Organizational Conflicts of Interest – A Success Story!
The Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) define an organizational conflict of
interest as a conflict that may occur when “because of other activities
or relationships with other persons, a person is unable or potentially
unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the Government, or
the person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or might be
otherwise impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage.”
Accountants don’t care very much about organizational
conflicts of interest (OCIs). OCIs have nothing to do with debits or
credits or dollar signs. But companies who want to successfully capture
government work need to care about OCIs—quite a bit, actually. We’ve
previously discussed OCIs here and also
here, and also over here, noting that—
Savvy readers will understand
that the regulations are just words, and that the words are given
meaning and come alive via interpretations provided by the Courts. So it is, with respect to OCIs, that
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims (CoFC) have interpreted various aspects of OCI rules in their
bid protest decisions.
OCIs are intractable little problems, both vague and complex
by their very nature. Normally, one hears about OCIs when somebody protests
an award. Sometimes OCIs arise in the
context of testing products for acceptance
and/or suitability. Here’s a story about an OCI in the context of a bid
protest. What makes this story different is that the Court found the
elimination of a bidder, based solely on an alleged OCI, to be
unreasonable. We think it’s worth exploring a little.
On July 16, 2010, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims issued a decision in the matter of Turner Construction Co., Inc. v. United
States, with McCarthy/Hunt, J.V. and B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, as
intervenors. At stake was the contract to replace the Army Community
Hospital at Fort Benning, Georgia. The contract was originally awarded
to Turner in September, 2009, after 15 months of conducting the
procurement and evaluating offerors. Two competitors (the “intervenors”
in the current action) protested the award to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). In February, 2010, GAO recommended that
the Army should “strip Turner of the contract” because of Turner’s
alleged OCIs, and “reprocure the contract.” In March, 2010, the Army
announced that it would “not waive” Turner’s OCIs, and follow the GAO
recommendation. Turner protested that
decision before the Court of Federal Claims.
Turner
argued that the GAO bid protest decision and subsequent recommendation
to the Army “lacked a rational basis.” In addition, Turner argued that
the Army accepted GAO’s recommendation without evaluating it, and did
not “reasonably evaluate” Turner’s request to waive its OCIs. Turner’s
alleged OCIs are rather complex so we’ll devote some space to discussing
them.
To develop its hospital design, the
Army obtained technical design assistance from a Joint Venture
consisting of Hayes, Seay, Mattern, & Mattern (HSMM) and Hellmuth,
Obata & Kassbaum, Inc. (HOK). HSMM was a wholly owned subsidiary of
AECOM. As part of its duties, HSMM assisted the Army’s Technical
Review Board in evaluating proposals received from bidders on the
hospital replacement project. Turner was not only the lowest price
offer, but the company also scored well in the technical evaluations.
Turner’s proposal anticipated awarding a subcontract to a
Joint Venture consisting of Ellerbe Becket (EB) and another firm. In
October, 2009, after a long courtship, EB was acquired by AECOM. In
July 2009 (during the courtship), it came to the attention of one the
HSMM participants that an OCI might exist, as AECOM was then in
negotiations to acquire EB. (Note that the OCI might be created because
AECOM would own a participant in the proposed project (EB) and a
participant in the project design (as well as a participant in the
technical evaluation) (HSMM). This “alignment of interests” might be
sufficient to create an OCI.) The HSMM employee immediately brought the
matter to the attention of the Contracting Officer and the Army’s legal
counsel. They decided that the one HSMM participant who knew of the
potential merger would recuse himself from further participation in the
proposal evaluations, but that the other HSMM participants, who were not
aware of the ongoing discussions between EB and AECOM, would be allowed
to continue their participation.
We have
discussed before the three “different flavors” of OCI. With respect to
the award of the hospital replacement contract to Turner, “both
protesters alleged the existence of ‘biased ground rules’ and ‘impaired
objectivity’ OCIs, and McCarthy/Hunt additionally alleged an ‘unequal
access to information’ OCI,” according to the Court.
During the protest proceedings before the GAO, the Contracting
Officer “addressed each possible type of OCI and found that no OCIs
existed prior to award of the contract.” However, GAO “disagreed” with
those conclusions, and “sustained the ‘unequal access to information’
and ‘biased ground rules’ protests.”
