farrell (USAF, Retired), recently used the cliché “perfect storm” to describe the situation facing the military services and their contractors.  General Farrell, who currently serves as President of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), wrote—

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are now consuming in the neighborhood of $200 billion a year, which despite a defense budget just north of $700 billion, have dragged funds away from needed modernization. Recall that Congressional Budget Office projections from 2005 even then indicated that Defense Department funding was running $100 billion a year short of what it needed to fund the modernization programs planned at that time.


Then came the 2007 recession, now extending past 31 months, which is the most protracted since World War II. Along with the downturn are unsustainable federal budgets and projections of more than $1 trillion in annual deficits out through 2020. The national debt is approaching $20 trillion and interest on the debt will be around $900 billion per year in 2020 — larger than the ‘projected’ defense budget that year. The unsustainable nature of this budget projection has now been recognized as a national problem that can no longer be ignored.


In response, President Obama this year appointed a National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. The so-called Deficit Commission is due to report in December. In anticipation, Congress has deferred action on the 2011 budget, which is normally scheduled to become law Oct. 1. …

Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont., said he sees three areas of focus: ‘the tax gap, the spending gap and the productivity gap.’ Since it’s fairly certain that government doesn’t directly legislate productivity, it is a safe bet that specific tax and spending recommendations will come from the Deficit Commission in December. …

All of these developments could begin to cause turbulence around December. The major unstoppable weather vector is the dire financial condition of the United States. The other converging elements — tax and spending reform and defense spending and reorganization — are minor by comparison.

Recognizing the “turbulence” coming their way, we’ve noted that defense contractors have been moving and restructuring, and re-org’ing and trimming, while nervously eyeing the Pentagon as if it was their sugar-daddy who had recently found a brand-new—younger—mistress to support.  That trend continues unabated.

The mega-sized provider of professional services, Accenture, recently reported that, “Pressures to reduce costs will be the primary drivers of decisions by aerospace and defense (A&D) companies to use external engineering services during the next two-to-three years.”  The firm issued a report entitled “Engineering Services in Aerospace and Defense:  Meeting the Sourcing Challenge,” available here.  The Accenture report stated—

Ninety percent of the executives interviewed cited cost reduction pressures as their top challenge, followed by supplier consolidation (52 percent) and increased competition from new players (36 percent). Consistent with these findings, the research revealed that 61 percent of these executives are buying engineering services to better manage production costs; 65 percent of them cited the need for improved efficiency and productivity.

Accenture’s bottom-line conclusion was that A&D companies will move to source engineering expertise and services from low-cost global providers—though the report acknowledged that the strategy contained challenges that would need to be overcome.  The benefits include lowering costs, shoring-up scarce skill sets, and more easily fulfilling offset obligations, while challenges include concerns about potential compromises of confidentiality and quality.  To those concerns we would add the worry about compliance with export controls.  Nonetheless, Accenture seems confident that A&D companies will embrace those challenges in order to lower their program costs.

Meanwhile, Navistar, the hugely successful (formerly) commercial manufacturer of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles, has announced “another round” of layoffs at its Mississippi production facility.  The linked-to article reports that—

John Munro, plant manager for Navistar in West Point, said the plant has some contracts which will last until 2013, but the high-volume MRAP production will end in 2011, leading to an unknown number of layoffs. The plant currently employs 505 workers.

Not to be outdone, Northrop Grumman issued a press release that announced “consolidation” of its Louisiana and Mississippi shipyards, a “winddown” of production at its Avondale, Louisiana shipyard, and closure of two more Louisiana yards.  Any remaining work (i.e., that related to the LPD-17 ships) will be performed at NGC’s Pascagoula, Miss. shipyard, according to the linked-to article.  The article reports that—

Northrop Grumman is considering a possible spinoff of its shipbuilding business, including a yard at Newport News, Va., into a separate company. Credit Susse has been hired as lead financial adviser on alternatives for the shipbuilding unit.

What’s driving Northrop Grumman’s decision-making?  According to the NGC press release (link above)—

‘Our decision to consolidate the Gulf Coast facilities is driven by the need for rationalization of the shipbuilding industrial base to better align with the projected needs of our customers. The consolidation will reduce future costs, increase efficiency, and address shipbuilding overcapacity. This difficult, but necessary decision will ensure long-term improvement in Gulf Coast program performance, cost competitiveness and quality,’ said Wes Bush, chief executive officer and president.