While the
protest was pending before the GAO, much discussion and debate ensued
regarding whether the Army would waive any OCIs. As the Judge Futey
(writing for the Court) reports, ultimately the Army decided not to
grant Turner a waiver.
After receiving the GAO’s
recommendation, the Army terminated Turner’s contract and Turner filed a
protest with the CoFC. Based on the protest grounds, the Court needed
to review the GAO’s decision, even though normally such decisions are
granted “a high degree of deference.” But the deference shown to GAO’s
decisions is not absolute, and executive agencies cannot simply rely on a
GAO decision to implement an unreasonable course of action. As the
Judge Futey wrote, “an Agency’s decision to follow the recommendation of
the GAO in a bid protest decision is arbitrary and capricious if the
GAO decision was irrational.” Judge Futey found—
According to Turner, the GAO conducted a de
novo review of the record that supplanted the
CO’s decision, which was based on ‘hard facts,’ with a decision based on
‘mere inference and suspicion.’ … plaintiff [Turner] argues that ‘the
assessment of OCIs is a fact-specific inquiry the CO must undertake, and
under the facts here, the CO reasonably concluded there was no OCI, and
GAO erred in substituting its judgment for that of the CO.’
Judge Futey concluded that, “it was irrational in this case to
depart from precedent and not consider the factually-based arguments of
Turner and the Army, especially when the GAO was tasked with looking
for ‘hard facts’ of an OCI.” Moreover, Judge Futey wrote that—
This Court thus finds that the GAO lacked a
rational basis because it overturned the CO’s determination without
highlighting any hard facts that indicate a sufficient alignment of
interests. Because the GAO lacked a rational basis, the Army was not
justified in following its recommendation. …
… the GAO failed to adhere to the proper standard of review.
The GAO’s task was to review the agency’s decision for reasonableness.
That agency decision, as described above, tracked the precise state of
negotiations between AECOM and EB, the exact dates upon which critical
changes to the RFP occurred, the exact employees that could have known
of the merger, and numerous other facts. Using this data, the CO
concluded that no OCI existed. The GAO failed to address this OCI
decision; in fact, the GAO decision on a biased ground rules OCI does
not even cite the agency decision that it was
tasked with reviewing. Instead, the GAO cites exactly one piece of
information—the text of AECOM’s contract with the agency—to support its
finding that the record ‘suggests’ that AECOM had ‘special knowledge’
that would have given Turner an unfair advantage.
(Emphasis in original.)
Turner was granted the permanent injunction it sought. The
Army was ordered by the Court to “restore” the original hospital
replacement contract to Turner and “not reprocure the contract to
another firm.”
Are there any lessons to be learned
here? We think so. When two Government contractors are considering a
merger/acquisition, it is important to review existing contractual
relationships to see if any actual, or potential, OCIs might exist. And
it is not only existing contracts that need to be reviewed, but also
future contracts and pending proposal submissions. Pipelines of
potential contract activity need to be reviewed with a discerning eye,
to see if a situation like that experienced by Turner might exist.
And please note that Turner itself did not have the alleged
OCI. It was Turner’s subcontractor, EB (who was actually one member of a
Joint Venture), that had the alleged OCI. This fact suggests that the
level of due diligence inquiry needs to be quite a bit more granular
than simply looking at the two prime contractors to see if a potential
OCI might exist. This is a demanding task, and one that time and
budgetary constraints might not always permit. But as this article
demonstrates, one ignores that level of inquiry at one’s own peril.
ASBCA Discusses Prompt Payment Act
We have noted before that the DOD
has attempted to wiggle out of complying with the requirements of the
Prompt Payment Act (Public Law 97-177, or PPA) when involved in military
contingency operations. In August 2009, DOD issued a “class deviation”
to evade requirements of FAR 32.9 with respect to such operations. On
July 13, 2010, DFARS 232.908 was revised and a
related contract clause was implemented (252.232-7011 “Payments in
Support of Emergencies and Contingency Operations”) to permanently
exempt such operations from the requirements of the Prompt Payment Act.
These actions concerned us. As we said in our previous
article on the topic—
The purpose of the Act, and
its implementing regulations in the FAR, was to protect contractors from
a government bureaucracy that was notoriously slow to pay, and from the
cash flow hardships caused by such slow payments. These contractors, who generally must follow all direction
given to them by authorized government representatives, and who
generally must continue to perform their government contracts regardless
of any losses they may be incurring, had little if any recourse
available to them for such contract breaches, short of litigation. But under the Prompt Payment Act,
contractors could typically expect to receive payment for properly
prepared invoices within 30 days (often sooner), or else receive an
additional interest payment automatically--i.e., without making another
request.