The consolidation of Gulf Coast ship construction is the next step in the company's efforts to improve performance and efficiency at its Gulf Coast shipyards, which began with the integration of its shipbuilding operations in early 2008.

As a result of the consolidation, the company expects higher costs to complete ships currently under construction in Avondale due to anticipated reductions in productivity and, as a result, is increasing the estimates to complete LPDs 23 and 25 by approximately $210 million. Of this amount $113 million will be recognized as a one-time, pre-tax cumulative charge to Shipbuilding's second quarter 2010 operating income. The balance will be recognized as lower margin in future periods, principally on the LPD 25. The company also anticipates that it will incur substantial restructuring and facilities shutdown-related costs including, but not limited to, severance, relocation expense, and asset write-downs. These costs are expected to be allowable expenses under government accounting standards and recoverable in future years under the company's contracts. The company estimates that these restructuring costs will be more than offset by future savings expected to be generated by the consolidation.

Obviously, Northrop Grumman is willing to invest a significant fraction of a billion dollars in order to trim future operating costs.  As it notes in its press release, it expects to recover much of its “investment” against its current and future government contracts as “allowable expenses.”  We wonder what the Pentagon leadership thinks of that plan?

While industry is undertaking these significant cost-cutting actions, the Pentagon is taking some of its own actions.  On July 13, 2010, Brett Lambert (Director, Industrial Policy) issued a Memorandum to the Defense Industrial Base.  When last we discussed Mr. Lambert’s Directorate, he stated his focus was on early identification of “points of failure” in the defense industrial base, so that the Pentagon might avoid “costly rescues of failing companies.”  In addition, his Directorate was focused on “the financial health of critical suppliers,” as well as the need to preserve “skills necessary to support our war fighters in the near term and long term.”  How’s that going, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. Lambert’s Memorandum to the Defense Industrial Base of July 13 did not address any of those prior focus areas.  Instead his new focus is on learning “to do more without more”—i.e., implementing the DOD’s new “Efficiency Initiative.”  Toward that end, Mr. Lambert announced a strategy involving “interacting parallel tracks, with close coordination.”  The effort will “drive fact-based recommendations” to Dr. Carter (USD, AT&L) for consideration and action.  Mr. Lambert’s plan involves five “issue focus groups,” an Industry Working Group (IWG), various Military Department Groups (MDGs), two Executive Directors, and a Senior Integration Group (SIG), which will be chaired by Dr. Carter.  In the words of Mr. Lambert’s Memorandum to the Defense Industrial Base—

There will be five government focus groups reporting to the Senior Integration Group (SIG) through two Executive Directors; Military Department Groups for each service will solicit ideas for the five Focus Groups to analyze; and I will lead an Industry Working Group that will collect ideas from industry and provide a feedback mechanism for industry to comment on the ideas we are considering. The groups will be comprised of government employees, although the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) will assist in administrative functions.

The five Focus Groups will address the following areas:

  • Affordability
  • Sharpening Contract Terms
  • Reward Productivity Growth
  • Measure Productivity Growth
  • Create Tradecraft in Services Acquisition

Mr. Lambert’s Memorandum to the Defense Industrial Base concludes with the following request for industry participation in the Efficiency Initiative—

In order to reach the broadest possible base and ensure that we are inclusive of those in our industrial base willing to assist us in this effort, we will begin the process by asking that a simple form be filled out, which will be available on our website (http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/). The form can be submitted directly to our offices via email at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it . Please note that this form is not a survey and participation by industry is undertaken as a voluntary act, without direction by the Department.

So what is one to make of the foregoing?  We have a couple of thoughts to share with you, if you will.

  1. It is clear, from this article and from others we’ve posted over the past year or two, that the defense industrial base is already moving to cut overhead and increase productivity.  We don’t see what value the Pentagon adds to the efforts that are already in process, and to those that will be undertaken in the coming months.