But this article isn’t really about
the DOD evading its statutory obligations to pay its contractors
timely. It’s more about a recent decision
by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), who were asked
to decide a contractor’s claim for interest due it pursuant to the
requirements of the Act. Before the Court was a request for summary
judgment, with the Government moving for a
dismissal – i.e., the Government asserted that it was entitled to a
decision without a trial because it was clearly going to prevail as a
matter of law. Judge Peacock wasn’t so sure.
Calvary Security Group (CSG) supplied equipment and supplies
to the Iraqi police forces under an ID/IQ contract, originally with the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The contract provided that—
Inspection and acceptance was to be ‘conducted by
DCMA QAR’ at a third Baghdad warehouse and … ‘Invoices are submitted to
the contracting officer, end user for approval certification and
submission to the USACE Finance Center [in Tennessee] in conjunction
with the receiving report (DD250).’
CSG
submitted a certified claim to the contracting officer in the amount of
$196,640 alleging that the government owed it PPA interest penalty for
late payments for deliveries made under the contract. CSG was asking
only for the interest that was payable ‘automatically’ under the
regulatory provisions implementing the PPA (which were recited at length
by the Judge in the decision).
The
Government contended that “payments were timely issued within 30 days of
actual acceptance of the supplies” and, therefore, CSG was not entitled
to any interest under the PPA. The Government asserted that the
contract required inspection by the DCMA QAR and that Government
acceptance took place only upon the QAR’s execution of the Form DD250.
According to the government, the 30 day PPA payment period did not
commence until the date of the QAR’s completion of the form for each of
the deliveries in dispute. The government asserted
that payments generally were made within 30 days of the actual
acceptance/signature dates indicated in the DD250 forms and, therefore,
the payments were not subject to PPA interest.
Judge Peacock, writing for the Court, disagreed with the
Government’s position, stating—
OMB
regulations establish as a general rule that PPA interest penalty begins
to accrue 30 days following the later of the date of actual receipt of
the invoice if annotated or seven days after delivery of the supplies
ordered, or the invoice date if not annotated, absent circumstances and
exceptions not germane to disposition of the present motion. The actual
acceptance date is relevant to the extent that it occurs prior to the
end of the “constructive acceptance” period of seven days for this
contract. … The government’s interpretation of the Prompt Payment
clause ignores ¶ (a)(5)(i) of that clause which states that ‘acceptance
is deemed to occur constructively on the 7th day (unless otherwise stated in this contract) after the
Contractor delivers the supplies….’ Although FAR 32.908(c)(1) and FAR
32.904(b)(4) authorize extension of the seven day ‘constructive
acceptance’ period if justified, no such modification of the date was
specified here or permitted for this … contract. The ‘constructive
acceptance’ provision in the clause is reiterated in FAR 32.904. See
also DFARS 232.905(1). Of course, the
government is entitled to take reasonable and appropriate actions to
ensure conformance of the delivered supplies with contractual
requirements. However, inspection delays extending beyond the prescribed
seven days do not postpone accrual of interest penalty where there are
no disagreements regarding quantity, quality or contractor compliance
with contractual requirements.
The
Government’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
We think this case is illustrative of some of the mechanics of
the Prompt Payment Act. In our experience, contractors are often
reluctant to assert their right to interest on late payments. This case
shows that contractors may have a good chance of prevailing in
litigation when they assert their rights under the Act.
|
DOD Contractors Look to Get “Affordable” While Pentagon Adds Bureaucracy

We’ve
previously discussed the latest fad amongst Pentagon leadership: the
notion that the DOD needs to focus on weapon system “affordability”—and
that the primary means for doing so is to focus on cutting contractor
overhead. In this article, we reported
that DOD intends to “identify and eliminate non-value-added overhead and
G&A charged to contracts” (among other actions), so that
affordability will be “restored” to defense goods and services. It’s as
if the entire national security leadership woke up one morning and
suddenly realized they all were overdrawn at the bank.
“Gosh! How could this have happened to such outstanding
managers?” they would have cried. “Our defense goods and services are
no longer affordable! Since it can’t be our fault, then obviously it must be the fault of all those greedy contractors!”
We reply to that hypothetical (yet all too real) assertion
using the immortal words of Cher Horowitz (played by Alicia Silverstone)
in the 1995 movie, “Clueless”—
“As
If!”
Lt. Gen. Larry
Farrell (USAF, Retired), recently used the
cliché “perfect storm” to describe the
situation facing the military services and their contractors. General
Farrell, who currently serves as President of the National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), wrote—
The
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are now consuming in the neighborhood of
$200 billion a year, which despite a defense budget just north of $700
billion, have dragged funds away from needed modernization. Recall that
Congressional Budget Office projections from 2005 even then indicated
that Defense Department funding was running $100 billion a year short of
what it needed to fund the modernization programs planned at that time.
Then came the 2007 recession, now extending past
31 months, which is the most protracted since World War II. Along with
the downturn are unsustainable federal budgets and projections of more
than $1 trillion in annual deficits out through 2020. The national debt
is approaching $20 trillion and interest on the debt will be around $900
billion per year in 2020 — larger than the ‘projected’ defense budget
that year. The unsustainable nature of this budget projection has now
been recognized as a national problem that can no longer be ignored.
In response, President Obama this year appointed a
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. The so-called
Deficit Commission is due to report in December. In anticipation,
Congress has deferred action on the 2011 budget, which is normally
scheduled to become law Oct. 1. …
Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont., said he sees three
areas of focus: ‘the tax gap, the spending gap and the productivity
gap.’ Since it’s fairly certain that government doesn’t directly
legislate productivity, it is a safe bet that specific tax and spending
recommendations will come from the Deficit Commission in December. …
All of these developments could begin to cause
turbulence around December.
The major unstoppable weather vector is the dire financial condition of
the United States. The other converging elements —
tax and spending reform and defense spending and reorganization — are
minor by comparison.
Recognizing the “turbulence” coming
their way, we’ve noted that defense
contractors have been moving and restructuring, and re-org’ing and
trimming, while nervously eyeing the Pentagon as if it was their
sugar-daddy who had recently found a brand-new—younger—mistress to
support. That trend continues unabated.
The
mega-sized provider of professional services, Accenture, recently reported that, “Pressures to reduce costs will be
the primary drivers of decisions by aerospace and defense (A&D)
companies to use external engineering services during the next
two-to-three years.” The firm issued a report entitled “Engineering
Services in Aerospace and Defense: Meeting the Sourcing Challenge,”
available here. The Accenture report
stated—
Ninety percent of the
executives interviewed cited cost reduction pressures as their top
challenge, followed by supplier consolidation (52 percent) and increased
competition from new players (36 percent). Consistent with these findings, the research revealed that 61
percent of these executives are buying engineering services to better
manage production costs; 65 percent of them cited the need for improved
efficiency and productivity.
Accenture’s
bottom-line conclusion was that A&D companies will move to source
engineering expertise and services from low-cost global providers—though
the report acknowledged that the strategy contained challenges that
would need to be overcome. The benefits include lowering costs,
shoring-up scarce skill sets, and more easily fulfilling offset
obligations, while challenges include concerns about potential
compromises of confidentiality and quality. To those concerns we would
add the worry about compliance with export controls. Nonetheless,
Accenture seems confident that A&D companies will embrace those
challenges in order to lower their program costs.
Meanwhile, Navistar, the hugely successful (formerly)
commercial manufacturer of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
vehicles, has announced “another round” of
layoffs at its Mississippi production facility. The linked-to article
reports that—
John Munro, plant manager
for Navistar in West Point, said the plant has some contracts which will
last until 2013, but the high-volume MRAP production will end in 2011,
leading to an unknown number of layoffs. The plant currently employs 505
workers.
Not to be outdone, Northrop Grumman
issued a press release that announced
“consolidation” of its Louisiana and Mississippi shipyards, a “winddown”
of production at its Avondale, Louisiana shipyard, and closure of two more Louisiana yards. Any remaining work (i.e., that
related to the LPD-17 ships) will be performed at NGC’s Pascagoula,
Miss. shipyard, according to the linked-to article. The article reports
that—
Northrop Grumman is
considering a possible spinoff of its shipbuilding business, including a
yard at Newport News, Va., into a separate company. Credit Susse has
been hired as lead financial adviser on alternatives for the
shipbuilding unit.