  1. Note the new bureaucracy announced by Mr. Lambert.  Were one to read SECDEF Gates’ original remarks at the Eisenhower Library, one might reasonably conclude that SECDEF Gates was less concerned with contractors’ overhead and efficiency, than he was with the overhead, bloated bureaucracy, and lack of efficiency within the Pentagon.  He said, “Another category ripe for scrutiny should be overhead – all the activity and bureaucracy that supports the military mission. According to an estimate by the Defense Business Board, overhead, broadly defined, makes up roughly 40 percent of the Department’s budget.”  He also said, “The private sector has flattened and streamlined the middle and upper echelons of its organization charts, yet the Defense Department continues to maintain a top-heavy hierarchy that more reflects 20th Century headquarters superstructure than 21st Century realities.” That doesn’t sound to us as if he were overly concerned about contractors’ overheads.

  1. Moreover, SECDEF Gates wanted the Pentagon to clean-up its own house.  He said—

Going forward, some questions to be considered should be:

  • How many of our headquarters and secretariats are primarily in the business of reporting to or supervising other headquarters and secretariats, as opposed to overseeing activity related to real-world needs and missions?
  • How many executive or flag-officer billets could be converted to a lower grade, with a cascading effect downward – where two-star deputies become one-star deputies, assistant secretaries become deputy assistant secretaries – to create a flatter, more effective, and less costly organization?
  • How many commands or organizations are conducting repetitive or overlapping functions – whether in logistics, intelligence, policy, or anything else – and could be combined or eliminated altogether?

In considering these questions, we have to be mindful of the iron law of bureaucracies – that the definition of essential work expands proportionally with the seniority of the person in charge and the quantity of time and staff available – with 50-page power point briefings being one result.

So, instead of focusing on cutting bureaucracy, Mr. Lambert’s Memorandum for the Defense Industrial Base announces the creation of more bureaucracy.  The action being taken is exactly the opposite of what is being sought by the SECDEF Gates, as if to prove by direct action his reference to the “iron law of bureaucracies.” 

We see quite a bit of activity throughout the defense industrial base as contractors prepare for the upcoming “turbulence” noted by General Farrell.  We see quite a bit of activity at the Pentagon, as the bureaucracy gears up to assist the contractors do what they are going to do anyway.  (In fact, General Farrell wrote, “Carter has invited the defense industry to participate in the coming decision-making and execution process. We intend to do so.”)   What we fail to see is any activity by the DOD bureaucracy and military services to address the very issues that the Secretary of Defense directed them to address.



 

DCAA Throws Another Monkey Wrench Into DOD Acquisition

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We (and others) have lamented before and yet again about the sad state of the current DOD acquisition environment.  This time around, we’ll try to avoid overly dramatic wailing and gnashing of teeth.  But permit us a level-setting sentence or two, if you will. 

Ever since DCAA came under fire from nearly every stakeholder in the defense acquisition process, it has reacted by circling the wagons, battening-down the hatches, and hunkering down while waiting for the political firestorm to pass.  Auditors must now document every audit step (including audit steps not taken) to a demanding level of detail.  And multiple layers of management review every aspect of the audit before a draft report is issued to the contractor.  If observed in an individual (as opposed to an entire agency), such a reaction might well be sufficient to obtain a clinical diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD).  (We would have said paranoia but the paranoia was probably justified, given that so many were actually out to get the agency.) 

The effect of such behavior on the acquisition process is clear:  DCAA is now issuing fewer audit reports, and those it does issue take dramatically longer to reach the customers.  (See our article, containing unedited opinions of (alleged) DCMA Contracting Officers, here.) 

Not to be outdone by DCAA’s “conservatism,” the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has instituted multiple “Boards of Review” (BoRs) that must be convened to review and approve key Contracting Officer decisions before they are implemented.  As a result, Contracting Officers are subject to a vastly increased workload (as they must document and prepare for multiple BoRs), while being simultaneously hamstrung, since they cannot issue decisions without the required approvals.  What used to take 60 or 90 days, now takes a C.O. as much as six or nine months—and that’s assuming all the required BoRs approve the proposed action.  We’ve heard of one situation where three separate BoRs (meeting over many months) approved a proposed action, but that the proposed action subsequently was disapproved at the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) level and remanded back to the C.O. for a redo.