What’s driving Northrop Grumman’s
decision-making? According to the NGC press release (link above)—
‘Our decision to consolidate the Gulf Coast
facilities is driven by the need for rationalization of the shipbuilding
industrial base to better align with the projected needs of our
customers. The consolidation will reduce future costs, increase
efficiency, and address shipbuilding overcapacity. This difficult, but necessary decision will ensure long-term
improvement in Gulf Coast program performance, cost competitiveness and
quality,’ said Wes Bush, chief executive officer and president.
The consolidation of Gulf Coast ship
construction is the next step in the company's efforts to improve
performance and efficiency at its Gulf Coast shipyards, which began with
the integration of its shipbuilding operations in early 2008.
As a result of the consolidation, the company
expects higher costs to complete ships currently under construction in
Avondale due to anticipated reductions in productivity and, as a result,
is increasing the estimates to complete LPDs 23 and 25 by approximately
$210 million. Of this
amount $113 million will be recognized as a one-time, pre-tax cumulative
charge to Shipbuilding's second quarter 2010 operating income. The balance will be recognized as lower
margin in future periods, principally on the LPD 25. The company also anticipates that it
will incur substantial restructuring and facilities shutdown-related
costs including, but not limited to, severance, relocation expense, and
asset write-downs. These
costs are expected to be allowable expenses under government accounting
standards and recoverable in future years under the company's contracts. The company estimates that these
restructuring costs will be more than offset by future savings expected
to be generated by the consolidation.
Obviously,
Northrop Grumman is willing to invest a significant fraction of a
billion dollars in order to trim future operating costs. As it notes in
its press release, it expects to recover much of its “investment”
against its current and future government contracts as “allowable
expenses.” We wonder what the Pentagon leadership thinks of that plan?
While industry is undertaking these significant cost-cutting
actions, the Pentagon is taking some of its own actions. On July 13,
2010, Brett Lambert (Director, Industrial Policy) issued a Memorandum to
the Defense Industrial Base. When last we discussed Mr. Lambert’s Directorate, he stated his focus was on early
identification of “points of failure” in the defense industrial base, so
that the Pentagon might avoid “costly rescues of failing companies.”
In addition, his Directorate was focused on
“the financial health of critical suppliers,” as well as the need to
preserve “skills necessary to support our war fighters in the near term
and long term.” How’s that going, Mr. Lambert?
Mr. Lambert’s Memorandum to the Defense Industrial Base of July 13 did not address any of those prior focus areas.
Instead his new focus is on learning “to do more without more”—i.e.,
implementing the DOD’s new “Efficiency Initiative.” Toward that end,
Mr. Lambert announced a strategy involving “interacting parallel tracks,
with close coordination.” The effort will “drive fact-based
recommendations” to Dr. Carter (USD,
AT&L) for consideration and action. Mr. Lambert’s plan involves
five “issue focus groups,” an Industry Working Group (IWG), various
Military Department Groups (MDGs), two Executive Directors, and a Senior
Integration Group (SIG), which will be chaired by Dr. Carter. In the
words of Mr. Lambert’s Memorandum to the Defense Industrial Base—
There will be five government focus groups
reporting to the Senior Integration Group (SIG) through two Executive
Directors; Military Department Groups for each
service will solicit ideas for the five Focus Groups to analyze; and I
will lead an Industry Working Group that will collect ideas from
industry and provide a feedback mechanism for industry to comment on the
ideas we are considering. The groups will be comprised of government
employees, although the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) will assist in administrative functions.
The five Focus Groups will address the following areas:
- Affordability
- Sharpening Contract Terms
- Reward Productivity
Growth
- Measure Productivity Growth
- Create Tradecraft in Services Acquisition
Mr. Lambert’s Memorandum to the Defense Industrial Base
concludes with the following request for industry participation in the
Efficiency Initiative—
In order to reach the broadest
possible base and ensure that we are inclusive of those in our
industrial base willing to assist us in this effort, we will begin the
process by asking that a simple form be filled out, which will be
available on our website (http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/). The form can be
submitted directly to our offices via email at
This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
.
Please note that this form is not a survey and participation by industry
is undertaken as a voluntary act, without direction by the Department.
So what is one to make of the foregoing? We have a couple of
thoughts to share with you, if you will.
- It is
clear, from this article and from others we’ve posted over the past year
or two, that the defense industrial base is already moving to cut
overhead and increase productivity. We don’t see what value the
Pentagon adds to the efforts that are already in process, and to those
that will be undertaken in the coming months.
- Note the new bureaucracy announced by Mr. Lambert. Were one
to read SECDEF Gates’ original remarks at
the Eisenhower Library, one might reasonably conclude that SECDEF Gates
was less concerned with contractors’ overhead and efficiency, than he
was with the overhead, bloated bureaucracy, and lack of efficiency within
the Pentagon. He said, “Another category
ripe for scrutiny should be overhead – all the activity and bureaucracy
that supports the military mission. According to an estimate by the Defense Business Board,
overhead, broadly defined, makes up roughly 40 percent of the
Department’s budget.” He also said, “The private sector has flattened
and streamlined the middle and upper echelons of its organization
charts, yet the Defense Department continues to maintain a top-heavy
hierarchy that more reflects 20th
Century headquarters superstructure than 21st Century realities.” That doesn’t sound to us as if he were overly concerned about
contractors’ overheads.
- Moreover,
SECDEF Gates wanted the Pentagon to clean-up its own house. He said—
Going forward, some questions to be considered
should be:
- How many of our headquarters and secretariats are primarily in
the business of reporting to or supervising other headquarters and
secretariats, as opposed to overseeing activity related to real-world
needs and missions?
- How many executive or
flag-officer billets could be converted to a lower grade, with a
cascading effect downward – where two-star deputies become one-star
deputies, assistant secretaries become deputy assistant secretaries – to
create a flatter, more effective, and less costly organization?
- How many commands or organizations are conducting repetitive or
overlapping functions – whether in logistics, intelligence, policy, or
anything else – and could be combined or eliminated altogether?
In considering these questions, we have to be
mindful of the iron law of bureaucracies – that the definition of
essential work expands proportionally with the seniority of the person
in charge and the quantity of time and staff available – with 50-page
power point briefings being one result.
So, instead of focusing on cutting bureaucracy, Mr. Lambert’s
Memorandum for the Defense Industrial Base announces the creation of
more bureaucracy. The action being taken is exactly
the opposite of what is being sought by the
SECDEF Gates, as if to prove by direct action his reference to the “iron
law of bureaucracies.”
We see quite
a bit of activity throughout the defense industrial base as contractors
prepare for the upcoming “turbulence” noted by General Farrell. We see
quite a bit of activity at the Pentagon, as the bureaucracy gears up to
assist the contractors do what they are going to do anyway. (In fact,
General Farrell wrote, “Carter has invited the defense industry to
participate in the coming decision-making and execution process. We
intend to do so.”) What we fail to see is any activity by the DOD
bureaucracy and military services to address the very issues that the
Secretary of Defense directed them to address.
DCAA Throws Another Monkey Wrench Into DOD Acquisition

We
(and others) have lamented before and yet again about
the sad state of the current DOD acquisition environment. This time
around, we’ll try to avoid overly dramatic wailing and gnashing of
teeth. But permit us a level-setting sentence or two, if you will.
Ever
since DCAA came under fire from nearly every stakeholder in the
defense acquisition process, it has reacted by circling the wagons,
battening-down the hatches, and hunkering down while waiting for the
political firestorm to pass. Auditors must now document every audit
step (including audit steps not taken) to a demanding level of detail.
And multiple layers of management review every aspect of the audit
before a draft report is issued to the contractor. If observed in an
individual (as opposed to an entire agency), such a reaction might well
be sufficient to obtain a clinical diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). (We would have said paranoia but
the paranoia was probably justified, given that so many were actually
out to get the agency.)
The
effect of such behavior on the acquisition process is clear: DCAA is
now issuing fewer audit reports, and those it does issue take
dramatically longer to reach the customers. (See our article,
containing unedited opinions of (alleged) DCMA Contracting Officers, here.)
Not
to be outdone by DCAA’s “conservatism,” the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) has instituted multiple “Boards of Review” (BoRs) that
must be convened to review and approve key Contracting Officer decisions
before they are implemented. As a result, Contracting Officers are
subject to a vastly increased workload (as they must document and
prepare for multiple BoRs), while being simultaneously hamstrung, since
they cannot issue decisions without the required approvals. What used
to take 60 or 90 days, now takes a C.O. as much as six or nine
months—and that’s assuming all the required BoRs approve the proposed
action. We’ve heard of one situation where three separate BoRs (meeting
over many months) approved a proposed action, but that the proposed
action subsequently was disapproved at the Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy (DPAP) level and remanded back to the C.O. for a
redo.