The DOD acquisition system is breaking-down, gentle readers, and we’re watching it happen in slow motion, just like a train-wreck shown on a reality TV show.  But perhaps that’s getting a bit overly dramatic, so let’s get to the meat of this article.   Here’s the punchline:  If you thought the process was slow now, you ain’t seen nothing yet.

On June 4, 2010, DCAA issued revised audit guidance via the usual method—a Memorandum for Regional Directors (MRD).  Published to the audit agency’s website (and to the public) five weeks later, it details how the audit agency will handle the situation where a contractor uses indirect cost rates not yet audited in a cost proposal.  Here’s the MRD in full.

Let’s summarize some of the key points –

  • Where an audit of the contractor’s proposed indirect cost rates has not yet been performed (or completed) by DCAA, then “the auditor should disclaim an opinion on the proposal taken as a whole.” 
  • Auditors should take care not to opine on any forward pricing rates “that are significant to the proposal” unless a DCAA audit of the rates has been completed.  “The results of audit section (including the opinion and exhibits) will not address or contain amounts associated with those rates.”
  • Where forward pricing indirect cost rates are significant to the proposed costs, and DCAA has not yet completed its audit of the rates, then the DCAA audit report should “recommend that contract price negotiations not be concluded until the audit of the rates is completed and the results are considered by the contracting officer.”
  • When the contractor’s proposed rates are based on a Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) or Forward Pricing Recommended Rates (FPRR), but those rates have not yet been audited by DCAA, then the rates “should be audited as part of the current pricing proposal audit, if possible.”  Moreover, “An examination of forward pricing rates includes detailed testing of the contractor’s assertion (i.e., proposal and basis of estimates) and, when appropriate, analytical procedures (e.g., regression or trend analysis).”
  • “In cases where DCAA has performed an audit of forward pricing rates and DCAA’s audit was utilized by the ACO in negotiating the FPRA, the FAO may opine on these rates in the pricing proposal audit report. This is true even if there are differences attributable to the negotiation process between the rates per DCAA’s audit and the FPRA rates.”
  • But where the auditor “believes the ACO did not fully consider the DCAA audit results and there are significant differences between the DCAA recommended rates and the FPRA or FPRR,” then the auditor should elevate the disagreement pursuant to the DCAA/DCMA dispute resolution process.
  • “If the pricing proposal audit report must be issued prior to resolving this disagreement, the audit opinion should reflect the DCAA recommended rates.”

So why does this particular MRD upset us?  Well, let’s recap, shall we?  We already know that DCAA audits are taking three times as long as they ever did and that the audit reports are less useful to DCMA Contracting Officers than they’ve ever been.  (See the link in paragraph 3, above.)  Now DCAA has decided it can’t issue an audit report to DCMA on a contractor’s cost proposal, unless it has performed appropriate “detailed testing” and other “analytical procedures” on the indirect rates being utilized in the bid.  Moreover, if the DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) disagrees with DCAA’s opinion on the correct rates that the contractor should be bidding, then the auditor is to drop a dime on the ACO and “elevate” the dispute.  Moreover, DCAA will continue to utilize its “recommended rates” in its audit reports, even though the ACO (the person with the authority) may have negotiated different rates.

Wow.

The only good news—if there is any—is the little ray of hope provided at the end of the MRD.  It says—

If requested, FAOs may provide available unaudited rate data to contracting officers to assist them in their negotiations generally following the procedures in CAM 9-107. This information should be furnished in a separate memorandum and it should clearly state that the rate data provided has not been audited.

So the burden is now on the DCMA Contracting Officer to request “unaudited rate data” – which we suspect the contractor has already provided as part of its submitted “cost or pricing data” – so that negotiations can commence.  Meanwhile, the DCAA auditor will be on the phone, whining to Fort Belvoir and perhaps to the Pentagon about being ignored.

We predict this MRD will paralyze the DOD acquisition process even more.  The average DCMA Contracting Officer will be caught between meeting the needs of its buying commands (and the warfighters) by negotiating contracts timely, and waiting for DCAA to finish its audit of the contractor’s indirect cost rates—which could take months.

The train wreck continues.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.