The DOD acquisition system
is breaking-down, gentle readers, and we’re watching it happen in slow
motion, just like a train-wreck shown on a reality TV show. But perhaps
that’s getting a bit overly dramatic, so let’s get to the meat of this
article. Here’s the punchline: If you thought the process was slow
now, you ain’t seen nothing yet.
On
June 4, 2010, DCAA issued revised audit guidance via the usual method—a
Memorandum for Regional Directors (MRD). Published to the audit
agency’s website (and to the public) five weeks later, it details how
the audit agency will handle the situation where a contractor uses
indirect cost rates not yet audited in a cost proposal. Here’s the MRD in full.
Let’s
summarize some of the key points –
- Where an audit of the contractor’s
proposed indirect cost rates has not yet been performed (or completed)
by DCAA, then “the auditor should disclaim an opinion on the proposal
taken as a whole.”
- Auditors should take care not to opine on
any forward pricing rates “that are significant to the proposal” unless a
DCAA audit of the rates has been completed. “The results of audit
section (including the opinion and exhibits) will not address or contain
amounts associated with those rates.”
- Where forward pricing indirect cost
rates are significant to the proposed costs, and DCAA has not yet
completed its audit of the rates, then the DCAA audit report should
“recommend that contract price negotiations not be concluded until the
audit of the rates is completed and the results are considered by the
contracting officer.”
- When the contractor’s proposed rates are
based on a Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) or Forward Pricing
Recommended Rates (FPRR), but those rates have not yet been audited by
DCAA, then the rates “should be audited as part of the current pricing
proposal audit, if possible.” Moreover, “An examination of forward
pricing rates includes detailed testing of the contractor’s assertion
(i.e., proposal and basis of estimates) and, when appropriate,
analytical procedures (e.g., regression or trend analysis).”
- “In cases where DCAA has performed
an audit of forward pricing rates and DCAA’s audit was utilized by the
ACO in negotiating the FPRA, the FAO may opine on these rates in the
pricing proposal audit report. This is true even if there are
differences attributable to the negotiation process between the rates
per DCAA’s audit and the FPRA rates.”
- But where the auditor “believes the
ACO did not fully consider the DCAA audit results and there are
significant differences between the DCAA recommended rates and the FPRA
or FPRR,” then the auditor should elevate the disagreement pursuant to
the DCAA/DCMA dispute
resolution process.
- “If the
pricing proposal audit report must be issued prior to resolving this
disagreement, the audit opinion should reflect the DCAA recommended
rates.”
So
why does this particular MRD upset us? Well, let’s recap, shall we?
We already know that DCAA audits are taking three times as long as they
ever did and that the audit reports are less useful to DCMA Contracting
Officers than they’ve ever been. (See the link in paragraph 3, above.)
Now DCAA has decided it can’t issue an audit report to DCMA on a
contractor’s cost proposal, unless it has performed appropriate
“detailed testing” and other “analytical procedures” on the indirect
rates being utilized in the bid. Moreover, if the DCMA Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO) disagrees with DCAA’s opinion on the correct
rates that the contractor should be bidding, then the auditor is to drop
a dime on the ACO and “elevate” the dispute. Moreover, DCAA will
continue to utilize its “recommended rates” in its audit reports, even
though the ACO (the person with the authority) may have negotiated
different rates.
Wow.
The
only good news—if there is any—is the little ray of hope provided at
the end of the MRD. It says—
If requested, FAOs may provide available unaudited rate data to
contracting officers to assist them in their negotiations generally
following the procedures in CAM 9-107. This information should be
furnished in a separate memorandum and it should clearly state that the
rate data provided has not been audited.
So
the burden is now on the DCMA Contracting Officer to request “unaudited
rate data” – which we suspect the contractor has already provided as
part of its submitted “cost or pricing data” – so that negotiations can
commence. Meanwhile, the DCAA auditor will be on the phone, whining to
Fort Belvoir and perhaps to the Pentagon about being ignored.
We
predict this MRD will paralyze the DOD acquisition process even more.
The average DCMA Contracting Officer will be caught between meeting the
needs of its buying commands (and the warfighters) by negotiating
contracts timely, and waiting for DCAA to finish its audit of the
contractor’s indirect cost rates—which could take months.
The
train wreck continues.
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